Foreign Aid to the Balkans 1990-2005:Who Gave Aid, to Whom, and Why? Disaggregation of Foreign Assistance Flows to the Region of the Balkans in the Period of Transition by Karajkov, Risto
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna 
 
 
 
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA 
 
 Cooperazione internazionale e politiche per lo 
sviluppo sostenibile  
 
Ciclo  XX 
 
Settore/i scientifico disciplinari di afferenza: storico politico sociale 
 
 
TITOLO TESI 
 
 Foreign Aid to the Balkans 1990-2005: Who Gave Aid, to 
Whom, and Why: Disaggregation of Foreign Assistance 
Flows to the Region of the Balkans in the Period of 
Transition  
 
SPS/04 SCIENZA POLITICA 
 
Presentata da: RISTO KARAJKOV 
 
 
 
 
Coordinatore Dottorato     Relatore 
 
Prof. Andrea Segrè                               Prof.r  Stefano Bianchini 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Esame finale anno 2009   
 
 
 
 2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Paola Ferrario, a colleague and a friend. You will be missed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
 
 
 
Table of Contents  
 
 
 
Table of contents        3 
List of Acronyms        5 
 
 
Introduction         6 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 Foreign Aid, Motives and Factors:  
Review of Major Theoretical Views    11 
 
 
Chapter 2 Foreign Aid in the 90s: Changes in the Foreign Aid 
  Regime After the   Cold War     42 
 
 
Chapter 3 Motives and Factors of Foreign Aid to the Balkans: 
  Review of Donor Policies     85 
 
 
Chapter 4 Motives and Factors for Aid to the Balkans: 
  Review of International Media    110 
 
 
Chapter 5 Who Gave Aid to Whom? 
  Disaggregation of Foreign Assistance Flows 
  to the Balkans 1990-2005     141 
 
 
Chapter 6 Sectoral Disaggregation  
  of Foreign Assistance to the Balkans    198 
 
 
Chapter 7 Who Gave Aid for What – Exactly? 
  Review of CRS Microdata  
  on Foreign Assistance Flows to the Balkans   264 
 
 
 
Conclusion         301 
 
References         308 
 
 
 4
 
Additional Bibliography       328 
 
 
Annexes  
 
 
Annex to Chapter 5 
Annex to Chapter 6 
Annex to Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
 
List of Acronyms  
 
 
BOS    Business and other services 
BFS    Banking and financial services 
CARDS                        Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development, and Stabilization 
CEE Central and Eastern Europe 
CRS    Creditor Reporting System 
DAC    Development Assistance Committee 
EI    Economic infrastructure 
ECHO    European Commission Office for Humanitarian Aid 
ESAF    Enhanced structural adjustment facility 
GCS    Government and civil society 
GDP    Gross Domestic Product 
GNP    Gross National Product 
IBRD    International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
IDA    International Development Association 
IDPs    Internally displaced persons 
IFIs     International Financial Institutions 
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
LDCs     Least Developed Countries 
NGO    Non-governmental organization 
NIS     New independent states 
OA    Official Aid 
ODA    Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
PHARE Poland and Hungary Aid for Reconstructuring of the 
Economy 
SAA     Sector allocable aid 
SAF    Structural adjustment facility  
SEE    South Eastern Europe 
SEED    Support for Eastern European Democracy 
SIS    Social infrastructure and services 
WB      Western Balkans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The beginning of the transition in the Balkans turned the region into a strong 
recipient of foreign assistance. The dramatic dissolution of Yugoslavia caused 
intensive international involvement in this part of the world and made the Balkans a 
visible issue on the international agenda. The Yugoslav wars of secession produced 
dramatic humanitarian emergencies and called up on the world to step in and relieve 
pain and suffering. The wars’ ends raised the question of post-war reconstruction and 
the need of bringing life back to normal.   
 
Simultaneously, the Balkans was part of another more global process, that of 
transition from socialism towards democracy and market economy. This transition 
was made even more complex in former Yugoslavia with the fact that it was 
combined with complicated processes of state disintegration and conflict. The 
transition to democracy in the countries of former Yugoslavia was by no means 
smooth or straightforward and it was an important item on the agenda of   
international efforts in the region.  
 
Foreign assistance has been a consistently strong aspect of the international 
involvement in the Balkans ever since the beginning of transition. In the past 18 years 
the region has received massive amounts of foreign aid, and it has become one of the 
most assisted parts of the world. In addition, this process   coincided with the fall of 
the Iron Curtain and the end of the bipolar world, which in its own right  produced   
the most fundamental  changes in the foreign aid regime ever since its institution after 
the end of WW II.  
 
Close to two decades after the start of this process, a retrospect of the phenomenon of 
foreign aid to the Balkans seems a well-timed effort. Over this period of time foreign 
aid has become an important aspect of international presence in the region, and of the 
political, economic, and social reality of the countries in the Balkans. Logically, this 
gives rise to many questions, such as: what have been the characteristics, principles, 
or drives of this process? Or what were the major outcomes, or results of foreign aid 
to the Balkans?   
 
However the questions concerning aid impact and effectiveness are preceded by 
another set of more basic questions. They include: how much aid has the region 
received over the past period? How was this aid distributed across the Balkans? Who 
were the major donors and major recipients of this foreign assistance? In addition to 
this, why was this aid given, and given in the way it was, and   what were the final 
goals of such assistance?  
 
The summary of these important questions produced the title of this essay: who gave 
aid, to whom, and why? The title itself is a homage. It is a replica of the title of the 
influential Alesina and Dollar (1998) article Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and 
Why.1 The other remaining aspect, excluded from the title for reasons of brevity is 
                                                 
1 The first version of the title was a homage of a much older article with a similar title: 
Foreign aid. For What and for Whom by Samuel Huntington (1970).  
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“for what”, or, in other words what was foreign assistance to the Balkans exactly 
spent on.  
 
These questions produce the central points of inquiry of this text: who gave foreign 
assistance to the Balkans, who received it, what motivated it, and what was it 
allocated for exactly. In this sense, the questions the text will look into are quite 
similar to those form Alesina and Dollar (1998), with the fact that the sample is 
limited to one region – Alesina and Dollar look into global flows – and the 
methodology is completely different. Whereas Alesina and Dollar use the quantitative 
economic methods, this text relies on the methods of qualitative research.  
 
A note is due at the very outset concerning the motivation for this text. This text is 
intentionally broad in its research scope, and that represented a serious challenge. It 
made the text rather lengthy and it made the research of the numbers extensive. The 
author recognizes that a more narrowly based research topic from within the overall 
realm of foreign aid to the Balkans would have produced a more tightly structured and 
concisely discussed argument. Such as for example, comparison of just European 
Union vs. United States foreign aid flows to the region, or even to one country; or a 
discussion of just one type of aid, for example, democracy assistance to just one or a 
few countries in the region, for example Serbia and Croatia; or for example, only 
post-conflict reconstruction aid through a Bosnia vs. Kosovo perspective. Instead of 
this, a deliberate choice was made to pursue an inquiry into all aid to all the countries 
in the Balkans. There is a reason for this. Namely, the early stage of research of the 
literature for this endeavor came to an interesting conclusion: very few titles could be 
identified which have addressed this issue. It turned out that despite the fact that 
foreign aid to the Balkans has been a strongly relevant process in the region over the 
past 18 years, relatively little scholarly attention has been dedicated to the issue. First, 
there was little material on the Balkans in the scholarly writing on foreign aid proper, 
and second, there was little on foreign aid in the tremendous amount of literature 
produced on the Balkans in recent times.2 
 
 This point should be clarified further. There is writing, even though perhaps not 
much, on specific aspects of foreign assistance to the region, such as for example, 
microcredit in Bosnia,   gender projects in Kosovo, assistance to media in the region, 
or US democracy assistance to Serbia, etc., but the more specific they are, naturally 
the less relevant they become for the overall perspective of foreign assistance to the 
                                                 
2 One of few the titles concerning foreign aid to Eastern Europe, but which is only of more 
distant relevance to the Balkans (it focused mostly on the countries in Central Europe, and 
particularly on Poland) is Janine Wedel’s  Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of 
Western Aid to Eastern Europe (2001).  A few shorter essays that have been identified 
through the review of the literature include for example, Kekic Laza, Aid to the Balkans: 
Addicts and Pushers, in Veremis Thanos and Daianu Daniel (eds.) Balkan Reconstruction 
(2001); Bartlet William, European Economic Assistance to the Post-Socialist Balkan States, 
in Bianchini Stefano and Uvalic Milica (eds.), The Balkans and the Challenge of Economic 
Integration. Regional and European Perspectives(1997); Kotios Angelos, European Policies 
for the Reconstruction and the Development of the Balkans, in Petrakos George and Totev 
Stoyan (eds.), The Development of the Balkan Region (2001). Among the  few titles which 
have been written in local languages, the research managed to identify for example, 
Milardovic Andjelko, Zapadni Balkan: Pojam, ideje, i dokumenti o rekonstrukciji Balkana u 
procesu globalizacije(2000).  
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Balkans.3 As a result of this situation, the research found out that there is generally 
very little knowledge of the basic features of this phenomenon. In this sense, the 
answers to the central questions from the title do appear unknown, un-synthesized at 
present. This is, in short, the basic motivation for the treatment of this issue.  
 
 The central tenets of this inquiry, that is, the basic questions such as “who”, “for 
whom”, etc.,   are further integrated in a framework which structures the discussion 
around the basic question of - why? The question “why” is the question which 
concerns the motivations for foreign aid to the Balkans? The question of motives is 
one of the central issues in foreign aid theory which has been extensively explored 
over the years. This question asks: why have donors given aid to the Balkans? What 
has motivated them to such an action? This is naturally related to the general question 
of: why donors give aid in general? It is to expect that the same or similar motives 
which drive foreign assistance allocations to other parts of the world are also at work 
in the Balkans. In a sense, the questions of “who”, “for whom”, and “for what”, can 
be explored as functions of the question “why”.  
 
For example, the motives determine the actual donors of foreign assistance. The 
extensive research of the numbers shows that whereas some donors had strong 
presence in the Balkans, other donors, which have strong presence in other parts of 
the world, were by and large absent from the region. The explanation for this should 
be sought in the motivation of those donors to give as opposed to not to give aid to the 
Balkans. Or in other words, it is the question of “why” which has determined the 
question of “who”.  The same applies to the other two questions of “for whom” and 
“what”. The text will show that whereas some donors gave huge quantities of aid to 
some countries in the region, they gave substantially less to others. The answer should 
again be sought in the motivations for such a choice. And the same is valid for the 
question of “what” that is, what were the exact ends foreign assistance was allocated 
for. The text will also show that often there was an obvious correlation between the 
donor motivation and the types of operations they chose to support in the Balkans. In 
this sense, the issue of donor motivation to give foreign assistance will be a persistent 
lens of the inquiry into development assistance to the region. The issue of motivation 
will be explored through the review of the theory (Chapter 1); it will be discussed vis-
à-vis the donor official policy texts (Chapter 3) and the political reality of foreign aid 
to the Balkans explored through an extensive review of international media (Chapter 
4). It will subsequently be discussed through the extensive research of the numbers of 
foreign assistance to the region.   
 
Given the fact that the text is broad in scope, it is perhaps useful to define its 
boundaries also by noting what this text is not. For example, this text will not be a 
discussion of impact and effectiveness, which are   major issues in scholarship of aid. 
Some arguments will nevertheless be made indirectly through the close review of the 
numbers. However, this text will not try to give an answer to the question of: what 
was the impact of foreign assistance in the Balkans. First, the position of this writing 
is that that question can only be asked   after this first set of basic questions has been 
answered. Second, another position of this writing is that the issue of impact cannot 
                                                 
3 A good example of  writing on specific aspects of  foreign assistance, or particular types of 
project are for example some of the essays in Siani-Davis Peter (ed), International 
Intervention in the Balkans since 1995 (2003);  
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be discussed in an aggregate, in the sense of “what was the overall impact of all 
foreign aid to the Balkans”, but only through a process of disaggregation and separate 
discussion of the impact of different types of aid. Another item which will not be 
covered will be private assistance, that is assistance originating from private donors, 
organizations, of individuals. This text will primarily be concerned with official 
development assistance (ODA) which is the foreign assistance given by donor 
governments to recipient countries. This is not to imply that this aid is given directly 
to the recipient governments. Private aid is by definition a small fraction in total 
foreign assistance (comprising official and private), but the bigger challenge for 
looking into private aid is the lack of organized data which represents a serious 
challenge.  Nevertheless it should be borne in mind that private aid is a small share in 
the total. Next, this text will address but will not thoroughly discuss the related 
phenomena of emergence of NGOs, aid conditionality, democracy assistance, 
operation of multilateral agencies in the Balkans and so forth. All of these phenomena 
are directly related to the functioning of foreign assistance but they also have a life of 
their own which is not necessarily part of the foreign aid discourse. They will 
nevertheless be introduced and discussed, but they are not issues of central interest for 
this text. In essence, this text will be a study of the numbers of foreign assistance to 
the Balkans.  
 
Overall, the writing ahead comprises two larger parts. The first one ( Chapters 1, 2,  3 
and 4) explores the available literature, official policy texts of major donors, and 
conducts a review of the major international media for the purpose of investigating the 
political dynamics surrounding the delivery of foreign aid to the Balkans. The second 
part (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) conducts an extensive inquiry into the numbers of foreign 
assistance to the Balkans in the period 1990-2005. Even though the text relies on 
sources from the literature, policy documents, and media, it is still by and large based 
on the analysis of statistical data. The three last chapters, combined with extensive 
annexes, provide in dept review of the numbers concerning development aid supply to 
the region. In addition, it is the numbers which serve as the major instrument for 
producing the findings on the “who”, “for whom”, “for what”, and “why”, of foreign 
assistance to the Balkans. This extensive study of the numbers has been motivated by 
the awareness that this is essentially the type of information which has been lacking 
concerning foreign aid to the region.   
 
Chapter 1 which follows provides the theoretical introduction into foreign aid through 
a review of the major theoretical views on the motivations to give development 
assistance.  Some of the major scholars and positions are represented in a historic 
perspective.  
 
Chapter 2 discusses the great changes which have taken place in the foreign aid 
regime after the end of the cold war; it reviews the possible factors behind those 
changes, and it identifies the major new features of foreign assistance in the post-cold 
war of the 90s on global scale.  
 
Chapter 3 brings the focus on the Balkans and it conducts a review of the official 
policy texts, documents, and declarations of some of the major donors to the region. It 
identifies the major declared goals of foreign assistance as declared by these donors, 
and it discusses the similarities and differences between them.  
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Chapter 4 shifts the focus to the political dynamic surrounding the supply of foreign 
assistance to the region, by conducting a review of the major international media in 
the 1990-2005 period. Through analysis of statements of relevant political officials, 
developments in the donor community, and facts concerning aid to the Balkans as 
recorded by the international press, it identifies factors of relevance for the supply of 
foreign assistance to the region and it categorizes them according to their common 
features. Chapter 5 commences the investigation of numbers and it reviews the 
general amounts of foreign aid   to the Balkans in the 1990-2005 period. It starts the 
answers to the questions of “who” and for whom” concerning aid to the region. 
Chapter 6 continues the exploration of numbers through an extensive sectoral 
disaggregation of foreign assistance to the region. It introduces the major sectors of 
allocation of aid, and it reviews sectoral allocation of ODA across donors and 
recipients. Chapter 7 continues the exploration of the numbers of aid through a review 
of the descriptions of the major allocations in order to obtain information on the final 
exact ends of foreign assistance. The Conclusion synthesizes the major observations 
and findings which have emerged throughout the discussion.  
 
As it has already been mentioned, this research endeavor relied on the combination of 
several approaches for the production of its findings. Extensive review of the 
literature on foreign assistance has been conducted in order to acquire the theoretical 
material on the issue. Review of official policy texts   of donor governments has been 
conducted for the purpose of assessing the officially stated goals of their foreign 
assistance efforts in the Balkans. Extensive review of the coverage of foreign aid to 
the Balkans in the period 1990-2005 in major international media has been conducted 
in order to grasp the real political dynamic surrounding the process, but also in an 
attempt to compensate for the lack of scholarly sources. Extensive analysis of 
statistical data has been conducted for the purpose of identifying the amounts and 
composition of foreign assistance to the region. In this process the research relied 
strongly on the two databases maintained by the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
These databases serve as   global registry for data on foreign assistance and are the 
prime reference for all scholarly writing on aid. Due to specific challenges concerning 
the inquiry of aid to the Balkans, other data sources have been consulted when 
deemed necessary. Material from interviews with donor representatives has been used 
only by exception.  
 
I owe a debt of gratitude to PhD program in International Cooperation and Sustainable 
Development Policies of the University of Bologna and its director, professor Andrea 
Segrè, for allowing me to do this exciting research. I also owe a special debt of 
gratitude to the Istituto per l‘Europa Centro - Orientale e Balcanica in Forlì which 
hosted my research effort and to my mentor, professor Stefano Bianchini for his 
guidance through this journey. In addition, I thank UNU WIDER in Helsinki,    the 
Center for Civil Society Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore,   and the 
Integrated Business Faculty in Skopje, Macedonia, where I did parts of this research.  
All mistakes are mine alone.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
Foreign Aid. Motives and Factors:  
 Review of Major Theoretical Views  
 
 
 
1. Introduction to Motivations for Aid: The State of the Debate  
 
 The study of motivations of foreign assistance represents a significant part of the 
international scholarship on aid. This writing which has as its core interest the process 
of foreign aid to the Balkans in the period of transition starts off with a general 
discussion about the motivations of donor countries to provide development 
assistance.  
 
The discussion opens with a review of the major theoretical views to be found in the 
literature on foreign aid. The major recent contributions have been consulted, as well 
as classical writings on the topic.  
 
Several notes are in order in the beginning. Substantial part of the scholarly literature 
on motives for aid concentrates   on bilateral aid, or more precisely, on the bilateral 
official development assistance (ODA). That is, it mostly analyses the motivations of 
donor governments to give aid to recipient governments. The focus on bilateral ODA 
is one marked feature of the debate on aid motivations. Naturally, related issues, such 
as the essential differences between bilateral and multilateral aid , or the role of 
private aid (aid provided by private organizations)  are addressed in the scholarly 
debate, but nevertheless, the body of thought dealing with motivations of foreign aid 
is primarily concerned with official, bilateral assistance.  This reflects the realities of 
aid. Aid in its present form historically originated as bilateral, government-to-
government form of cooperation, and bilateral aid still accounts for around 70% of 
total ODA. Private aid (which is not part of ODA) is significantly smaller and stands 
at around 8-10% of ODA.4 
 
Another important aspect of the discussion on aid motivations, and what more, aid in 
general, is that it   often focuses on aid by very few countries. In this sense, as it has 
rightfully been noted, the debate suffers from a certain degree of “Americanization”.  
 
Scholarship on aid is visibly dominated by writing which focuses on the aid practices 
of the United States. In addition, the literature is predominantly populated by titles 
and authors from the Anglo-Saxon tradition.  
 
Many studies of aid focus primarily on the several largest bilateral donors, the US, 
UK, Japan, Germany, and France. This again reflects the reality of aid whereby these 
5 big bilaterals account for over 80% of total ODA.  
                                                 
4 Private organizations, of which most prominent the NGOs, in addition to providing 
assistance which comes from private sources (individual contributions or mass public 
campaigns, etc.) have over the years, become an important channel for ODA. This trend 
became especially pronounced in the 1990s. Chapter 2 discusses this phenomenon in detail.  
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In addition, bilateral ODA has essentially been instituted and for great many years 
absolutely dominated by the US. Beyond the 5 largest bilateral donors, the discourse 
on aid usually focuses on the practices of the countries which are members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.5 The DAC aid definitely 
accounts for the balk of ODA globally.  
 
At closer look, two sub-discourses can provisionally be identified in the body of 
academic writing on the subject. The first has the already mentioned focus on ODA 
by the biggest bilaterals, biased towards the US.  
 
The second, coming largely from Scandinavian scholars, centers on the development 
cooperation practices of the Scandinavian countries. These donors, although 
accounting for a much smaller absolute share of aid, have been widely recognized to 
provide aid of better quality, guided by the “right” sets of motivations, and to be 
closest to reaching the UN quota of 0,7% of GDP. Nevertheless, although aid from the 
Scandinavian (or Nordic) countries is nominally smaller, compared to the ODA 
provided by the US or Japan, it is quite bigger when considered as percent of their 
GDP. The active engagement of Scandinavian countries in the field of development 
cooperation has also resulted with considerable literature on the topic, produced by 
authors from these countries.  
 
 Finally, and in a similar vein, Japanese aid can provisionally be considered a separate 
focus of interest, often of Japanese scholars.  
 
This state of the debate definitely offers less insight into foreign aid which falls out of 
the principal focus of interest. At least two issues should be mentioned. The first is a) 
the assistance from Arab (oil producing, OPEC member) countries, and the second, b) 
past aid from socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union. These two types of aid, 
although at present a less relevant reality - OPEC aid small and going to a limited 
number of recipients; Russia transformed from a donor into a large recipient in the 
1990s - have had periods of historic significance. Soviet Union aid was for a certain 
period of time during the cold war a relevant competitor to US aid, in the struggle for 
global dominance (Guan-Fu, 1983; Lawson, 1988; Heymann, 1960; Horvath, 1970; 
Lumsdaine, 1993; Beim, 1964).  Assistance from oil producing countries had peaks 
especially in periods of time when due to high oil prices, assistance from the West had 
declined (Neumayer, 2003; Lumsdaine, 1993). Aid from some oil producing countries 
was present during the Balkan wars in the 1990s, when it went to countries which had 
Muslim population (Bosnia and Kosovo).   
 
Another observation concerns aid by the European Union (EU). The EU enlarged and 
deepened over the past decade and a half, and that definitely transformed profoundly 
its assistance programs. There is the impression that literature on aid lags behind in 
giving the proper attention to EU assistance, which is still often considered as just one 
more type of multilateral aid. The EU has been the largest donor to the Balkans since 
the beginning of the transition, and thus it will be discussed in detail further in the 
text. In this sense, the situation is a bit paradoxical.  EU ODA will receive less 
attention in the theoretical discussion on motives; from the simple reason that there 
                                                 
5  The DAC is composed by 23 member countries. The DAC members web page is available 
at http://www.oecd.org/linklist/0,3435,en_2649_33721_1797105_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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are still fewer titles in the scholarly writing on aid which have dealt with the issue of 
EU development assistance. Yet, the EU aid will be quite centrally positioned in the 
later chapters of the text which will extensively draw on the numbers and amounts of 
ODA allocated into the Balkans, and which were seriously dominated by the aid 
provided by the European Commission (EC).     
 
After these notes on the limits of the debate, the review follows of the theoretical 
debate on the motivations of donor government to provide foreign aid, as a broad, 
general introduction to the topic of foreign aid to the Balkans.  
 
  
 
2.  The Two Poles of Motivations of Aid: Self-Interest vs. Altruism  
 
There is hardly a more highlighted topic in literature on aid than that concerning   
motivations for foreign assistance. Why do donors give aid? What motivates the 
volume, allocations, and type of aid donors choose to give?  
 
It is a matter of convention, of common understanding, that the overarching universal 
goal of aid is - development. Whereas there can be a multitude of different, specific 
objectives of any particular aid effort, there can be no doubt that the final goal of any 
aid is to - promote development. Although not exclusively, ever since the very 
beginnings of foreign aid development has been seen mostly in economic terms. Aid 
is given to lift people out of poverty and produce economic growth6. As such aid is 
given to those who need it, who demonstrate the need of foreign assistance.  
 
Nevertheless analysis of foreign aid has observed   rather soon after the establishment 
of foreign assistance programs that allocation is not always proportionate to need. 
Some poor (who clearly demonstrate great need) can receive a lot whereas others 
equally poor, very little; similarly, the less poor would often get a lot more than the 
more needy. The reason for such mismatch between human need and aid allocations   
has been identified by scholarly thought to rest with - donor motivations   to give aid.  
 
Put succinctly by McGillivray (2003: 1):  
 
”why do some poor countries receive so much aid and other so little? The 
explanations of most studies turn on the perceived motives of donor countries.”    
 
Aid is always allocated for the achievement of certain nominal goals, such as reducing 
poverty, improving governance, promoting democracy, strengthening civil society, 
helping gender equality and so forth. Alongside these nominal goals, theory on aid 
argues, donor countries have additional sets of motivations and reasons which 
influence the amounts of aid going to recipients. Donor motivations strongly influence 
aid decisions.  
 
                                                 
6 Nevertheless, one of the earliest foreign aid endeavors did not aim at reduction of poverty 
but reconstruction. It is commonly accepted that the Marshall Plan represents the very 
beginning of foreign aid in its present meaning. The objective of the Marshall Plan was to 
help the reconstruction of post-war Europe.  
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The exploration of factors influencing aid allocation has produced a significant body 
of literature.  Overall, scholarship on aid recognizes two general views on why aid is 
given.   
 
According to the first, so-called idealist view, aid is given out of a pure inclination to 
help. Foreign aid as an instrument of pure altruism derives from the philosophic idea 
that - there is a moral obligation to help. This   view argues that there is a moral 
obligation to help to the poor and disadvantaged, and relates the appearance of foreign 
aid to the evolution and maturation of ethical standards in Western democracies.  
 
Extensive analysis of the moral obligation to give would be beyond the scope of this 
writing. The most comprehensive treatment of this issue can be found in the classic 
work of Roger Riddell “Foreign Aid Reconsidered (1987).”7  
                                                 
7 Riddell (1987: 17-26) analyses the ethical argument for aid, by exploring the views on the 
moral obligation to help from the early scriptures of Christianity to the more recent pertinent 
philosophical discourses. He suggests that the idea that there is an obligation to help the 
weaker has existed from the very onset of Christian faith, and that it has grown and evolved 
inside theological thought over centuries. Riddell refers to some of the writings of Thomas 
Aquinas in his Summa Theologica, to discern the distant antecedents of today’s debate on the 
moral argument.  Aquinas held that:  
 
“according to the natural order instituted by divine providence, material goods are provided 
for the satisfaction of human need. Therefore the division and appropriation of property, 
which proceeds from human law, must not hinder the satisfaction of man’s necessity for such 
goods. Equally, whatever a man has in superabundance is owed, of natural right, the poor for 
their sustenance... (cited by Riddell, 1987: 17).”  
 
Interestingly studying more recent theological discourses, papal pronouncements from the 
1960s in particular   Riddell has also traced very specific arguments that states have the 
obligation to help “the problems of underdevelopment (1987: 17).”  
 
Moving to the exploration of the philosophical narratives on   moral obligation, Riddell 
divides them into several streams. The first, which he discusses through the work of Paul 
Streeten and Nigel Dower, builds on the basic premise that the simple fact of being human 
implies certain obligations (Streeten), and that “being human is what is needed for human 
well-being (Dower)”. These views, according to Riddell, impel the obligation to eradicate 
evils such as extreme poverty stems from here.  
 
Another theory about the obligation to help, which has often been used in development, 
derives from the idea of utilitarianism promoted by Jeremy Bentham. According to this view, 
expressed succinctly in the words of the DAC Chairman, in the 1980 DAC Review:  
 
 “the core rationale of development assistance remains the profound intuition most people 
have that unrequited transfers from the averagely richer people of rich areas to the averagely 
poor people of poor areas usually add more utility to the latter than they inflict disutility on 
the former (cited by Riddell, 1987: 20).”  
 
Or in the words of Streeten, (cited by Riddell, 1987:20): 
 
 “the distributional argument for aid can be justified on a variety of philosophical grounds. 
Perhaps the most common is the utilitarian argument that a dollar distributed from a rich to a 
poor man detracts less utility than it adds, and therefore increases the sum of total utility.”  
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In the second, realist view, the motive for giving aid is the self-interest of the donor. 
Primarily, this view sees foreign aid as a tool of the foreign policy, which is   in turn 
considered to be driven primarily by interests of national security.  
 
Aid as it is known today began in the aftermath of World War II, with the United 
States Marshal Plan for Europe. From the altruistic point of view, the motive for the 
Marshall Plan would be the desire of the US to help Europe which was devastated by 
the war. In the “realist” point of view, the US move was motivated by its own self-
interest - to help its own national security by helping European security, containing 
the spread of communism, and by promoting the market for its exports. In the political 
circumstance of that period of time, the national security interest probably by far 
exceeded any commercial interest the US may have had in rebuilt Europe.  
 
The notion of self-interest has been consistently present in policy making circles ever 
since the very emergence of the foreign aid regime, and what more; it was often 
present in what would at present be considered a “self-conscious” way.  
 
For example, discussing the US foreign aid regime  in the 50s, Hjertholm & White 
(2000: 11) note that “ most US aid was released under the tellingly named Mutual 
Security Act...aid was quite consciously used to stop countries ‘going communist.” 
Opeskin (1996: 21) starts his essay on the moral obligation to give with a reference to 
a statement by US President Richard Nixon that the purpose of aid is “not to help 
others but ourselves.” In much recent times, in his testimony before US Congress in 
2004, Radelet (2004) has identified three motivations for US aid in the post 9/11 
period: national security, promotion of American values, and humanitarianism.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
The influential Theory of Justice of John Rawls has also been invoked to contribute to the 
discussion on the moral obligation to give aid.  Riddell (1987: 23) suggests that according to 
Rawls’s theory of justice: 
 
 “not only people have rights to life but also they have rights to the resources necessary to 
create the conditions for basic life, even if acquiring these resources entails the extraction of 
these resources acquired legitimately by others.”   
 
According to Riddell, this is the point where Rawls surpasses the utilitarian idea which he 
considered not to go far enough; to be in a manner of speaking, permissive( 1987: 21).  
 
A more recent short essay by Opeskin (1996), on the moral foundations for aid, distinguishes 
between two types of obligations; the first based on the idea of humanity and the second, on 
the idea of justice. The idea of humanity requires “to relieve human suffering and distress, 
irrespective of state boundaries, whenever we can do so without great personal sacrifice 
(Opeskin, 1996: 23).”  
 
The idea of justice comprises two types of justice. These two types, according to 
Opeskin(1996: 23), correspond “ with the Aristotelian notions of corrective and distributive 
justice”:  
 
. “Global transfers of resources may be called for as rectification of the wrongs committed by 
developed states against developing states in the past, or they may be called for by way of 
global redistribution of wealth or income, according to some criterion of need or desert 
(Opeskin, 1996: 23).”  
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For scholars who subscribe to the realist view, foreign aid is a product of the cold war 
and the bipolar world, and it is nothing else but another tool of foreign policy. 
According to Hopkins: 
 
 “there has never been a pure economic development assistance regime...until 1990, 
cold war concerns provided the core motivation for aid...the institutionalisation of 
foreign aid after the Second World War occurred in a context of the cold war. 
Strategic political considerations were the major force shaping aid allocations, at 
least bilateral ones. While moral concerns underlay aid, especially emergency relief, 
this motivation was never paramount, certainly not in a sustainable fashion (Hopkins, 
2000: 425).”  
 
In their influential Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, 
Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows, Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor (1998), add a 
third view on motivations for aid. They contend there are essentially three paradigms 
in scholarly thinking on what motivates foreign assistance: realist, idealist, and neo-
Marxist.  
 
According to the realist paradigm, the major motivation for giving aid is national 
interest. It is determined by strategic interests of the donor country. Classical realists 
concentrate only on security interests whereas neo-realists also take into account 
economic ones. In the idealist view, although other factors come into play, altruism is 
considered the primary motive of foreign assistance. Perhaps the best known recent 
proponent of this view is David Halloran Lumsdaine (1993) with his Moral Vision in 
International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989. The third view represents 
the so-called neo-Marxist argument, which insists on a division of the world between 
a rich centre and a poor periphery, whereby aid is merely one of the instruments for 
maintaining that status quo. By suggesting that aid is a function of the donor interest, 
in this case, the interest to maintain the status quo between a rich North and poor 
South, between a centre and periphery, the neo-Marxists thinking does essentially 
come back into the realist camp,. The neo-Marxist argument   has at least in part 
originated from scholarly views promoted in aid recipient countries.8  
 
Whereas the Neo-Marxist discourse has almost completely lost relevance over the last 
decades, the dynamic between the realist and idealist paradigm suggests that the 
realist view has prevailed over the idealist one. In reality no scholar would propone an 
exclusively realist or idealist point of view, and it has come to be accepted that both 
positions have a stake in the decision making on foreign aid.  In addition, in the minds 
                                                 
8  Huntington for example has referred to the positions of Latin American intellectuals, such 
as Vincent Sanches and Ivan Ilich, to describe the opposition to aid in recipient countries. 
according to Huntington,  : “these expressions range from the argument by the Chilean 
psychiatrist, Vincent Sanchez, that U.S. aid is creating ‘cultural psychosis’ in Chile to that 
elaborated by Ivan Illich that the export of Western concepts, aspirations, and techniques of 
mass production and consumerism induces "chronic underdevelopment" in poor countries 
from which the latter can escape only by evolving some fundamentally different alternatives 
unknown to developed Western societies  (cited in Huntington, 1970: 187).” In his classic 
From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis, Robert Wood (1986) has referred to the work of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979)  as proponents of the dependency theory 
which had essentially claimed that the rich North keeps the poor south in a state of 
dependency.  
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of policy makers the different conceptual views are often fused (Meernik, Krueger, 
and Poe, 1998: 68). Nevertheless, the predominant view in aid theory (and wider) still 
is that foreign assistance is strongly motivated by donor interests. The argument of 
course does not end there. Self-interest can not be considered a monolithic category:  
 
 “The notion that self-interest pervades the aid calculations of industrialized states 
has become axiomatic in scholarly literature.. But this notion begs the question of 
which of many potential self-interests are at play in the execution of aid policy 
(Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998:295).” 
 
 The trichotomy comprising the realist, idealist, and neo-Marxist view is already to be 
found in a title which actually precedes the influential Foreign Aid Puzzle.  Steven 
Hook, who co-authors the Foreign Aid Puzzle, refers to these three views as: realist, 
idealist, and structuralist (Hook, 1995).  
 
In his National Interest and Foreign Aid, Hook (1995: 34) argues the premise that 
foreign aid can be seen as a microcosm of states’ behavior in foreign affairs, goes on 
to produce an analysis of the aid flows of the same four donor states, the US, France, 
Sweden, and Japan, by exploring the different aspects of their national interests as 
inductors of aid giving. In doing this, Hook gives a good overview of the theoretical 
argumentations and the policy positions of the realist, idealist and structuralist view.  
 
 Discussing the realist view, Hook notes that it perceives foreign aid as an almost 
“exclusive” property of national interest. In the realist view:   
 
 “foreign aid should primarily, if not exclusively, be designed to facilitate donor 
interest. Humanitarian objectives are deemphasized; aid is viewed as minimally 
related to recipient economic development. If an effect is identified, it is significant 
only to the extent that it increases the donor’s political influence, military security, 
trade programs, and foreign investment (Hook, 1995: 34).”   
 
The following excerpt from Hook (1995) is instrumental in introducing the views and 
arguments of the “old school” of realists from the 60s, starting with their founder, 
Hans Morgenthau. As such, it merits to be cited fully:    
 
“Many realists have questioned the assumed linkages between the transfer of foreign 
assistance, recipient economic development, and subsequently harmonious relations 
between a donor and recipient. Morgenthau (1963:79) for example, found these 
assumptions to be ‘borne out neither by the experiences we have had nor by general 
historic experience.’ In this view, US foreign assistance should be better understood 
as bribes from rich to poor countries. Similarly Banfield (1963: 26-27) criticized the 
‘fog of moralizing’ that often accompanies foreign aid rhetoric. ‘The most influential 
writings about aid doctrine are full of clichés and sweeping statements that turn out 
on close examination to be meaningless or else entirely unsupported by evidence.’ 
Moralists’ analysis, he argued, ‘tells us how we ought to act in a world which is not 
the one in which we must act.’ Ten years later Knorr (1973:166) dismissed notions of 
‘genuine philanthropy or humanitarianism’ and added that ‘merely a small fraction 
of foreign economic aid can safely be attributed to a plane sense of human solidarity 
or to sincere feeling that the wealthy ...have the responsibility to share with the 
destitute two-thirds of the mankind.’”  
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 In addition to presenting the theoretical premises, Hook discusses the policy positions 
which emanate from the realist and the idealist view. For the realists, “prescriptions 
range from the elimination of aid programs which have little bearing on the donors’ 
interests to qualified support for aid based on demonstrable benefits to the donor 
(Hook, 1995: 34).”  
 
Alternatively, “In the view of most idealists, national interests should be minimized or 
eliminated from aid calculations, which should instead be guided by transnational 
humanitarian concerns (Hook, 1995: 36).” 
 
Structuralists, or neo-Marxists contend that “aid policies further encourage the 
dependent development of the peripheral states (Hook, 1995: 38)”, and have been 
inclined to call for abolition of foreign aid.9 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Quite a few critics of aid have argued for its elimination, even though from different 
positions. The extent of the criticism varies and not all critics of aid have called for the 
cancellation of all aid under all circumstances. A good overview of the different critiques of 
aid is presented in Riddell’s Foreign Aid Reconsidered.  
 
Riddell starts off by dividing the critics into those who deny the moral obligation to give, and 
those who do not deny the obligation but who doubt that aid is the proper means for fulfilling 
that obligation. 
 
In the first group Riddell places Peter Bauer, Friedrich Hayek, and Robert Nozick. Bauer has 
challenged the moral obligation to give by arguing that economic differences between people 
are deserved and justified if they stem from just processes. Hayek is not a direct critic of aid 
but he dismisses the idea of social justice as threat to other values in free society. Nozick’s 
theory of entitlements produces a “rejection of any theory of justice based on needs or 
egalitarian principles (Riddell, 1987: 29).”  
 
In the second group Riddell places theorists who do not challenge the moral case, but who 
doubt, for one reason or another, that foreign aid can promote development. This ensemble 
comprises on the right: Milton Friedman, Peter Bauer, and Melvyn Krauss; and on the left, 
Lappe’ et all, Teresa Hayter, Willem Zeylstra, Tibor Mende, Gunnar Myrdal, and Dudley 
Seers.  
 
According to Riddell, Friedman, Bauer, and Krauss, have argued that foreign aid interferes 
with market forces, and that in some cases it causes more harm than good. For Lappe’ et all, 
aid cannot help because it cannot reach the poor and powerless (since being siphoned by 
corrupt governments). For Hayter it is irrelevant whether aid can help or not because its 
principal aim is to maintain the capitalist status quo.  Zelystra considers aid to have failed 
because it rests on the flawed assumption about the universal applicability of the Western 
model of development. Mende holds that the mobilization of domestic resource in favour of 
the poor, rather than turning to external resources, is the answer to underdevelopment. Myrdal 
and Seers have argued that aid is good for development and the more of it the better, but have 
criticised its waste and inefficiency due to corruption, or lack of political commitment to 
fighting poverty in recipient countries (Riddell, 1987: 45-60).  
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3. The Realist View: Aid as Instrument of Foreign Policy  
 
Hans Morgenthau is the intellectual founder of the contemporary realist theory. In his 
classic article Political Theory of Foreign Aid (1962), he pioneered the argument that 
foreign aid could not be seen as anything else but a tool of foreign policy, and that its 
only possible rationale could be to serve the national interest.   
 
Morgenthau was not a critic of foreign aid per se and disagreed with those who saw it 
as a” gigantic boon-doggle, a wasteful and indefensible operation which serves 
neither the interests of the United States nor those of the recipient nations (1962: 
301).”  
 
Writing specifically with regards to the United States experience, Morgenthau holds 
that it is not necessary to doubt the need for aid policy; aid should exist, however, it 
needs to serve the national interest:  
 
“it is in fact pointless even to raise the question whether the United States ought to 
have a policy of foreign aid – as much as to ask whether the United States ought to 
have a foreign political or military policy. For the United States has interests abroad 
which cannot be secured by military means and for the support of which the 
traditional methods of diplomacy are only in part appropriate. If foreign aid is not 
available they will not be supported at all (Morgenthau, 1962: 301).” 
 
Morgenthau thus concludes, that the question is not “if” the United States should have 
a foreign aid policy, but “what kind” of foreign aid policy it should have 
(Morgenthau, 1962: 301).10 
                                                 
10 Morgenthau considered the foreign assistance policy of the United States at the time to be 
“fundamentally weak” and “conceived as a self-sufficient technical enterprise, covering a 
multitude of disparate objectives and activities, responding haphazardly to all sorts of 
demands, sound and unsound, unrelated or only by accident related to the political purposes 
of [US] foreign policy”. He saw six types of foreign aid: humanitarian, subsistence foreign 
aid, military assistance, bribery, prestige foreign aid, and finally, economic development aid. 
Of these six types, Morgenthau considered only humanitarian aid to be non-political but to 
still be able to serve political purposes (1962: 301). According to him, a lot of the foreign 
assistance given is nothing else but bribes: “much of what goes by the name of foreign aid 
today is in the nature of bribes. The transfer of money and services from one government to 
another performs ...the function of a price paid for political service rendered or to be 
rendered.” A paragraph in the Political Theory of Foreign Aid, discusses what can be 
considered a distant forerunner of today’s policy of conditionality, which will be a separate 
focus of discussion further in this text. If Foreign aid is seen as  bribe,  what is called 
conditionality today, can be  the modality to obtain the optimum from the bribe:  
 
“bribes proffered by one government to another for political advantage were until the 
beginning of the nineteenth century an integral part of the armoury of diplomacy. No 
statesman hesitated to acknowledge the general practice of giving and accepting bribes...thus 
it was proper and common for a government to pay the foreign minister or ambassador of 
another country a pension, that is, a bribe...the Prussian Ambassador in Paris summed up 
well the main rule of this game when he reported to his government in 1802: ‘Experience has 
taught everybody who is here on diplomatic business that one ought never to give anything 
before the deal is definitely closed, but it has only proved that the allurement of gain will 
often work wonders (Morgenthau, 1962: 302).”   
 20
 
Another realist of the old school is Samuel Huntington. Huntington was asked to 
contribute to the inaugural issue of Foreign Policy in 1970, which resulted with his 
landmark article Foreign Aid for What and for Whom. Yet a tractate which is quite 
dated, at closer look one finds that some of the propositions of today are essentially 
re-worked, revived premises from the 60s – 70s. It also invites the conclusion that 
some of the aid dilemmas of present day are the same as 30-40 years ago.  
 
“Foreign Aid: Billions in Search for a Good Reason” – is how Huntington opens his 
argument, referring to a 1963 “Fortune”  article by Charles J.V. Murphy,11  in order 
to posit the dilemma of what should be the motivation for US foreign assistance and 
what kind of aid system should derive from it.  
 
Paying regard to the altruistic argument for aid, Huntington accepts that the US as the 
wealthiest country in the world “has a moral obligation to help (1970: 188).” He does 
not dispute the moral obligation to relieve suffering but he does not agree that foreign 
aid for economic development can logically derive from a moral obligation:   
 
“the moral obligation to feed the hungry in India is fairly obvious. The moral 
obligation to insure that India's economy grows at 6 percent per annum is 
considerably less obvious ...The moral argument is thus persuasive when it comes to 
providing minimum economic well-being for individuals, but much less so when it 
comes to promoting optimal economic growth of societies (Huntington, 1970: 188).”  
 
Thus, he accepts moral obligation but only with regards to relief aid; he contends that 
other aid for economic development should be channeled multilaterally; and that 
finally the US should give greater bilateral assistance to states “where the US has 
special, political, economic or security interests (Huntington, 1970:189).” 
 
Hence, alike Morgenthau, Huntington sees foreign aid as a tool that needs to serve US 
interests abroad. He contends that the moral argument alone is not strong enough a 
motive for US foreign assistance. One of the reasons, he argues, why US foreign aid 
has been in decline, after the initial boost in the late 40s and 50s, is because the 
altruistic argument of the “purists”, as he refers to the proponents of the idealist view, 
is not compelling to policy makers:  
 
“French official economic assistance has consistently been fifty to almost a hundred 
percent higher than U.S. assistance as a ratio of Gross National Product (GNP). One 
reason for this may well be that French aid has had the very consciously defined 
political purpose of maintaining French influence in its former colonies and that it 
has been almost exclusively concentrated in those former colonies. Such purposes 
make sense to chief executives and legislatures. In a somewhat similar fashion, the 
rapidly increasing Japanese aid has been directly tied to the efforts of the Tokyo 
                                                 
11 Recently, Burnell (1997: 46), in his Foreign Aid in a Changing World, used the same 
approach to introduce the perplexing question of “Why Give Aid”.  He used a title of an 
article from The Economist to introduce the same question of what should be the underlining 
motivation for aid. “Needed: a Case for Giving”, was the title of the article; clearly another 
way to address the same issue as in “Billions in Search for a Good Reason.” Obviously, in 
1997, the issue had the same timeliness as in 1970.  
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government to extend Japanese commerce and investments in Asia (Huntington, 1970: 
169).” 
 
Yet a convinced realist, Huntington does not oppose aid per se but he sees it as a 
foreign policy tool which should correspond to national interest, and along this he 
considers five criteria for  choosing the countries to be helped: a) economic 
performance -  the country should demonstrate its ability and commitment to use the 
aid effectively, b) security relevance of that country to the US, c) political democracy, 
d) historic association with the US, and e) global importance (Huntington, 1970: 182).  
 
 
4. The Idealist View: Humane Internationalism    
 
The full ideological counterweight to the realist view is the argument that foreign aid 
is essentially a result of   belief in the principles of justice and solidarity. The idealist 
view holds that aid is and should be given out of altruism and care for the poor and 
disadvantaged, and it sees foreign assistance as extension of the concept of welfare in 
international relations.  
 
The major proponent of the idealist view is David Halloran Lumsdaine. The basic 
argument of Lumsdaine’s widely quoted Moral Vision in International Politics: The 
Foreign Aid Regime 1949-1989,   is that foreign aid is in a final analysis a product of 
idealist concern about humanity:  
 
 “foreign aid cannot be accounted for on the basis of economic and political interests 
of the donor countries alone; the essential causes lay in the humanitarian and 
egalitarian principles of the donors countries, and in their implicit belief that only on 
the basis of a just international order in which all states had a chance to do well was 
peace and prosperity possible (Lumsdaine, 1993: 30).” 
 
Lumsdaine does not reject realism. He does not deny the existence of self-interest of 
various kinds but he minimizes its importance. He argues that a small share of aid is 
affected by donor selfishness; that the larger part of aid goes to those who need it, and 
that overall aid quality has been improving over the years. In support of his argument 
that aid is a result of gradual maturation of ethical standards, Lumsdaine claims that 
the sudden appearance of aid after the second World War cannot be explained on a 
case by case basis: 
 
 “looking only at French aid, one could hypothesize that it sprang from France’s 
unique pride in disseminating its cultural traditions; looking just at Swiss aid, one 
could argue it showed the special place of Switzerland’s international banking 
industry; US aid alone could be attributed to US hegemony or to American 
exceptionalism in foreign policy; and Japan’s aid might have been a tool of its export 
promotion strategy. But explanations of this kind do not explain why aid policies 
arose in all these industrial democracies at once, in a single decade, and have 
remained for nearly half a century (Lumsdaine, 1993: 36-37).”  
Lumsdaine does take into account the political explanations for the appearance of aid 
after the World War II. He analyzes factors such as the Cold War or the end of the 
colonial system, but only in order to dismiss them in a final analysis: 
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 “If the interest in aid was a response to a bipolar world, the support for aid ought to 
have varied as the cold war thawed and refroze. But instead the period of the detente 
was the period in which aid rose the most, as a percentage of GNP, in most of the 
donors’ countries. Had aid been an artefact of the cold war, one would also expect a 
rapid falling off of aid after the end of the cold war; but that has not happened... 
(Lumsdaine, 1993: 110)” 
 
Explaining aid with the cold war has two more flaws according to Lumsdaine. It does 
not explain why the two superpowers had different attitude to aid (Soviet aid was 
much smaller and directed to a much smaller number of allies), and why on the 
recipient side, countries which were in dissimilar position strategically, received 
similar levels of aid (Lumsdaine, 1993: 225).  
 
The explanation related to the end of the colonial system as the cause for the 
emergence of aid, whereby new poor states were created, and since they were not in a 
patron-protégé relationship with a dominion, could thus receive support from 
elsewhere,   does not hold in his view either, because,   Lumsdaine points out, there 
were poor countries which existed before the dismantling of the colonial system.  
 
Lumsdaine’s conclusion is that “the bases of support for aid lie in increased 
sensitivity to human need and not in calculations of strategic advantage (1993: 154).”  
 
Lumsdaine’s ultimate conclusion is that foreign aid is an international extension of 
social welfare. Welfare was first introduced in the national states, some 50-70 years 
before foreign aid appeared. As general awareness and sensitivity to human need 
increased in the countries of the industrialized West, Lumdsaine argues so matured 
ideas and mechanisms for its alleviation internationally. The same factors which 
promoted welfare, stemming from the social-democrat forces in society, are the 
strongest supporters of foreign aid. Countries with more generous welfare systems are 
also the most generous donors of foreign assistance, in GDP per capita terms.12  
  
Few scholars would subscribe to Lumsdaine’s argument in its ardent form. Most 
analysts of aid allocation agree that foreign assistance is strongly influenced by the 
self-interest of donor states. Albeit even Lumsdaine cannot deny the realism of 
allocation, he downplays its importance. According to him, the various forms of 
national self-interest cannot explain how aid appeared at the same time in many 
countries after the World War II. That can only be explained through evolution of 
ethical standards and concerns about humanity.  
The realist and the idealist view on motivations for aid represent the two distinct 
theoretical poles in the scholarship on foreign assistance.  
 
                                                 
12 A similar view concerning the relationship between welfare and foreign assistance has been 
argued by other scholars, notably by Brian Smith (1990). According to Smith, before being 
taken up by states, welfare at national level was provided by private associations, originally 
churches. The same applies to foreign aid; the  public assistance provided by governments 
which appeared after the WW II had been preceded by the activities of private organizations, 
most notably church missions in what came to be known as the Third World. Smith’s More 
Than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid (1990) is an excellent account of the 
interrelationship between private foreign aid and official development politics.  
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Yet, there is agreement in the scholarship that no donor disburses assistance solely 
according to self-interest or sheer altruism.  There is vast space which occupies the 
middle ground between the realist and idealist pole. A lot of this space is taken up by 
the concept of the so-called enlightened self-interest.  
 
 
5. The Middle Ground: Enlightened Self-Interest and Mutual Advantage  
 
There are said to be three aspects to the “allocational pattern of aid” (Hjertholm & 
White, 2000; Hjertholm & White: 2000a; McGillivray, 2003). The first deals with the 
question - is aid properly allocated among recipients, in the sense, is it proportionate 
to needs? This is the so-called the descriptive aspect. The second aspect analyzes why 
donors allocate aid they way they do; this is called explanatory analysis. The third 
aspect is the so-called prescriptive as it tries to prescribe how aid should be allocated; 
or what should be the proper criteria for just allocation of aid (Hjertholm & White, 
2000: 39).  
 
The discussion so far has employed the descriptive and explanatory perspectives, that 
is, it has reviewed and analyzed the motives of aid as it is given. The question posed 
by “The Economist”, and much earlier by “Fortune” asks what should be the motive, 
the right motive (if any), to give aid? It asks for a prescription on how foreign 
assistance should   be distributed.  
 
Writing in a prescriptive way, that is, not describing and analyzing the motives which 
shape donor aid allocations    , but advocating a valid motive for aid instead, Burnell 
(1997) sees it in the principle of mutual advantage for both donors and recipients.  
This is the concept of the so-called “enlightened self-interest” as motivation for 
development assistance.    
 
The mutual interest argument, was originally proposed by the Brandt Commission 
report, “North-South: A Program for Survival”, by the Independent Commission on 
International Development Issues (1980), otherwise known as the Brandt 
Commission. 
 
This argument tries to reconcile the concepts of altruism and self-interest. The logic is 
that the enlightened self-interest of donors should go beyond the straightforward 
moral case for giving, which is nevertheless taken as valid, and accept the obligation 
to give as a way to contribute to long-term mutual interest. In Burnell’s words: 
 
 “among donor countries, enlightened understanding would recognize that national 
self-interest can be pursued effectively only through taking account of mutual 
advantages (1997: 62).” 
 
The Brandt Commission report, Burnell suggests (1997: 63), came against the 
backdrop of the major oil crisis in the late 70s, when it became more than clear that 
the world was interdependent; that a rich North cannot isolate itself from a poor 
South, and that events taking place in one part of the world, affect the other parts and 
the world as a whole. This heightened acknowledgment of the risks of global 
interdependence prompted the view that aid should be seen as more than just a tool for 
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narrow self-interest; but an instrument for an enlightened, long- term mutual interest 
of nations. 
 
The notion of the enlightened self-interest has been widely reviewed in aid literature. 
Hook, similar to Burnell, has also subscribed to the concept of the enlightened self-
interest as a motive which supersedes the conventional national interest of states, and 
which provides universal validity for aid.  
Hook argues that in an ever greater interdependence of states, transnational regimes 
such as aid advance simultaneously both collective and individual state interests. The 
restraining of nuclear proliferation, preservation of rain forests, or fight against AIDS, 
as much as they are collective interests, or in other words “public goods”, can not be 
said to be excluded from the self-interest of any state (Hook, 1995: 184).  
 
Hook makes the very interesting observation that the emergence of the idea of the 
enlightened self-interest, as a new, reformed platform for international cooperation, is 
actually not new. It is at least as old as the ideological basis for the realist view – the 
Hobbesian state of nature - the view of international relations as an anarchical arena 
of bellum omnium contra omnes where states have no choice but to strictly pursue 
their self-interest if they want to survive.  
 
Hook points out that about the same time Thomas Hobbs wrote the Leviathan, which 
provided the original framework of realist thinking and the emergence of the concept 
of national interests of states, the writing of Hugo Grotius, a Dutch lawyer, set the 
original postulates of the idealist paradigm by identifying the need for cooperation 
among states:  
 
 “Grotius foresaw states conforming to a corpus of international law, anticipating 
that their adherence to transnational norms of behavior would be based  not upon the 
acceptance of universal moral codes but upon the enlarged definition of states’ self- 
interests (Hook, 1995:34).”  
 
The idea of the enlightened self-interest is an appealing one. It easily fits as middle 
ground between crude realism and pure idealism. Yet, some scholars consider it a 
component, or a milder stream of the concept of humane internationalism. That is 
perhaps visible in Lumsdaine himself, who suggests that only on the “basis of a just 
international order in which all states had a chance to do well was peace and 
prosperity possible (1993: 30).”  
 
Similarly, Olav Stokke (1996) is even more specific in seeing the enlightened self-
interest as an ingredient of the humane internationalism. He contends that the realist 
paradigm cannot  be used to explain the altruistic features of aid in the development 
policies of the small and middle powers (such as the Nordic countries) and suggests 
that humane internationalism is a more appropriate lens for   analysis (Stokke, 1996: 
22). The point that the classical concept of national interest as pertinent to the aid 
policies of great powers,   especially the United States, has not been useful in 
explaining the foreign assistance of the so called “like minded donors”, is well known 
in aid scholarship.  
Stokke suggests in addition to being a moral obligation, the responding to the needs of 
the poor, is in the long term national interest of donor countries. That is in his view 
the basic premise of the concept of the enlightened self-interest:       
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“the core of humane internationalism is the acceptance of the principle that citizens 
of industrial nations have moral obligations towards peoples and events beyond their 
borders...within the context of North-South relations, humane internationalism 
implies, in particular, responsiveness to the needs of the South as regards social and 
economic development, ...such ethical obligations are combined with what is 
considered to be in the best long- term interest of the Northern countries concerned... 
(Stokke, 1996: 23).” 
 
Stokke distinguishes three forms of internationalism: liberal internationalism, which 
combines the values of solidarity with faith in open markets; radical internationalism, 
which he relates to the neo-Marxist tradition; and reform internationalism, which 
derives from both Christian and socialist, values such as brotherhood and solidarity, 
but which “is also based on an enlightened self-interest” In Stokke’s view: 
 
“a more just international order, and economic development and improvements of the 
social and political conditions in the South will also in various ways be of benefit to 
the North. (Stokke, 1996: 24).”   
 
Stokke concludes that the concept of the enlightened self-interest both reconciles the 
classical realist and idealist view and transcends the nation state as the natural arena 
for the intermediation of interests and ethical norms:  
 
“[through] presentation of humane internationalism and its main expressions it 
becomes clear that an ethical thrust is combined with, and considered to be 
instrumental for the promotion of longer term, overall interests of rich countries… 
this mix of ethical values and national interests varies for the main expressions 
identified. In this way a bridge with the realist approach is established; whereas that 
approach, in its extreme form, starts out from naked political (security) and economic 
national self-interest, humane internationalism, in its extreme form, starts out from 
predominant values and norms. And contrary to the classical realist paradigm: these 
values and norms are not necessarily confined to the national system, and, to the 
extent that interests are involved, these transcend those of the nation state (Stokke, 
1996: 25).”  
 
The review of the concept of the enlightened self-interest concludes the general 
contouring of the framework for discussing motivations for foreign assistance. The 
playing field is composed of two opposite poles and a vast space in-between. The 
realist view, the idealist view, and the enlightened self-interest as the prescriptive 
middle ground, provide the ideological frame for discussing the allocation of foreign 
aid.  
 
Departing from this level of concept, the text will further go into exploring the 
specific factors that influence donor aid decisions. Some of these factors operate 
within the realist and some within the idealist paradigm. Sometimes it is not easy to 
conclude if an aid decision is motivated by self-interest or altruism. Often an aid 
decision will be naturally motivated by both, but even in such cases these motivations 
can enter into different balances and produce complex dynamics. Chapter 3 which 
provides a lengthy discussion of motivations for ODA to the Balkans, using among 
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other sources, an extensive media review, will show in more detail how intricate these 
processes can actually be.  
 
 
6. Additional Factors Shaping Aid Allocation   
 
6.1 Recent Views on the Motives and Factors of Aid Allocation  
 
The three paradigms, realism, idealism, and enlightened self-interest, discussed in the 
preceding sections, provide the overall ideological framework for the discussion about 
foreign aid. They were discussed as ideological constructs but it was nevertheless 
pointed out that first, they themselves are not monoliths, and second, and that in 
reality they often become fused.    
 
In addition, in reality each philosophic framework is always applied on a complex 
situation which involves many other variables. Some of these variables exist on the 
side of the donor whereas others on the side of the recipient. These variables or 
factors enter into numerous and complex inter-relationships. Sometimes even the most 
altruistic of donors must mind their own self-interest, whatever it may be in any given 
situation.  The opposite is also true: even the most self-interested donor will feel 
compelled to respond altruistically to certain events. The foreign assistance policies 
donors have make them respond differently to different contexts. The decision to give 
aid will in reality depend on the interaction of many different variables.  
 
One of the most influential recent writings on the factors shaping aid allocation has 
been the seminal article by Alberto Alesina and David Dollar (1998), Who Gives 
Foreign Aid to Whom and Why.  
 
 By using a large data set covering many donor countries, but with an emphasis on the 
US, Japan, France and Germany, who together account for 70% of total aid (Alesina 
& Dollar, 1998:6) , the authors offer a comprehensive analysis of the relative  
importance of   the various factors affecting   foreign assistance allocation. These 
factors include security interests, colonial ties, altruism, level of political freedom (the 
fact whether the recipient country is considered democratic or not), whether the 
recipient pursues good economic policies and so forth.  
 
Alesina & Dollar (1998) find “considerable evidence that the pattern of aid giving is 
dictated by political and strategic considerations, much more than by the economic 
needs and policy performance of the recipient.”  
 
The two authors argue that even though recipient need, good policies and political 
freedom count as determinants of aid, they are outweighed by strategic and political 
considerations of the donor country:  
 
 “ an inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged, non-democratic former colony 
politically friendly to its former colonizer, receives more aid than another country 
 27
 
with similar level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without past as a colony 
(Alesina & Dollar, 1998:1).” 13 
The study confirms the widely assumed link between foreign aid and democratization: 
“countries which have democratized have received a ‘surge’ in foreign aid, 
immediately afterwards (Alesina & Dollar, 1998: 2).” 
 
Although the article concludes that motives of self-interest regularly prevail over 
altruism, Alesina & Dollar do identify relevant   differences in motives for aid 
allocation between donors:  
 
 “Certain donors (notably the Nordic countries) seem to respond more to the 
‘correct’ incentives, namely income levels, good institutions of the receiving 
countries, and economic openness. Other countries (notably France) give to former 
colonies tied by political alliances, without much regard for other factors, including 
poverty levels or choice of politico-economic regimes. The United States’ pattern of 
aid giving is vastly influenced by that country’s interests in the Middle East (Alesina 
& Dollar, 1998:2).”  
 
Another influential writing on the motivations and factors shaping aid decisions from 
the same period of time is the already mentioned Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle by 
Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor.   
 
Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor (1998) do an empirical analysis of aid flows of four major 
donors, the US, Japan, France, and Sweden over the 80s and the result of their 
research “rejects the rhetorical statements of policymakers within the industrialized 
North who publicly assert that foreign aid is an altruistic tool of foreign policy 
(Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998: 319).”  
 
The authors nevertheless,   confirm some of the findings of the vast qualitative 
literature that these four largest bilateral donors are essentially motivated by different 
factors.  
 
                                                 
13  Alesina & Dollar provide an insight into the relative importance of different factors 
influencing aid, and their interrelation :  
 
“ceteris paribus a country that is relatively open receives 17 per cent more aid. A country 
that is relatively democratic receives 36 per cent  more aid; a country that has relatively long 
colonial past receives 72 per cent more aid ; a country that voted relatively often with Japan 
in the UN receives 177 per cent more aid. Finally Egypt and Israel receive much more aid 
than other countries with similar characteristics. Egypt receives 481 per cent more and the 
value for Israel is basically of the scale. (1998: 9).” 
 
They confirm the importance of democratization as a factor but indicate that it is much lesser 
than the presence of other factors, such as for example, presence of historic links:  
 
“more democratic countries receive a bit more than less democratic ones, but these 
differences are trivial compared with the difference between colonies and non-colonies. A 
non-democratic former colony receives almost 25 dollars per capita, a democratic non-
colony about 14 dollars per capita” (1998: 12).  
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The authors conclude that the US is largely driven by strategic and ideological 
concerns related to the Cold War; Japan’s key motivation is economic self-interest, 
with its foreign aid going into countries where it has strong trade interests. French aid 
goes largely to its former colonies and francophone countries, although strategic 
interests do also play a role. Sweden’s aid goes to a smaller number of countries 
(given that Sweden is a small country and its aid is small in absolute amounts), which 
share the same ideological views as Sweden (Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998).14  
Some additional analytical insights into how national self-interest is being pursued 
through foreign aid come from the work of international relations theorists.  
 
Trying to analyze the difference in US aid during and after the cold war, Meernik, 
Krueger, & Poe (1998) invoke three theoretical lenses of foreign policy behavior of 
states, the system – level, societal, and statist approach. According to the three 
authors: 
 
”The system-level approach, locates the primary determinant of state behaviour in the 
nature of the international environment... its anarchic, and self-help qualities induce 
states to be primarily concerned with their survival.... self-interested states act first 
and foremost to protect their national interests (Meernik, Krueger, & Poe, 1998: 
64).” 
 
Obviously, what the authors refer to as “system – level” approach is identical with 
what other scholars have termed “national interest”, in its versions which is concerned 
solely with preservation of national security.  
 
The second approach Meernik, Krueger, & Poe identify is the so-called “societal” 
one. Referring to work done by Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno (1988), the former 
define the societal approach as a view of American policy as: 
 
 “either reflecting the preferences of the dominant group of class in society, or as 
resulting from the struggle for influence that takes place among various interests.”  
 
They also refer to Krasner (1978), according to whom the societal view “rejects the 
notion of the state as an autonomous actor and rejects a view of the national interest 
as distinct from societal and individual interests.”   
 
The novelty of this view is that it seeks to deconstruct what is usually referred to as 
“national interest”, and to analyze factors which contribute to its definition. Thus, the 
national self-interest is not a “given” and determined by the state as an actor in its 
own right, but it takes shape through the interaction of social groups and the interests 
they represent, and which find expression in the policies of the government.  
 
Meernik, Krueger & Poe go on to conclude that what follows from the societal view is 
that  interests of business and industry are  critical in the making of U.S. foreign 
policy and that “if the societal level approach can forecast state behavior, we ought to 
find the United States pursuing a liberal, free market-oriented foreign policy (1998: 
65).”  
                                                 
14 The research looks into aid flows to Africa.  
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This view corresponds somewhat adjacently to what Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor call 
“neo-realist” approach, but it also goes further.  
 
According to neo-realists, the national interest pursued by donor governments goes 
beyond the strict security interest, and it entails economic considerations. Thus 
foreign aid serves to promote exports, access to raw materials, promote trade, and 
related commercial interests of the donor country.    
 
Meernik, Krueger, & Poe conclude that the influence that business and industrial 
lobbies have on foreign policy and foreign aid as its exponent, goes beyond simple 
promotion of economic interests of US companies through the foreign aid industry, 
and translates into ideological norms. One such norm is pertains to the promotion of 
liberal free market capitalism.  
 
Finally, according to the third, statist approach, the state has aims which are “separate 
and distinct from the interests of any particular societal group (Krasner, 1978: 10).”  
 
Meernik, Krueger, & Poe cite Krasner who regards “the pursuit of ideological goals 
as the most important” and who argues that if a state has a lot of power, it would be 
inclined to “remake the world in its own image (1998: 66).”  
 
This leads the three authors to conclude that the Unites States has continuously 
positioned itself as a promoter of moral values in international relations:  
 
 “the history of American foreign policy before and during the Cold War, [offers] 
ample evidence of the attention given to ideological concerns. Whether sincerely 
intended or not, presidents have continually made reference to the unique role of the 
United States as a moral force in world politics, particularly in the promotion of 
democracy and human rights (Meernik, Krueger, & Poe, 1998:  67).” 
 
Meernik, Krueger, & Poe’s analysis offers some interesting, albeit perhaps cynical   
conclusions about the international foreign assistance regime.  
 
Some of the arguments they make reveal possible additional angles in explaining   
certain traits of foreign aid. For example, unlike scholars who are inclined to consider 
the positive effect of democracy and democratization on foreign aid levels as a factor 
which is good in of itself, in the sense that aid  rewards good policies in recipient 
countries, Meernik, Krueger, & Poe consider it as another “concealed” facet of “self-
interest”. In their interpretation, the interest is an “emotional” one; it consists in 
promoting an ideology by the state seen as an autonomous actor.   The state which 
remodels the world in its own image uses foreign assistance as a tool to reward 
followers. Naturally, the fact that aid is used as a reward is nothing new; it is the fact 
that it is used as a reward for a very specific achievement which attracts interest. 
 
The chapter on the Political Economy of Foreign Aid by Raymond Hopkins, in Finn 
Tarp’s seminal Foreign Aid and Development (2000), is another significant 
contribution to the recent debate on factors and motives of foreign assistance.  
 
 Using the conceptual framework of “political economy”, which he defines as analysis 
of policy choices through the political and economic goals which have motivated 
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them, whereby the goals are “products of culture, institutions, power distribution and 
the dynamics of competitive interests”, Hopkins (2000) draws on three approaches 
which according to him can be useful in explaining aid. In the first, aid is an effort to 
maximize benefits to donor states; in the second, foreign aid is determined by the 
economic interests of powerful groups within donors; and in the third, aid is the 
outcome of bargaining between units, such as aid bureaucracies, multilaterals, and 
other actors in the process.    
 
The first approach is essentially another version of the concept of self-interest of a 
donor state which is seen as an autonomous actor; the second approach sees state 
policy (in this case on foreign aid) as an outcome of competition of various groups 
(firms, NGOs, sectors, parties, etc) within the state, or basically what Meernik, 
Krueger, & Poe would call a societal approach.  In the third view, the outcome results 
from the process of negotiation between the different actors in the process, inclusive 
of donors, intermediaries, recipients, and so forth: “producers and consumers of 
foreign aid set terms (prices) by bargaining (Hopkins, 2000: 425).”  
 
What this view brings in is the notion that foreign aid also depends on facts existing 
on the side of or recipient. This is of course implicit in the work of some of the 
scholars mentioned already – Alesina & Dollar show the effect of good policies, etc., - 
but Hopkins accentuates the moment of active exchange between a donor and 
recipient with regards to foreign aid. Recipients will attempt to achieve certain 
objectives requested by the donor in order to get aid, or to get more aid; sometimes 
recipients will try to have a say in the terms under which aid is awarded; it can happen   
that recipients reject aid or certain types of aid.  
 
The discussion in Chapter 3 will pin down this moment in the Balkans. In situations 
when donors agreed the terms of foreign assistance with the recipient countries, 
usually by signing cooperation agreements or memorandums, recipients had a say in 
defining the goals of ODA. Some recipients in the Balkans shied away from certain 
types of aid, such as democratization aid for example.  
 
 
 
6.2 Latest Additions to the Debate on Factors and Motives   of Aid Allocation  
 
Two most recent volumes by senior scholars on aid have made a timely contribution 
to the discussion on motivations and factors of aid giving. The first is Does Foreign 
Aid Really Work by Roger Riddell (2007), and the second, Foreign Aid by Carol 
Lancaster (2007).  
 
Riddell’s telling title “Does Foreign Aid Really Work” restates a dilemma which is 
old as foreign aid itself, and represents probably the core question in the study of 
foreign assistance – that of its effectiveness and impact.  
 
In Riddell’s view, the nominal motives for aid alone, that is, those officially provided, 
yield a far incomplete picture of why governments give aid. Giving aid, in his view, 
has always been an essentially political decision (Riddell, 2007:90).  
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Riddell considers six “clusters of motives [which] have historically influenced donor 
decision to allocate aid: These are 1) to help address emergency needs, 2) to assist 
recipients achieve their development (growth and poverty-reducing) goals, 3) to show 
solidarity, 4) to further their own national political and strategic interests, 5) to help 
promote donor country commercial interests, and 6) because of historic ties (Riddell, 
2007:90).”  
 
He also adds two additional motives which have, in his view, appeared more recently; 
strengthening global public goods, and respect for human rights by the recipient 
government.  
 
In weighing the realist vs. idealist motivations for aid, Riddell suggests that “the vast 
majority of donors have allocated aid on the basis of a mix of these different factors, 
the particular mix differing, often sharply, between donors and over different time 
periods (2007:91).” In his view, it cannot be denied that aid is influenced by self-
interest, but, there are two additional questions. One is how strong is that influence, 
and second, how much does the fact that aid is influenced by donor self-interest 
matter?  
 
Concerning the strength of the influence, he contrasts, on one side,  the views of 
Sogge (2002:43)  - who says that “ideology and pursuit of commercial advantage are 
the main determinants”, and of Browne (2006), according to whom “expansion of aid 
has been due primarily to geopolitical, commercial, and other interests,  (Riddell, 
2007:92),  - to those of Lumsdaine (1993) as the main proponent of the idealist 
paradigm, according to whom, self-interest is not sufficient in explaining foreign aid 
giving  and who argues that the principal motivation is in a final run altruism.  
 
Riddell (2007:93) summarizes some of the main arguments in the debate of how 
important the “non-developmental” factors actually are, thereby concluding that there 
is a consensus that they are important, but no consensus on how important exactly. He 
quotes the widely referenced, pioneering study by Maizels and Nissanke (1984:891) 
according to which, “United States, British, French German, and Japanese aid 
allocations were made ‘solely in support of donors perceived foreign economic, 
political and security interests’ (Riddell, 2007:93).’” Providing reference to more up 
to date work, he refers to the Alesina and Dollar study which has already been 
consulted above.  
 
Finally, Riddell points to another aspect of the difficulty of precise assessment of non-
altruistic influence on aid by suggesting that developmental and non-developmental 
motives can essentially overlap. For this he refers to recent work done by 
McGillivray.  
 
McGillivray (2003a) has rightfully observed that “there can often be methodological 
problems in trying to separate out developmental from non-developmental allocations 
of aid, particularly  when geopolitical factors lead countries to allocate more aid to 
very poor countries (cited by Riddell, 2007:93).”  
Something along the same line has been pointed out also by Lumsdaine (1993:84) 
who argued that the fact that aid goes to a former colony which is at the same time a 
poor country, is not in itself enough to claim that donor self-interest is involved, if 
there was not particular benefit for the donor.  
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Finally how much does the influence of the donor self-interest matter for aid 
effectiveness? This is an entirely different question from that of how strong the 
influence actually is. One may conclude for example that French aid is strongly 
motivated by national self-interest, but does this mean that because of this French aid 
will be ineffective in reaching its developmental goals? Does the fact that aid is 
motivated by donor self-interest definitely deprive it of developmental effect? Riddell 
lends the critical point of view of Browne (2006), according to whom, “when aid is 
allocated for the wrong reasons, it becomes largely a vain pursuit to measure its 
effectiveness (Riddell, 2007:92).”  In other words, according to Browne, the motive of 
donor self-interest is a strong factor hampering the effectiveness of aid. 
A similar argument can be found in the work of Stokke, who has suggested that the 
real motivation behind aid was the prime standard for measuring its effectiveness:   
 
“Motives and justifications for aid, more than even the stated objectives at various 
levels, constitute the standards against which the successes and failures of aid should 
be measured. Ideally, objectives are derived from motives and justifications; however 
they also give content and precision to them.  Motives – more than justifications, 
which sometimes may even disguise the real motives - drive the activity (Stokke, 1996: 
18).” 
 
The suggestion is that aid which is driven by donor self-interest will be ineffective, or 
in other words- will do little good to the recipient.  
 
The opposite point of view has been independently (not in direct opposition to the 
argument made by Stokke and Browne) suggested by Burnell. According to Burnell:  
“there is no a priori reason to suppose that transfers cannot assist the recipients just 
because they are offered on grounds which include self-interest” .In addition,  Burnell 
quite forcefully argues that, to the contrary,  “the best of intentions can produce 
action that is so misguided or badly executed that it wreaks havoc on intended 
beneficiaries (1997: 3).” 
 
Burnell makes a fair point. Donor motivations alone would often not be a sufficient 
indicator of how and for what exactly aid monies were spent, and in this sense if they 
were well and effectively spent.  Donor self-interest can mean for example, that aid 
went to a country which is of strategic importance to the donor, but without any 
prejudice as to how those resources were employed. Alternatively it can also be that 
aid really did   address a very particular issue which is primarily of interest to the 
donor, and without relevant impact on the recipient country population. However, that 
cannot be claimed without a specific disaggregation of the aid effort, and solely on the 
basis of the motivation.   
 
What is usually considered is that self-interest reduces the quality of aid because it is 
directed to countries, which yet strategic allies or friends, do not need aid as much. 
That is, that aid does not go to the poorest countries.  To this extent, aid looses 
potential effectiveness. But this is only one dimension of analysis. The second one is 
– how effective was aid in the actual phase of implementation? It is perfectly 
plausible that the donor which directs aid to poorer countries spends that aid less 
effectively than donor which gives its aid to strategic allies or friends. This question 
would require an in-dept case study analysis, and there should not be a reason to 
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preclude that motivations alone would constitute an ultimate ex-ante indicator of aid 
effectiveness  
 
In addition to Riddell’s Does Foreign Aid Really Work, Carol Lancaster’s (2007) most 
recent writing, titled simply Foreign Aid, is a fine contribution to the discussion on 
development assistance. Being uniquely well placed, as an aid practitioner and insider 
into the senior policy making circles of the US aid administration, she offers a 
convincing historic narrative about the evolution of aid motivations over the last half a 
century.  
 
The basic argument in Lancaster’s Foreign Aid is straightforward: at its emergence 
aid was a tool of the cold war; however, once it has come into existence, other 
motivations developed, and gradually an international norm of humanism took hold:  
 
“aid (for purposes other than humanitarian relief) began as temporary expedient of 
Cold War diplomacy. It was not primarily an expression of altruism on the part of the 
aid-giving countries. Nor was it driven mainly by commercial interests or desire to 
spread capitalism. If there had been no Cold War threat, the United States -  the first, 
and for most years, the largest aid-giving country – might never have initiated 
programs of aid or put pressure on other government to do so (Lancaster, 2007:5).”   
 
In Lancaster’s view, the US created the aid regime as it exists today, and exerted 
pressure on their allies to join it. She discusses the strong pressure the US put on 
Germany, which was well on the road to recovery and a growing economic power, to 
start providing aid, with the ultimatum of asking compensation for the US troops 
stationed on German territory, had Germany refused (2007: 171):  
 
“Without the Cold War, aid would likely not exist today – or if it did, it would be 
much smaller than the $100 billion in aid provided by all governments in 2004. Aid is, 
in short, a child of hardheaded, diplomatic realism (Lancaster, 2007: 25).”  
 
Writing in historic terms, Lancaster even suggests that the very beginning of foreign 
aid as it is known today can be specifically pinpointed in time – to a particular Friday 
afternoon in February 1947:  
 
“on a Friday in late February 1947, the British ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, 
informed the Department of State that the British government would no longer be able 
to support Greece in resisting a communist led insurgency or to support Turkey to 
modernize its military in the face of pressures from its Soviet neighbor. It was clear 
immediately to Secretary of State George Marshall and President Harry Truman that 
the United States would have to act to help these countries maintain their 
independence and territorial integrity (Lancaster. 2007: 63).”   
 
However, overtime, Lancaster argues, an international norm gradually emerged 
suggesting    “that the governments of rich countries should provide public, 
concessional resources to improve human condition in poor countries. [This norm] 
did not exist in 1950. By 2000 it was widely accepted and uncontested (Lancaster, 
2007).” 
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What “commenced as a temporary diplomatic expedient”, says Lancaster, “by the 
year 2000 ... became a common, and expected, element in relations between better off 
and poorer states (2007: 5).”15 
 
A common thread can be identified between the   work of Lumsdaine and Lancaster. 
They both agree that the foreign aid regime is result of gradual emergence and 
maturation of norms of international solidarity. However, whereas in Lumsdaine’s 
view that norm has already matured by the 50s, which he sees in the fact of foreign 
aid appearing almost simultaneously in just over a decade, in many industrialized 
countries, in Lancaster’s view, the norm has only started to develop in that period of 
time, by virtue of the US first instituting foreign aid policy to serve its cold war 
interests, and subsequently urging its allies to do the same. In Lumsdaine’s view, the 
norm has originated and progressed from the social democrat milieu fermenting ideas 
of humane internationalism and solidarity; Lancaster, in her historic observations, 
contends that in the beginning there was nothing more than realist national interest.  
 
 
 
6.3 Bilateral vs. Multilateral Aid  
 
 The theoretical discussion of self-interest vs. altruism is primarily relevant to bilateral 
aid; the assistance awarded from the government of one country to another. Most of 
what is written on motivations for aid looks into the motivations of governments and 
states.  
 
The situation is different when multilateral aid is considered. This is assistance 
provided by multilateral organizations such as the UN;   international financial 
institutions (IFI’s)   as the World Bank, or the IMF; regional development banks, such 
as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); or the European 
Union (EU).  
 
Scholarly thought on aid has observed early that multilateral aid works differently 
from bilateral aid and that the composition of factors shaping it is different than that 
for bilateral assistance.  Discussing aid motivations in the theoretical framework of 
recipient need (RN) vs. donor interest (DI), Maizels & Nissanke (1984) have argued 
that multilateral aid follows the RN model whereas bilateral aid follows the DI model. 
( Bandyopadhyay & Wall, 2006: 1).Or in other words, multilateral aid is more 
sensitive, responsive to need, whereas bilateral aid is more closely guided by national 
self-interest.    
Alesina & Dollar (1998) subscribe to the widely held point of view that “determinants 
of bilateral and multilateral aid are quite different” and cannot be explained together.  
 
                                                 
15 This norm “evolved in significant measure because of domestic politics of aid-giving in 
donor countries, the imperatives of governments gaining domestic support for annual aid 
expenditures, the creation and professionalization of aid agencies (which in effect became 
lobbies within their own governments for aid for development), and the rise of development -
oriented NGOs, which created the domestic constituency for aid’s development purpose 
(Lancaster, 2007: 5).”  
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Doing a comparison between bilateral and multilateral aid across many indicators of 
performance, including responsiveness to poverty, good policies, population size in 
recipient countries, etc., Canavire et al (2005) find one of the “pronounced 
differences” between bilateral and multilateral aid, together with many “minor 
discrepancies” to be the fact that multilateral aid is much less influenced by exports 
from the donor to the recipient countries. Export interests, as a subset of donor 
commercial interests, weigh substantively more on bilateral aid:  
 
“the exports of donor countries to recipient countries did not affect the allocation of 
multilateral aid, whereas the export-related self interest of DAC countries provided a 
fairly strong incentive to grant bilateral aid. In 2001, for example, 50 per cent higher 
average donor exports were associated with more than US$ 30 million additional aid 
disbursements..(Canavire et al, 2005: 18).”     
 
Radelet has also pointed out that bilateral aid is more prone to succumbing to 
economic interests in the donor country than multilateral aid (2006: 6), and according 
to Knack & Rahman (2004), the very reason nations form multilaterals is  to make 
them (and the aid they provide)  less susceptible to political pressure.  
 
Along the same line, Birsdall has suggested that pooling resources in multilaterals 
reduces aid fragmentation at recipient country level (2005: 9).  
 
Making the case that donors who are more concerned about poverty are also more 
keen to reward good policies of recipient countries, Dollar & Levine (2004) find 
multilateral assistance to rank better on both good policies and poverty than bilateral 
aid. Hjertholm& White (2000: 46) refer to work done by Rodrik (1996) who has 
pointed out that multilateral aid agencies are less influenced by political 
considerations than bilateral ones. 
 
There are however certain, if fewer, studies which represent a voice of dissent with 
the mainstream position that overall, multilateral aid is less dependent on donor self-
interest, and by virtue of this fact, also of greater quality. Referring to work by 
McGillivray & White (1993), on bilateral and multilateral performance in the period 
1974 – 1990, Hjertholm & White remind of a certain shade of doubt concerning 
multilateral aid performance:   
 
“one would have expected the political and commercial considerations of bilateral 
donors to have rendered their performance inferior to that of multilateral agencies. 
This was not the case, however, leading to speculations about the legitimacy of the 
notion of multilateral aid being relatively more poverty-oriented and needs-based 
than bilateral aid (2000: 52).” 
 
With a comprehensive analysis of the differences between bilateral and multilateral 
aid being beyond the scope of this writing, the short scan of scholarly thought above 
suffices the purpose – of pointing to the fact that these two types of aid essentially 
work differently.  
In addition, multilateral aid is not a generic term either. The types of assistance 
provided by the International Development Association (IDA), the soft loan arm of 
the World Bank, aid from the UN agencies such as United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Development Program 
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(UNDP), or World Food Program (WFP), and aid from the European Commission 
(EC),  have in common the fact of being multilateral aid. Nevertheless, they will be 
separate worlds of their own in terms of how they operate. The fact that these 
different types of multilateral aid had varied engagement across Balkan countries is of 
relevance to the further discussion.  
 
In addition, a lot of the literature on aid (some of it being of older date too, which is 
likely the reason for the point of view it employs) often considers aid from the 
European Commission as one more type of multilateral aid. A note of differentiation, 
or disclaimer, in this regard is important.  
 
  In this regard, simply placing it in the general club of multilaterals can be outdated, 
also because the EC is one of the largest donors to the other multilaterals, such as the 
World Bank or the United Nations. Over the past decade and a half, the EC aid has 
definitely transformed and become aid sui generis.  
 
It could perhaps be argued that over the years, with transformation of  the European 
Union from an economic club to a political union, the EC aid has also been 
transforming; if in the beginning of the 90s EC aid was more similar to multilateral 
aid, at present times, it is  in some veins more similar to bilateral assistance.   Thus 
discussing it in the generic terms for analyzing multilateral aid is not sufficient. This 
distinction is of special pertinence for the Balkans where EC aid has been the single 
largest contributor. In addition, EC aid to the Balkans, especially over the last 10- year 
period, has been increasingly related to the process of EU enlargement. This will be 
discussed in more detail further in the text.  
 
 
 
6.4 Summary of Factors Shaping Foreign Aid   
 
The discussion up to this point reviewed the general framework for deciding the 
allocation of foreign aid. This frame is structured by the motivations of donor 
countries to provide aid and all the additional factors which affect that decision. These 
factors are in a dynamic flux and what more, as scholarly debate has recorded, it is not 
always simple to determine with precision the composition of factors shaping aid 
allocation. For purposes of summarizing, the major variables which affect the 
allocation of foreign assistance include:  
 
 
a) Level of need. Poor countries need more aid than countries which are less 
poor. This is one of the core issues in aid research which has received a 
tremendous amount of attention. Donors are ranked in terms of quality of the 
aid they provide depending on how much of it goes to the poorest countries 
and peoples.16 The poorer a country is, the more it should be entitled to 
                                                 
16 Assistance to a country and its people is not one at the same. Sometimes donors will be 
disinclined to provide aid to a certain country because of its government’s record in human 
rights for example, but they will nevertheless recognize the need of its people of aid. The 
experiences in practice can vary and this will be discussed further in this writing. One of the 
perhaps most highlighted examples from the Balkans is the “Energy for Democracy” project 
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receive. Different donors position themselves vis-à-vis this issue in different 
ways. Need   should naturally not only be defined in terms of poverty. 
Emergencies, natural or manmade, are the basis of humanitarian and relief aid, 
whereby need is defined in terms of alleviating imminent human suffering. 
Reconstruction aid often follows after relief aid and its aim is to restore the 
conditions for life, disrupted by a natural or manmade disaster. Poverty is not a 
necessary condition for either relief or reconstruction aid. Both of these types 
of ODA were supplied to the Balkans in large quantities. 
 
b) Population size of the country. It is widely confirmed that small countries get 
more aid in per capita terms than large countries; a phenomenon which is 
known in aid literature as “small country bias”. If aid would be allocated on 
the basis of need alone, and be proportional to a country’s population, than 
practically all aid should go to two countries alone: India and China (White, 
2004: 241).    
 
c) Geo-strategic location of the country. The part or the region of the world 
where the country is located, that is, its geo-strategic importance, strongly 
influences the amounts of aid it could receive. Most of the aid to the Balkans 
comes from European countries.  The Balkans is getting disproportionately a 
lot of aid from the EC in per capita terms, compared to much poorer parts of 
the world. Further, it is widely known that 1/3 of all US aid goes to two 
countries in the Middle East alone: Egypt and Israel. This factor of geo-
strategic or geo-political position of the country will influence not only the 
amount, but also the type of aid the country is getting from different donors. 
 
d) Historic, political, economic, cultural, and other ties. The different ties which 
exist between the donor and recipient country act as a strong determinant of 
aid. Colonial ties have been proven to be a strong predictor of allocation.  
 
e) Recipient country policies. The policies which donors  consider important in 
assessing a country’s eligibility, or worthiness for receiving aid, such as 
democracy and human rights record, promoting of good economic policies, 
overall good governance, fight against corruption, are all relevant factors of 
aid allocation.   
 
To summarize further:   
 
? different donor countries will be more or less motivated by different sets of 
interests, ranging from strategic and security interests, economic benefits, to 
ideological or cultural goals; 
? these different interests can display with different intensity depending on the 
specific  situation and some will prevail over others in different settings; 
                                                                                                                                            
of the European Commission, to supply heating oil only to opposition run municipalities in 
Serbia in the winter of 1999. The major concern in the donor community was to make sure 
that the Milosevic regime does not in any way benefit from the aid. This case will be analyzed 
later in the text.  
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? different types of donors (bilateral vs. multilateral) will essentially be driven 
by different types of motivation; 
? different types of aid will correspond differently with different motivations. 
For example, humanitarian aid which aims to relieve imminent suffering 
would be less influenced by donor self-interest than soft loans for balance of 
payments, but the probability for and the extent of that interrelationship would 
always depend on who stands on the side of donor and recipient.  
 
The preceding discussion on motivations of foreign aid has already lent significant 
insight into the wider factors of allocation of development assistance. Schraeder, 
Hook, & Taylor (1998) and Alesina& Dollar (1998) have discussed the factors which 
shape the aid allocations of the largest bilaterals, whose combined aid allocations have 
always represented the bulk of foreign aid globally; in addition Alesina & Dollar have 
provided relevant insights into their relative weight. 
 
The short list of factors above is by no means exhaustive. There are many other 
factors that influence aid allocation. For example, according to Lai (2003:105) one of 
the strongest predictors whether a country will receive aid, is whether it received it in 
the previous year. He relates this to bureaucratic decision making. The OECD (2005: 
46) subscribed to this point of view, providing a somewhat more value neutral 
observation according to which: 
 
 “in most DAC member countries, radical changes to … distribution patterns are 
rare,  with established commitment tending to continue and changes generally 
occurring by making small adjustments  regularly (OECD 2005: 46).”  
 
Mosley (1985: 380) has noted the same quite earlier also by concluding that aid 
disbursements by almost all donors (he finds the US and Sweden to be exceptions to 
this) are determined in upward direction predominantly by two factors: past 
disbursements; and disbursements by other donors, which “encourage” or “shame” the 
other “members of the club”, that is of the donor community. Peer pressure as factor 
of aid has been observed and discussed by quite a few scholars. For example, Round 
& Odedokun (2003: 20) have found strong evidence to confirm   the influence of peer 
pressure through   empirical analysis.     Other authors have nevertheless, considered 
this influence not to be substantial. Riddell (2007: 91) for example, thinks that, still, 
for the vast majority of donors, separate decision making is the rule. Thus, although 
there may not be a consensus on how important peer pressure is, it can definitely be 
concluded that it exists as a factor of aid allocation.  
 
In conclusion, after having provided the framework, composed of the poles of self-
interest vs. altruism, and the middle ground of enlightened self-interest, the section 
above discussed the many potential variables existing both on the side of the donor 
and the recipient, known to influence aid allocation. The list of items was by no 
means exhaustive. The discussion merely referenced some of the more common 
issues present in scholarship on aid. Note was made thereof of the difference between 
bilateral and multilateral donors. Summary was given on some of the relatively more 
important variables.     
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6.5 Fusion of Justifications for Aid  
 
The literature on aid, some of which was reviewed above, has pointed out that the 
motives and factors of aid enter into many interrelationships with different dynamics. 
It can be said that in the reality of foreign assistance there is a certain 
interconnectedness and substitutability of motivations and justifications for aid. This 
essentially means that the different rationales for foreign assistance can   often be 
mixed and interweaved   . In addition, rationales, as well as their interrelationships, 
are subject to change over time.  
   
At present for example, the argument which looms large in the donor community is 
that aiding democracy abroad can strengthen national security at home; the US has 
been a strong proponent of this view. Although support for democracy promotion has 
long been a consistent priority of US foreign policy, according to some scholars, this 
recent “remake” of the argument, which reinforces the relevance for national security 
as opposed to democracy as an end in itself, has been related to research which has 
indicated that democracies rarely wage wars on one another.17   
 
 In addition, the issue of the link between democracy and development has long been 
thoroughly studied and there are variety of views; from the older argument that 
democratic political system is not conducive to development, to the revived ideology 
that it does actually provide the best framework for robust economic growth. In turn, 
it has also been argued that economic growth is a prerequisite of democracy.18  
 
This endless availability of possible causalities has proven to provide a fair 
combination of motivations and justifications for foreign aid. Sometimes these 
justifications have the purpose of convincing legislatures to approve aid 
appropriations, or to mobilize the support by public opinion, but sometimes they are 
definitely an expression of sincere faith in, be it ideologically or scientifically 
supported propositions.  
 
This does not pertain to motivations and rationales for aid alone, but also to modalities 
in implementation of the aid effort. The practice and scholarship of aid have gone 
through several phases since the appearance of foreign assistance in the 50s. If the 
final expected goal was always defined in terms of economic growth, the proposed 
and attempted ways to achieve it have definitely gone through transformations.  
Chapter 2 on foreign aid in the 1990s discusses in more detail the changes in 
“thinking about development” which led to substantial transformation of foreign aid 
practices after the end of the cold war.  
 
A digression to older, yet not dated arguments is perhaps insightful. Discussing the 
doctrines and ideas about development in the US policy community, Robert 
                                                 
17 See for example, Weart Spencer R, Never at War. Why Democracies Will Not Fight One 
Another? Yale University Press, 1998; Rummel  Rudoplh J., Libertarian Propositions on 
Violence Within and Between Nations: A Test Against Published Research Results, The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 29 ,September 1985 p. 419-455. In addition, for see for 
example  bibliography on the topic collected by Rummel Rudolph J., available at   
http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/MTF.BIBLIO.HTM  
18 These views will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
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Packenham, in his Liberal America and the Third World (1973) has long time ago 
argued that the essential belief that one good thing leads to another – democracy leads 
to economic growth; economic growth reduces poverty, less poverty lessens the 
propensity for violence (terrorism?), and so forth- is typical of American liberal 
thinking about development.   
 
The idea originally belongs to Huntington. In his Political Order in Changing 
Societies (1968), Huntington called it “unity of goodness”; a term he used to explain 
that blessed by their happy history Americans tend to think that change and 
development were easy.  
 
The fusion of rationales for aid, based on ideological, or evidence based convictions 
in desirable developmental causalities is a matter of reality, and what more it is a 
commonly observed practice in policy documents. Differing views can be found on 
the “motivations” for the fusions as well, that is, why such fusions are created.    
 
For example, Meernik, Krueger, & Poe (1998: 67) have suggested that the framing of 
the aid effort in moral, value based terms increases its appeal to the public. Their 
argumentation is that the rhetoric of “ethics” is utilized in garnering public support, 
for what is essentially pursuit of national self-interest.  However, the preposition 
exists that the opposite can also be true, that is, that governments would sometimes 
feel compelled to justify with self-interest an aid effort essentially motivated by moral 
sentiments, in order to persuade legislators to support it.  
 
In conclusion, whatever the direction of the desired sequence of causality, 
justifications for aid are often fused, especially by policy makers. This of course 
reflects the reality of the aid process and more generally social change, but it also 
corresponds to donor views and thinking about the role of aid in development.  
 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
The preceding pages   reviewed the major strands in the long-running debate on 
motivations of foreign aid. The discussion tried to reference some of the most well-
known and influential views on the topic.  
 
The conclusion is that most views concur that donor self-interest is the dominant 
factor of aid allocation, although there is understanding that no donor is either 
completely realist or altruist.  
 
In addition to the ideological poles and the middle ground occupied by the concept of 
the enlightened self-interest, the discussion outlined the numerous factors that have 
been proven to influence aid decisions, and which align to, or actually   derive from 
the basic ideological view supporting the decision on aid.  
 
The discussion also served as an introduction into some   the basic concepts in foreign 
assistance which will be further discussed in the next chapters.   
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 Chapter 2 which follows steers the focus to the profound changes that took place 
inside the international system of aid after the end of the cold war. This gradually sets 
the stage for the focus of the discussion – the region of the Balkans, whose emergence 
as an important aid recipient, coincided with these changes.    
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Foreign Aid in the 1990s: 
Changes in the Foreign Aid Regime After the Cold War 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The 1990s of the last century brought about the biggest changes in the foreign aid 
regime ever since its creation with the Point Four of US President Harry Truman19, 
and the institution of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe. The single most 
important factor for this transformation, by a wide consensus,   was the end of the 
cold war and subsequently, the dismantling of the bipolar world.  
 
Chapter II, as already evident by its title, focuses on the foreign aid regime after 1989, 
the year which marked the end of the cold war. The decade of the 90s is important 
because it was the period of greatest change in the foreign aid regime since its 
creation. Its other very specific importance of interest to this text is that it was the 
period of time in which the region of the Balkans became a strong recipient of foreign 
assistance. These two processes coincided. The great changes in the international aid 
system started taking place about the same time the Balkans emerged as a strong 
recipient of ODA20. What more, although not directly, they were interrelated. They 
were related in the sense that they were, in a general sense, instigated by the same 
events. The fall of the Berlin Wall opened Eastern Europe as the grand new frontier 
for foreign assistance; the change of the global geopolitical circumstance also changed 
some of the ways in which aid operated.  It is important to note these changes as they 
provided the overall framework for foreign aid to the Balkans.  
 
Chapter I on motivations for aid discussed in length the interest of donor governments 
as a factor in the shaping and maintenance of the international foreign aid system. The 
predominant voice in the debate on motives relates foreign aid   to the national interest 
of donor states, and subsequently sees it as a tool of foreign policy. In addition, there 
is wide consensus that in the 40- year period from 1950-1990, foreign aid was under 
strong dominance of cold war politics. Thus, in the aftermath of the cold war, the 
                                                 
19 Point Four was the “US policy of technical assistance and economic aid to underdeveloped 
countries, so named because it was the fourth point of President Harry S. Truman’s 1949 
inaugural address.” See Encyclopaedia Britannica at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/466343/Point-Four-Program . Point Four is 
considered as the beginning of official foreign aid programs in today’s sense of the word.    
20 Official Development Assistance (ODA) covers: “Grants or Loans to countries and 
territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are: (a) 
undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as 
the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a Grant Element 
(q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]. In addition to financial flows, Technical Co-operation (q.v.) is 
included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded.   Transfer 
payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) are in 
general not counted.” See DAC’s Glossary available at 
http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html   
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essential question was - what will happen with aid once this major reason for its 
existence was gone?  
 
Scholarly writing on foreign aid over the 90s has widely promoted the conclusion 
that, contrary to some expectations, the end of the cold war did not bring as big a 
change in aid as expected (Hjertholm & White, 2000; Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 
1998; Hook, 1995). Or in other words, it proved wrong the numerous forecasts and 
expectations that foreign assistance would actually disappear once the cold war was 
over. This conclusion looms large in the writing on foreign aid in the 90s.  
 
For example, Hjertholm & White (2000: 84) observe that the end of the cold war did 
not actually change the aid system as much as it was expected, in the sense that it did 
not bring about its final dissolution: 
 
 “the end of the cold war may be expected to have heralded great changes for aid. 
There have been less (and different) changes that many expected however.”  
 
In identical manner, and somewhat earlier, Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor (1998: 294) 
have suggested that “contrary to the expectations of many, the global network of 
foreign aid has outlasted the end of the cold war.”  
 
The same conclusion is also evident in earlier work done by Hook (1995: 3): 
 
 “contrary to widespread expectations that foreign aid flows would weaken or 
disappear with the demise of the cold war ...the scope and complexity of aid relations 
has only increased in the 1990s.” Further in the same title (National Interest and 
Foreign Aid,) Hook (1995: 32) repeats that “the end of the cold war did not produce 
the end of the aid regime, as many had predicted...”  
 
In his latest contribution, Riddell (2007:2) echoes the same conclusions from an even 
safer time distance:  
 
“...as the cold war drew to an end, aid levels experienced their sharpest and most 
prolonged period of contraction in four decades. This led some to question whether 
foreign aid would survive in our new, emerging and globalizing world. Some thought 
it would wither, and eventually disappear, as another relic of the cold war.”  
 
Previsions of the end of foreign aid as such derived from the strict understanding of 
aid as a tool of foreign policy pursuing national security objectives:  
 
“the dismantling of the Berlin Wall symbolized the end of the East-West divide and 
hence, for some, the end of the need for aid. (Riddell, 2007:38).” 
 
A dose of contentment is evident in the conclusions of scholars that aid did as a matter 
of fact manage to survive the end of the cold war.  Riddell (2007: 38) suggests that the 
expectation of the end of foreign aid proved not truer than that of the “end of 
history”21: 
                                                 
21 Riddell refers to Francis Fukuyama’s renowned The End of the History and the Last Man 
(1992), (Fukuyama originally promoted the idea in the foreign policy journal, the National 
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“Such was the extent and the dept of the fall in ODA as the 1990s progressed that, 
from the early 90s to well into the new century, a dominant theme in the aid literature 
was that we were witnessing the end of official development aid as we had known it. 
Understandably prominent among the explanations for this dramatic fall-off in aid-
giving was the ending of the cold war- assertions that we have reached ‘the end of 
political aid’ sat comfortably alongside those proclaiming ‘the end of history’. Both 
proved to be mirages.”  
 
Nevertheless, if aid did not disappear with the end of the cold war, it did definitely 
experience the strongest decline ever since its very appearance, making predictions 
not completely unfounded. Predictions which foresaw the end of foreign aid, held aid 
as an instrument serving national security interest of states. Two points are important 
to mention in this regard.  First, national security interests did not disappear 
completely; they merely modified.  Second, national security was not an equally 
strong motive for all donors active in   foreign assistance   
 
 
 
2. Decline of Foreign Assistance in the 1990s 
 
Global aid flows reached a peak in 1992 and started plummeting from there on until 
the late 90s, when they returned to an ascending trajectory. The decline of foreign 
assistance in the 1990s was by and large due to the reduced aid contributions by the 
world’s largest donors led by the US.   
 
The following passage from Riddell (2007: 94) is instrumental in describing this trend 
and the motivation behind it:  
 
“One-quarter of all ODA and 30 per cent of all official bilateral aid22 is provided by 
the United States...the end of the cold war afforded the United States what turned out 
to be a relatively short break from the pressure to allocate aid according to clear 
geopolitical aims, but instead of refocusing aid to the poorest countries, deep cuts in 
the overall level of aid were made. In real terms, the total amount of United States 
official aid fell by half between 1990 and 1997.”  
 
A similar description of global trends in foreign assistance made by Radelet, which 
has a particular focus on the changes in the 1990s, conveys the same point. Chart 1 
below, taken from Radelet provides a visual description of the global trends in ODA 
                                                                                                                                            
Interest in 1989). He argued that Western liberal democracy emerged as the “last man 
standing” from the  cold war, and that it posited itself as the only alternative for a post-cold 
war model of political organization of states.  
22  Bilateral aid comprises “flows [which] are provided directly by a donor country to an aid 
recipient country. See DAC’s Glossary available at 
http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965442. 
The DAC Statistical Reporting Directives (2007) provide a more elaborate definition of 
bilateral aid. According to this definition: “bilateral transactions are those undertaken by a 
donor country directly with a developing country.  They also include transactions with 
national and international non-government organisations active in development and other 
internal development-related transactions such as interest subsidies, spending on promotion of 
development awareness, debt reorganisation and administrative costs (OECD, 2007: 6).”   
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allocation over a 30 year period (1975-2004).   Radelet comments the trend and    
analyzes some of the principal causes for shifts in aid trajectories:    
  
 “Global ODA increased steadily from the 1960s until it reached a peak of $68 billion 
in 1992, just after the end of the Cold War, and then declined sharply to just under 
$55 billion in 1997. Aid flows began to rebound in the late 1990s following calls for 
greater debt relief23 and increased aid to new democracies, and accelerated very 
sharply after the attacks of September 11, 2001, reaching $92 billion in 2004... 
(Radelet, 2006: 4)”  
 
Radelet   points out that  “In real terms, total ODA in 2002 was about the same as in 
1992, and by 2004 was about 12 percent higher (Radelet, 2006: 4).”  Chart 1 below 
shows the decline in ODA (in nominal and real amounts, and a percent of donor GDP) 
in the beginning of the 90s, after a steady, continuous growth over the previous two 
decades.     
 
 
                                                 
23 Debt relief or debt forgiveness is one form of what the DAC terms as debt reorganization, 
which includes: “Any action officially agreed between creditor and debtor that alters the 
terms previously established for repayment. This may include forgiveness (extinction of the 
loan), or rescheduling which can be implemented either by revising the repayment schedule or 
extending a new refinancing loan.” See DAC’s Glossary at 
http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965500 .  
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          Chart 1: Global ODA 1975 – 2004  
 
 
   
Source: OECD/DAC; from Radelet (2006)  
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The landmark World Bank report Assessing Aid. What Works, What Doesn’t, and 
Why?, points to the lowest point of foreign aid decline in the 1990s, by looking at aid 
as share of donor GDP:    
 
“In 1997 OECD donors gave the smallest share of their GNPs in aid since 
comparable statistics began in the 1950s-less than one-quarter of 1 percent. It would 
take roughly a 50 percent increase even to restore aid to its 1991 level (World Bank, 
1998: 2).”  
 
After the all-time low in 1997 aid started recovering in the late 1990s and reassumed a 
fast upward trend in the beginning of the 21st century. There is   a consensus in the 
literature24 that the critical moment was marked by the 9/11 attack on US soil and the 
ensuing war on terror.  
 
Riddell   has highlighted the fact that after the slump in the 1990s, foreign aid reached 
an all- time record high in the first years of 2000s, noting however that most of the aid 
increase accounted for on a few specific types of aid:  
 
“In the year 2005, the total quantity of aid provided by the rich countries of the world 
topped the $ 100 bn mark for the first time ever, nearly doubling the amount of 
official aid given in 2001 ($52 bn).” ....”Careful analysis of the massive jump in aid – 
from $ 80 bn in 2004 to over $100 bn in 2005 - showed that the additional aid 
provided was absorbed almost entirely in debt relief, emergency aid25, and other 
special purpose grants...  (Riddell, 2007: 2-3)” 
 
In conclusion, aid did survive the end of the cold war, but it also suffered its sharpest 
decline ever. It started falling from 1992, stayed low throughout the 90s, to start 
slowly to resume towards the end of the decade. The 9/11 attack on the United States 
and the ensuing war on terror have marked the beginning of a new era in international 
relations and have definitely brought aid as an instrument of national security interest 
back into the fore.  
 
As already noted, it was exactly in this redefining period for foreign aid that the 
Balkans appeared as strong aid recipient d. The global decline of foreign assistance 
efforts can not be observed in the Balkans, as shall be discussed further. The region 
received massive assistance flows over the 1990s.  
 
                                                 
24See for example  Radelet (2006); see also Moss Todd, Roodman David, and Standley Scott, 
The Global War on Terror and US Development Assistance: USAID Allocation by Country, 
1998-2005, Centre for Global Development, Working Paper, No. 62, July 2005; Burnell 
Peter, Foreign Aid; Resurgent: New Spirit or Old Hangover? Research Paper 2004/44, UNU 
WIDER, July 2004.  
25 The term emergency aid in this sense is used to denote the category of humanitarian aid. 
According to the DAC definition: “Within the overall definition of ODA, humanitarian aid is 
assistance designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity 
during and in the aftermath of emergencies.  To be classified as humanitarian, aid should be 
consistent with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and 
independence (OECD, 2007a).”  The composition of humanitarian aid will be discussed in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  
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The last dramatic events of relevance to foreign aid dynamics, the NATO intervention 
in Kosovo in 1999 and the severe humanitarian crisis, the subsequent ousting of 
President Slobodan Milosevic and democratization of Serbia in the autumn of 2000, 
both happened before 9/11. This time dimension should be underscored as it of 
importance for the priority and attention that the international community could at the 
time dedicate to the Balkans.  
 
 
 
3. Factors for the Decline of Aid in the 1990s 
 
What were the reasons for such a radical decline of foreign aid in the 1990s?  As 
already discussed above, the reductions of aid amounts of the largest donors have 
been largely explained through the end-of-the-cold war paradigm.  The profound and 
far-reaching geopolitical changes produced with the collapse of the bipolar world 
have been by a wide consensus accepted as the principal factor. If the end of the cold 
war did not manage to dissolve foreign aid completely, it did definitely and 
effectively change it. The declined levels were only one, if most pronounced aspect of 
that change.  
 
Geopolitics was not, as this chapter will further discuss, the only factor, although it 
was definitely held to have been the most influential one. The compelling logic is that 
the end of the cold war lifted the direct threat to national security of major donor 
states, primarily the United States, and with it, eliminated a strong factor for giving 
aid. The  most austere version of this view considered the realist-political motivation 
for aid as a sole rationale for aid as such, and saw the end of political need for aid as 
the end of need for aid overall.   
 
For Hopkins (2000), it is logical that the sharpest declines in aid therefore took place 
with donors which were most engaged in the global ideological clash, the United 
States and its closest allies:  
 
“the end of the cold war both reduced support for aid and loosened constraints on its 
use. From 1948 until 1991, the great risk to security from a war between two large 
alliances caused each side to mobilize and use aid as a tool to shape relations with 
other states (2000:428)...in donors most engaged in the cold war struggle, 
particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, domestic support for aid 
evaporated with the end of the global ideological clash. Predictably, among OECD 
members, the largest declines in aid since 1992 are reported for the United States, 
followed by close military allies, Germany, Japan, Australia (2000:426).”  
 
The argument concerning Japan as put forth by Hopkins is nevertheless countered by 
observations of aid trends made by other scholars. White (2002, 2004) for one has 
pointed out (this chapter) that Japan became the single largest bilateral donor in the 
early 1990s. This was possibly in part made possible by the falling levels of US aid.  
 
Table 1 below, adapted from White (2002) shows the trends in the shares of bilateral 
donor in total aid in the period 1966-2000. From the table it is clear that the biggest 
change concerns the share of the United States which steadily declines from 35% in 
the 1970s, 25% in the 1980s, to 18% -17% in the 1990s. Contrary to Hopkins’s 
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argument, Table 1 does not demonstrate decline of Japanese aid.26 On the other end, 
the strongest growth is marked by the   Nordic countries whose share in total global 
volumes of ODA has grown steadily over the decades.  
 
Taking into account factors that go beyond   the (substantial) US influence on overall 
aid flows, White (2004: 237), gives a relevant cross-national overview of the trend in 
development assistance, over a longer time period (see Table 1 below):  
 
“The most striking change is the falling share of the United States, from over half in 
the 1960s to well under a fifth by the end of the 1990s. The largest rise is that of 
Japan, which became the largest single donor in the early 90s, accounting for just 
over one fifth of all DAC bilateral aid. However, the United States remains the second 
largest donor in absolute terms, with a program just over double that of the next rank 
of donors (France, Germany, and the UK with shares in 1990-2000 of 11%, 11%, and 
7%, respectively). Whilst the shares of the former colonial donors, France, Germany, 
and the UK, have not changed greatly since the 60s, the share of the new European 
donors has risen. That of the Scandinavians grew most quickly from the 60s to the 
early 70s: collectively, their share rose from 4% in 1966-1969 to 16% in 1996-2000. 
The programs of southern European donors grew in the 80s, continuing its growth in 
the next decade, dropping back slightly with the drastic cut in Italian aid in the late 
90s (White, 2004: 237).”  
 
 
Table 1: Bilateral donor shares in total aid, 1966-2000; (period averages; per cent)  
 
 1966-1969 
1970-
1979 
1980-
1989 
1990-
1995 
1996-
2000 
France 13 11 12 14 11 
Germany 8 12 11 12 11 
Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherl., Norway, and 4 12 13 14 16 
Japan 5 10 16 20 22 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain 2 2 6 8 7 
United Kingdom 7 8 6 5 7 
United States 54 32 25 18 17 
Others 7 13 11 10 10 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: adapted from White (2002) 
                                                 
26 It should be borne in mind that the table displays period averages, thus a decline over a 1-2 
year period can be concealed by a subsequent rise in the ensuing years, with no change in 
period averages as a final result.  
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However Hopkins (2000: 430) concedes that “some political uses of aid to promote 
stability continue”. Therefore, he confirms the fact that the end of the cold war did 
not mean final disengagement between aid and politics. He supports this assertion 
with the fact that aid is still being used as a tool for maintaining political stability: 
“aid still goes to help stabilize countries or regions such as the Middle East, Eastern 
Europe, or Southern Africa (Hopkins, (2000: 430).”  
 
Riddell (2000) fine-tunes the argument and makes a very relevant conclusion in 
pointing out that the end of the cold war did not eliminate the political motivation for 
aid but that it instead changed the relationship between politics and foreign assistance. 
According to him, politics still remains central to understanding ad:  
 
“the end of the cold war...led some to believe that the political influences on aid and 
the impact of aid would decline. In practice, however, the political dimensions of aid 
remain central to understanding both the giving of aid and its impact on the recipient 
end. It is the nature of   some of the relationships between aid and politics which have 
changed (Riddell, 2007:7).” 
 
With the end of the cold war threat to national security of (great donor) states declined 
but it did not disappear. Rather, as it has been pointed out by many scholars (Lai, 
2003; Hopkins, 2000), it transformed. The standoff by two major blocks was replaced 
by small, but numerous local and regional conflicts, which were both a cause and 
consequence of failed states, many of which were created in the process of dissolution 
of the geopolitical blocks. These failed states were not a direct and imminent threat to 
the national security of great powers, in the sense threat was perceived during the cold 
war, but they produced refugees, threatened regional security balances, and proved a 
breeding ground for the threat of the coming century- terrorism.  
 
This new aspect of the national security interest has been well observed by Lai (2003: 
106):  
 
  “given that the current distribution of power is somewhat unilateral, especially in 
terms of military strength, threats to US security are likely to be regional....while none 
of these regional foes threatens the continental United States like the Soviet Union 
did, they still threaten vital US interests across the world...with the end of the Soviet 
threat it has been argued that the US has switched its focus to containing ‘rogue 
states.’ “ 
 
The same argument can be found in the work of Hopkins. He suggests that the 
transformed security interest sets new goals for foreign policy, and subsequently for 
foreign assistance:  
 
“Now that the cold war is over, foreign policy is more geared towards international 
public goods, including containing international ‘bads’ (Hopkins, 2000: 425).” 
 
One direct consequence of this modified international environment   on allocation of 
foreign assistance has been - its withholding from traditional allies from the time of 
the cold war. National allies could no longer expect to aid get under the same terms as 
during the bipolar freeze. Until 1990 allies often received aid without questions asked 
as long as they stayed military allies and rejected communism. It was not important 
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whether they spent aid effectively and efficiently; nor was much attention paid to their 
human rights record, economic policies, or the democratic standards they pursued. 
The end of the cold war brought changes to that system. Donors started linking aid to 
protection of human rights, democracy, and the “correct” economic policies.  
 
This led to greater aid selectivity, the rise of political conditionality, and democracy 
assistance. The change in the global aid regime in the 1990s did not comprise only the 
reduction of aid flows, but also a rather profound shift in the themes, priorities, and 
methods of aid. Some of these changes did come into effect as a result of the 
declining geopolitical rationale, but not all of them.  
 
Some of the changes were a result of processes that had been gradually unfolding in 
the preceding  decades. One such change is the increasing role of NGOs which will be 
discussed further in this chapter. Others were result of ideological shifts which have 
occurred prior to or independently from the end of the cold war. An example for such 
a change is the withdrawal of aid away from production sectors27 .  
 
Lessened threat to national security was one of the major factors for falling aid levels, 
but it was not the only one. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the 
geopolitical rationale never had the same importance for the aid programs of the 
middle powers as it had for the US and the Soviet Union.    
 
Discussing the factors for the changes in the aid regime post-90, Hopkins   has 
suggested as many as six reasons for the declining aid flows over the 1990s:  
 
“First, the end of the cold war made it less important. Second, globalization 
attenuated aid tied to colonial interests. Third, growing budget pressures squeezed 
donor resources. Fourth, disappointment with the effectiveness of aid weakened 
popular support. Fifth, donor country specific interest coalitions supporting aid 
unraveled. Finally, neo-liberal philosophies challenged some of the intellectual 
foundations of aid (Hopkins (2000: 426).”  
 
 Given that it accounts for a huge share of global allocations,   foreign assistance by 
the United States has traditionally occupied the center-stage in scholarship on aid. In 
addition to the widely discussed reasons for the fall-off in US aid, several scholars 
(Hopkins, 2000; Hook, 1996) have discussed the specific factors of decline of 
European aid in the 1990s, at regional as well as country basis. Some of these factors 
are again in a final analysis connected to the end of the cold war, such as German 
unification, or enhanced European integration, but their influence on foreign aid does 
not essentially follow the same national security logic as it is the case with  US 
foreign assistance.  
 
Hopkins (2000:431) has, among others, pointed to the effect of the preparation for the 
adoption of the European single currency on aid allocations by EU countries in the 
                                                 
27 Production is one of the sectors in sector allocable aid, according to the classification of the 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS) maintained by the DAC. The sector of production contains 
aid allocated for: agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry, mineral resources and mining, 
construction, trade policy and regulations, and tourism. The CRS is available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW    
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1990s. He notes though that the effect of this process was not equally distributed 
across European economies:  
 
“Among European countries, the decision to meet the Maastricht’s treaty criteria for 
entering the Euro-currency arrangement required substantial shrinking in budget 
deficits in the years leading up to January 1999. Slow economic growth made the 
fiscal cuts required particularly painful. Some were dramatic. In Italy, for example, 
after large increases in aid, budget pressures in the nineties, combined with 
disappointment about fraud and waste in projects, brought about a fall in Italian aid 
over 50 per cent ( Hopkins (2000:431).”  
 
Hook (1996) has pointed out to the after-effect of another major change made 
possible by the end of the cold war – the unification of Germany - on European 
foreign aid. Hook suggests that the slowed economic growth in Germany, caused by 
the enormous cost of unification, has had significant impact on the wider European 
economy:  
 
“Germany fell into a protracted economic slump after covering the enormous cost of 
unification and its restrictive monetary policies dampened economic growth across 
the European Union (EU). Economic strains provoked nationalistic uprisings in 
major German cities and across France and Great Britain, where sluggish growth 
and high unemployment were increasingly blamed on unfair trade practices and 
foreign laborers. Scandinavian leaders, long the leading foreign aid donors on 
qualitative terms, scaled back aid commitments after conservative parties rose to 
power and demanded deep cuts in government spending (Hook (1996: 2).”  
 
Nevertheless, Hook   goes beyond Europe per se, and points out to the wider, global 
character of fiscal constraints in the 1990s:  
 
“even the government of Japan, the world’s largest donor since 1989, temporarily 
curbed many aid programs as it struggled to overcome recession and political crisis 
(1996: 2).”   
 
The logic is corroborated by Riddell (2007), a decade later. Riddell however points 
out that the fiscal crisis of the 90s was not the first one to affect foreign aid 
historically:   
 
“sharp falls in ODA were also linked to a (short) period of large fiscal deficits in 
leading donor countries (as they had been in earlier times),and to rising concerns 
about the environment, to which (falling) aid funds were additionally directed 
(Riddell, 2007: 38).”  
 
The phrase “earlier times” refers to the two major oil crises from the 1970s which   at 
the time had a profound impact on foreign aid. This impact resulted with declining 
flows in most donor countries (except for OPEC countries whose aid flows surged) 
and with the paradigmatic shift towards macro-economic stabilization and adjustment 
as new goals for ODA,  in the sense that aid was redirected to maintaining 
macroeconomic stability and regular repayment of debt to donor countries, over the 
1980s.  
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According to Hook (1996), fiscal strictness was also accompanied by reduction in the 
quality of aid, in the sense that donor self-interest played a greater role in deciding 
which aid will endure:  
 
“the euphoria surrounding the cold war’s demise gave way to a new era of fiscal 
austerity and economic competition in the industrialized world. Without influential 
domestic constituencies to promote aid on a humanitarian basis, and in absence of the 
geopolitical rationales that had driven U.S. and Soviet aid flows for decades, many 
long-standing aid programs were reduced or eliminated outright. Those that survived 
were often those that most benefited the donor countries... (Hook (1996: 227)”  
 
An analysis coming from White (2004), and which is of particular relevance for this 
writing concerned with foreign aid to the Balkans, as a part of the wider Eastern 
Europe, makes a very relevant point by suggesting that at least some of the global 
decline of aid flows in the 1990s is relative or ostensible in character. This is because   
aid flows to Eastern Europe have not been counted by the OECD as ODA but instead 
as OA (Official Aid). In this sense, at least a part of the decline of ODA is result of 
the increasing OA to post-communist countries (Table 2):  
 
“Why has aid fallen in the 1990s? One reason maybe thought to be diversion to other 
uses. In particular, rather than realizing a peace dividend from the end of the cold 
war, funds have been taken up by the needs of the former Communist countries. To 
the extent that these countries do not qualify as ODA recipients then ODA will fall. 
Whilst this is part of the story, the data do not bear out the view that it is the whole 
picture. In 2000, OA was US $7.8 billion. Since total ODA in that year was US $49.5 
billion, then OA ‘‘accounted for’’ about 60% of the ‘‘shortfall’’ in ODA compared to 
its nominal peak in 1992. But, between 1993 and 2000, OA rose by $2 billion, 
compared to the fall in ODA of US $6 billion, suggesting that increased OA explains 
an even smaller part of the fall in ODA. Hence, additional reasons for the fall in ODA 
have to be sought (White, 2004: 236).” 28  
 
Table 2 below comprises the major recipients of OA and their share in total OA flows 
over the 90s.  
 
The issue of ODA vs. OA as it pertains to the Balkans will be revisited in Chapter 5 
which will start the exploration of numbers on foreign assistance to the region.  
                                                 
28 The DAC originally produced the Part II list of recipients, or recipients of OA – to 
distinguish transition from developing countries. White observes that most OA, with the 
exception of Israel, went to countries in Eastern Europe: 
 
 ”Predominant in the list of recipient of OA are those of the former Soviet Union and other 
Eastern block countries. Such countries constitute, with one exception. the top 12 recipients 
of OA with the largest two, Russia and Poland, getting just under 20% each in the total in 
2000. ...most notable is Israel accounting for 10% of OA. (White, 2004: 242).” The special 
position of Israel (together with Egypt) as recipient of US aid has already been mentioned in 
the previous chapter. In 1997 Israel was graduated from the list of ODA and was moved to 
Part II, list of OA recipients. White notes that,   “the graduation of Israel off Part I of the 
DAC list thus badly hit the volume of U.S. ODA since the money has continued to flow to 
Israel, rather than be reallocated to countries eligible for ODA. (2004: 236).”   
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Table 2: Major recipients of official aid (OA), 1991-2000, (USD million) 
 
 1991 1995 2000 Share in 2000 (%) 
Russia 563.5 1,610.1 1,564.6 19.5 
Poland 2,508.3 3,790.4 1,396.2 17.4 
Israel na na 800.0 10.0 
Ukraine 368.3 319.1 541.0 6.7 
Czech Republic 230.6 147.9 438.2 5.5 
Romania 321.1 275.6 432.1 5.4 
Bulgaria 316.1 113.7 311.1 3.9 
Hungary 626.0 -244.0 252.2 3.1 
Slovak Republic 114.5 98.2 113.1 1.4 
Lithuania 4.0 179.6 99.0 1.2 
Latvia 3.4 63.6 91.1 1.1 
Estonia 15.4 58.2 63.8 0.8 
Cyprus na na 54.5 0.7 
Belarus 187.0 222.9 39.6 0.5 
Bahamas na na 5.5 0.1 
Singapore na na 1.1 0.0 
Brunei na na 0.6 0.0 
Qatar na na 0.5 0.0 
Other 1,316.0 1,782.0 1,816.0 22.6 
TOTAL 6,574.2 8,417.3 8,020.2 100.0 
 
Source: adapted from White (2002)  
 
Riddell (2007) includes the so called   “development -based rationale” among factors 
that have influenced the reduction of aid in the 1990s. In other words, increasing 
recognition emerged that too much aid was as bad as no aid. This is the argument that 
points to the very real threat of aid dependence:  
 
“.. too much aid, it was argued, was detrimental to development as it encouraged 
recipients to depend continually on aid as a source of finance (Riddell, 2007:38).”   
 
Thorbecke (2000) has pointed out to the same phenomenon, using the term “aid 
fatigue”. According to him: “the decade of the 1990s was marked by a strong and 
lingering case of ‘aid fatigue’” ,which in his view is  one factor of the declining aid 
flows:  “...fatigue was also influenced by the rising fear that foreign aid was 
generating aid dependency (Thorbecke,  2000: 44).” 
 
In simple terms, donors became replete with giving aid and waiting for tangible 
effects, which aid scholarship is well aware, are often difficult to identify. In addition, 
donors realized the potential counterproductive effect of aid. It should be borne in 
mind however, that the coincidence of these argumentations, such as fatigue and 
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attempt at avoiding aid dependency, with the demise of the geopolitical rationale, 
does make them, at least to some extent, seem rhetorical exercises for withdrawal of 
aid on political grounds. Especially given the fact that disappointment with aid is not 
a new awareness, typical of the 1990s; it goes way back to the very beginning of the 
aid regime.  
 
 
 
4. Changes in the Structure and Composition of Foreign Assistance  
 
The decline of ODA in the 1990 was not a homogeneous trend. Not all forms of aid 
went through an identical trend of decline; some, to the contrary, experienced an 
opposite trajectory, even if it was concealed by the overall downward movement of 
the aid flows.  
 
Humanitarian aid experienced a strong expansion, as well as aid for promotion of 
democracy and good governance. Technical cooperation29 declined, and so did 
program aid30. The grants vs. loans31 balance shifted toward the former; aid shifted 
                                                 
29 According to the DAC’s Glossary, technical cooperation “includes both (a) grants to 
nationals of aid recipient countries receiving education or training at home or abroad, and (b) 
payments to consultants, advisers and similar personnel as well as teachers and administrators 
serving in recipient countries, (including the cost of associated equipment). Assistance of this 
kind provided specifically to facilitate the implementation of a capital project is included 
indistinguishably among bilateral project and programme expenditures, and not separately 
identified as technical co-operation in statistics of aggregate flows.” See DAC’s Glossary at 
http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965653 . 
The DAC Statistical Reporting Directive (2007) define technical cooperation as “provision of 
know-how in the form of personnel, training, research and associated costs... Used without 
qualification, the term technical co-operation (sometimes referred to as technical assistance) 
is a generic term covering contributions to development primarily through the medium of 
education and training.  There is, however, a distinction that is relevant to the compilation of 
statistical data, between free-standing TC (FTC) and investment-related TC (IRTC) (OECD, 
2007).”  
30  General program aid or assistance (which goes combined with commodity aid) “includes 
contributions for general development purposes without sector allocation, with or without 
restrictions on the specific use of the funds (and irrespective of any control by the donor of 
the use of counterpart funds).  Funds supplied on the general condition that they be used for 
capital projects at the recipient’s choice, but not subject to agreement by the donor, are also to 
be included here (OECD, 2007:45).” 
31  According to the DAC: “grants are transfers in cash or in kind for which no legal debt is 
incurred by the recipient.  For DAC reporting purposes, it also includes debt forgiveness, 
which does not entail new transfers; support to non-government organizations; certain costs 
undergone in the implementation of aid programs; and “grant-like flows”, i.e. loans for which 
the service payments are to be made into an account in the borrowing country and used in the 
borrowing country for its own benefit ... Loans are transfers in cash or in kind for which the 
recipient incurs a legal debt.  Official loans are those with fixed maturities made by 
governments (central and local) or official (non-monetary) agencies, for which repayment is 
to be made by the recipient country.  This includes loans repayable in the borrower’s currency 
whether the lender intends to repatriate the repayments or to use them in the borrowing 
country (DAC, 2007: 10-11).” In order to be able to count as ODA, according to the DCA 
rules, the loan has to have at least 25% of grant element. The grant element, according to the 
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away from production sectors into services. Bilateral ODA mildly declined in the 90s 
at the expense of the rising share of multilateral32 ODA. Table 3   below shows the 
changes in the grant vs. loan ration, and in bilateral vs. multilateral ODA in the period 
1973-1996.  The important point is that whereas the overall trend in global ODA in 
the 90s was that of decline, the composition of aid flows underwent many additional 
changes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
DAC’s Glossary   :” reflects the financial terms of a commitment: interest rate, maturity (q.v.) 
and grace period (interval to first repayment of capital). It measures the concessionality of a 
loan, in the form of the present value of an interest rate below the market rate over the life of 
a loan. Conventionally the market rate is taken as 10 per cent in DAC statistics. Thus, the 
grant element is nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10 percent; it is 100 per cent for a 
grant; and it lies between these two limits for a soft loan. If the face value of a loan is 
multiplied by its grant element, the result is referred to as the grant equivalent of that loan. 
(cf.concessionality level) (Note: the grant element concept is not applied to the market-based 
lending operations of the multilateral development banks.)The extent of concessionality can 
be measured either as the benefit to the borrower, or the opportunity cost to the lender. Both 
benefit and opportunity cost depend on the interest rate and duration of the loan. In a benefit 
calculation, concessionality would be calculated from the difference between the interest 
charged and the market rate of interest which the borrower would otherwise have had to pay. 
In an opportunity cost calculation, the concessionality would be calculated from the 
difference between the interest charged and the return that the lender could have expected 
from the next most profitable means of investing the capital. DAC statistics generally 
measure costs to donors, and consideration of opportunity costs played an important part in 
determining a reference rate of interest for calculating grant elements. For practical purposes 
this was set as 10%.” See DAC’s Glossary at 
http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965544   
 
32 Multilateral assistance is that which is given to a “recipient institution which   a) conducts 
all or part of its activities in favour of development; b) is an international agency, institution 
or organization whose members are governments, or a fund managed autonomously by such 
an agency; and c) pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral 
part of its financial assets (OECD, 2007: 6).”  
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Table 3: Net ODA disbursements, by type and donor; all donors; 1973-1996 (%)  
 
ODA type Aver. share 1973-80 
Aver. share 
1981-90 
Aver. share 
1991-96 
    
ODA grants 61.6 71.1 77.4 
ODA loans 38.4 28.9 22.6 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Donor    
Bilateral ODA* 77.2 75.4 70.1 
Multilateral ODA 22.8 24.6 29.9 
of which IBRD & IDA 5.6 7.7 8.3 
               IMF (SAF & ESAF) 0.0 0.1 1.3 
               United Nations Agencies 7.5 8.6 9.6 
               European Commission 3.4 4.4 7.2 
                Other 6.3 3.8 3.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
* including Arab donors  
Source: adapted from Hjertholm & White (2000a) 
 
As evident from the first part of Table 3, the share of grant aid in the total rose from 
an average 61, 6 % over the 70s to 77, and 4% in the first half of the 90s. The second 
part of the table shows that descending trajectory of bilateral aid, from 77, 2% in the 
70s to 70, 1 % in the first half of the 90s, at the expense of the rise of multilateral 
assistance. As it can be seen from the table, this is due to rise in ODA by all major 
multilaterals, IBRD and IDA, the UN agencies, and the European Commission.  
 
Emergency and relief aid has multiplied in the decade of the 1990. Riddell (2007) has 
dully observed the ascending trend in humanitarian aid and analyzed the factors 
thereof:  
 
“The deep falls in ODA in the 1990 masked a trend of even greater magnitude for 
emergency and humanitarian aid – but precisely in the opposite direction. While ODA 
funds for development contracted, ODA funds for humanitarian assistance doubled. If 
emergency funds from non-governmental sources are included, the 1990 saw a four-
fold expansion in overall emergency aid funds (Riddell, 2007: 38-39).” 
 
In Riddell’s view, two factors in particular, converged to this end: “the expanding 
number of people affected by natural disasters, and the expanding number of post-
cold war local conflicts... (2007: 39).” 
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Another change concerns humanitarian and emergency relief. Aid allocated for 
containing, relieving, or ending conflict, which comprised but was not limited to 
assistance for post-conflict reconstruction and development, reconciliation and 
stabilization, experienced a strong rise in the 1990s. On the European continent at 
least, the central place for this type of aid effort in the 1990s was definitely the 
Balkans. Table 4 below presents the changes across types of aid in the period 1973-
1997. The strong rise of emergency assistance is evident. The table also shows the rise 
of debt forgiveness and the general decline of program aid. In addition, the changes in 
the sectoral composition of ODA can be observed. The sectoral composition of ODA 
with specific focus on the Balkans will be the subject of extensive treatment in 
Chapter 6.   
 
 
Table 4: ODA commitments by sector and purpose; DAC donors, 1973-1997 (%)  
 
 
 
Av. share 
1973-1980 
Av. share 
1981-1990 
Av. share 
1991-1997 
Soc. infrastructure and services33 20.8 25.0 26.2 
Ec. infrastructure and services34 13.9 18.7 21.8 
Production sectors 22.0 19.7 12.0 
Multisector (crosscut) 2.2 3.0 4.7 
General program aid 14.2 16.2 10.0 
Action relating to debt 3.7 4.3 8.8 
Emergency assistance 1.1 1.7 5.3 
Admin. cost of donors NA 3.8 a* 4.3 
Support to NGOs NA 2.2 a* 1.3 
Unallocated/unspecified 22.1 7.1 5.7 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Note: a* - Average numbers refer to 1984-1990 
 
Source: adapted from Hjertholm & White (2000a);  
 
                                                 
33 Aid for social infrastructure and services is one of the sectors in sector allocable aid, 
according to the classification of the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) maintained by the 
DAC. The CRS is available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW . This sector will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6.   
34 Aid for economic infrastructure is one of the sectors in sector allocable aid, according to the 
classification of the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) maintained by the DAC. The CRS is 
available at http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW . This sector 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
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Emergency aid rose up because of the multiplied local conflicts. In addition, there was   
political will on part of the international community to contain such conflicts. Foreign 
assistance followed the focus of the new foreign policy which shifted toward 
controlling regional risks to security. In this sense, the already discussed new priority 
of containing “international bads” and “rogue states” often naturally went hand in 
hand with the objective of containing and ending conflict. This was definitely the case 
in the Balkans. Many scholars (Hopkins, 2000) have pointed out that the 1990s 
witnessed the (re)emergence of the terms “humanitarian intervention” and 
humanitarian war.  
 
Hopkins (2000: 441) tends to explain even humanitarian aid as motivated by security 
reasons:  
 
“the involvement of the UN in Somali, Cambodia and Southern Africa, and of NATO 
in the Balkan wars, suggests that containing armed conflict is a rising goal of 
Western states, especially when refugees threaten to destabilize surrounding states.”  
 
The rising share of humanitarian relief in total assistance flows is only one aspect of 
the transformation of aid in the 1990s. The decade saw disaffection with technical 
cooperation (Arndt, 2000: 162), and subsequently its decline in the overall flows; shift 
of aid  from production sectors into social services; decline of program aid; rise of 
grant aid; and among other, further stable expansion of multilateral assistance. Bigger 
paradigmatic shifts included the rise of the themes of sustainable development and 
democracy promotion. Increased efforts for political development were combined 
with the expanded and widespread use of political conditionality.  Scholars (Hook, 
1996) have observed with concern that flows shifted away from the poorest, in favor 
of middle income countries. The aid system became more diffused. Donor 
proliferation, which has been observed as a trend ever since the 1970s, has also 
become a source of increasing concern. NGOs have risen to prominence.  
 
In his topical Foreign Aid Towards the Millennium (1996), Hook discusses the 
changes in the aid regime after the end of the cold war.  He notes the great hope 
present in the donor community in the early 1990s for a shift towards care for the 
environment as the possible new raison d’etre   for aid in the absence of the cold war 
scare, which also calls for preserved involvement of governments in an era of 
renewed faith in the operation of market forces:  
 
“The cold war’s collapse prompted ...a shift toward sustainable development as the 
guiding principle of the aid regime...although market factors received growing 
emphasis in development aid, leaders recognized that ‘environmental protection is 
one area in which government must maintain a central role. Private markets provide 
little or no incentive for curbing pollution (Hook, 1996: 8-9).” 
 
Belonging to the minority of aid scholars who actually expected aid to rise in the 
aftermath of the cold war, as a result of the so-called “peace dividend”, Hook does 
acknowledge that the expectation of a great new momentum for aid in the post-1989 
period did not come about. Sustainable development has become an increasingly 
important issue in international cooperation, but still far from the expectation that it 
would become the axis of a new world order, which was perhaps expected in the 
beginning of the decade.  
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The following passage from Hook’s Foreign Aid Towards the Millennium is 
instrumental in conveying that momentum, and thus merits to be cited in entirety:  
 
“The end of the East-West was also expected to bring overdue relief to North-South 
relations, subordinated for nearly half a century to the cold war rivalry. The United 
Nations declared sustainable development the centerpiece of its post-cold war 
mission. At the 1992 UN Conference of the Environment and Development, the largest 
assembly of world leaders in history confronted transnational problems such as rapid 
population growth, global worming, habitat destruction, AIDS, and terrorism. To pay 
for the expensive remedies to these problems, along with a growing list of UN peace 
keeping missions, wealthy governments pledged higher levels of foreign aid. The 
impoverished regions of Africa, Latin America, and South Asia were to receive more 
support, as were the transition states of Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. 
For a fleeting moment it appeared that foreign aid, for so long contaminated by the 
cold war, would finally achieve its vast potential. As subsequent events have 
demonstrated, however, these expectations of a new world order were unfounded. 
Global collaboration in the mid-1990s instead succumbed to the domestic priorities of 
wealthy governments, to intensifying economic cooperation, and to the resurgence of 
ethnic and religious violence. Rather than growing, as widely expected, economic aid 
flows decreased in absolute terms between 1992 and 1994, and the percentage of 
donor states’ income devoted to aid fell to its lowest levels in two decades (Hook, 
1996:1).” 
 
Discussing the changes in the international aid regime Hook (1996) notes the growing 
complexity of   foreign assistance over the last decades, a fact which has increasingly 
come to be seen as impediment to the effectiveness of ODA:  
 
“The foreign -aid regime became more diffused, involving the OECD, IMF, World 
Bank, United Nations, European Union, and a network of regional development 
banks, each of which brought discrete institutional biases to the table. As a result, the 
proclaimed ends and executed means of foreign aid were increasingly disconnected, 
resulting in compromises that undercut the efficiency of aid strategies (Hook, 1996: 
229).”  
 
Last but not least, Hook (1996: 233) points out to the diverting of foreign aid from the 
poorest to less needy countries:  
 
“In general, we have witnessed a paradoxical pattern among recipient of foreign 
assistance in the post-cold war period. Foreign aid has increasingly been directed 
towards more affluent LDCs and middle-income countries...less support is available 
to those in greatest need....economic polarization of the developing world is likely to 
widen...”  
 
Hjertholm & White’s (2000a) essay on “Foreign Aid in Historical Perspective” is 
one of the more relevant recent texts on the trends in the foreign aid regime, since its 
beginning and through the 1990s. Some of the changes they observe in ODA in the 
decade of the 1990s include the rise of multilateral aid, shift towards social services, 
decline of program aid, and the falling share of tied aid.  
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A change which has actually materialized over a longer period of time, and does not 
just concern the 90s is the increasing share of multilateral aid and grant aid. Hjertholm 
& White note that “the share of multilateral aid has risen from about 23 percent in 
the 1970s to nearly 30 percent in the 1990s (2000a: 17).”  
 
In an earlier, discussion version of the paper, White (2002) explains some of the 
reasons for this rise of the share of multilateral aid:  
 
“The impetus for this increase in the 1970s and 1980s was the role of the Bretton 
Woods institutions in financing the response of developing countries to first the oil 
price shocks and then the debt crisis...it  reinforced in the 1970s by the expansion of 
the World Bank under the presidency of Robert McNamara. For European countries, 
an additional factor has been the increase in the size of the aid program of the 
European Union, which has gone from just over three per cent of total aid in the 
1970s to nearly nine per cent in the most recent years; for EU members this share 
rose from 11 to 20 per cent from 1989-90 to 2000. But a further factor underlying the 
rising multilateral share in the 1990s has been the shrinking aid programs35 (White, 
2002: 7).” 
 
Another change in the composition of foreign assistance has been the decline of ODA 
loans, combined with the rising share of ODA grants.  This trend has been observed 
by Hjertholm & White (2000a):   
 
“more than three-quarter of total ODA had been in the form of grants in the period 
1991-1996, compared to just over 60 per cent two decades earlier (2000a: 17).” 
 
Hjertholm & White (2000a: 25) also note the shift of ODA toward the field of social 
infrastructure and services and economic infrastructure:  
 
 “There has been a marked switch toward more aid for social infrastructure and 
services (e.g. education, health, water supply and sanitation), in particular after 
1992, a reflection of the strengthened emphasis by donors on the developmental role 
of human capabilities. In recent years more than a quarter of ODA has been 
committed to this sector. Likewise, economic infrastructure and services (e.g. energy, 
transport, and communications) has received increased attention and flows (rising to 
over 20 per cent 1991-1997).”  
 
Thorbecke (2000) has indicated to the same moment of the rise of aid going to social 
infrastructure and services, but he offers a different rationale. He shares the quite 
widely accepted view that the shift was due to the resurgence of neo-conservative 
faith in the markets, which resulted with diverting of aid from sectors of production:  
 
                                                 
35 White notes a negative correlation between a country’s shrinking aid budget and rising 
share of multilateral aid. He provides the example of Italy which had the “largest increase in 
multilateral share...and the largest fall in aid”. White suggests that: “it thus seems that the 
multilateral component appears as a fixed cost in the aid program, whose share rises as 
volume falls. This finding may be partly explained by the fact that multilateral contributions 
are calculated by some formula for burden sharing (e.g. IBRD and EU). But this argument 
does not apply to all contributions; many of those, such as to parts of the UN system, are 
voluntary (2002: 8).”  
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 “the sectoral composition of foreign aid switched towards a significantly larger 
proportion channeled to social infrastructure and services...and economic 
infrastructure and away from productive sectors. The above trends reflected the 
strong faith in the operation of the markets and skepticism regarding governments’ 
(both aid donors and recipients) involvement in productive sectors... (Thorbecke, 
2000: 44)”  
 
This point is highlighted in a landmark report on aid by the World Bank:  
 
“evidence suggests that rapid development is possible, and should be based on 
markets and on effective states playing an economically important facilitating, but not 
dominant, role (World Bank, 1998: 10).” 
 
In addition, Hjertholm and White (2000a: 26)   observe the downscaling of program 
aid over a longer term, commencing in the decades preceding the 1990s:  
 
“Program assistance (including food aid), after having played important role in the 
1970s and 1980s, has been scaled down considerably (only 10 per cent in 1991-97) “  
 
Finally, the two scholars point to the continued progress in the untying of aid36, by 
noting that the share of “total untied DAC aid has increased steadily from 40-5 per 
cent in the early 80s to about 70 per cent in 1995-6, and even 88 per cent in 1997...” 
(Hjertholm and White, 2000a: 35).   
 
In conclusion, the overall decline of foreign assistance flows conceals a complex 
transformation of the structure and composition of aid.  
 
To say that aid declined in the 90s only begins to explain all the changes in the 
foreign aid regime in that decade of profound change. Not all aid decreased. Relief 
went up, as did grant aid, and aid channeled multilaterally. In addition, aid shifted 
away from production and went into social infrastructure.  
 
Even more significant was the expansion of aid for political development, that is, 
good governance and democracy, although because of the way aid statistics is 
collected it is difficult to say exactly how big this increases was.37 The rise of NGOs 
definitely left a relevant imprint on the decade of the 90s. Although the phenomenon 
of international civil society exceeds the boundaries of the foreign aid debate, it is a 
fact that its rise has been closely related to trends in channeling of aid. All of these 
changes unfolded contemporaneously, and were in many ways influenced by the 
profound political changes of the 1990s.  
 
Three of these aspects will be discussed in more detail in the next sections of this 
chapter, since considered of special relevance for the theme of interest. They are the 
                                                 
36  According to the DAC’s Glossary “untied aid is Official Development Assistance for 
which the associated goods and services may be fully and freely procured in substantially all 
countries.” See DAC’s Glossary at 
http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#m   
37 The DAC does not have an aid expenditure category of “democracy assistance”. 
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rise of NGOs; the expansion of democracy assistance and political conditionality; and 
the emergence of Eastern Europe as aid recipient.  
 
 
 
5. The Rise of NGOs 
 
Another marked change, which after having gradually unfolded for decades, has 
climaxed in the 1990s, was the rise of NGOs. The last decade of the 20th century 
witnessed the prominence of nongovernmental organizations as new actors on the 
international stage. Although the expansion of the so-called “international civil 
society” can be relevantly studied within the framework of foreign aid, it definitely 
exceeds the aid debate per se, and it concerns many other disciplines. What more, it 
has probably become a discipline in its own right.  
 
A longer treatment of this issue would be beyond the scope of this writing, although a 
shorter introduction is relevant to the discussion about the trends in the foreign aid 
regime in the 1990s, and definitely, for the ensuing review of the aid phenomenon in 
the Balkans.   
 
In the 1990s it became increasingly clear that NGOs have come to be actors of 
growing influence in international relations; an integral part of ever more tightly 
interconnected and multilateral world;  counterparts, watchdogs,  and sometimes   
opponents of states.  
 
Many scholars (Matthews, 1997; Salamon, 1994) have reflected on the genealogy of 
this phenomenon.  
 
The view espoused by Jessica Matthews in her classic “The Power Shift (1997)”, is 
that the rise of NGOs is an aspect of a process of   redistribution of power in the 
world:  
 
  “the end of the cold war has brought no mere adjustment among states but a novel 
redistribution of power among states, markets, and civil society.... They are sharing 
powers—including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty— 
with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens 
groups, known as nongovernmental organizations (Matthews, 1997: 50).” 
 
Matthews has suggested that the world with states as the major power players was 
over, and that NGOs were the natural exponents of what was essentially a new world 
order. She argues that the “steady concentration of power in the hands of states that 
began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while (1997: 50).” 
 
Yet, Matthews explains this essentially political change with apolitical factors. 
According to her, “the most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states 
and the rise of non state actors is the computer and telecommunications revolution 
(1997: 51).”   
 
 
64
Still, she does nevertheless concede that political requirements, such as the existence 
of political freedom are preconditions for the growth of civil society:  
 
“[except] where culture or authoritarian governments severely limit civil society, 
NGOS' role and influence have exploded in the last half-decade(1997: 53).”    
 
Matthews also   points out the financial aspect of the power of civil society:   
 
“Their financial resources and—often more important—their expertise, approximate 
and sometimes exceed those of smaller governments and of international 
organizations (1997: 53).”   
 
Matthews subscribes to the widely known comparisons, which essentially see NGOs 
as part of the foreign aid regime, to indicate to the financial strength of civil society: 
“today NGOS deliver more official development assistance than the entire U.N. 
system (1997: 53), and concludes that “increasingly, NGOS are able to push around 
even the largest governments (1997: 53).” 
 
Likely among the first to indicate to the “associational revolution” taking place in the 
1990s, Lester Salamon suggests in his classical “The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector 
(1994)” that the scope of this trend is enormous, and potentially its significance 
epochal:  
 
“A striking upsurge is under way around the globe in organized voluntary activity 
and the creation of private, nonprofit or non-governmental organizations... The scope 
and scale of this phenomenon are immense. Indeed, we are in the midst of a global 
"associational revolution" that may prove to be as significant to the latter twentieth 
century as the rise of the nation-state was to the latter nineteenth. The upshot is a 
global third sector (1994:  109).” 
 
For Salamon, at least in part, the exponential growth of civil society in the 1990s is 
owed to the political dynamics in Eastern Europe, and the struggle of Eastern 
Europeans against authoritarianism:  
 
 “Well before the dramatic political events that captured world attention in 1989, 
important changes were taking place beneath the surface of East European society, 
and voluntary organizations were very much at the centre of them. Indeed, a veritable 
"second society" had come into existence, consisting of thousands, perhaps millions, 
of networks of people who provided each other mutual aid to cope with the economy 
of scarcity in which they lived. By the late 1970s, these networks were already 
acquiring political significance. This process has only accelerated since the 
overthrow of the communist governments. As of 1992, several thousand foundations 
were registered with governmental authorities in Poland. In Hungary, 6,000 
foundations and 11,000 associations had been registered by mid-1992 (1994: 110-
111).” 
 
Salamon also acknowledges that fact that the boom of civil society is related to the 
fact that NGOs were increasingly accepted as preferred implementers of development 
operations:  
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“Official aid agencies have supplemented and, to a considerable degree, subsidized 
these private initiatives...even the World Bank, which had traditionally given only 
sporadic support to private voluntary organizations, recently acknowledged the 
‘explosive emergence of nongovernmental organizations as a major collective actor 
in development activities’ (Salamon, 1994: 114).”  
 
It is evident that even though both Salamon and Matthews indicate to deeper social, 
political, and technological changes, as factors for the growth of civil society, they 
both pay a reference to the fact that the financial strength of NGOs does have to do 
with foreign aid and their role as implementers of ODA.  
 
The explosion of civil society in the 90s became a topic that exceeded scholarly 
debate. The growing power of NGOs came to concern governments and big 
international actors from the World Bank to big multinational companies. Analyses of 
the so called “third sector” and its relations with the first two sectors, government and 
the economy, have multiplied.  
 
Tracing the roots of modern international civil society way back in history, in an 
influential article, The Economist has tried to explain the expansion of NGOs in the 
1990s with the tremendous social, political and technological changes:  
 
”Although organizations like these have existed for generations (in the early 1800s, 
the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society played a powerful part in abolishing 
slavery laws), the social and economic shifts of this decade have given them new life. 
The end of communism, the spread of democracy in poor countries, technological 
change and economic integration - globalization, in short - have created fertile soil 
for the rise of NGOs (The Economist, 11 December 1999).”  
 
Yet elsewhere, The Economist has presented views which simplify the civil society 
phenomenon by boiling it down to its financial basics:  
 
“the principal reason for the recent boom in NGOs is that western governments 
finance them. This is not a matter of charity, but of privatization: many 'non-
governmental' groups are becoming contractors for governments. Governments 
prefer to pass aid through NGOs because it is cheaper, more efficient - and more at 
arm's length - than direct official aid (The Economist, 29 January 2000).” 
 
Without entering too deep into the complex discourse of how social and political 
changes propelled the growth of civil society in the 90s, the point needs to be made 
that one of the factors which contributed to the NGOs’ growing economic power was 
the fact that over the preceding years they had gradually come to be seen as the 
preferred deliverers and implementers of aid.  
 
 Delusion with the ineffectiveness of government-to-government aid, the convenience 
of subcontracting aid through private organizations for both political (avoidance of 
direct official government presence in certain compromising settings)  and economic 
(cheaper delivery) reasons; flexibility of setting up an NGO operation as opposed to 
the slow, overregulated government administration type of management; growing 
multilateralism in international relations and, among other,  especially the role of the 
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UN system in promoting work through NGOs; have all contributed to the growing 
reputation of NGOs in the decades preceding the 1990s.  
 
Overtime, references to the superiority of NGOs to other actors in the foreign aid 
industry, have multiplied. This superiority was not only seen as in operational terms. 
Overtime NGOs have come to be seen as morally superior actors, not just in delivery 
of foreign aid, but as regards conduct in the international arena overall.  
 
For example, when Brian Opeskin (1996) doubts the capacity of foreign aid to do 
good, he excludes aid channeled through NGOs. Relying on the arguments provided 
by Hancock (1991)38, which he analyses thoroughly, Opeskin excuses NGOs from his 
harsh critique of the foreign aid regime:  
 
“Aid is bad because the poor in developing countries suffer the most abject miseries 
not in spite of aid but because of it... One may surmise that if different world 
institutions could be created, foreign aid might then be worthwhile. This is clear from 
Hancock’s introductory disclaimer that his attack is focused on donations channeled 
through official aid organizations. The foreign aid undertaken by voluntary agencies 
such as Oxfam and Save the Children Fund is worthwhile because ‘they rarely do 
significant harm [and] sometimes they do great good’ (Opeskin, 1996: 24).”  
 
The view supporting the ethical and operational superiority of NGOs as actors in the 
foreign aid industry became quite popular in the 1980s. Burnell (1997: 15) for 
example, makes a reference to a speech by Chris Patten from 1989, who back than 
had argued that all aid channeled through NGOs is of better quality.  
 
In addition to their popularity as development operators, especially in situations when 
emergency relief is necessary, NGOs were identified with civil society, and given that 
civil society was considered an essential ingredient of democracy, NGOs came to  
been seen as both the means an ends of democracy promotion activity.39 
 
Another factor which contributed to the rise of NGO power was the increased interest 
in direct intervention in political development and the rising popularity of the concept 
of democracy promotion.  
 
In a recent retrospective for example, The New York Times has tied the rise of NGOs 
to the growing international interest in democracy:  “in the early 1990's, as the West 
tied aid to democratization, the independent organizations began flourishing... 
(Onishi, 22 March 2002).”   
 
Hulme& Edwards (1997: 4) refer to a report by the International Commission on 
Global Governance (1995) which notes that the “176 ‘international NGOs’ of 1909 
had blossomed into 28,900 by 1993.” They also note that the explosion of numbers of 
NGOS has been paralleled by the expansion in size of individual NGOs (1997: 4).  
                                                 
38 See Hancock Graham, “Lords of Poverty”, Mandarin, 1991. 
39 In this sense, a vibrant civil society was considered a relevant indicator for the health of 
democracy; the indicator for this very often was the sheer number of registered NGOs. Thus, 
developing civil society was considered an important item of the democracy promotion 
agenda. At the same time, the actors charged with this task were most often NGOs 
themselves.  
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Hulme & Edwards have also pointed to the clear link between foreign aid and NGOs. 
According to them, the rise of NGOs is not accidental, “nor is it solely a response to 
local initiative and voluntary action. Equally important is the increasing popularity of 
NGOs with governments and official aid agencies (1997: 5).” 
 
 They suggest that this process is an outcome of the re-consolidation of the concepts 
of neo-liberal economy and liberal democracy as the universally valid blueprint for 
development. In economic terms this has meant that government intervention should 
be reduced, since private initiative is the most efficient mechanism for growth. In 
terms of political development, NGOs and civil society have come to be considered a 
vital element of democracy (Hulme & Edwards1997: 5-6).   
 
In their “NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (1996)”, Gordenker & Weiss (1996: 
24-25) have identified three major factors for NGO expansion in the 1990s: the end of 
the cold war, technological development, and the growth of available resources. They 
have pointed to some interesting financial indicators to describe the scope of the 
trend, by using data concerning foreign aid:  
 
“in 1994 over 10% of public development aid ($8 billion) was channeled through 
NGOs, surpassing the volume of the combined UN system ($ 6 billion) without the 
Washington-based financial institutions. About 25% of US assistance is channeled 
through NGOs (Gordenker & Weiss, 1996: 25).” 
 
According to Gordenker & Weiss, the main reason donor governments have been 
increasingly opting for NGOs as implementers of development operations - is their 
cost-effectiveness. 
 
Antonio Donini (1996) has also resorted to data on foreign assistance to give another 
account of the strength of the presence of NGOs in ODA delivery:  
 
 “In terms of net transfers, NGOs collectively represent the second- largest source of 
development and relief assistance, second only to the bilateral governmental 
donors...public grants represented 1, 5% of NGO income in the 1970, 35% in 1988, 
and, with the explosion of humanitarian relief programs in recent years, probably 
over 40% today (Donini, 1996: 88).”40 
                                                 
40  According to Donini, “One explanation of this shift is that it represents a lasting legacy of 
Reaganism- Thatcherism in the sense that it is an application of laissez-faire and anti-state 
ideology to international relations. A similar view holds that it is a manifestation of the 
North’s loss of patience with the perceived ineffectiveness of UN organizations as conduits of 
international assistance and of the corresponding faith in the operational superiority of the 
‘hands-on’ NGOs. In any event, the end of the cold war seems to have accelerated a process 
that was already underway – the emergence of political conditionality. The Northern NGO 
community benefited collectively from the fact that, with the end of superpower confrontation, 
the need for political state-to-state North-South support has all but disappeared (Donini, 
1996: 89).” 
 
Donini is perhaps the first to outline the famous “oligopoly theory” suggesting that very few 
big NGOs control the humanitarian relief market, In his view the situation “... is tantamount 
to an oligopoly, where eight major families of federations or federations of international 
NGOs have come to control almost half an $8 billion market...they are CARE...World Vision 
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Scholars (Paul, 2000; White. 2002) have also pointed out that the net-rise of NGOs 
was at the expense of the net-fall of other actors in the aid industry, that is, that NGOs 
took “market share” from other actors in international development:  
 
“In the 1990s, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees expressed alarm that 
governments were increasingly channeling funds for humanitarian assistance to their 
own national NGOs rather than to multilateral agencies. The agencies were losing 
their capacity to coordinate relief in large scale emergencies, as dozens of NGOs 
appeared on the scene (Paul, 2000).” 
 
An important distinction has to be made concerning the composition, or the character 
of the funds controlled by NGOs. For example, looking into total official and private 
flows over a three-decade period, White (2002: 3) notes that “grants from NGOs have 
been remarkably stable at about 4 per cent of total flows.” This is apparently at odds 
with the preceding argument about the growing financial strength of civil society 
organizations (CSOs). It needs to be underscored that this is 4% of total flows, not 
just ODA. Hence, White (2002: 3) further explains:  
 
“if they were to be included with ODA, they would be about 8 per cent of the resulting 
total. This figure represents the funds which NGOs raise themselves. They also act as 
a channel for ODA.  DAC data have a line ‘support to NGOs’, which has been stable 
at 1.5 per cent of total ODA for the last two decades ...), so that aid through NGOs is 
about 10 per cent of the total of ODA... However, this line covers direct flows from 
agencies to NGOs to spend on their own programmes, and does not capture cases 
when the NGO is the implementing agency for a project funded by that agency. Whilst 
data are not available on the latter, it is generally believed to have increased quite 
substantially since the mid-1980s.”  
 
Operating with more recent data Riddell has noted that “... in 2004 NGOs were 
responsible for some $ 23 bn of aid money; equivalent to over 30 per cent of all ODA 
(2007: 48).” 
 
Riddell (2007) also makes one very important observation concerning the 
transformation of ODA in the 90s and its effect on NGOs. Namely, he the points to 
the fact that the decline of aid in the 1990s did not affect the growing role of NGOs:  
 
  “The post-1990 has seen further changes and consolidation in the status and 
importance of NGOs as aid donors. The steep falls in ODA which marked the early 
1990s were not mirrored in NGO income, which continued its steady increase 
throughout the decade... (Riddell 2007: 47-48)” 
 
                                                                                                                                            
International, ...the Oxfam federation,...the MSF group,...Save the Children Federation,...and 
CIDSE, ARDOVE, and Eurostep. (Donini, 1996: 91).”  
The similar argument is put forward in the same volume, by another veteran of development 
aid, former USAID director Andrew Natsios (1996). . According to Natsios “ten US NGOs 
received 76% of all cash grants to NGOs for relief purposes from the US government in fiscal 
year (FY) 1993 and over 87% of all food aid for relief purposes in FY 1993. The European 
Union gave 65% of all relief grants to 20 nongovernmental organizations in FY 1994 
(Natsios, 1996: 69).” 
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But the argument does not end here. According to some scholars, such as Omaar & de 
Waal (1994), not only that the rise of NGOs was not affected by the fall of aid. It was 
caused by it.   Referring to the work of the former, Gordenker & Weiss (1996: 25) 
have also put forward the argument that the reduction of ODA and the increasing 
funding for NGOs were “two sides of the same coin”. This relates to the point made 
earlier in the discussion concerning the cost-effectiveness as reason for donor 
preference of NGOs as aid operators.  
 
This is a relevant, yet not sufficiently discussed finding in the scholarly thought on 
aid.41 Basically, the fall of ODA did not hinder but rather it spurred the growth of 
NGOs.  
 
A longer discussion on the rise of civil society in the 90s would exceed the scope of 
this writing. It was however important to note, a finding which is corroborated by 
conclusions produced independently by different scholars (some of who are not 
scholars on foreign aid per se) that the rise of NGOs in the 90s was related to trends in 
foreign assistance.  
 
The end of the cold war definitely had a role to play – donors were no longer bound to 
go with state-to-state aid as they no longer needed to prop up friendly regimes. The 
space created by this new political flexibility was quickly filled by a dynamic industry 
of private aid organizations. However, as the previous discussion suggested, there 
were many additional factors involved.  
 
Quite before the 90s NGOs have already built the aura of morally superior agents of 
aid. This popularity definitely had to do with the disillusion with other types of 
implementation of foreign assistance, such as through government bureaucracy. The 
increasingly multilateral world was a factor – ever since its very beginning, the UN 
system relied on NGOs for different types of operational work. Then, in the 80s there 
was the Reagan-Thatcher ideology of privatization. Governments shed competences 
and handed them over to private organizations. Salamon’s reference to the example of 
Eastern Europe bears a lot of relevance for the understanding of the base of 
ideological support for the idea of civil society. The Polish dissidents such as Adam 
Micnik and Jacek Kuron invoked civil society as a form of resistance to government 
oppression. The ensuing democratization of Poland led by the worker’s union 
Solidarnost, greeted with a lot of enthusiasm in the West as the Wall started to 
crumble, was a strong factor for the revival of the old ideal of civil society as the 
essential natural environment for the growth of democracy.42 
                                                 
41 Carothers for example has suggested developing civil society is much cheaper than other 
types of democracy promotion work; Burnell has advanced a similar idea considering 
political development in general. 
42 An influential title appearing in the early 1990s, Robert Putnam’s Makings Democracy 
Work? Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993), reverberated on the waves of Solidarnost’s 
achievement in Poland and contributed to the comeback of another classic, Democracy in 
America of Alexis de Tocqueville, (often referred to as the greatest book on America ever 
written).  Foley & Edwards (1996) for example, suggest that a basic dichotomy of concepts 
on civil society is: civil society as civic culture, or as counterweight to state power.  Whereas 
the first notion of civil society is usually referred to as “Tocquevillean”, the latter is 
considered as “Lockean”. Putnam, with his concept of “social capital” is considered the most 
recent proponent of the Tocquevillean view. De Tocqueville’s description of civil society in 
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These were all the factors which made the 90s the decade of civil society. Foreign aid 
in the Balkans has been closely and inseparably linked to the NGOs phenomenon.  
 
 
 
6. The Rise of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality  
 
6.1 Democracy Assistance  
 
The other marked change in the foreign aid system in the 1990s was the rise of 
democracy assistance. Although democratic development has featured as a theme in 
international cooperation long before the decade of the 1990s, and it has had a small 
yet gradual consolidation as a concept in international aid efforts, it achieved 
unprecedented expansion in the 1990s. Relevant amounts of aid were directed to 
programs which aimed at promoting democratization, through support for civil 
society, political parties, independent judiciaries, free and fair elections, government 
administration reform and so forth. A lot of this aid was going to countries from the 
former communist block as they started their transition to democracy and market 
economy. Democracy, as the argument goes, became both an end and condition of 
foreign aid. Countries, which over the period of the cold war were automatic aid 
recipients simply by virtue of being friendly states, were increasingly conditioned to 
improve their democratic record as a precondition for getting foreign aid.  
 
The rise of democracy assistance went in hand with the increasing popularity of the 
concept of “good governance”, and both of these concepts have been brought into 
close correlation with yet another tool for state -building which caused enthusiasm in 
the donor community in the 1990s – political conditionality.  
 
Often, due to their intrinsic connectedness, they are discussed together in scholarship 
on aid. Democracy assistance and good governance can overlap to a large extent in 
aid parlance and practice, and many discussions consider them as two aspects of what 
is essentially a single process of political development.  Nevertheless, at closer 
analysis they have two distinct poles. The expansion of the concept of democracy 
promotion in the 1990s has been closely related to ideological values which have their 
origin in the United States efforts in the international arena; the concept of good 
governance, it could be argued, in its original form has been conceptualized as more 
apolitical quality in managing economic and political affairs, and it has only over time 
entered into a romantic partnership with democracy promotion.  
 
In practice, as pointed out by Carothers (1999) below, even if the promotion of good 
governance and democracy could often come down to the same types of project 
activities, some donors would still prefer to term as the one or the other. For example, 
an activity on increasing government accountability and transparency can by some 
donors considered either as democracy promotion or good governance work, 
whatever their rhetoric is. Nevertheless there are types of activities, such as election 
work, which do essentially fall into the camp of democracy promotion. However, 
                                                                                                                                            
America, which he finds in the ubiquitous forms of associational life, as the great school of 
democracy, is considered one of the great classic works on civil society.  
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even though certain actors would have strong and consistent engagement in election 
work, they would not necessarily define it in terms of democracy promotion.  
 
 In his topical Democracy Assistance. International Co-operation for Democratization 
(2000), Burnell provides a comprehensive discussion of the expansion of aid for 
democratization toward the end of the 20th century. He highlights the fact of the rapid 
expansion of this type of aid effort:  
 
“the growth of international democracy assistance efforts in the 1990s has been 
dramatic in terms of number and variety of organizations, the resources involved and 
the range of projects and programs (Burnell, 2000: 34).”  
 
Burnell provides an analysis of the historic development of democracy assistance in 
order to point out that the origins of the concept emerged much before the 1990s.  
Burnell however finds the rhetoric about the importance of promoting democracy   
both to precede and outstrip actual practical action:   
 
“between 1976 and 1979 Congress passed 25 pieces of legislation linking foreign 
policy and human rights...for most donors the policy rhetoric did not translate into 
much practical substance at that time... (Burnell 2000: 37)”  
 
Essentially even at present day, according to   scholars (Burnell, 2000; Carothers, 
1999), the actual amounts of aid invested into promoting democracy do not keep pace 
with the overpowering rhetoric about the importance of democratization.  
 
Burnell’s wider thematic focus on democracy assistance also documents facts which 
are important for the study of foreign aid in Eastern Europe.  He correctly observes 
that, even if partly, the increased effort in democracy assistance, at least by the United 
States, was related to developments in Eastern Europe:  
 
“in 1989 the Congress passed the Support for East European Democracy Act, 
primarily with Poland and Hungary in mind. In the next year Secretary of State James 
Baker declared the promotion and consolidation of democracy to be a foreign policy 
priority (Burnell, 2000: 38).” 
 
Burnell (2000) sees four factors crucial for the rise of democracy assistance in the 
1990s:  
 
a) “new opportunities became available as a result of the end of the cold war 
and decline of Soviet power. Governments in the West could now bring 
forward on their diplomatic agenda issues that previously they would not have 
dared to raise in such a forthright way...” 
b) “democracy assistance offered a relatively low-cost means of boosting the 
image of foreign aid....” 
c) “in contrast to the ‘push’ factors..., there were the ‘pull’ factors..., namely 
domestic pressures for political reform in a growing number of countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe...”  
d) “a sea-change in the [thinking] about the relationship between economic 
development and political development... (Burnell, 2000: 39-40)”  
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In addition, he discerns a sort of spontaneity in the expansion of democracy 
promotion, in the sense that it has in his view, rather inadvertently emerged from the 
application of political conditionality. According to Burnell (2000):   
 
“what started out as a willingness by international donors to attach political 
requirements and political conditionalities to development aid (a seemingly logical 
extension of economic conditionalities, which was the leitmotif of North-South 
cooperation in the 1980s) turned increasingly to democracy assistance (Burnell, 
2000: 26).” 
 
The four factors identified by Burnell provide an accurate analysis of the expansion of 
democracy assistance in the 1990s. With some variations, they are discernible in the 
wider body of thought on democracy promotion, such as for example in the influential 
work of Carothers (1999) which be discussed below.  
 
Two of these factors are closely related to end of the cold war and the opening of 
Eastern Europe. The third essential factor is what Burnell terms a “sea change” in 
thinking about the relationship between economic and political development. 43 In 
summarized terms, the concept which traditionally held economic development to be 
primary to political development was abandoned. The interest in other possible 
interdependencies between the two gained currency.   
 
The usually surprising aspect when discussing the factors which gave way to aid for 
democratization in the 1990s is the one about the cost of democracy assistance. 
Burnell has suggested there is a moment of “political economy” in the donor’s rapidly 
increasing interest in democracy assistance, and that is – because it costs less than 
other, more traditional,  types of intervention. Some of this argument is definitely a 
matter of   simple logic. The types of actions related to democracy assistance are 
much less costly than for example, investment in infrastructure. Carothers has pointed 
out to the same moment discussing the support to civil society as part of the efforts to 
promote democracy. In his words, part of the shift towards civil society was driven by 
the desire to “do more with less” (1999:208-209). This should be taken into account 
                                                 
43 Because of its relevance the passage merits to be cited fully. Burnell, alike Carothers (1999) 
below, points to the fact that the 1990s brought about new ideas about the interdependence 
between political and economic development:  
 
“...for many years two major doctrines held sway and were mutually reinforcing. The one, 
originating...[.from] Seymour Martin Lipset ...argued that social and economic progress are 
requisites for stable democracy...the second doctrine, advanced by economists like Jagdish 
Bhagwati, indicated there is a cruel choice: developing countries cannot both develop their 
economies and democratize at the same time. This is primarily because capital investment is 
essential for economic development...unfortunately, in this regard, competitive political 
regimes such as multi-party democracy ...place a premium on offering voters instant 
gratification....by the late 1980s neither the notion that that economics drives politics nor the 
crude derivation of development from capital- formation...held sway any more...towards the 
end of the 1980s the World Bank identified the problem as failure of governance. An 
increasing umber of economists...came to view that primary responsibility lay in the political 
sphere...this revised intellectual paradigm implies there are circumstances in which an 
essential precondition for a lasting uplift in development fortunes is political reform  
(Burnell, 2000: 40-42).”  
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as a very relevant observation, and as such not isolated in scholarship on aid, 
especially against the backdrop of the falling aid levels in the 1990s.44 
Tracing the origins of the idea about democracy promotion in United States foreign 
aid policy, Thomas Carothers opens his seminal “Aiding Democracy Abroad. The 
Learning Curve” (1999), with the remark that democracy has been consistent theme 
in American foreign policy for generations:  
 
“President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that America was fighting World War I ‘to 
make the world safe for democracy’..., US officials...framed the emerging cold war as 
a struggle to preserve ‘the Free World’..., in the early 1960s President John Kennedy 
embraced the idea of a noble campaign to foster democracy in the developing 
world..., in the 1990s Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton asserted that 
democracy promotion was a key organizing principle of US. foreign policy after the 
cold war (1999: 3).” 
 
Reviewing the other foreign policy measures the US government has used for 
achieving the goal of promoting democracy, including diplomacy, conditionality, and 
even military means, Carothers points out that, “the most common and often most 
significant tool for promoting democracy is democracy assistance (1999:6).” 
 
Carothers provides a historic account of democracy promotion efforts by the US, and 
alike Burnell, makes the point that prior to the 1990s, democracy aid was not a 
significant part of the overall foreign assistance effort:  
 
“prior to the 1980s, the United States did not pursue democracy aid on a wide basis. 
In the past two decades, such aid has mushroomed, as part of the increased role of 
democracy promotion in American foreign policy. It started slowly in the 1980s then 
expanded sharply after 1989 (Carothers, 1999: 6).” 
 
Carothers writes primarily about the US democracy promotion effort. He does 
acknowledge however that democracy assistance has become a wide, internationally 
accepted trend. Nevertheless Carothers suggests that the case study of US democracy 
aid is valid for making broader conclusions, given that: “...the United States moved 
into democracy assistance earlier than most other actors and has been the largest 
single democracy donor (1999: 12).” 
 
Carothers also points to another well observed fact concerning aid for political 
development– that the different conceptual frames, paradigms, or defined priorities of 
different donors, do as a matter of fact come down to the same types of interventions. 
He notes that the different theoretical concepts, such as “good governance” and 
“democracy promotion” can in practice entail very similar interventions:  
 
“the recent surge of democracy assistance is by no means exclusively or even 
principally a US story...almost every major country that gives foreign assistance now 
includes democracy programs in its aid portfolio...the international financial 
                                                 
44 Such strategy actually seems much less peculiar to practitioners than to scholars. Faced 
with shrinking budgets, organizations instinctively turn toward more cost-effective types of 
intervention. Such a move is for example, from big capital intensive investments in education, 
such as renovating schools, to work on educational policies (interview with Open Society 
Foundation representative, 2006).  
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institutions have begun committing resources to promoting good governance, which, 
although theoretically distinct from democracy promotion, often substantially 
overlaps with it in practice (1999: 8.)” 
 
In Carothers’s view, there are three major factors for the surge of democracy 
assistance in the 1990s: “the global trend toward democracy; the end of the cold war, 
and new thinking about development (1999: 44).”45 The end of the cold war and the 
“new thinking” were already discussed with respect to Burnell. The “global trend 
towards democracy” which Carothers identifies as a factor, builds on the enthusiasm 
which appeared in the Western hemisphere in the 1980s, that a new  “third wave” 46 of 
democracy was unfolding and that the future held the rosy prospect of global 
democracy, of democratic government in each and every state on the planet.47 
 
More recent work by Burnell & Morrissey (2004) echoes the same and very similar 
conclusions derived by Carothers and Burnell. They note the shift toward intervention 
aimed at direct political change in the 1990s (as opposed to indirect one, through 
economic reform, which was the standard in the past); the appeal of such political 
change both as an end in itself and conductor for economic reform. The authors relate 
this policy to the constant aspiration for greater aid effectiveness; and conclude that 
this was made possible by the end of the cold war:    
 
“...a growing number of interventions (albeit comparatively modestly funded) 
intended to influence directly political change. The rationales – that political reforms 
consonant with liberal democracy and what has come to be known as ‘good 
governance’ are both desirable in themselves and conducive to improved economic 
management – seemed to promise a more effective use of effective use of development 
aid. The trigger for this development was the end of the cold war... (Burnell & 
Morrissey, 2004: introduction; xvi).”  
 
Some of the argumentation about the exponential growth of democracy assistance 
inevitably goes back to the relationship between aid and (realist) politics.  Meernik, 
                                                 
 45   Carothers chronologically precedes Burnell with his explanation of the “new thinking”; 
According to him:  
 
“during most of the 1970s and 1980s, aid providers from the United States and elsewhere 
conceived of development largely in social and economic terms. Consideration of a country’s 
form of government was conspicuously absent. This was because most developing countries 
were dictatorships...in the latter half of the 1980s, however, the accumulated economic 
consequences of the corrupt, stagnant, often incompetent dictatorial regimes in many 
countries...prompted donors to begin considering the economic value of openness, 
accountability and transparency....in the 1990s, the donor community accepted the idea that a 
country’s political development could have major impact on its socioeconomic development 
(Carothers, 1999: 46).” 
46  An influential theoretical underpinning for this was provided by Samuel Huntington in his 
The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991).  
 
47 This enthusiasm waned in the 1990s, with the apparent backsliding of many, former      
communist, and new would be democracies, into “semi” or outright authoritarianism.  See for  
example Ottaway Marina, “Democracy Challenged. The Rise of Semi- Authoritarianism”,  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003.  
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Krueger, & Poe (1998) relate the increased interest in democracy to the fact that the 
United States could simply relax the national security concerns in the post-cold war 
international arena:  
 
   “Many foreign policy analysts argue that the end of the Cold War has released the 
U.S. government from the need to orient every international action toward the pursuit 
of national security, and that policymakers may devote greater attention and 
resources to the international promotion of U.S. ideological values, such as 
democracy and human rights(Meernik, Krueger,& Poe , 1998: 64).”  
 
According to Richard Haass (1995) for example, the Clinton administration in the 
early 1990s reached for democracy promotion as a replacement paradigm, when the 
previous long-standing paradigm of “containment” from the period of the cold war 
was no longer valid in the new circumstance:  
 
“Its principal attempt was National Security Adviser Anthony Lake's September 1993 
statement that "the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of 
enlargement, the enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies 
(Haass, 1995: 44).” 
 
And finally, whereas Haass sees democracy as replacement for the politics of 
containment; Meernik, Krueger, & Poe, as giving emphasis to ideological values in a 
situations when national security concerns are lesser; Diamond (1995) has reconciled 
the ideological need to “have a purpose” in the new world, with the realist, national 
self-interest. According to Diamond:   
 
”Now, when new threats are rising and chaos looms on many fronts, the U.S. 
government is mired in debt, its foreign operations are being cut back sharply, and 
doubt grows both at home and abroad that the United States has "any purpose in the 
world beyond promoting its own interests.”  
 
For Diamond (1995), promoting democracy is inherently good as an end in itself and 
at the same time it benefits the United States national security interest:   
 
“Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with 
one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or 
glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own 
populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do 
not sponsor terrorism against one another.” 
 
In conclusion, the promotion of democracy grew into a new paradigm in international 
cooperation. Many donors redefined the mission statements of their foreign aid 
programs so as to include a reference to the importance of democracy. Aid went to 
promote democracy, but as already discussed in the chapter on motives and factors, 
democracy became a factor and condition for receiving aid. Countries which 
democratized got more aid for all purposes. At the same time, countries that did not 
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fare so well with democracy did not get more democracy aid, in order to expedite the 
process.48  
 
The substance of democracy assistance was only briefly mentioned until this point. 
The discussion mostly concentrated on the reasons for the emergence and popularity 
of the concept in the 90s. Democracy assistance work can include a variety of 
different activities including but definitely not limited to support for elections, civil 
society, local government, trade unions, media, judiciary, public administration 
reform, and a plethora of other actions. The supply of possible types of activities and 
goals which can be framed within the philosophical framework of democracy 
assistance is practically   unlimited.  
 
The opening of Eastern Europe was definitely a strong factor for the growth of 
enthusiasm about democracy promotion in the West, and subsequently the expansion 
of democracy assistance programs worldwide.  
 
In the Balkans, aid for promoting the transition to democracy ranked high on the 
donor agenda. The countries that were seen by the donor community to lag in this 
process had their assistance levels reduced and suspended. The case of Serbia is 
particularly instructive in this regard and it will be discussed in more detail further. 
The ousting of Serbia’s president Slobodan Milosevic in October of 2002, in what 
came to be known as the “velvet revolution”, and the country’s democratic 
breakthrough, came to be considered a textbook example of the potential success of 
democracy assistance programs. Democracy promotion activity was a constant 
priority in all of the countries of the region, and these programs continue as of the 
writing of this text as the process is not considered to be completed. Chapter 3 
continues the discussion on motives and justifications for aid to the Balkans through a 
review of the policy documents of some of the major donors to the region. The review 
shows that promotion of democracy was one of the most often invoked goals for 
supply of foreign assistance to the Balkans.  
 
 
 
6.2   Political Conditionality   
 
The other novelty in foreign aid in the 1990s, which according to   scholars (Burnell, 
2000) is merely another aspect of democracy assistance, or in more generic terms, an 
intricate aspect of the expansion of aid for political development, was the rise of 
political conditionality.  
 
Positively defined, conditionality involves an award for compliance; negatively - 
punishment, sanctions for non-compliance (Hughes, 2003). Some of the well known 
definitions include the one provided by Schmitter (1996:41-42):  
 
"conditionality, especially when practiced through multilateral diplomacy and 
international organizations ...[is about] fulfillment of stipulated political obligations, 
as a prerequisite for obtaining economic aid, debt relief, most- favored- nation 
                                                 
48 In such a situation more aid would usually to opposition groups but would generally be 
withheld from the undemocratic government.  
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treatment, access to subsidized credit, or membership in coveted regional or global 
organizations." 
 
Stokke (1995:11-12) has observed that the defining conditionality “is itself 
controversial”:  
 
“the key element is the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to 
terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it, if conditions are not met by the 
recipient. Foreign aid is used as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor which 
the recipient government would not otherwise have agreed to. The donor may set the 
pursuit of such objectives, by the recipient, as a condition for entering into an aid 
relationship (ex ante conditionality); or expectations of the recipient’s progress 
towards meetings those objectives may be expressed beforehand and followed up 
afterwards (ex post conditionality).”  
 
Geoffrey Pridham (1999: 62) has defined it as "specifying conditions or even 
preconditions for support, involving either promise of material aid, or political 
opportunities". 
 
Discussing conditionality with respect to the process of EU enlargement, Kubicek has 
noted that the policy of conditionality has been "most clearly enshrined in the 
Copenhagen Criteria for membership" into the EU. Kubicek’s (2003: 7) definition of 
conditionality focuses on the "linking of perceived benefits (e.g. political support, 
economic aid, membership in an organization) to the fulfillment of a certain 
program...in the target state". 
 
Its widespread application in the 1990s has given conditionality49 (at least for a while) 
the aura of the most effective “vehicle of democratization and state building”. 
Schmitter (1996: 30) referred to it as “the most recent ...and rapidly expanding sub-
context for the exercise of international influence.” Similarly, it has been   termed is 
as: 
 
 "the most developed of all approaches relating to international aspects of 
democratization... the most visible and proactive of all policies explicitly designed to 
promote democratic convergence (Kubicek, 2003:7).” 
 
 Schimmelfennih et al (2002: 1).have also seen as "the core strategy of international 
organizations to induce non-member states to comply with fundamental rules of 
statehood.”   
 
Political conditionality in its present form is definitely a product of the 90s.As such, it 
should be observed in sink with the other major changes in aid of that period of time. 
It is a fact that aid has always been given with strings attached, with conditions of one 
type or another. However, it was only in the 90s that the idea that the mechanism of 
the carrot and the stick can be purposely steered in order to produce a democratic and 
                                                 
49 Parts of this section pertaining to definitions of conditionality were originally produced by 
the author for the purpose of his paper on State Building and Democratic Reform in the 
Balkans: All the Faces of Conditionality, Conference of the Association for the Study of 
Nationalities, Belgrade, 2006.  
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state building effect. Stokke does note that aid has come with strings attached, often 
of political nature,50ever since its invention, and that thus conditionality is nothing 
new (1995: 5)51; one novelty according to him is that the conditions have become 
“open and transparent (1995: 7).” Many scholars have observed that political 
conditionality came about as a logical extension of the economic conditionality that 
was invented and applied by the IFIs in the 80s.  
 
Discussing political conditionality in terms of the wider concept he calls “the new 
policy agenda” , and which combines under the rubric of political development aid the 
thematic trio of human rights, democracy, and good governance, Gordon Crawford 
identifies three major factors for its intensified use in the beginning of the 1990s: the 
end of the cold war, the so called “new thinking” about the relationship between 
economic and political development, and the need for new justifications for aid before 
the public in donor countries (2001: 12-14).  
 
Political conditionality, also referred to as “second generation” conditionality has 
been considered to be  a “natural” step further from  the classical days of economic 
conditionality devised by the international financial institutions (IFIs). Whereas under 
the rules of engagement of economic conditionality countries needed to comply with 
certain economic conditions in order to obtain or maintain the status of aid recipient,  
political conditionality  represents "the tying of policy responses to political 
objectives (Schimtter, 1996: 42).”According to Stokke (1995: 1):  
 
“in the 1990s, aid donors have increasingly made [ODA] conditional of political and 
administrative reform in recipient countries. The stated objectives for this second 
generation conditionality have been to promote democratic reform, human rights, and 
administrative accountability...while the first generation aimed at reform of the 
economic policy of the recipient country, the second aimed, above all, at political 
reform involving both systemic and substantive aspects.” 
 
Suggesting that the rise of this new policy which made democratic reform both a goal 
and condition for aid, was almost simultaneous with the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
Crawford (2001: 4), suggests that major European states were the ones to jump-start 
its extensive use. Crawford traces its early beginnings in the 1990s in policy 
statements by British and French officials:  
 
“the British and the French government were the first to declare this linkage. In 
perhaps the first public statement indicating the policy shift, British Foreign 
Secretary, Douglas Hurd, spoke in June 1990 of the need for ‘good government’ and 
political pluralism, and stated that ‘aid must go where it will do good’ (IDS Bulletin, 
January 1993: 7)...later that same month,...President Mitterand declared that France 
                                                 
50 He refers to the work of Edward Clay (same volume) who has pointed out that the Marshall 
Plan had had both economic and political conditions.  
51 Chapter 1 noted Hans Morghentau’s remarks about the “allurment of gain” in 19th century 
diplomatic affairs and the effect it had on the success of deal-making. Yet a more specific 
reference to the fact that money has always come with strings or conditions attached among 
states themselves can be found in Misha Glenny’s “The Balkans. Nationalism, War, and the 
Great Powers, 1804-1999 (2001). Glenny notes that when the great Western powers made 
loans to the declining Ottoman Empire, they made the loans conditional on certain political 
concessions.  
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‘will link its financial efforts to the efforts made towards liberty’ (cited in Uvin, 
1993:66).” 
 
Stokke subscribes to the point of view that the end of the cold war and the opening of 
Eastern Europe triggered the 2nd generation conditionality, by giving the West more 
freedom in pursuing the goals of political development. However, according to him 
“although the new emphasis given to political reform as a condition for aid coincided 
in time with this revolution, the causalities involved are probably indirect (1995: 9).” 
In his view, other factors, especially the legacy of economic conditionality, combined 
with the “new thinking” about development, were equally if not more important than 
the end of the cold war: 
 
“there are inter-linkages between the first and the second generation aid 
conditionality. After years, the structural adjustment programs have produced few 
results in terms of economic recovery...this led to a growing recognition...that the 
main cause had to be sought...[in] reform of the political and administrative systems 
(Stokke, 1995: 9).” 
 
It is interesting that some scholars (Baray, 1992) have related the rise of conditionality 
to the opening of Eastern Europe, in order to pursue the argument that Western donors 
have invented conditionality in order to produce an excuse for taking aid away from 
traditional recipients, such as Africa and Asia. This argument suggests that the 
donors’ motive was to redirect foreign aid to Eastern Europe, where, it was widely 
believed in the beginning of the 1990s, aid could be more productive.  
 
This argument can be found in Baraya (1992, cited by Sorensen, 1995: 393-394), who 
identifies three purposes for the new conditionality in the post-cold war world: the 
definite de-legitimizing of socialist ideology, creation of a “new credible source of 
legitimacy for hegemony”, and three “justification for the impending decline in 
Africa’s share of global assistance as resource flows to Eastern Europe begin to 
mount.” This point of view was denied by further developments in foreign aid 
dynamics over the course of the 90s.  
 
Conditionality, as applied by the principal actors in international relations today, is 
used to keep countries from straying from the path of democratic reform. The 
conditions that countries need to meet are political, ranging from free and fair 
elections, respect for civil and political rights, legal and public administration reform, 
and so forth.  
 
Besides the favorable climate for application of political conditionality after 1989, it 
is a fact that its roots lie in the macro-adjustment policies promoted by the IFIs in the 
period of the 1980s. The basic “carrot and stick” mechanism which was previously 
applied only with respect to financial matters, such as control of inflation, public 
spending, or budget deficits, came to be extended over matters such as fairness of 
elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights, fight against corruption and 
so forth. A recipient government’s poor record of achievement in meeting these and 
similar standards of democracy and good governance could lead to suspension, 
reduction, or withdrawal of aid.  
 
 
80
Conditionality has been much applied in the international intervention in the Balkans 
and it is by and large the principal framework of communication between the region 
and the international community. It has definitely been a guiding principle of EU 
assistance to the region (COFR, 1999); in addition, the US involvement in the region 
has often assumed the stance of intense conditioning. 
 
In its essence as a policy lies the belief on the part of the donors that the mechanism 
of combined incentives and disincentives can successfully guide constructive political 
change in recipient countries. Conditionality as such exceeds the realm of foreign aid 
and becomes a more generic principle of relationships in the international sphere. In 
the Balkans for example, as it will be discussed further in the text, aid is not as 
relevant level of conditionality compared to other benefits of good conduct in 
international relations, and especially with regards to EU accession, such as for 
example visa liberalization, or eventual full entry into the EU.  
 
In addition some countries in the region of the Balkans were, due to different political 
circumstance, subject to more intense conditioning than others. This will be discussed 
in more detail further in the text.  
 
 
 
7. The Emergence of Eastern Europe  
 
Last, but for this writing of particular relevance, the end of the cold war redefined the 
foreign aid regime by opening up an entire new and uncharted land for allocation of 
foreign assistance.  This was caused by the fall of the iron curtain and the opening of 
Eastern Europe and the countries from the former Soviet Union. This entire part of the 
world on the other side of the iron curtain was not recipient of development assistance 
in the sense know today. As a matter of fact, many of those countries acted as   aid 
donors throughout the years of the cold war. The countries from the Soviet block, 
under strong guidance and mentorship from the Soviet Union, acted as donors to 
Third World countries. Most importantly, they were not recipients of foreign 
assistance.52  
 
The exception to this was Yugoslavia. Being a non-aligned country, Yugoslavia was a 
recipient of generous Western assistance in the years to 1991.  Some scholars have 
referred to it as the “World Bank’s favorite Eastern European son (Tammen, 1990).”  
 
The end of the cold war changed all this. This entire part of the world disappeared as a 
donor and reemerged as a strong recipient of foreign aid.  
 
Vicky Randall (1997)53 for example, has suggested that even at conceptual level, the 
appearance of Eastern Europe as aid recipient changed the ideological postulates of 
the aid regime, in the sense that it reshaped the relationship between the so called First 
and Third World. According to Randall: 
 
                                                 
52 A good description of Soviet aid can be found in Lumsdaine (1993).  
53 Preface to Burnell Peter, Foreign Aid in a Changing World (1997). 
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“from the later 1980s we have witnessed the disintegration of most of the ‘Second 
World’ of state socialist societies – where does that leave the First and the Third 
World (Randall, 1997)?”  
 
In Randall’s view that division of the world into developed and undeveloped; North 
and South; First and Third; functioned as a myth, and that the end of the cold war, 
transformed that myth:  
 
“writers both on the Right and on the Left have suggested that the notion of a Third 
World functions primarily as a myth: for the former is a projection of the guilt of the 
First World liberals while for the latter it evokes for the West a reassuring image of 
its own opposite, all that it has succeeded in not becoming.”  Thus, Rendall suggests 
in her preface to Burnell’s “Foreign Aid in a Changing World”, “the dissolution of 
the Second World.....leaves the confrontation and contrast between the First and the 
Third World starker than ever ...on the other hand the countries of the old Second 
World will not be transformed overnight into members of the First and there is a case 
for retaining a Second World category to refer to countries only recently emerged 
from a prolonged period of communist rule.”  
 
Stokke (1996) has analyzed the grand changes in the system of international relations 
over a longer period of time and the effects these changes have had on foreign 
assistance. He   compares the opening of Eastern Europe to the process of 
decolonization which took place 30 years earlier. Back then the “opening” of the 
former colonies    acted as a strong factor for allocation of development aid:    
 
 “...a change in the international environment,  - the decolonization process, which 
represented a new international balance of power of a magnitude similar to that of 
the revolution in the East some 30 years later  - constituted a precondition [for aid] to 
take place (Stokke, 1996: 27).”  
 
 The fact that the process of decolonization and creation of new states has been a 
strong impetus for the foreign aid regime has been noted in aid scholarship. Stokke’s 
comparison goes along this line. However, it is a fact that after a peak in 1992foreign 
aid suffered its greatest decline in the 1990s. In this sense, the opening of the Second 
World did not have the same effect on aid levels as the process of decolonization. 
Rather the opposite. However, it did have a lot to do with the changes on the aid 
agenda, which were discussed above.  
 
Together with the decline in overall flows and the changes inside the structure of 
foreign aid in the 1990s, Hjertholm & White (2000: 14) consider “the disappearance 
of Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union as aid donors and 
their re-emergence as recipients”, as one of the two additional major changes in aid 
in the 1990. The other additional major change they observe consists in the 
appearance of increased concerns about governance, or in other words, the increasing 
popularity of the concept of good governance.   
 
As already mentioned above, the opening of Eastern Europe diverted significant aid 
flows away from Africa.  According to White (2004), this was by and large a result of 
the change in priorities for European donors:  
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“Overall, the fall in sub-Saharan Africa’s share matches the rising share of Europe. 
For European donors in particular, European recipients feature among the top 10 
recipients, whereas they did not do so ten years earlier. For example, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia - Herzegovina  are now among the top recipients 
of aid from Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland  (all of whom have seen a reduction in 
their share of aid going to Africa of more than 10%) whereas they did not feature 10 
years ago.” (White, 2004: 241).  
 
Table 5 below presents the regional allocation of ODA over the period 1980-2000. 
The increased receipts of Europe are especially visible in   aid per capita terms, 
although Europe’s total share in global ODA has also risen substantially. At the same 
time the decline especially of Africa’s share is obvious.  
 
 
Table 5: Regional allocation of net ODA, 1980-2000 (share and per capita)   
 
 Share (% of total aid)  Per capita (USD) 
 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
North Africa 8.1 12.4 4.3 42 68 18 
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.5 30.9 25.3 27 38 22 
South America 2.4 3.6 4.7 5 8 8 
Middle East 15.9 8.2 4.6 76 40 16 
South & Central Asia 16.7 10.6 11.5 8 5 4 
Far East Asia 7.8 12.1 15.4 3 5 5 
Other 26.7 22.2 34.3 66 60 72 
       of which Europe 3.6 2.5 7.4 19 16 43 
TOTAL 100 100 100    
       
Memo item    
 
   
Real ODA (USD billion; 
1999 prices)     46 60 56 
 
Source: adapted from White (2002)  
 
The reduction of flows to Africa and their redirection to middle income countries 
elsewhere has been encountered with criticism in some of the scholarship on 
development assistance. According to scholars (Hyden, 1996; White, 2004), a major 
factor to this end was the new geopolitics and the lesser importance of certain African 
states as strategic partners. The popular argument from the early 90s, riding on the 
wave of disillusion with the impact of 40 years of foreign aid to Africa, that aid could 
work better in Eastern Europe, probably has some of the credit.   This view has been 
criticized by Hyden (1996):  
 
 “the argument that Africa can be placed on the back-burner because it is of little 
strategic value to donor countries is extremely short-sighted and dangerous. So too is 
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the argument, unsupported by any evidence so far, that foreign aid money can be 
better used in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Hyden, 1996: 197).” 
 
Foreign aid to Eastern Europe became more complex with the painful dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. Whereas aid to the countries of Central Europe comprised the standard 
package of activities for supporting the transition to democracy and market economy, 
the wars in the Balkans created an enormous need for humanitarian relief and post-
conflict reconstruction. Because of this, aid to the Balkans had to be very different 
and essentially more complex as a process than aid to Central Europe. At the same 
time, the transition to market economy, but above all, the transition to democracy in 
the Balkans was, as a matter of common knowledge, much more difficult and 
protracted in time than in Central Europe. This was a strong factor for the final 
definition of the overall framework of development assistance to the region.   
 
 More recently, White (2004) has suggested that aid would shift back to the poorest 
countries of the Third World with the end of political crisis in the Balkans:  
 
 “...the increase [of aid] to Europe reflects response to emergencies in the region; so 
that aid to the region will fall back should the emergencies not continue (2004: 240).”    
 
This is only part of the story. The other major aspect is the EU enlargement. The 
impact of the process of EU enlargement on levels of aid allocation is of strong 
importance   as     amounts generally increase as the countries move ahead in their 
accession process. This is a complex topic in its own right and addressing it in full is 
beyond the scope of this writing. It is important to underscore however that given the 
fact that the EU was the single largest donor to the region of the Balkans, its policies 
overall and its enlargement policy in specific were of major importance to the aid 
phenomenon in the region.    
 
In conclusion, the opening of Eastern Europe was a tectonic change in the global 
foreign ad regime. It was an intrinsic aspect of the end of the cold war (and 
enlargement), but what more, it was the essence of that process. It was not a 
consequence but a cause. In this sense, some of the changes in the foreign aid regime 
did come about because of certain processes that took place in Eastern Europe. For 
example, the rise of the ideal of democracy, and the rebirth of the idea of civil society 
which strongly shaped the foreign aid regime in the 90s, were inspired in large part by 
the success of Solidarnost in Poland.  
 
In this sense, it can be argued that the opening of Eastern Europe had an important 
and complex influence on how foreign aid developed and changed over the 1990s. It 
reshaped the relationship between the First and Third World; it took away aid flows 
from the Third World; it became the new battleground for the novel concepts in aid in 
the 1990s. It did a lot to spur the enthusiasm with democracy and civil society.  
 
The ensuing wars and tragedies in the Balkans made that region one of the strongest 
recipients of foreign aid in the world over the 90s. Because of the multitude of 
changes it was undergoing – from one country into several, from autocracy towards 
democracy, from planned towards market economy, and all of these changes  
accompanied by the presence of  violent conflict – the Balkans received many types 
of aid from many different sources, and which had a variety of purposes,  over the 
 
84
past decade. As already mentioned earlier, the more complex transition in the Balkans 
compared to Central Europe, also conditioned the greater complexity of the aid 
process.   
 
 In a final run, although the trends discussed earlier in this chapter, such as the 
growing popularity of NGOs, the interest in democracy & good governance aid, and 
the emergence of political conditionality, had started to emerge long before the 90s, it 
was the global geo-political change which essentially enabled them in the last decade 
of the 20th century. In this sense, all of these aspects of the foreign aid system at 
present should be looked in their entirety.  
 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
The preceding discussion looked into the transformation of the foreign aid regime 
after the end of the cold war and consulted some of the major scholarly views on the 
causes and dynamic of this transformation. The major changes in foreign assistance in 
the 1990s were discussed, including the global decline of aid flows;   rise of 
democracy assistance and political conditionality; and global prominence of NGOs.  
 
 There is an overwhelming consensus that the end of the cold war was the major 
factor for the changes in aid in the 1990s. However, other factors were also discussed, 
not all of which derive their existence directly from the end of the cold war.  
 
The rise of political conditionality was enabled by the new freedom the West had to 
promote its values, but it was at the same time an extension of the first generation 
economic conditionality.  
 
The strong appeal of civil society in the 1990s, when it came to be seen as a magical 
panacea for a wide range of socio-political challenges, was definitely promoted by the 
fight for democracy in Eastern Europe. But if Solidarnost produced the ideological 
momentum for the prominence of NGOs in the 1990s, the preconditions had been 
gradually put in place with NGOs making their way in the aid industry for decades 
earlier.  
 
 The popularity of good governance came from within the foreign aid system, with the 
so- called “new thinking” about development gradually gaining foothold overtime.  
 
Nevertheless, it is true that had it not been for the tectonic geo-political change, 
foreign aid in the 90s would have looked probably different.   
 
The factors discussed above entwined and converged into producing the framework 
for the delivery of foreign aid to the Balkan region   from the beginning of the 1990s. 
They have been, and as of the writing of this text, still are major features of ODA 
supply to the region. Given the significance aid has had for the Balkans in the period 
of transition, and the fact that ODA has been a relevant aspect of the overall relations 
between the region and the international community, these features have exceeded the 
realm of aid per se and become characteristics of the region’s “internationalisation” as 
well as of the overall socio-economic and political circumstance.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Motives and Factors of Foreign Aid to the Balkans: Review of Donor 
Policies  
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Following the general theoretical discussion on motives for foreign aid, Chapter 3 
turns    the focus to the central interest of this writing, which is foreign assistance to 
the region of the Balkans in the period of transition.  
 
The 1st chapter on motives provided the general frame for discussing motives and 
factors of ODA. The 2nd chapter on aid in the 1990s gave an overview of the huge 
changes which have taken place in the field of development assistance after the end of 
the cold war.  
 
The preceding discussion served as a necessary introduction for understanding the 
general framework for foreign assistance in the Balkans, as the region became a 
strong aid recipient practically simultaneously with these changes in development aid 
taking place.  
 
The general discussion on motives of foreign assistance is framed between two 
distinct poles which are represented by donor self-interest on one and altruism on the 
other end. The vast middle ground between these poles is occupied by a very dynamic 
and diversified reality where numerous possibilities exist for combinations of motives 
and factors shaping ODA allocations. No author has ever denied the strong role of 
donor self-interest in development aid. Even strong proponents of the ideas of moral 
vision and altruism as factor of ODA,   such as Lumsdaine (1993), have limited their 
argument to   the point that aid cannot be explained only by donor self-interest.  
 
The Chapter 2 which followed, in a manner of speaking continued to paint the picture 
of foreign assistance. It introduced the great changes which took place in the foreign 
aid regime in more recent times, but by doing that, it also made references to what aid 
looked like before the end of the cold war. Whereas Chapter 1 provided the overall 
frame, Chapter 2 provided the additional elements of the present portrait of ODA: the 
strong role of NGOs, rise of democracy assistance,   good governance, and political 
conditionality.  
 
The inquiry into the motives and factors of aid now zooms into the process of foreign 
assistance to the Balkans and the discussion becomes time and context specific.  
 
There are several levels for discussing motivations for aiding the Balkans. The first 
and most general is produced by the general perception of the Balkans by the West, or 
the “international community”. At this broadest level, the Balkans has been perceived 
as a troubled place, a region defined by common circumstance, the most dramatic   of 
which is of course the former Yugoslav wars. Huge part of the aid which went into 
the Balkans was conflict and post-conflict related assistance. This included 
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emergency relief and post-conflict reconstruction aid which as its very name suggests 
aimed to relieve suffering and help societies get back on their feet after wars had 
ended. A lot of the aid which went into the region was motivated by the images of war 
and suffering donor constituencies in the West were exposed to. The demonstration of 
tremendous humanitarian need produced by the wars and the destruction is what made 
the Balkans one of the most highly assisted regions in the world over the 1990s.   
 
This is only a generic description. A lot of the assistance the region has received was 
not conflict related. In addition, not all countries in the Balkans were affected by 
conflict. Of those affected, not all were affected in the same way. The conflict had 
different duration in different countries. There was close to 4 years conflict-free 
period between the signing of the Dayton agreement which ended the war in Bosnia 
in 1995 and the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 which produced the second major 
humanitarian crisis in the region.,  
 
At this most general level, the other major denominator of the Balkans as an aid 
recipient in the 1990s is the fact it is part of the Eastern European block. In this sense, 
the two major goals of foreign assistance for Eastern Europe, a) democratization and 
b) promotion of market economy, held equally strongly for the Balkan countries. 
These two overarching goals which motivated aid to Eastern Europe overall, were in 
the Balkans complemented by one additional major goal – humanitarian relief. This is 
one major difference between assistance to the Balkans as opposed to the rest of CEE.  
 
 In addition to provoking tremendous suffering, the Balkan wars also delayed and 
complicated the achievement of the goals of democracy and free market reform. The 
challenges to democratization in the region were of particular concern to donors and 
the international community as a whole. Aid to promote democracy constituted a 
substantive part of the foreign engagement in the region. In addition, progress with 
democratization was one of the major conditions to receive foreign development aid.  
 
A second level to discuss motivations for aid is the level of the relationship between 
the particular bilateral or multilateral donors vs. the region as a whole. Some of the 
major donors to the region, such as the European Union (as a multilateral), the United 
States, the World Bank, UN, or the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD)   define their policies in regional terms. This of course does not 
preclude them from having country specific policies, in the sense that they fine-tune 
their country approaches. Nevertheless for many of the donors their effort has been 
regionally defined. Most comprehensive in this regard is the aid policy of the EU 
which is to a great extent defined by its enlargement policy. The amounts and types of 
aid to individual countries change as they progress in the process of accession and 
enter subsequent phases. Although countries are assessed individually, this is in 
essence a complex, regional approach. Quite a few of the bilateral donors also had 
regional aid policies for the Balkans. The understanding (or belief) that the countries 
of the Balkans shared some common characteristics and problems, which could best 
be addressed regionally, has given life to quite a few regional mechanisms and 
approaches. The most notable of these, particularly as concerns foreign assistance, is 
the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe.  
 
The third level for discussing motives for aid is at the bilateral donor-recipient level. 
This is the level between any bilateral donor and recipient country, such as for 
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example Italy and Albania, UK and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Netherlands and 
Macedonia, and so forth. At this level, the aid commitment of a particular donor to a 
particular recipient is defined by factors specific to that relationship. The previous two 
dimensions, West - Balkans, and individual donor – Balkans, have a strong influence 
on this bilateral relationship as donors; naturally conform to certain internationally 
coordinated policies. Such example is the aid embargo on Serbia which was in force 
until the fall of the Milosevic regime in late 2000. Further, donors can definitely be 
expected to react similarly to certain situations, such as for example, the humanitarian 
crises in Kosovo or Bosnia. In this regards, the specific demonstration of need by a 
recipient country is what determines the aid response.  
 
At this bilateral donor-recipient level aid allocations can depend on the specific 
circumstances of the relationship between two countries. One   such example would 
perhaps be Italy’s special rapport with Albania, which received the lion’s share of 
Italy’s aid effort in the Western Balkans. Other examples could perhaps be the Taiwan 
- Macedonia cooperation over a short period at the end of the 90s.  Similarly, the 
United Kingdom – Serbia relationship in the immediate period after the fall of the 
Milosevic regime could be considered, whereby Serbia received huge assistance from 
the UK, at a level quite higher then UK’s previous aid commitments to other countries 
in the region. The motive is, as in the previous cases, of bilateral nature. The UK had 
been a strong creditor to former Yugoslavia in the past. A huge part of that foreign 
debt to the UK was overtaken by Serbia in the succession of Yugoslavia. The UK 
assistance to Serbia was for the most part debt relief that is forgiveness of this old 
debt, made possible with the lifting of the sanctions after the fall of Milosevic.54 In 
the Italy – Albania case, security concerns related to uncontrolled migration were 
certainly a   factor of the aid effort55; in the Taiwan-Macedonia case aid was a reward 
for   Macedonia having recognized the former. Macedonia recognized Taiwan in 1999 
in exchange of a clear offer of massive economic assistance.56  
 
These levels: West-Balkans; individual donor – Balkans; and donor country – 
recipient country, are provisional by nature and serve to indicate the multi-
dimensionality of the discussion of motives and factors of foreign assistance. They do 
not exist as firm, given platforms but   permeate and entwine instead.   
 
                                                 
54 This issue will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
55 This issue will be revisited further in the text during the discussion of political dynamics in 
Chapter 4, and also later during the review of the individual allocations in Chapter 7. See for 
example: Orizio Riccardo, Gli aiuti all’Albania: venti milliardi sospetti, Corriere della Sera, 
17 October 1992; Santevecchi Guido, Martino: Via agli aiuti, ma bloccate i clandestini, 
Corriere della Sera, 13 September 1994;  Haver Flavio, Il Pollo: adesso basta aiuti 
all’Albania, Corriere della Sera, 25 July 2000; Cianfanelli Renzo, Tirana, dissidio Bonino 
Dini, Corriere della Sera, 31 October 1998.  
 
56 Casella Alexander, Macedonia: Taiwan’s Lost Gambit, Asia Times, 11 July 2001, available 
at  http://www.atimes.com/china/CG11Ad02.html ; Editorial: Ensuring the Wise Use of 
Foreign Aid, Taipei Times,  13 February 2001, available at 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2001/02/13/73493 ;  
Tupurkovski Puts Hope in Taiwan Economic Aid, Taipei Times, 19 January 2000, available at 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/01/19/20464 ;   
Foreign Aid Promises are a Thorny Issue for MOFA, Taipei Times, 21 April 2000, available 
at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/04/21/33101.  
 
88
The discussion which follows will provide an extensive review of the different 
motivations and factors which have   shaped and steered the foreign aid allocations to 
the countries and the region of the Western Balkans. These factors and motivations 
changed over time and with respect to recipients in response to the changing 
circumstances.  
The general framework of motivations for foreign assistance to the Balkans was 
produced by several overall goals, such as to promote democracy, free markets, and 
peace and stability. A complex dynamic of factors which have shaped aid allocations, 
has developed within this general framework. These factors existed both on the side 
of donors and recipients. In addition, these factors on the donor and recipient side 
communicated between each other. In discussing these various factors of ODA in the 
Balkans, the central question of motivation, posited between the poles of self-interest 
and moral altruism will be kept constantly in mind. The goal is naturally not to answer 
the question how much of the aid to the Balkans was motivated by self-interest as 
opposed to altruism, but to explore, in qualitative terms, the interaction of motives and 
factors in the overall process.      
It is important to note that the overarching goals of democracy, free markets, peace 
and stability were not static and universally agreed concepts of common 
interpretation. On the contrary, different donors had different ideas of how these 
should be achieved, and these concepts communicated with one another, transformed 
through this process of communication, and sometimes also competed with each 
other,  
 Each of these principal  goals had many correlated objectives, which often depended 
on particular developments on the ground, and different donors often differed in 
thinking as to which was the right way to react toward achieving the final goals . 
Goals in themselves had different meanings to different parties. For example, the goal 
of “stable and peaceful Balkans” had a different meaning to the European Union as 
opposed to the United States. Review of the political discourse surrounding the 
Balkan crises makes that conclusion quite clear. To the European Union stable 
Balkans meant, among other, peace of mind at its outer borders. To the United States, 
as much as it meant stability in the wider European area, it also meant – possibility for 
disengagement from a part of the world which was not of critical priority for its 
national interests. This particular point will be discussed in greater detail later in this 
chapter.  
Each stakeholder had a specific point of view. The agglomeration of all these views, 
interests, and motivations provided the basis for the entirety of foreign assistance to 
the Balkans.    The full disaggregation of ODA allocations which will be conducted in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will discuss this process in detail and offer a full 
“deconstruction” of foreign aid to the Balkans to its smallest constituent components.  
This stage in the discussion will provide a detailed review of the motives and factors 
which shaped donor aid commitments to the Balkans. The first part of this discussion 
is the subject of this chapter, whereas the second will be the subject of Chapter 4.   
 
 The first approach (this chapter) consists of a review of the official policy statements 
of major donors to the region. This review comprises   legislative texts, policy 
documents, and relevant reports concerning aid to the Balkans, as well as donor aid 
agencies’ websites. The second approach (Chapter 4) consists of an extensive review 
of major international media since 1990/1991, and analysis of texts relevant for the 
study of foreign aid to the Balkans.  The review of legislation and policy documents 
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(this chapter) will reveal the overall intended goals and concepts   underpinning and 
guiding the foreign assistance effort. The media review (Chapter 4) will offer insights 
into the political discourses and considerations concerning aid delivery to the Balkans, 
and it will provide analytical content which can regularly not be found in official 
documents.  
 
 
 
2. Review of Donor Aid Policies for the Balkans  
 
The following section will review the declared goals of foreign aid of several major 
bilateral and multilateral donors to the region of the Balkans. The review is not 
exhaustive in character, in   that it does not aim to provide a comprehensive listing of 
all the goals of each and every donor active in the region. The purpose is to indicate to 
the commonness of the general motives for aid to the Balkans as declared by the 
donors in their official policies. Because of this, some donors are omitted, same as not 
each and every nuanced motivation for aid to the region is included. It is important to 
mention that the selection of donors to review has also been influenced by the 
availability of sources. Nevertheless, some of the major donors to the region have 
been included, such as, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, the 
United States, and the European Union.  
 
Terminologically, the word “goal” of foreign aid will be used more often than 
previously in the text, as practitioner’s vocabulary operates with terms such as goals, 
objectives, rather than motives.  
 
From the point of view of this writing,   at a declarative, nominal level, the goal of aid 
is largely synonymous with the motive for aid. When the donor states “the goal is to 
promote economic development”, this means exactly what is being said; it indicates 
the selfless motive to promote economic development. Since the section explores the 
official statements of donors concerning the purposes of their aid to the Balkans, the 
stated, nominal goals are by and large one and the same with the motives for 
development assistance.  The donors are reviewed in no particular order.   
 
 
2.1 Germany  
 
Germany has been the single largest bilateral donors to the Balkans overall since 1990 
(see   Chapter 4), and consistently a top donor to the individual recipients in the 
region.    German ODA to the Balkans has by and large   been provided by and 
delivered through its two major   actors of development cooperation, the 
Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung/Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit/German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). 
The review of donor aid policies starts with a discussion of the policy texts and 
declarations of the German BMZ and GTZ.  
 
An examination of the official websites of these two development cooperation 
institutions finds that the most often referenced goal of development cooperation with 
the countries in the Balkans is - economic development. In addition to economic 
 
90
reform, references to other major goals include democracy and preparation of 
countries for accession into the EU. For example, the webpage of the GTZ reads that:   
 
“GTZ has been supporting the countries in South-Eastern Europe since 1992 in 
establishing a competitive market economy. The promotional measures of German 
Development Cooperation aim to bring economic policy in these countries closer to 
the European Union (EU).”57    
 
The review of the German policy texts finds evidence about the   dynamic character 
of donor aid policies concerning the Balkans, and the transformation of the aid 
process overtime. This is observable from the policy positions of the BMZ and GTZ. 
Where applicable the subsequent phases in the foreign aid process   are referenced, 
starting from emergency relief, through post-conflict reconstruction, economic 
reform, stability, and democracy promotion. For example BMZ notes with regards to 
Bosnia:  
 
“After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, German cooperation with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina concentrated initially on emergency aid measures, especially 
assistance for returning refugees. Thereafter, the focus of cooperation shifted to 
rebuilding the country and securing peace and democracy.”58 
 
The similar sequence can be found also with regards to Macedonia, eve though it 
should be underscored that in the first years into its independence Macedonia did not 
have the same need of emergency aid as BiH:  
 
“During the first few years after Macedonia’s independence, GTZ mainly 
implemented emergency aid and income creation projects.”59 
 
One relevant observation from the review of BMZ and GTZ policy texts concerns the 
already discussed democracy assistance. It is interesting that whereas the priority 
areas for cooperation with some countries explicitly reference democracy, for other 
countries they are omitted. This is not a coincidence   and the reason is the position 
vis-à-vis this issue of certain recipient countries, given that the goals of cooperation 
are set in a cooperation agreement. For example, Bosnia and Macedonia both appears 
as recipients of democracy aid in BMZ and GTZ policy documents:  
 
“(GTZ) The priority areas of cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina are economic 
reform and the promotion of democracy.”60  
 
The similar policy position can be found with respect to Macedonia:  
                                                 
57 GTZ, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/2623.htm; accessed on 
19 August 2008; italics added.    
58 BMZ, 
http://www.bmz.de/en/countries/partnercountries/bosnien_herzegowina/cooperation.html, 
accessed on 19 August 2008; italics added.  
59GTZ, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/658.htm, accessed on 19 
August 2008; italics added.   
60GTZ, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/1186.htm, accessed on 
19 August 2008.  
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“GTZ’s role in German-Macedonian cooperation focuses on the following priority 
areas: economic reform and development of the market system, promotion of 
democracy and civil society.”61 
But at the same time,    democracy promotion does not appear as a priority area of 
German ODA for the other countries in the region (at the time of review of the policy 
texts placed on the organizations’ web pages). Such as for example Albania:  
 
“GTZ’s current projects in Albania focus on economic reform. The main aim is to 
enhance the competitiveness of the Albanian economy and [bring it] more into line 
with EU standards.”62 
 
The same is the case with Montenegro. Economic and financial goals populate the list 
of priorities for cooperation, but there are no references to democracy promotion.  The 
section on cooperation with Montenegro specifically notes that the selection of goals 
is done on the basis of an agreement between the two governments:  
“As agreed by the German and Montenegrin Governments, Technical Cooperation 
concentrates on the following areas: promoting the economy and employment, 
structural reforms and reorganizing the financial sector”63  
The same is the case with Croatia, where the goals “defined in 2000, are ‘Economic 
promotion/promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)’ and ‘Regional 
development’”64; and with Serbia which also benefits only from assistance for 
economic development.  
This invites the conclusion that the reason some of the countries in the region have 
democracy promotion as a cooperation priority, an others do not, is the cooperation 
mandate which in the case of Germany is set with a bilateral agreement. It is 
important to note that this conclusion is provisional as it is based on relatively little 
available evidence. Or in other words, this chapter assumes that the reason for the 
omission of references to democracy work in some of the countries in the region is a 
result of the disinclination of recipient countries to accept it as a goal of foreign 
assistance. There is no other logical explanation why it should be a priority in the 
cases of BiH and Macedonia, but not for the others. Nevertheless, the research did not 
result with clear, written evidence that this is as a matter of fact the reason.  
In conclusion, the review of the policy declarations of the two major German actors of 
development cooperation, the BMZ and the GTZ, suggests that the nominal motives 
of German assistance to the Balkans comprise the standard topics of economic 
development, democracy (only with respect to some recipients), and rapprochement 
with the EU. The evolution of the assistance follows the logical sequence from 
emergency aid toward measures for long- term development.  
 
  
                                                 
61 GTZ, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/1244.htm, accessed on 
19 August 2008.  
62 GTZ, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/1164.htm, accessed on 
19 August 2008.  
63GTZ, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/18825.htm, accessed on 
19 August 2008.  
64 GTZ, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/1204.htm, accessed on 
19 August 2008.  
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2.2 Sweden  
 
A review of the priority goals of the major Sweden’s actor of development 
cooperation, the official Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), for the 
Balkans, demonstrates, similarly to Germany, strong commitment to the process of 
European enlargement. This major goal of Swedish ODA to the region is combined 
with some of the “traditional” development goals of poverty reduction. Accession into 
the EU and poverty are to be identified as major goals of Swedish foreign aid for all 
the countries in the region. Commitment to peace, stability, democracy, and human 
rights also rank high on the list of goals. According to a SIDA regional policy text 
from 2001:   
 
“The objective of Sweden’s development co-operation in the Western Balkans is to 
create conditions for a sustainable peace in the region and to facilitate the long-term 
integration of the new states into European co-operation... Sweden’s long-term 
development co-operation started after the peace agreement in Bosnia in 1995.Since 
then the main aim has been to build sustainable institutions... A vital part of Swedish 
aid aims at furthering human rights and democracy (SIDA, 2001: 3).”65 
 
The foreign assistance goals for individual countries stay within the frame of the 
regional goals defined by SIDA. The SIDA strategy for Albania, similar to the 
strategies for the other countries in the region, places the focus on bringing the 
country closer to the EU:  
 
“The focus of development cooperation with Albania is to support reforms that help 
the country develop closer ties with the EU... (SIDA, 2001:8)” 
 
The strategy lists the same or similar priority “areas of activity” for all the countries in 
the region. For Albania for example, they comprise: “democracy and good 
governance, respect for human rights, gender equality, sustainable use of natural 
resources and concern for the environment, economic growth, social development and 
security (SMFA, 2004: 8).” 
 
The actual allocation of funding is always a good indicator of the priorities on the 
ground. The strategy for Albania observes that: “just under half the funds [in the 
period 2001-2003] went to rural development and local administration projects, 
chiefly in the Korça region, while a third was allocated to measures to promote 
human rights, democracy and health...(SMFA, 2004: 5)”  
 
A review of SIDA’s policies on Macedonia suggests it is consistent with that on 
Albania. SIDA’s country strategy for Macedonia lists   similar priorities as the ones 
valid for Albania. The foremost goal of Swedish ODA in Macedonia is the country’s 
eventual EU integration:  
 
“The EU accession process lies at the heart of Swedish development cooperation with 
Macedonia (SMFA, 2006: 8).”  
 
                                                 
65 italics added.  
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Guided by its own (based on in-house produced assessments), strategic development 
reflection, SIDA has been inclined to focus its intervention on fewer areas of 
intervention over the midterm. In this sense, it has set a single priority area – 
agriculture - for Macedonia for 2006-2010. This means that most of the funding is to 
be allocated in this area, with occasional, smaller funding available for other fields. 
This is a policy change compared to SIDA’s strategy for the country for the previous 
period. According to a recent SIDA’s policy paper on Macedonia:   
 
“The previous country strategy for Macedonia covered the years 2003-2005 and 
focused on three sectors: democratic governance, economic development and 
environment....support has contributed to the overall goal of peace, stability and 
European integration (SMFA, 2006: 6).”  
 
According to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (SMFA, 2006:6) a total of 48 
% of aid in that period has gone for democratic governance. 
 
In addition to its policy of narrowing the focus of intervention, and the fixed priorities 
of EU integration and poverty reduction, SIDA regularly underscores that it sets its 
country priorities based on the priorities sets by the recipients themselves. The 
description of the agency’s priorities for Bosnia is a good example of this aspect:  
 
“The goal of Swedish development assistance is to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
development plan, the Mid Term Development Strategy (MTDS), which focuses on 
accession to the EU and the fight against poverty. In order to achieve this goal, and to 
promote concentration in the Swedish program, development assistance is to target 
two main sectors: the building of a sustainable state, and economic development 
(SMFA, 2006a: 1). “ 
  
 An assessment of SIDA’s policy documents on Croatia reveals the same pattern; the 
focus of Sweden’s intervention in Croatia is also placed on one big issue, EU 
integration:  
 
 “The focus of development cooperation with Croatia is to support reforms that help 
the country develop closer ties with the EU (SMFA, 2004a: 7).”  
 
Nevertheless the list of priority areas  for intervention is afterwards quite expanded 
and it includes: “democracy and good governance,  respect for human rights, gender 
equality,  economic growth,  sustainable use of natural resources and environmental 
concern,  social development and security (SMFA, 2004a: 8).” 
 
Although they demonstrate strong resemblance, SIDA’s country strategy papers 
produced for   the Balkan states   nevertheless take into account their separate 
realities. In this sense for example, the strategy for Kosovo rightfully underscores the 
priority of securing peace & stability:  
 
“The aim of Swedish development cooperation with Kosovo is to contribute to the 
development of peace and stability by strengthening Kosovo in its efforts to achieve 
closer integration with the rest of Europe. The two principal sectors for the 
cooperation are democracy and good governance, and sustainable economic 
development (SMFA, 2005: 1).” 
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Finally, SIDA’s priorities for Serbia and Montenegro are quite similar to the rest of 
the Western Balkans. According to a policy document by the SMFA from 2004:   
 
“Focus for development cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro is to support 
equitable and sustainable reforms that help the country develop closer ties with the 
EU and its integration in European cooperative structures (SMFA, 2004b:1).” 
 
The documents comprises the following priority areas for intervention  : “democracy 
and good governance, respect for human rights, gender equality, economic growth, 
sustainable use of natural resources and concern for the environment (SMFA, 2004b: 
8).” 
 
In conclusion, the poles of EU integration and poverty reduction represent the 
declared priorities of Swedish foreign aid to the countries of the Balkans. The rhetoric 
concerning democracy assistance operates with the term “democratic governance” 
more often than just democracy. Nevertheless, the three major overall goals are easily 
discernible: the economy, democracy, and the European Union.  
 
Nevertheless, specific donor   priorities can be discerned through the review.   For 
example, the study of SIDA’s policy documents indicates that human rights are a 
consistent priority, and gender equality ranks high on the list of foreign assistance 
goals. The rhetoric of environmental protection also indicates the importance of this 
goal in Swedish development cooperation. Thus, SIDA’s overall goals, such as 
democracy and the EU can be taken to be similar with Germany’s, but there are 
nevertheless differences. How much these differences in rhetoric actually translate 
into differences in operational strategies and the final ends of development assistance 
will be the subject of Chapter 6 which will explore the sectoral composition of ODA 
to the Balkans, and especially by Chapter 7 which will look into the micro data on 
individual allocations.  
 
 
  
2.3 The Netherlands  
 
A review of the goals of Dutch foreign assistance to the Balkans displays strong 
general similarity with the goals of other DAC bilateral donors. The standard range of 
notions comprising democracy, accession into the EU and stability interweaves the 
official texts of Dutch foreign assistance policy for this part of the world.  
 
A policy memorandum by the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation from the 
period immediately after the end of the Kosovo war outlines the major priorities of 
Dutch cooperation with the region of the Balkans:  
 
“In the coming years the main priorities of Dutch policy in the Balkans will be 
institution building, good governance and democratization of the state and society as 
a whole, promoting cooperation within southeastern Europe, and integrating the 
nations of the region into Europe and the world economy. This will improve the 
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standard of living for the people of the Balkans while promoting stability in 
southeastern Europe - and indeed of the whole continent (MDC, 1999: 1).”66 
This excerpt is en excellent example of a sublimate of the traditional goals of foreign 
assistance, such as increasing wellbeing (“the standard of living”), with the new 
trends of the 90s, such as     institutions and governance, and the common priorities 
for the Balkans as democracy and European integration.  
 
A   policy document of more general application, in that it discusses the Dutch global 
aid policies, produced by the Dutch Directorate General for Development 
Cooperation in 2003 also references the major goals of Dutch development policy for 
the Balkans. According to the document:   
 
“In the Balkans, the Netherlands will focus on sustainable stability and economic 
development (DGDC, 2003: 6).”  
 
Following this general outline of stability and economic development as policy 
priorities, the policy paper adds that:  
 
“The Netherlands supports   accession [of the Balkan countries] to the EU. 
Development cooperation can contribute to conflict management, stability and 
sustainable development in the region by providing specific support for the transition 
process (DGDC, 2003: 18).” 
 
The Balkans is one of three parts of the world where Dutch development cooperation 
is implemented with a regional approach:  
 
“The Netherlands works with other countries on the basis of bilateral agreements. 
Sometimes, however, agreements need to be made with more than one country, as in 
the case of cross-border conflicts or in post-conflict reconstruction. In such cases, we 
adopt a regional approach... The Netherlands takes a regional approach in the Horn 
of Africa, the Great Lakes region and the Western Balkans.”67  
 
The rhetoric of Dutch foreign aid operates more frequently with the term 
“governance” rather than democracy, and governance is defined to involve aspects of 
both good economic,   administrative, as well as political management. This is evident 
for example, from the following excerpt outlining Dutch development cooperation 
policy on Macedonia:    
“The Netherlands and the Macedonian authorities have agreed to streamline the 
development cooperation program...the basic principles of Dutch development 
cooperation policy are now: the cross-sectoral theme of good governance (public 
finances, inter-ethnic relations, and decentralization), private sector development, 
and basic education.”68   
                                                 
66 italics added.  
67 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, 
http://www.minbuza.nl/en/themes,international-cooperation/regional_approach, accessed on 
19 August 2008.  
68 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, 
http://www.minbuza.nl/en/developmentcooperation/PartnersAZ,Macedonie.html#a5, 
accessed on 19 August 2008.  
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 A review of Dutch development priorities for BiH shows that   the choice of priorities 
which Dutch aid has supported in Bosnia is similar to those in Macedonia. The 
website of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs reads that:  
“The Netherlands is among the five biggest donors [to Bosnia], and is the biggest 
donor to activities in the field of governance, human rights and peacebuilding...”69  
 
With regards to Albania, the webpage of the Dutch Development Cooperation refers 
to two priority areas: good governance and “sound public service”, placing them in 
the context of the need for stability, the care for the environment, and EU 
integration.70  
 
 In addition to having a regional approach, the Netherlands development cooperation 
has a policy of building closer relationship with select recipient countries. Such 
recipient in the Western Balkans is Macedonia:  
 
“Apart from the case of Macedonia, we do not intend to build up long-term 
development cooperation programs with each country bilaterally... (MDC, 1999: 3)” 
 
This type of donor behavior has been observed by aid scholarship, particularly with 
respect to mid- size and smaller donors, who can not afford to cover, or be present in 
every country of the world which demonstrates need of assistance. Because of this, 
and in order to maximize the impact of aid (through longer term, sustained, consistent 
intervention), they sometimes tend to focus on fewer selected recipients with whom 
they build special relationships.  
 
 In conclusion, the review of Dutch foreign assistance policy to the Balkans finds 
great similarities with the aid policies of the other donors active in the region. 
Democracy, governance, and European integration feature as major policy priorities, 
combined with the classical goals of development assistance, such as economic 
development and poverty.  
 
Given the Balkans specific circumstance, reference is paid to stability, conflict 
management, and peace building. The theme of governance is used extensively, and 
as a cross-sectoral category.   
 
 
 
2.4 Switzerland  
 
Switzerland has also been a relevant donor to the region of the Balkans in the 
transition period, ranking as the 10th largest bilateral donor in the period 1990-2005 
(see Chapter 5, Annex). A review of the goals comprised in the Swiss development 
cooperation policy vis-à-vis the Balkans comes across the similar range of issues and 
priorities to be found in the policies of other donors present in the region.  
                                                 
69 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, 
http://www.minbuza.nl/en/developmentcooperation/PartnersAZ,bosnie_herzegovina.html  
accessed on 19 August 2008; italics added.   
70 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, 
http://www.minbuza.nl/en/developmentcooperation/PartnersAZ,Albani-.html, accessed on 19 
August 2008.  
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 Albania has been a strong recipient of Swiss foreign aid directed to the Balkans. 
According to official policy declarations by Switzerland’s official development 
cooperation agent, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC),   
Swiss assistance to Albania seeks “to contribute to the stabilization, security and 
democratization” of the country. 71  
 
More specifically, “the cooperation strategy focuses on supporting the country in 
strengthening a social and free market economy and in realizing democratic 
principles for enhancing the regional and European integration.”72 To this end, the 
areas of Swiss development intervention in Albania include: democratization and 
decentralization, development of the private sector, and basic infrastructure and social 
service.  
 
The review of the goals of Swiss development aid for BiH, similar to the cooperation 
policies of other donors, notes the succession from emergency relief to reconstruction 
and development:   
 
  “During and after the war (1992 to 1995), Switzerland provided emergency aid and 
reconstruction assistance to the tune of 365 million CHF to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
From 1999, the focus shifted to long-term support for market-economy and 
democratic reforms and to reconciliation among the ethnic groups.“73 
 
The SDC does note that the the stability of BiH is a particular foreign policy priority 
for Switzerland. According to SDC policy texts,  this is   related to the presence of 
Bosnian refugees in Switzerland:  
 
“Participation in international efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina became a Swiss foreign policy priority owing, in no small measure, to 
the large number of Bosnian refugees in our country.“74 
SDC defines its goals in BiH in terms of:  self-determined reform of political 
institutions, sustainable development of the economy; and an equitable and 
participatory society. To this end is chooses to operate in the three major areas:  social 
domain, private sector development, and governance and basic services.75  
                                                 
71 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) 
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Countries/Southeastern_Eastern_Europe/Albania , 
accessed on 19 August 2008; italics added.   
72 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)  
http://www.swisscooperation-albania.ch/en/Home/Swiss_Cooperation_Fund , accessed on 19 
August 2008.  
73Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)  
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Countries/Southeastern_Eastern_Europe/Bosnia_and_Her
zegovina  
74Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) 
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Countries/Southeastern_Eastern_Europe/Bosnia_and_Her
zegovina , accessed on 19 August 2008.  
75Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)  
 http://www.sdc-seco.ba/ , accessed on 19 August 2008.  
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 Similarly, the goals of Swiss foreign assistance to Serbia, as featured on SDC’s 
official Serbia webpage, are defined in   terms of “alleviating poverty, enhancing 
democratisation and enabling a successful international, economic and social 
transition process respecting human rights.”76  
 
More recently SDC has produced strategies or country programs for some of the 
countries in the Balkans. The cooperation strategy for Serbia defines as the overall 
goal of Swiss assistance:  
 
“...the social, economic and political transition of Serbia, including its regional, 
European and international integration.... the programme is consolidated in four 
domains, each of which continues to be essential in the overall transition context: 
education, public infrastructure, local governance, and private sector development.... 
(SDC & SECO, 2006: 6)” 
 
Kosovo has been one of the strongest recipients of Swiss assistance in the Balkans, 
particularly in the emergency period, which is observable from the huge, tenfold rise 
in Swiss assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999. In that 
period of time Serbia was under sanctions and could not receive aid, except 
humanitarian assistance.  SDC’s aid policy on Kosovo places a noticeable accent on 
stability. Understandably the notion of integration of Kosovo is, as in the case of other 
donors, carefully phrased:  
 
  “Humanitarian actions and programmes to assist the return of persons displaced by 
the war were soon complemented by reconstruction and development activities. 
Switzerland is one of Kosovo's major donor countries. It aims to promote political 
stability as well as economic and social development, to strengthen local authorities 
and civil society, and to encourage regional integration.”77 
 
Similarly to the Netherlands, Swiss development cooperation also pursues the policy 
of building special relationships with select beneficiary countries. Same as in the 
Dutch case, Swiss development assistance policy for the Balkans singles out 
Macedonia as a priority recipient since 199678, which is noted also in the recent 
policy paper for the country jointly produced by SDC and the Swiss Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs (SECO):  
 
“in 1996 the Swiss government decided to give Macedonia the status of a priority 
country (SDC&SECO, 2005: 6).” 
 
The analysis of the donors’ choice of Macedonia as a special recipient in the Balkans 
would require additional analysis which exceeds the scope of this chapter.   One 
reason could likely be the fact that throughout the 1990s Macedonia was seen as an 
                                                 
76 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)  
http://www.swisscooperation.org.yu/ , accessed on 19 August 2008.  
77Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) 
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Countries/Southeastern_Eastern_Europe/Kosovo , 
accessed on 19 August 2008.  
78 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) 
http://www.sdc.admin.ch/en/Home/Countries/Southeastern_Eastern_Europe/Macedonia , 
accessed on 19 August 2008.  
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exception to the Balkan turmoil. It was frequently referred to as the “oasis of peace”, 
as it managed to stay conflict- free until 2001. Nevertheless, this is only an 
assumption. The research did not produce evidence for a definite conclusion on this 
issue.   
 
However, it should be noted that the declarative status of a special recipient does not 
always translate into increased aid amounts, and this is evident from the case of 
Macedonia, which is actually the second smallest recipient of Swiss aid to the 
Balkans, after Croatia (see Chapter 5, Annex).  
 
The SDC & SECO country program for Macedonia specifies the priority goals for the 
2005-2008 period:  
 
“In 2000, the first CP [country program] established for a four-year duration, was 
approved with the overall objective of supporting an effective, equitable, and market 
oriented economy and the further transition to a democratic system...the overall goal 
of the CP [for 2005-2008] is to contribute significantly to the sustainable 
enhancement of the quality of life of all Macedonian citizens, governed by democratic 
institutions (SDC&SECO, 2005: 7).”  
 
According to the SDC & SECO program, Swiss support concentrates on: governance, 
basic infrastructure and social services, and sound economic development 
(SDC&SECO, 2005: 7).  
 
In conclusion, the standard notions relating to market economy, democracy, 
governance, and stability apply also in the case of Swiss foreign aid to the Balkans. 
 
SDC’s terminology operates with stronger references to more specific goals such as 
service supply and intervention in infrastructure. This does not necessarily mean that 
other donors at level of operations invest less in infrastructure, but that the goals of 
Swiss cooperation are defined more specifically, with reference to particular 
operational ends.  
 
This issue will be taken into closer consideration further in the text, when donors’ 
particular projects and programs on the ground are to be discussed (Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7).  
 
 
2.5 Italy 
  
The official web page of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri (MAE) has a particular section dedicated to development cooperation. 
The region of the Balkans features as geographic area of interest for Italian 
development cooperation, and this section states the priorities for   such cooperation.  
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According to MAE the general goals of development cooperation with the Balkans 
include “support for the process of economic transition and political democratisation 
in the region with the goal of encouraging stabilisation.”79  
Going into the more specific objectives promoted in the region MAE states that:  
 
“Italian Cooperation is concentrated in the sectors of infrastructure, energy, the 
environment, health, education, public administration, support for the private sector 
(SMEs in particular) and protection of cultural heritage.”80  
 
The text also indicates the legal basis for provision of bilateral foreign assistance: 
“Italian financing is provided for by Law 49/87, and Law 180/1992; many projects 
have been facilitated by Law 84/2001 and Law 212/1992,”81 indicating that relevant 
part of the cooperation effort is channeled also through multilateral initiatives.  
 
The section also makes a reference to the different channels of cooperation, noting 
that big part of the effort has been channeled through Italian NGOs, but also that:  
 
“Bilateral agreements have also been signed in the sector of cultural cooperation for 
scholarships, inter-university cooperation, research programs, projects and initiatives 
to create libraries, museums and cultural centers.”82 
 
MAE also states the objectives and priorities for Italy’s development cooperation with 
individual countries in the region. The text notes that cooperation with Albania has 
started in 1992 and that “600 million euro in aid to development has been earmarked 
for Albania”83 since. The major goals of Italy’s assistance to Albania, according to 
MAE, are to help: 
  “Albania's process of association with Europe, fostering its economic development 
and the restoration of stability in the country.”84  As main sectors of cooperation 
MAE lists “infrastructure, energy, healthcare, institution building and support to the 
private sector (SMEs).”85  
 With regards to Croatia, the section reads that “Italian Cooperation was formerly 
engaged in reconstruction interventions in the areas struck by the Serbo-Croatian 
conflicts of 1991-1995, particularly in Eastern Slavonia, with projects in the socio-
healthcare sector, the reconstruction of buildings and the restoration of essential 
facilities.”86 
The goals of development cooperation with the rest of the countries in the Balkans are 
similar. According to MAE  “cooperation policy [with Serbia] aims at supporting 
                                                 
79  Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), 
http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Politica_Estera/Aree_Geografiche/Europa/Balcani/, accessed 1 
March 2009.  
80 ibid 
81 Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), 
http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Politica_Estera/Aree_Geografiche/Europa/Balcani/, accessed 1 
March 2009. 
82 ibid 
83 ibid 
84 ibid 
85 ibid 
86 ibid 
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Serbia's process of association with the European Union...  with the intention of 
encouraging institution building, economic development, and the restoration of 
security conditions...”87 
 
According to MAE, Italy has been the second strongest donor to Serbia since the year 
of 2000:  
“The commitments undertaken by the Italian government beginning in 2000 have 
evolved into a substantial financial commitment estimable at approximately 155 
million euro, 97.7 million of which has already been distributed. Italy is currently 
Serbia's second largest bilateral donor country, after the United States.”88  
In Bosnia, according to MAE “Italy's intervention is concentrated on support for 
sustainable development, institution building and protection of the weaker segments 
of the society.”89 MAE divides the goals of Italian ODA to BiH into three categories: 
“a) emergency; b) reconstruction and institution building; c) socio-economic 
development.”90 
With respect to Macedonia, MAE states that Italian Cooperation has been active in the 
country since 1992, “supporting the economic transition and development ... [and] 
sponsoring various humanitarian and emergency programs.”91  
 The development cooperation section of MAE’s official webpage succinctly states 
the major goals of Italian foreign assistance to the Balkans, and it is obvious that they 
are by and large similar to those of the other major bilaterals active in the region.  
The section of development cooperation is placed together with three other policy 
sections discussing Italy’s a) political relations, b) economic relations, and c) military 
presence in the region. The section on political relations provides perhaps the most 
succinct definition of the goals of Italian engagement with the region, which have 
obviously translated into the priorities for development cooperation:  
“Following the crisis of the 1990s, we are now engaged in the broad-based support of 
democratic institutions there and the transition toward free-market economic 
systems.”92 
The conclusion is the following: the official texts concerning Italian foreign assistance 
to the Balkans operate with the standard range of goals, common also for the other 
bilaterals active in the region, including democracy, market economy, peace & 
stability, and accession into the European Union.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 ibid 
88Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), 
http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Politica_Estera/Aree_Geografiche/Europa/Balcani/, accessed 1 
March 2009. 
89 ibid 
90 ibid 
91 ibid 
92 ibid 
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2.6 United States  
 
 Consistent with its role of one of the largest bilateral donors globally, the United 
States has had strong donor presence in the Balkans since 1990, and it has been the 
2nd largest bilateral donor to the region   in the period of transition (see Chapter 5).  
 
The policy framework for US aid to the Balkans has been set up by the US   overall 
legal framework for foreign assistance to Eastern Europe – the   Support to Eastern 
European Democracy (SEED) bill from 1989.93 The   title of the act itself is self-
explanatory and it clearly indicates the primary motivation for US assistance to the 
region - support to democracy.  
 
The SEED act declares two succinct goals of the assistance to Eastern Europe:  
 
“(1) to contribute to the development of democratic institutions and political 
pluralism... [and]  (2) to promote the development of a free market economic 
system”94  
 
These two major goals are further specified in detail in the normative part of the law. 
The “development of democratic institutions and political pluralism” is characterized 
by:  
 
• “the establishment of fully democratic and representative political systems 
based on free and fair elections, 
• effective recognition of fundamental liberties and individual freedoms, 
including freedom of speech, religion, and association, 
• termination of all laws and regulations which impede the operation of a free 
press and the formation of political parties, 
• creation of an independent judiciary, and 
•  establishment of non-partisan military, security, and police forces.”95 
 
The second goal, defined as “development of a free market economic system” is 
characterized by:  
 
• “ privatization of economic entities, 
• establishment of full rights to acquire and hold private property, including 
land and the benefits of contractual relations, 
• simplification of regulatory controls regarding the establishment and 
operation of businesses, 
• dismantlement of all wage and price controls, 
• removal of trade restrictions, including on both imports and exports, 
• liberalization of investment and capital, including the repatriation of profits 
by foreign investors; 
• tax policies which provide incentives for economic activity and investment, 
• establishment of rights to own and operate private banks and other financial 
service firms, as well as unrestricted access to private sources of credit, and 
                                                 
93 Support to Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act, Pub. L. 101-179, Nov. 28, 1989 
94 SEED Act, paragraph b 
95 SEED act, paragraph b 
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• access to a market for stocks, bonds, and other instruments through which 
individuals may invest in the private sector.”96 
 
It is interesting to observe that the goals concerning the promotion of free economy in 
particular, are very specific and detailed in describing the economic system the US 
considered desirable for the countries of Eastern Europe immediately after the fall of 
communism. The PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for Reconstructuring the 
Economy) act 97 which established the European Union aid, originally to Hungary and 
Poland, in that same year, was quite less specific and more concerned with 
humanitarian ends.  
 
Review of the introduction to the 2003 SEED Implementation Report gives additional 
insights into the motives and factors of US assistance to Eastern Europe:  
 
“By helping move the Central and Eastern European countries in the direction of 
democracy and market-based economies, these programs promote long-term stability 
in the region and contribute to U.S. national security.”98   
 
Clearly, democracy and economic reforms are brought in connection with the region’s 
stability and, importantly, US national security. This logic in the motivations for 
foreign aid has been discussed in detail in Chapter 1. Explicit formulations of this 
type leave little room for arguing against the motive of self-interest as factor of US 
foreign assistance, when it is succinctly cited by US official documents. Nevertheless, 
the later phases of the review will look into how this declared self-interest translates 
into operational strategies.   
 
The report makes a reference to the standard range   specific objectives of foreign aid, 
including the need to: “fight corruption, strengthen civil society and the independent 
media, enhance market reforms, create economic opportunity, mitigate conflict, fight 
disease, reduce threats of weapons of mass destruction, prevent trafficking in persons 
and contraband, and promote the rule of law and human rights throughout the 
region.”99  
 
With assistance to the CEE countries already phased out, and aid to the second tier of 
countries, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania, declining, the report notes that the bulk of 
effort under the SEED Act by that point in time has been focused on the Western 
Balkan countries:  
 
“Of the 15 countries covered by the SEED Act, three are NATO members already, 
with another seven scheduled for membership in spring 2004. Eight of the 15 are 
slated to join the EU at about the same time. As a result, the program’s focus has 
shifted predominantly to Southeastern Europe.”100The report further states that:  
 
                                                 
96 SEED Act, paragraph b 
97 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to certain 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (PHARE Regulation). 
98 US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/36985.htm, accessed on 19 
August 2008; italics added.   
99 ibid  
100 ibid 
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“The overarching goal of SEED assistance to such countries as Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro is to help them stand 
completely on their own feet, politically, economically, and socially, and with 
reasonable prospects for eventual full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.” 101 
 
In conclusion, the review of the major legislative document guiding US assistance to 
the region, combined with an examination of   goal statements in a recent SEED 
report offer sufficient insight into the motives and factors of US aid to the Balkans. It 
should be reminded that full review of motives and factors is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Longitudinal review over a ten year period would definitely reveal the 
evolution of goals of assistance as the circumstances in the Balkans were changing. 
Motives were changing also due to circumstances on the part of the donor. The post 
9/11 period saw a significant re-incorporation of security considerations in foreign 
aid, thus the 2003 report notes that “SEED countries have proven valued partners for 
the United States in the war on terrorism.”102 
 
The relevant conclusion is that which concerns the consistency,   with the 
understandable presence of necessary differences, of the motives of foreign assistance 
to the Balkans across donors. From the review of the US policy priorities for 
development cooperation with the Balkans, it is clear that with the acceleration of the 
process of enlargement, accession into the EU became also a goal of US foreign 
assistance to the region.  
 
Obviously there are notable differences in the rhetorical importance of certain goals of 
foreign aid. For example, whereas democracy is enshrined in the title of the 1989 act 
setting up the US foreign aid program to Eastern Europe, it was completely absent 
from the original EU PHARE document103. Over the years the EU joined the 
democracy discourse104 and references to democracy are much more present in the 
OBNOVA and CARDS programs, as goal but also precondition of aid, yet still not at 
the rhetoric level democracy had in US policy texts.  
 
Interestingly, although the SEED act is short for “support to Eastern European 
Democracy”, the bigger part of the legislative documents is concerned with issues of 
economic development. The fact of the intensity of certain rhetoric, as scholarship has 
well noted and as mentioned earlier, does not necessarily translate into aid allocations.  
 
 
 2.7 European Union   
 
The European Union has been the single largest donor to the Balkans in the period of 
transition. EU development assistance has been channeled through the different 
instruments and programs set up over the years by the European Commission (EC), 
and has gone through various phases. The CARDS (Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization) program of the European 
                                                 
101 ibid  
102 ibid 
103 PHARE Democracy was introduced several years later.  
104 The 2nd chapter discussed the rise of democracy assistance in the 90s.  
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Commission for assistance to the Western Balkans was introduced in 2000105, 
replacing or amending the previous EC acts which regulated this matter, namely 
OBNOVA and PHARE.  
 
The goals of the CARDS program are defined in accordance with the enlargement 
policy of the EU and the preamble of the CARDS regulation asserts that the overall 
objective of the European Council vis-à-vis the Western Balkans is “the fullest 
possible integration of the countries in the region in the political and economic 
mainstream of Europe and that the stabilization and the association process is the 
centerpiece of its policy in the Balkans”. 106 The CARDS regulation also reasserts that 
the countries from the region are seen as potential candidate countries.107   
 
By the year of 2000 the overall goal of EC assistance to the Balkans   has already 
become the integration into the EU. In this sense the CARDS regulation provides that 
aid to the Balkans should “contribute to the stabilization and association process and 
increase responsibility of recipient countries and entities in relation to that process.” 
108  
 
As regards the more specific objectives of Community assistance, the CARDS 
regulation foresees that:  
 
“... Community assistance will be focused mainly on building up an institutional , 
legislative, economic and social framework directed at the values and models 
subscribed to by the European Union and on promoting a market economy, with due 
regard for priorities agreed with the partners concerned.”109 
 
 Article 2 of the CARDS regulation specifically(in 6 paragraphs) defines the purposes 
of assistance to the Balkans, ranging from reconstruction and humanitarian aid, 
through institution building, “market-economy oriented economic reform”110, social 
development, regional cooperation, and so forth.  
 
The discourse of “democracy promotion” is not accentuated in the CARDS regulation 
but there is nevertheless a strong reference to the goal of democratization, indirectly 
through institution building whereby the goal of aid is “the creation of an institutional 
and legislative framework to underpin democracy, the rule of law and human and 
minority rights, reconciliation and the consolidation of civil society...”111 
 
Democracy features as a goal of foreign assistance, though not as strongly as in the 
United States aid rhetoric, but it   also features as a condition of receiving assistance. 
According to the preamble to the CARDS regulation:  
 
                                                 
105 Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000 (CARDS regulation)  
106CARDS regulation,  preamble article 3 
107 preamble art 4  
108 preamble art 5  
109 preamble art 6  
110 art. 2, par c  
111 art. 2 par b  
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“A precondition for receiving assistance is that the recipients respect democratic 
principles, the rule of law, human and minority rights, fundamental freedoms and the 
principles of international law.”112 
 
The “conditionality clause” already exists in the previous act which guided EC 
assistance to the Balkans through the framework of OBNOVA, whereby award of 
assistance was “based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms....”113   
 
These   general conditions are combined with more specific ones for individual 
countries The OBNOVA regulation provides that:  
 
  “The specific conditions laid down by the Council for the implementation of 
cooperation with former Yugoslavia are also an essential part of this Regulation.” 
114 One such condition was and still is the cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  
 
The   commitment to conditionality is also stated in the preamble to the OBNOVA 
regulation, whereby the Community “intends to make its support contingent on 
adherence to the political and economic terms of the peace agreements signed in 
Paris on 14 December 1995, notably respect for human rights”115 
The goals of EC aid to the Balkans as defined by the OBNOVA regulation are 
similar to those listed for CARDS four years later 
 
   : “The aim of the projects, programs and cooperation schemes shall be to 
underpin the reconstruction process, to encourage the return of refugees, 
reconciliation and regional economic cooperation, and to create the economic and 
social conditions that will lay the foundations for the development of the recipient 
countries.”116  
 
It is interesting to review the full listing of goals of foreign assistance as presented 
in paragraph 2 of article 4 in the OBNOVA regulation:  
 
“The projects, programs and schemes referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover the 
following fields, in particular: 
- regional cooperation and good neighborliness projects, and transborder 
projects; 
- rebuilding of infrastructure and other individual or collective facilities 
damaged in the fighting; 
- the consolidation of democracy and civil society; 
                                                 
112 preamble art. 7, CARDS regulation  
113 art 2, Council Regulation (EC) no 1628/96 of 25 July 1996 (OBNOVA regulation) 
114 OBNOVA Regulation, article 2  
115 OBNOVA Regulation, preamble  
116 OBNOVA Regulation ,article 4, paragraph 1  
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- return of refugees; 
- integration or reintegration of refugees, displaced persons and former soldiers 
into working life; 
- preparation of the production apparatus for economic recovery; 
- development of the private sector, notably small businesses, and promotion of 
investment; 
- the strengthening of non-governmental organizations, cultural institutions and 
educational establishments”117 
 
Full analysis of the goals exceeds the purpose of this chapter, nevertheless it is 
noticeable that humanitarian and reconstruction goals are highlighted, which is 
logical given the time-period of the regulation,  shortly after the end of the war in 
Bosnia, and the immense humanitarian and reconstruction needs. “Consolidation of 
democracy” already features as a goal in hand with consolidation of “civil society”. 
Another interesting observation is that “strengthening of nongovernmental 
organizations” exists in parallel with the need to consolidate civil society.    
 
Given that OBNOVA is from 1996 when the prospect of Balkan accession in the EU 
was practically non-existent, the goal of enlargement or accession does not exist as a 
factor of EC assistance to the region in this act regulating EC development aid to the 
region.  
 
However, the prospect of EU integration of the Balkans has clearly become much 
clearer by the time of the institution of the CARDS mechanism.  
 
In addition, from the review of the aid policies of some of the major bilateral donors, 
it is clear that the goal of the Balkan’s EU integration has fully permeated the 
development assistance priorities of other European but also of non-European 
bilaterals.  
 
Beyond   EU integration as a goal of foreign assistance to the Balkans, whose origin is 
clearly the EU enlargement policy and from there it has been translated into the EU 
development policy, it can be concluded that the same and similar overall goals, 
comprising governance, institutions, democracy, as well as stability, guide the EC 
foreign aid to the region of the Balkans.  
 
 
 
3. Conclusion  
  
The purpose of the preceding review was to provide a general overview, rather than a 
full scan, of the goals of the foreign assistance   as declared in the official documents   
of the major donors to the region of the Balkans. Not all the donors to the Balkans 
were included, nor was the analysis of texts a fully comprehensive one. As already 
mentioned, the limits of the discussion were also dictated by availability of sources.  
The aim was to observe the   similarities rather than to identify all the differences, 
which are inevitably plenty.  
                                                 
117 OBNOVA Regulation, article,  4 paragraph 2  
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The main conclusion is that there is a standard range of declared goals which have 
motivated foreign assistance to the Balkans in the transition period. These goals relate 
to the overall vision of the Western world for the post-communist countries, including 
democracy and market economy as the major perimeters. In addition they have been 
strongly defined by the Balkan’s unique circumstance which produced an immense 
humanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction need.  
 
Another strong factor in defining the goal of foreign aid has been   the EU 
enlargement policy. Enlargement has not only impacted the aid policies of the EU 
member states, but also non-EU donors, such as Switzerland and the US, which have 
also included integration of the Balkans into the EU as a goal of their aid policies.  
Further, the goals correspond with the general trends of foreign assistance in the post-
cold war world, which were discussed in detail in Chapter 2. This is evident from the   
numerous references to democracy, governance, institutions, and civil society, in the 
policy documents of donors.  
 
Some notes of caution are perhaps well warranted when discussing donors’ official 
aid rhetoric. Some of these have already been hinted in the text during the discussion 
of the particular aid policies. Such as for example, the frequent use of certain rhetoric 
or the underscoring of certain goals does not necessarily mean that they would be 
equally strongly supported by actual aid disbursements. The intense democracy 
promotion rhetoric does not always translate into specific democracy promotion 
projects, or at least the actual financial commitments are not at the level of the 
rhetorical one. This can also apply to other declared policy goals.  
 
Related to this, the question is how much are such development assistance 
declarations real policy positions as opposed to mere rhetorical exercise? And how 
consistent are the donors’ operational strategies with their policy statements? How 
can a donor ensure the commitment to goals which a) range over entire sets of issues, 
such as poverty, institutions, stability, and b) which are defined at such generic level, 
such as for example “stability” which can often mean a variety of different things?  
 
In this sense, the valid question which emerges is how relevant an exercise the review 
of aid policy actually is, especially if done at the level of donor statements? Logically, 
the actual inspection of what a donor actually chooses to do is a much more relevant 
insight into what the donor’s policy priorities really are.   
 
 These dilemmas open a debate which is as complex as it is extensive.  At this point, 
the intention is not to fully elaborate on these issues, but simply: to caution to certain 
realities of the foreign aid process. Chapter 6 and especially Chapter 7 will look into 
what have donors in reality chosen to support in the Balkans 
 
At the same time, the raising of such dilemmas is not done with the purpose to 
indicate hidden or ulterior agendas, but simply to test the achievability of certain 
declarative goals in practice. For example, the stated goal of EU integration of the 
Balkans, for example by Switzerland, should be supported by certain operational 
modalities which further that specific goal. What if such specific measures are not to 
be found in Swiss ODA to the Balkans, for example? Is the declaration of such a 
goals still a worthy statement?  
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An overall framework can nevertheless be discerned, regardless of how broad it is. 
This     framework can be defined in the following way:  
 
Eastern Europe equals free market economy plus democracy.  
 
 Balkans equals free market economy plus democracy plus peace.  
 
In the simplest of terms, these are the major points of reference for foreign aid to the 
Balkans, as they emerge from the review of the policy texts of the major donors to the 
region. Overall, foreign aid to the Balkans was motivated by the desire to: promote 
democracy and market economy, and ensure stability and peace.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Motives and Factors for Aid to the Balkans:  
Review of International Media 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Following the review of official policy texts in Chapter 3, this chapter continues the 
examination of donor motivations   with a review of international media. The media 
review is done in order to get insight into the dynamic political reality of Western 
assistance to the Balkans and to analyze moments and contexts which are often not 
part of official rhetoric.  
The review of the international media coverage of foreign assistance to the Balkans 
reveals a lot of interesting material about the theme of inquiry. This material consists 
of a) political discourses, and especially statements by senior political officials 
concerning the process of international intervention in the Balkans, and b) information 
on a range of situations and circumstances which have acted as factors of aid 
allocations to the region in one way or another. It is instructive to review some of 
these situations and factors and to discuss the more particular among them. This is 
important in order to underscore the versatile and complex dynamic of the process of 
foreign assistance to the region.  
An additional note of clarification is perhaps due concerning the choice of media 
review as a method of exploration of motives and factors of aid to the Balkans. One 
reason is definitely the fact that the review of the media reveals information which is 
usually not comprised in official development assistance documents. In this sense, 
statements by senior politicians, reports of international dynamics and trends, or of 
arguments or disagreements concerning foreign aid between donor governments, or 
between donors and recipients, are critical items of evidence in the exploration of the 
reality of motives and factors of aid.  
 
The second reason is produced by necessity. As already noted earlier, the extensive 
review of the existing academic literature produced   little on the topic of foreign 
assistance to the Balkans, in particular as it concerns the focus of this inquiry. The 
issue of foreign aid to the Balkans has been to date quite under-explored in the 
scholarly debate on aid. Apart from occasional references, and a few shorter 
contributions, there has not been to date a comprehensive treatment of the subject. In 
this sense, the intensive use of media reports, in addition to being a reliable source of 
factual information, is used as a substitute for the deficiency of scholarly sources.  
All of the factors which the review of international press discloses have been in some 
way relevant to the foreign aid operation in the Balkans. Some of them have been of 
much greater importance than others. Any particular aid decision is a result of many 
intertwined factors. Often these factors are mere notions in the process of making an 
aid decision, and sometimes they have a particular significance to only one or a few 
donors. In addition, some of them can be considered to be more general principles in 
foreign aid, whereas others are individual responses to particular situations.  
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The review of international media uncovers a) numerous cases in which foreign aid 
was considered as a response to a certain situation, and b) many nuanced uses of 
foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy. Many different situations and 
circumstances have made governments resort to aid as a tool and in this way acted as 
factors of foreign assistance.  
For the purpose of this chapter, the more relevant of those cases documented from the 
international press were collected and provisionally categorized. The review has 
produced 12   situations which have acted as factors of foreign assistance in one way 
or another. All of these situations are positioned in between the two distinct poles of 
self-interest and altruism, which explain the motivation for giving foreign aid in 
broadest possible terms.   
 
 
2. Review of International Media  
2.1 Moral and Historic Duties, Concerns and Responsibilities  
The feeling of altruism and compassion invoked in response to war and humanitarian 
emergency was a strong factor of foreign assistance to the Balkans. There is no doubt 
that it was the images of horror and human suffering from the Balkan wars that made 
the region one of the strongest aid recipients in the world over the past decade and a 
half. Aid for humanitarian purposes is what generally distinguishes the Balkans from 
the rest of Eastern Europe. In addition to economic and democracy aid, the region also 
received huge amounts of humanitarian assistance. In this sense, altruism, or in other 
words, the feeling of moral duty, was an important motivation for aid to the Balkans. 
Altruism in itself is not a firmly bound and homogeneous category. It would represent 
a range of moral sentiments. In addition, it would combine with and engage in 
exchange with other both philanthropic and political impulses. For the purpose of this 
text it is interesting to outline several situations where moral duty either acted as a 
factor of aid commitment, or was invoked as a motive to provide aid.  
It is important to note that the selection of cases is random, from what has been 
registered by international media. Nevertheless, the research effort for this text 
comprised an extensive and comprehensive examination of possibly relevant coverage 
in all of the media included in the review.     
What emerges as a relevant observation from the analysis of the situations is the 
existence of what can be termed interweavement and substitutability of motivations 
for foreign assistance, whereby motives of self-interest and moral duty easily 
exchange places in the political rhetoric surrounding aid giving. What more, in of 
themselves they are not firm categories. Moral duty can be a generous impulse to 
help, but it can also be fear of reprimand for not having helped. Self-interest can and 
in reality often is a composite of many different, often unrelated, self-interests.  
An interesting example which is an excellent case study of  the use (and abuse) of 
moral concern     as factor of foreign aid is the famous Energy for Democracy project 
of the European Commission to opposition governed municipalities in Serbia in 1999. 
Energy for Democracy is one of the most highlighted cases of foreign aid to the 
Balkans.  
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 The Energy for Democracy project designed by the EC, provided heating oil to 
opposition governed municipalities in Serbia in the winter of 1999, in the aftermath of 
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, and in a last critical period of the Milosevic regime.  
Serbia’s oil refineries had been destroyed by the NATO bombing earlier that year and 
the country was facing a severe energy crisis and a humanitarian catastrophe with the 
coming winter.  The EC proposed a project to give heating oil, but only to 
municipalities which were controlled by the Serbian opposition.    The United States 
initially strongly opposed the project. The reason for the opposition, from what can be 
gathered from the press review, was primarily the fear that aid would be abused by the 
Milosevic regime. The US worried that the Milosevic run government could manage 
to divert the assistance to his loyalists. In the end, the US conceded and supported the 
project. The reason for the yielding was the fear of possible moral blame from the 
consequences of withholding aid. As the New York Times notes:   
“The Clinton administration, worried that it could be blamed if Serbs freeze to death 
in the winter, has decided to support a European-run pilot program to send millions 
of dollars worth of heating oil to Serbia...”118  
It is obvious from the excerpt that motivation was not an altruistic desire to help but 
fear from moral blame.   It should be however taken into consideration that both the 
EU and the US conduct in this particular situation can not withstand a closer ethical 
scrutiny. The EU did not have a problem tying essentially humanitarian aid (heating 
oil in winter) to political ends. The US on the other hand initially objected the whole 
project also because it felt that “by alleviating the hardships of a cold winter, the oil 
might diminish public protests against his government.”119  
Basically, as it appears from the media review, the US did not primarily worry about 
people freezing. The EU did, but only about people with the correct political 
affiliation. In the end, the US conceded and supported the project, not because of a 
sudden altruistic reawakening, but because it feared moral rebuke. In this case, both 
actors played with moral concerns, but in essence for both of them it was political 
ones which prevailed.  
 Another interesting case which operates with the sense of duty to help is Italy’s aid to 
Albania in 1991. Albania was the first country in the Western Balkans to start 
receiving   substantive amounts of foreign aid, largely on humanitarian grounds. The 
opening of its long sealed borders produced a strong wave of migration, mostly 
towards Italy and Greece in the beginning of the 90s. 
 Explaining the decision to commit substantive amounts to Albania in June of 1991, 
then Italy’s Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis resorted to a combination of motives 
which comprised fear of migration and “historic and geographic duty” to help:  
"We surely hope this aid will discourage the pressure of immigration," Foreign 
Minister Gianni De Michelis said at a news conference…"Europe must help Albania," 
Mr. De Michelis said. "Italy has a special duty for historic and geographical 
reasons." 120  
                                                 
118  New York Times, U.S. Backs European Effort To Send Heating Oil to Serbs, November 2, 
1999.  
119  ibid 
120 New York Times, Italy Pledges $50 Million in Aid for Albania, June 14, 1991. See more 
on fear of migration as factor of Italian foreign aid to Italy below in the respective section of 
this chapter.  
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This is a good case study of an aid decision motivated by a combination of factors. 
The notion of “historic duty” refers to former colonial ties, to Albania’s past as Italian 
colony, a motive for aid already discussed in the theoretical part; the “geographic 
duty” can be extensively interpreted to include fear from migration, related security 
issues, and “real” feeling of duty on account of geographic proximity which definitely 
contributes to the intensity of the perceptions of need in a neighbouring country. Fear 
from migration probably outweighed other concerns, but they were nevertheless 
present. Whatever factor taken as dominant in deciding Italy’s assistance to Albania 
in the early 90s, it has decided almost half of its assistance to the Balkans over the 
entire 1990-2005 time period. Half of all Italian development aid to the Balkans over 
the 15-year period has gone to one country, Albania, in only a few years in the 
beginning of the 90s (see Chapter 5).   
Finally, a third case evoking moral concern as grounds for aid decision involves the 
interesting example of Israeli aid to the Balkans. Israel’s assistance to the region of 
the Balkans has been overall marginal. Yet, the reports of human suffering  
particularly related to prison camps in the war zones of former Yugoslavia prompted 
Israel to offer urgent humanitarian aid in the beginning of the 90s. According to news 
report from the time:  
“Reports of atrocities in detention centers set up in what was once Yugoslavia have 
struck a sensitive nerve in Israel, evoking memories of Nazi concentration camps and 
leading many people to say that their country has a special moral obligation to send 
help.”  
In the words of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres: 
 ... "The reports of murder and suffering of those detained in Bosnia can only cause 
everyone in the world, and especially Jews, to feel revulsion to the depths of their 
souls.  ”121 
Clearly, the feeling of moral duty in this case arises from the similarity of the human 
suffering in former Yugoslavia with the tragedy of Jewish people during WW II. 
Israel felt called upon, even if this moral impulse did not translate into massive 
inflows of Israeli aid.  
Nevertheless, as an evidence in support of the claim that no aid decision is driven by a 
single motive, which is essentially the nature of human (and likely government) 
behavior, even this very particular sense of moral obligation was combined with other 
inclinations.   In the words of Aryeh Barneafrom   head of the group   Movement for 
Remembering the Lessons of the Holocaust, which was actively involved in this 
project: 
"This has a moral element of course, but also a political element...After we do 
something like this, we should say to the United States: 'We the small ones, have done 
our part and saved 500. Now you should do your part and save 50,000.' " 
                                                                                                                                            
  
121 New York Times, Shuddering at Camp Reports, Israel Plans Aid, August 9, 1992.  
 
 
114
 This statement relates to the moment of peer pressure as a factor of aid, which was 
discussed in the theoretical part in Chapter 1, and which will be further encountered in 
some of the following examples.  
Peer pressure itself is also not a simple category and it can exist in a plentitude of 
modalities. In this particular case it simply follows the strong ethical drive which is of 
primary importance. In this sequence thus: 1) aid is motivated by a strong feeling of 
duty, 2) the donor desires or hopes that the act would also serve as an impelling 
example for others.  
There are other cases where the intention to press peers is much bigger constituent 
part of the decision to give aid. Such a case is discussed further in this chapter, in the 
section on donor rivalry, with regards to US and EU squabbling over assistance to 
Kosovo.   
 
 
2.2 Aid as Instrument of Foreign Policy I:  Reward and Punishment, Isolation 
of Opponents and Help to Allies  
 
The use of foreign assistance as an instrument of foreign policy can take many 
different forms. In addition, the function of aid as an instrument of foreign policy is in 
reality often fused with its other functions, such that it is sometimes difficult to say 
where the role of aid as a tool of economic development stops, and where its role as 
an instrument of foreign policy begins.  This being said, it should be noted that the 
very incipient moment of award of aid for economic development, is also (to a lesser 
or greater extent) subject to foreign policy considerations. This would also naturally 
depend on the extent to which the particular donor country considers, or wants to use 
foreign aid as an instrument in its foreign policy.  
 
Review of the process of foreign assistance to the Balkans finds evidence of aid 
allocation, or its withholding being used as a tool for the achievement of different 
foreign policy goals, such as: 
  
a) reward for reformers,  
b) punishment for non-reformers,  
c)   isolation of opponents (or simply tool against opponents), and  
d)  helping allies  
 
Uses under a) and b) are usually part of a politically more neutral process of 
meritocratic assessment, whereas uses c) and d) imply a clear-cut political function of 
foreign aid. Uses a) and b) are   not analogous with uses c) and d) and they can 
hypothetically be opposed: laggards can receive aid if they are political allies, and the 
opposite can also be true. The theoretical discussion on motives for aid in Chapter 1 
covered that issue in detail. Several cases will be reviewed for the purpose of 
exploring these dynamics.  
 
Although by no means immune to political influences, the process of distribution of 
the EU development assistance has by and large been subject to regular assessments 
of progress against certain parameters which have occasionally had the power to 
influence the distribution of aid. Such value judgments on the progress vs. lack of 
progress by certain recipients are regularly found in the EC progress reports. The 
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following excerpt from a European Voice coverage from 1999 refers to a situation 
when aid was withheld on account of such a meritocratic assessment about lack of 
progress with democratic reform:  
 
 “According to the Commission's report, Albania and Macedonia are the Balkan region's 
success stories compared to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where EU governments had 
hoped for the return of western-style democracy and respect for minority rights in the 
wake of the Bosnian war... Croatia's failure to make progress on democratization has 
prevented it from benefiting from the EU's Phare program...”
122
  
 
Croatia was for example, at one point excluded from the EU PHARE program on 
account of insufficient progress with democratization; Serbia was (and it still is) under 
continuous monitoring and the   flow of aid was subject to periodic approvals of the 
country’s progress, particularly with respect to its full cooperation with the ICTY; 
Macedonia never had its aid halted but in the immediate period after the end of the 
2001 conflict, it was several times warned that the flow of assistance was contingent 
on the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA).  
 
The   case of Croatia’s exclusion from PHARE shows that the borderline between 
purely merit- based and political decision can be blurred.123 Whereas it can be argued 
that Croatia’s exclusion from PHARE (the country was receiving funding from other 
donors and funding mechanisms) was a result of the EU’s technical assessment that 
the country had failed to meet certain criteria, the case of neighboring Yugoslavia, 
which was under a complete aid and trade embargo, was a case of complete isolation 
of a regime which the international community considered a pariah, an enemy.  
 
Yugoslavia reached a state of total embargo because the whole international 
community saw it in complete disrespect of democratic standards. Overtime, a strong 
international consensus emerged against Yugoslavia, which was not the case with 
Croatia, or the other countries in the region.  
 
In this sense the two functions of aid can be seen as posited along a continuum 
whereby technical or merit-based (reward-punishment) actions, by gaining in weight 
and intensity overtime, can turn into intense political acts. The same is possible in 
reverse.  Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that this cannot only depend on the 
non-performance of the recipient. A non-performing recipient with a strong position 
in the “international community’ will not likely be isolated.  
 
The withholding of aid from Serbia under Milosevic demonstrates instances of not 
just withholding aid from someone who is not worthy, but actually consciously using 
aid as a political instrument to politically isolate an opponent. This aspect can be 
isolated from the following moment registered by the New York Times:  
 
                                                 
122 European Voice, Report Reinforces Need for Balkan Stability Pact, Vol. 5 No. 20: 19 
May 1999.  
  
123 A good example of a purely merit-based decision to use aid to punish non-reformers is the 
case of Bulgaria, which is taking place at the time of writing this chapter (June – July 2008). 
The EU has decided to suspend around 500 million Euros of regional funds to Bulgaria 
because of the country’s failure to address corruption, in particular related to the use of the 
very European funds.  
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 “...Gerhard Schroder, the German Chancellor, said of Serbia that, ‘Reconstruction 
aid, reestablishment of economic structures and reincorporation into Europe need 
democratization, and that is not possible with Mr. Milosevic’... Michael Steiner, the 
chief diplomatic adviser to Mr. Schroder, said that money would be used as a political 
weapon to isolate Mr. Milosevic. Aid would be channelled to Kosovo, Montenegro 
and even perhaps areas of Serbia itself run or controlled by opposition parties...”124  
 
This statement expresses a clear intent that foreign assistance be used a tool to isolate 
and harm a political enemy. In such a particular case also the surrounding strategic 
partners are in a position to receive more aid than they otherwise would.  They benefit 
not by criteria of merit or need, but reasons of political manoeuvre:  
 
“the leaders gathered here [at the Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo] are seeking to 
avert future conflicts in the Balkans through longer-term economic reconstruction... 
But they also pointedly wanted to try to isolate President Slobodan Milosevic of 
Yugoslavia, who was not invited... The leaders said that as long as Mr. Milosevic 
remained in power, they would not contribute to rebuild Serbia.”125 
 
The function of aid as reward for political allies in the Balkans is quite evident in the 
position of the international community towards Montenegro, in the period after the 
Kosovo war and before the fall of Milosevic. In this particular period of time the West 
feared that Montenegro could be the stage for the next Balkan crisis caused by the 
Milosevic regime, and felt the imperative to support the fledgling pro-Western 
republic:  
 
“The West essentially needs to subsidize Montenegro until Mr. Milosevic leaves 
power. Given the republic's size, this is not that difficult.”126 
 
Generous foreign assistance was both a handy and much appreciated way of helping:  
 
“In the past few months, Montenegro has adopted the German mark as its currency, 
an act of economic audacity that infuriated Milosevic. In retaliation, Milosevic 
imposed a blockade between Serbia and Montenegro, but Djukanovic has overcome 
many of its effects, in part through a generous and largely unconditional infusion of 
Western aid.”127 
 
Montenegro did earn credit with the West for its actions opposing Milosevic, and in 
this sense it was not just a protégé but a worthy ally:   
 
“Mr. Djukanovic matters to the West. He has provided shelter to Serbian opposition 
figures who were afraid for their lives, both during the war and afterward, as well as 
to Serbian draft dodgers during the war. And he has provided a platform for 
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broadcasting anti-Milosevic material into Serbia. In return, he has received Western 
adulation and millions of dollars in aid.”128  
 
As already discussed in the first chapter on motives and factor of foreign aid, political 
alliance is a strong predictor of foreign assistance. There are many other instances in 
the aid process to the Balkans which were directly motivated by political allegiance 
and political interest.  
 
Political interest is the strongest, but also the broadest possible denominator of foreign 
aid, as it can include everything ranging from fear of migration, positioning in the 
international arena, to support for a particular political platform, party, or politician. 
In this sense, the West did not just support Montenegro, but a specific political option 
represented by its leader Milo Djukanovic.   
 
Changes of government in the Balkans were definitely a factor of foreign assistance. 
The West rewarded the political options it favored by increasing aid. The 
replacements of the Tudjman government in Croatia and Milosevic in Yugoslavia in 
the early and late 2000 respectively, were the two most prominent examples. 
Naturally, in these two cases the changes in power were not only seen as entering of 
more friendly or cooperative governments, but as historic democratic breakthroughs.  
 
In line with the same principle, the international community was always reluctant in 
giving aid to governments it did not favor. Such was also the case with the nationalist 
government in the Republic of Srpska, part of the Bosnian Federation.  
 
Argumentum al contrario, to the extent that shifting of power did not cause changes in 
the foreign aid flow to a country, the West did not “have an issue” with the political 
choices in the country. An example would be changes of governments in Macedonia.  
 
The Western support to the Djukanovic government in Montenegro through strong 
supply of foreign aid is a good case study of aid as instrument of foreign policy. The 
democratic opposition in Serbia also received significant amounts of aid, and it was 
also seen as an important ally against Milosevic, but here the moment of foreign 
policy interest was fused with the notion of support to democracy.  It can be argued 
that democracy promotion is also a foreign policy interest, but it should nevertheless 
be borne in mind that states have foreign policy interests   which outweigh their 
interest in the spread of democracy.  
                                                 
128 New York Times, The Trouble With Democracy. NATO's Friends Can't Win Every Vote, 
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2.3 Aid as Instrument of Foreign Policy II: Aid Suspension as Reaction to 
Wide Range of Political Situations   
 
The theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 pointed to the fact that aid is a relevant tool of 
foreign policy.  As such it is used as in many different situations in international 
relations.  The award or suspension of assistance is a political reaction of the donor to 
a number of political developments. In this sense the act of suspension is the active 
response, an act of doing. The supply or the regular flow of aid is the state of 
regularity. Foreign aid programs are ongoing. Suspension occurs when the donor 
disproves of certain political development and reacts by cutting off aid.  
 
This type of aid decision is broader in scope than the reward vs. punishment function 
described earlier. Reward and punishment could be seen as a subset of the broader 
dimension of flow vs. suspension. Reward understands acknowledgement of 
achievement by the recipient; on the other hand, the regular aid flow can be 
unconcerned with achievement. Punishment, as an antithesis to reward, should 
recognize disproval of the failure of the recipient to achieve certain goals. Suspension 
is not necessarily related to a failure to achieve something. It is merely a foreign 
policy decision. Aid suspension is one of the first tools diplomacy reaches for in 
international relations. A tool which actually precedes the aid suspension is the threat 
of aid suspension.  
 
The functions of (and motives for) aid as punishment for laggards, isolation of 
opponents, and the generic suspension can be similar. Every withdrawal of aid is a 
suspension, but not every suspension is a) sanction for a certain failure, or b) done 
with the intention to isolate, politically hurt an opponent. The difference is produced 
by the motivation for the suspension and the intensity of the political position. The 
generic act of suspension subsumes withdrawal of aid on account of a number of 
different motives.  
 
The process of foreign aid to the Balkans involved numerous instances of threats of 
suspension,   aid suspension, and resuming of aid flows. Some of the major cases have 
already been mentioned, but there have been many other instances in the region where 
aid was one of the first tools of foreign policy.  
 
The reasons for aid suspensions or threats of suspension varied over time and across 
countries; they involved concerns of human rights violations, pressure to cease 
hostilities, non-implementation of peace deals, political choices the West did not 
approve of, and so forth.  
As early as 1991, before the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia had actually 
begun, the US resorted to aid suspensions on grounds of human rights violations.  The 
first such suspension which happened in May 1991 was lifted after only 20 days, but 
with a threat of more specifically targeted suspensions for the future:  
“The Bush Administration announced today that it was resuming economic aid to 
Yugoslavia after a 20-day suspension... Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d coupled 
the announcement with a rebuke to the leadership of the Yugoslav republic of Serbia 
for its ‘intensified repressive measures’ against the rights of the 1.7 million ethnic 
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Albanians in Kosovo... He also said... that all economic assistance to Yugoslavia 
would be conducted ‘on a selective basis.’”129 
The reference to economic assistance on “selective basis” was a warning to Serbia, 
over its conduct in Kosovo. This meant, at the time when Yugoslavia was still one 
state, in simple terms that US aid could be targeted to other republics, while Serbia 
could be excluded.  
Just a few moths later the US came to reconsider aid sanctions against Yugoslavia, 
together with other measures such as arms embargo, on grounds of the rapidly 
unfolding crisis:  
“Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d said today that Yugoslavia could be on the 
brink of "a full-fledged civil war," that its army appeared to be out of the central 
Government's control and that the United States and its allies were considering 
imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and suspending all financial 
assistance…..Mr. Baker said the United States and its allies nonetheless ‘should give 
consideration to the suspending of aid and assistance to Yugoslavia’ and mentioned 
the prospect of an arms embargo…”  130  
The US installed sanctions in December of 1991. The European Community had 
already preceded it by installing its economic sanctions on 11 November (Bohr, 
1993).131 Other major bilateral donors moved in the same direction:  
“Chancellor Helmut Kohl toughened his position toward Yugoslavia today, 
threatening to cut off all German aid if the Belgrade Government again sent troops 
against the independence-minded republics of Slovenia and Croatia. …German aid to 
Yugoslavia last year totalled about $550 million, according to official figures.”  132 
The US subsequently lifted sanctions in 1992 from the new states it recognized.  The 
lifting was conditioned for Serbia and Montenegro, which by that time had become 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY):   
“The Bush statement said that as a result of American recognition, the Administration 
would lift sanctions against Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and 
Slovenia. The sanctions, involving both economic aid and trade benefits, were applied 
to all of Yugoslavia last December. The Administration said these sanctions would be 
lifted from Serbia and Montenegro as soon as those two republics ceased blockading 
commerce with Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.”133 
The European Community also agreed on focusing its economic sanctions, including 
“scientific and technical cooperation”, on the FRY in the period April-May 1992. On 
30 May 1992 the UN Security Council installed full economic sanctions against FRY 
which also included aid (Bohr, 1993: 261).  By mid 1992 FRY came to be perceived 
by the international community as the principal culprit for the war. Sanctions which 
were initially put in place against Yugoslavia, on the grounds of being a threat to 
international peace, were narrowed down to the FRY.  
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Sanctions against the FRY stayed during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and were 
suspended with a UN Resolution134 after the signing of the Dayton peace agreement, 
but they were not entirely lifted.  
Another country which was also in between threats of suspension and actual 
suspensions in the post-Dayton period was Croatia. As reported by the New York 
Times:   
“Signalling mounting frustration with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, the 
Clinton Administration said today that the United States would try to block the World 
Bank from considering a $30 million loan for Croatia... Madeleine K. Albright has 
repeatedly warned Croatia and Serbia that they would face economic punishment if 
they did not do more to comply with the peace accords.” 135 
The threat of sanctions against Croatia in the post-Dayton period was also in relation 
to extradition of criminals of war, same as with FRY:  
“Because of Croatia's failure to cooperate with the tribunal, the United States 
abstained earlier this year from an International Monetary Fund vote approving an 
economic-reform loan for Croatia.” 136 
Macedonia did not reach a point to have its aid suspended but it was several times 
threatened with the possibility. In the post-conflict period in 2001 the West several 
times conditioned aid with the implementation of the peace accord:  
“The European Union is expected to warn Macedonia that it risks having aid and 
bilateral relations frozen, unless it moves quickly to implement fully the peace deal 
signed in August. In a draft statement due to be approved later today, EU foreign 
ministers say the parliament in Skopje must endorse a constitutional amendment 
improving the rights of the country's ethnic-Albanian minority, and pass an amnesty 
for rebels who have laid down their arms.” 137 
A milder form of withdrawal of aid is the postponement of aid until certain conditions 
have been met, or as in this case with Macedonia, the postponement of a donor 
conference:  
“The European Union has postponed an international donors' conference for 
Macedonia, saying the country's government has failed to give ethnic Albanians more 
rights. The EU's External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, said the meeting 
                                                 
134 More on the issue of aid sanctions against former Yugoslavia see   for example in, Delvic 
Milica, Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Yugoslavia, The 
International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1998; Human Rights Watch, 
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Hard Measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union 1981 – 2004, paper 
45, Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2005; Woehrel Steven, Conditions on US Aid 
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could not go ahead until Macedonia implemented reforms to improve the rights of the 
ethnic Albanian minority”. 138  
Further flow of money from donor conferences was also conditioned to the 
implementation of the peace deal:  
“Macedonian leaders say they hope for more than 250 million euros ($220m) in 
pledges from more than 40 countries at the conference, which is backed by the 
European Commission and the World Bank... Officials from donor countries say 
provision of the money will be tied to the implementation of the peace accords.”  139 
 Montenegro for example, came under threat to have its aid suspended back in 2001 
because of its plans for secession from the FRY. Back at that time the West was not 
yet supportive of the idea of Montenegrin independence:  
“Montenegro has abandoned plans for an early referendum on whether to break 
away from Yugoslavia and will wait until it has completed a 'dialogue' with Serbia, 
the Montenegrin president, Milo Djukanovic, said in London yesterday.... In an 
oblique reference to western threats to cut aid if Montenegro seceded, he complained 
that 'direct and indirect influence from outside' reduced his coalition's chances of 
getting a better result.”140  
 
In conclusion, aid suspension was one of the most often used foreign policy tools of 
bilateral donors and the international community as a whole, in their involvement in 
the crises of former Yugoslavia. This tool was applied with different intensity, 
ranging from postponement, conditioning, threats of sanctions, to actual imposition of 
sanctions. Sanctions themselves were bilateral or multilateral in nature.   
 
Aid sanctions were a relevant factor influencing the flow of aid to the Western 
Balkans. Serbia (FRY) which was in-and-out of sanctions for most through the 90s, 
and under a complete embargo since the 1998 until the fall of the Milosevic regime, 
could not receive any aid except basic humanitarian assistance (and some donors 
denied it even that right) and it was in a position not to receive any relevant ODA 
until the year 2000. Even after that, the flow of aid was (and it is still) subject to 
periodic checks and approvals, pending cooperation with the ICTY.  
 
 
2.4 Influence of Historic Myths  
Ever since its becoming a myth, the Marshal Plan which rebuilt Western Europe after 
the WW II, has been invoked numerous times in situations where foreign assistance 
was needed. Its symbolic value being that of revival, reconstruction, rebirth, the 
Marshal Plan has been used as reference on many occasions of similar character. The 
idea of a Marshal Plan has definitely been brought in connection with the Balkans 
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numerous times. This reference was particularly recurrent at occasions of ends of 
wars and beginnings of post-war reconstruction, that is to say, after the Dayton 
agreement, and after the end of the Kosovo crisis. The Stability Pact which was 
established after the end of the Kosovo war was at the time nothing less then an 
attempt at revival of the idea of the Marshal Plan: 
“Throughout the Kosovo campaign, NATO promised a new Marshall Plan for the 
Balkans, reminiscent of the effort made at the end of World War II in reconstructing 
Europe.” 141 
The revival of the idea naturally, was promoted by the historic equivalence of the 
opportunity. According to a comment by the Washington Post:  
“The reconstruction of Kosovo has been likened to the Marshall Plan. Indeed, the 
plan to repair the devastation caused by World War II in Europe was a huge 
investment of money, but it also brought formerly warring nations together.”142 
In addition, a notion which has always been inseparable with the Marshal Plan is that 
of the grandness, of the sheer magnitude of the effort:  
“The phrase 'Marshall plan' is not being used, but it is clear that key figures in the 
project - including the World Bank president James Wolfensohn and the EU's 
economic commissioner Yves-Thibault de Silguy - are beginning to think in these 
grandiose terms.”143  
The fact that the Stability Pact was promoted in those terms definitely affected 
expectations on both the donor and the recipient side, and it clearly affected 
commitments and allocations in many ways. The press review shows evidence of 
concern on the side of donors about the possibility to meet such great expectations. 
US President Clinton was a supporter of increased aid spending and repeated the well 
known argument that sustaining peace through foreign assistance would preclude the 
US from engaging in future wars. Nevertheless, he bewared not to scare off legislators 
and public opinion with the amounts that might be needed:  
  “‘‘The costliest peace is far cheaper than the cheapest war.''……….. In particular, 
[President Clinton] called for spending to rebuild Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the 
NATO bombing campaign over the situation in Kosovo. But he said that it would 
require nothing ''as ambitious as the Marshall Plan,''144 
The enormous expectations from the Stability Pact, particularly because of its 
comparison with the Marshal Plan, led to a serious delusion a few years since its 
creation, when it became clear that the Stability Pact could not produce the resources 
imagined. There were many attempts to point to differences from the original Marshal 
Plan:  
“What of the big Marshall Plan promise? Officials wriggle at the analogy and say it 
really isn't at all like Germany after the war when an astounding Dollars 88bn (at 
present day prices) rebuilt the country from nothing to super-prosperity within 10 
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years. It's all much more difficult, with no proper political or free market institutions 
in place.”145 
A similar comment can be found in the Washington Post:  
“Some have called for a Marshall Plan, but Western Europe had functioning 
institutions before World War II and thus the U.S. role was reconstruction.”146  
 
A lot has been written comparing the Balkans post-conflict reconstruction effort with 
the Marshal Plan. Another major difference which can be noted is that the Marshal 
Plan had one big donor, the US, whereas the Stability Pact tried to coordinate a 
multitude of bilateral and multilateral donors. It was somewhat vainly hoped that the 
many donors would re-channel their resources from their national instruments through 
the Stability Pact. However, the original ambition that the Pact could somehow come 
to “own”, control, and coordinate all the resources flowing into the Balkans proved 
impossible.  
 The major point is that historic myths had strong influence on aid commitments to the 
region. Once aid to the Balkans was framed in the terms of the Marshal Plan, that 
definitely had serious influence on many donors. It definitely increased aid 
commitments as donors tired to live up to the expectations. However, it also produced 
a sense of delusion over the failed expectations over the mid term.   
Overall, the myth of the Marshal Plan was a relevant factor of donor commitment to 
the region. It should be noted that the same theme was invoked as early as 1989, when 
the opening of Eastern Europe originally started. It was again called upon after the 
end of the major Balkan wars, in 1999. 
 
 
2.5   Nexus to Military Intervention  
 
 Humanitarian aid regularly follows situations of   armed conflict. Some of the many 
local or regional armed conflicts   also provoke different types of international 
military intervention. In such a context humanitarian motives come to interweave with 
military logic. Military logic becomes a factor of foreign assistance and vice versa. 
Humanitarian aid and military intervention have come to be closely entwined 
throughout the process of international intervention in the region over the 90s. Armed 
conflict was the strongest generator of need for humanitarian relief in the Balkans. 
Aid flowed from all sides to help alleviate human suffering. At points in time the 
armed conflict also acted as a factor of suspension of aid. As already discussed in the 
preceding sections, aid suspension was one of the first tools of foreign policy.    
The nexus between foreign humanitarian aid and military concerns has been noted to 
produce several different causalities in the Balkans. They have included situations 
whereby:    
a) foreign assistance was used as an argument to engage militarily,  
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b) foreign assistance was used as an argument not to engage militarily,  
c) armed conflict   acted as a generator of aid, and 
d) armed conflict was a reason to stop the flow of aid.  
These situations can be observed on many different levels, ranging from the 
essentially humanitarian and field operations level, to the highest political one. At the 
basic field level a common situation in the Balkans (not different from anywhere else) 
has been the operational suspension of humanitarian aid until ceasefires would occur 
which would produce secure conditions for delivery, or  situations of conditioning of 
the delivery of humanitarian aid with ceasefires.  
However of much more essential importance has been the general political 
connection between military intervention and humanitarian aid in the Balkans. 
Namely, humanitarian aid has come to be used in the Balkans (and other places) over 
the 90s as a justification for intervention.  In this sense, it can be observed that at a 
political level humanitarian aid has been used as an argument both for justifying 
intervention and for justifying non-intervention. David Rieff   (2002:197) for 
example, has rightfully observed that humanitarian aid in the Balkans has been used 
as an argument not to intervene in Bosnia –in order not to impede the supply of 
humanitarian aid; and the same argument has been used for the opposite purpose 
concerning the NATO intervention in Kosovo – to make possible the humanitarian 
effort. This is of course not to understand that the supply of humanitarian aid was the 
major motive for intervening militarily. On the contrary, the argument is that it has 
been utilized as a sort of an additional operational motive as it seemed fit. Naturally, 
the much more compelling factors of intervention included grave human rights 
violations, prevention of ethnic cleansing, wider security interests, and so forth.    
 
This practice has not been typical only of the Balkans. In the post-cold war world 
humanitarian motives have   increasingly interweaved with political and military 
goals.147 At this level, humanitarianism was used to justify the political decision to 
use military force. In this sense, it should be understood that humanitarian assistance 
was merely one aspect of the broader humanitarian concern for the safety and 
wellbeing of civilian populations.  
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For example, according to a report by the New York Times from the imminent period 
before the start of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, US President Clinton has 
justified the possible need to intervene with “national and humanitarian interests in 
resolving the conflict in Kosovo.”148 To underscore again, intervention did not start 
only on the grounds of the imperative to deliver aid – in Bosnia the argument was 
different as the humanitarian aid was ongoing – but once intervention started, the two 
got intrinsically intertwined.149  
Similarly, Italy  for example has sent its troupes to Albania twice over the 90s, on   
UN approved missions to secure   humanitarian intervention, The first time was in 
1991 when Albania’s borders opened150; the second time it was in 1997, after the 
collapse of the pyramidal saving schemes which brought the country to the verge of 
collapse. Both times Italian troupes went there with a mandate to safeguard the 
humanitarian effort.  151 According to a report by the New York Times at the time:  
“...the soldiers are to insure that aid sent to poor Albanians is not hijacked by armed 
gangs... ” 152  
In the words of  Jean-Marie Boucher, the World Food Program manager for the 
Balkans: ''The only way [the soldiers] could get their coming here approved by the 
United Nations was to say it was for humanitarian assistance.''153  
The point is the following. This case is illustrative of the fact that there can be a 
different nexus between foreign aid and national security interest. The theoretical 
discussion on motives for aid elaborated in dept the relationship between national 
interest and foreign aid: donor countries give aid because it is in their national 
interest. In such a situation aid acts as a direct tool of their national interest.  In this 
particular case, the sequence is somewhat different. Aid is not primary, but secondary 
to the deployment of a military mission. It is used as a justification for the 
deployment. Troupes go in first; some aid should follow in order to justify the 
troupes’ presence. That is, foreign aid is used as a justification, not only as a direct   
tool of national interest. It is in a final analysis still a tool, but a tool for different use.  
In conclusion, given that considerable share of aid to the Balkans was conflict-related, 
there was at times a close nexus between aid and military intervention. Military 
intervention acted as a factor of foreign assistance with considerable power to shape 
aid allocations. Aid was at times used as a source of legitimacy for both military 
intervention and for non-intervention.  
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2.6    Foreign Aid as Arena of Donor Rivalry   
 
The review of   the international political dynamics surrounding   international 
involvement in the Balkans reveals evidence of instances of rivalry over the allocation 
of foreign assistance. Donor rivalry and   the subsequent use of foreign aid as a tool of 
in that rivalry have been at periods present in the foreign aid process to the region. 
Most conspicuous   in this regard have been the episodes of rivalry between the 
European Union and the United States.  
One dimension of such rivalry could provisionally be termed “outbidding”. This is the 
process in which donors engage in a competition in making aid commitments. There 
are indications that in some cases certain donors deliberately “take the lead” by 
committing a big amount, in order to compel peers to match or raise that commitment. 
In other cases donors can criticize each other for what they feel is an insufficient 
commitment by a peer. This aspect has already been discussed in Chapter 1. 
According to some scholars (Mosley, 1985; Round & Odedokun, 2003) peer pressure 
acts as a strong factor of aid allocation. Riddell (2007) has tended to believe that its 
influence is smaller. Nevertheless scholarship on aid has registered the phenomenon. 
In this section evidence from the media review will show how such dynamics played 
out in the reality of international intervention in the Balkans.    
An example of a deliberate and outspoken attempt to raise the stakes can be found in 
the approach of the Clinton administration with regards to the relief effort in the 
immediate aftermath of the war in Kosovo:  
“President Clinton's national security adviser said today that the United States would 
pledge up to $500 million in relief aid for Kosovo at a conference in Brussels this 
week... By announcing what is expected to be the largest donation at the conference  
... the United States hopes to demonstrate that it will take the lead on aid…… The 
Clinton Administration calculated that by pledging a large sum before the conference 
began, the 49 other countries attending the session might reach deeper in their 
pockets. ''We hope to raise the ante,'' said Mike Hammer, a White House 
spokesman.”154 
The record of Trans-Atlantic relations over the Kosovo post-conflict reconstruction 
also reveals a different model of making aid commitments: there were instances when 
aid commitments were made conditional on the commitments by other donors.   Close 
to a year after the   NATO intervention, the US had got impatient with what it 
perceived as a slow response by the EU to meeting the needs of the Kosovars, and aid 
became a point of tension in European – American relations. The US made its 
contribution contingent on the contributions of European donors. As the Guardian has 
reported: 
“No longer concealing its irritation, Washington is demanding that EU states put 
hard cash on the table when donor countries meet in Brussels later this month. It 
looks like being an important and highly public test of the gap between rhetoric and 
reality - and it is already ratcheting up transatlantic tensions. In a sharp private letter 
to EU foreign ministers last week, Madeleine Albright, the US secretary of state, 
pledged Dollars 350m ( pounds 222m) for 'quick start' and 'first priority' projects and 
nearly Dollars 400m for next year - though those figures, she warned, would depend 
on what other countries were prepared to spend. 'We are keen on understanding more 
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clearly the exact commitments you are prepared to make,' Mrs Albright added tartly. 
Chris Patten, the EU's external relations commissioner, quickly cautioned that 
disagreements over money could 'poison or warp' European-American ties.”155 
These dynamics with respect to making aid commitments, such as “taking the lead” 
and the “conditioning”, were taking place in a general climate of disagreement 
between Europe and the United States over the financing of the post-conflict 
reconstruction in the Balkans. This disagreement had a broader political pretext. The 
United States had taken the burden of leadership in the military intervention and 
expected Europe to carry the burden of the reconstruction effort. In such a climate, the 
US quickly became impatient and it considered Europe was not doing its share:   
“Mr. Clinton came to the conference armed with some concrete promises, including 
investment guarantees and tariff reductions. The Europeans, who have promised to 
take the lead in Balkan reconstruction, offered no such specifics. If the stability pact is 
to have any meaning, Europe will have to ante up, and soon. That means providing 
aid.”156  
Loud US criticism caused nervous responses by European representatives. In a letter 
to the Washington Post, John Richardson, Deputy Head of the European Commission 
to the United States, criticized the paper’s coverage of European aid contribution to 
the Balkans:  
“News coverage following the Stability Pact Conference in Sarajevo was strikingly 
incomplete about the European Union's contributions. This was also true of The 
Post's Aug. 3 editorial, "Balkan Stability." As to what the Europeans have done for 
southeast Europe in 1999, the answer is: Much more than The Post gives us credit 
for.... The European Union may not be good at blowing its own trumpet, but in the 
case of southeastern Europe it is moving forward decisively within a broad 
framework of aid, trade, investment and institutional integration.”157 
There can be no doubt that such extent of political tension, expressed at such high 
political level, definitely had an impact on the amounts and dynamics of foreign aid in 
the immediate post-conflict   period.  Looked from a certain time distance, it is clear 
that the EU did take the burden of the reconstruction effort in the post-war Balkans. 
The European Commission has been the single largest donor to the region, with 
disbursements around double those of the US (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). It is 
nevertheless true, and supported by evidence that EC aid was slower in getting up to 
speed, and this is where lies the reason for the US impatience.  
Nevertheless the point to be made is the following:  foreign assistance can be a 
competitive realm, and the process of aid to the Balkans offers evidence of episodes 
of such donor competition. Default on commitments taken in the international arena 
expose donors to criticism by peers; donors with a particular interest in a certain 
context can engage in outbidding in order to influence peer behaviour, and so forth. 
This donor manoeuvring and positioning acts as a clear and relevant factor of foreign 
assistance allocations in a given situation.    
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2.7   Fear of Migration  
 
Scholarship on aid has pointed to the link between foreign assistance and the 
prevention of migration as one particular facet of national interest. In this sense, aid is 
given to countries which represent a source of potential migrant threat. During aid 
negotiations the allocation of aid can actually be tied to commitment from the 
recipient government that it would invest in efforts to curb out-migration. The history 
of foreign assistance has also recorded examples of assistance which is tied to 
repatriation programs, whereby the award of aid is tied to repatriation of migrants 
from the donor to their native, recipient country. The evidence collected from the 
media review will point out to instances when this factor had a role in determining 
ODA allocations in the Balkans.  
 Italy’s foreign assistance to Albania   from the beginning of the 90s onward has been 
self-declaratively motivated by fear of migration. Some of the sources for this 
argument have already been cited in the previous chapter and in the section of historic 
responsibilities above. It would be useful to further corroborate this claim with 
additional evidence.  For example, as reported by Corierre della Sera in 1994, the 
combined military and foreign assistance operation “Pellicano” was launched in 1991 
in response to the max exodus of Albanians from Albania into Italy. In the words of 
then Italy’s foreign minister Antonio Martino, the aid of the foreign assistance was to 
create jobs in Albania and to subsequently reduce the migrant pressure.158 Similarly, 
another report of Corierre della Sera from 1998 indicates to the presence of the same 
factor as driver of Italian foreign aid to Albania.  The article cites then Italian foreign 
minister Lamberto Dini pledging support during a visit to Tirana:  
“We will help Albania if it helps us help her...the possibility to continue with the 
preferential acceptance of regular workers coming from Albania, says Dini, depends 
on the effective control of migrant flows by the Albanian government.”159  The article 
further reads that “in the future, says Rome, all of this financial support can continue 
only if the flow of migrants coming through the Adriatic is blocked.”160 
In addition to Italy’s aid for Albania, there are other references to the migrant threat as 
a factor of foreign aid in the Balkans.  
In the period around the creation of the Stability Pact in 1999, for example media 
reports indicate that France had become increasingly nervous over Germany’s 
“expansion” in the Balkans:  
“Among western neighbors such as France, the new focus of Germany's attention and 
resources is viewed suspiciously as an attempt to expand the country's influence and 
penetration in the new markets in Eastern Europe.”161 
Germany however, explained its motivation to offer strong assistance to the Balkans 
with the simple fear of migration:  
"German foreign policy these days is driven by a simple priority: to prevent poor 
foreigners from swamping our prosperous country," said Michael Stuermer, a former 
adviser to Schroeder's predecessor, Helmut Kohl. "Given the dangers of right-wing 
                                                 
158 Santevecchi Guido, Martino: Via agli aiuti, ma bloccate i clandestini, Corriere della Sera, 
13 September 1994. 
159 Cianfanelli Renzo, Tirana, dissidio Bonino Dini, Corriere della Sera, 31 October 1998.  
160 ibid 
161 Washington Post, Germany Turns Its Gaze to Eastern Europe, September 11, 1999.  
 
129
extremism, the idea is to do whatever is necessary to keep would-be immigrants from 
leaving their homes and heading for Germany."162  
An additional example concerns the United Kingdom.   In May of 2002 Prime 
Minister Tony Blair of Britain, suggested that conditionality be used on counties, 
including the ones from former Yugoslavia which are not effective in preventing the 
migrant flow to the EU and the UK. The idea was that "Britain will cut off aid if 
[these countries] fail to crack down on illegal immigrants passing through their 
borders."163 The UK asked and got the support of Spain to put the proposal high on 
the agenda of the June 2002 EU Summit in Seville, and thus make it EU policy.  
However, at the Summit, the proposal: 
 "was watered down  ...in the face of opposition from some member nations. Prime 
Minister Goran Persson of Sweden called the proposal 'stupid', and British cabinet 
minister, Claire Short, labeled it 'morally repugnant'. Some countries, including 
Denmark and Germany, supported the idea of financial penalties for countries that 
persistently refused to take back illegal immigrants or that did little to stop trafficking 
in people. But British and Spanish officials, seeking a compromise, spoke of 'positive 
conditionality' -- making larger amounts of aid available to non- Union countries that 
cooperated."164   
Another example was provided by Switzerland. The review of the Swiss foreign 
assistance policy texts on the Balkans (section 2.4 in   Chapter 3) showed that 
Switzerland very expressly relates the policy priority to help Bosnia with the presence 
of Bosnian refugees in Switzerland.  
The conclusion to make is the following: migrant threat was a factor of foreign aid to 
the Balkans. There is documented evidence in the form of policy statements from high 
level officials that indicate that (some) aid was motivated by the fear of migration. 
Logically, the migrant threat worked as a factor of aid for donor countries which were 
traditional hosts of migrants from the Balkans, that is to say, particularly exposed to 
migration. Corroboration comes also from the review of micro data on aid allocations 
conducted in Chapter 7. For example, some of Italy’s aid to Albania was allocated for 
constructing prisons. These were perhaps not large amounts, but were only found in 
Italy’s allocations to Albania; not in Italian aid to the other countries of the Balkans.     
At this point however, the purpose is to simply point to the link between the fear of 
migration and allocation of foreign assistance. This short section has already indicated 
the additional modalities in using aid to prevent migration: tying it to repatriation, and 
using it as lever of conditionality. It is reasonable to assume that foreign assistance 
motivated by fear of migration was, at least in some cases, also operationally designed 
to prevent migrant flows, by the particular modes and measures of intervention it 
financed. The case of aid for construction of prisons is one example.  
 
 
       2.8   Kin Solidarity  
 
The Balkan wars caused an enormous   feeling of international solidarity with the 
suffering of the people in the region. Solidarity itself was not homogeneous. It was 
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composed of many various acts of compassion. These acts responded to different 
impulses and were essentially performed by different constituencies which had greater 
or lesser sensitivity and attachment to some communities than others.  
 
For example, the suffering of the Muslim population in the Balkans, first during the 
war in Bosnia and later in Kosovo, mobilized generous support in Muslim countries 
across the world. The Balkans was a recipient of   foreign assistance from the Muslim 
world, primarily from rich Arab countries in the Middle East. This assistance was 
directed primarily to beneficiaries of Muslim religion, or to areas where Muslims 
lived. Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo were the relevant recipients of Arab aid for the 
Balkans (see Chapter 5).  
 
Strong motivation for this foreign aid was the feeling of religious solidarity. In the 
words of the then Bosnian Prime Minister, Hasan Muratovic on the occasion of a visit 
to Iran:  
"the Iranian Government and nation offered humanitarian assistance to Bosnia at a 
time when its Islamic identity was jeopardized." 165  
Support from Muslim states ranged from emergency relief,166 economic and 
reconstruction aid, to military assistance. Islamic countries urged military aid for 
Bosnian Muslims who due to the fact that Bosnia was under sanctions could not 
purchase arms. 167  
Significant assistance was directed in both Bosnia and Kosovo to the construction or 
reconstruction of sacral objects, and according to many sources, for the promotion of 
specific religious views:  
 
“Saudi Arabia, for example, has spent more than $500 million on humanitarian and 
religious projects. According to both Bosnian and foreign officials, the aim is to 
spread its rigid interpretation of Islam in a land where most Muslims are not 
conspicuously pious.”168 
 
This foreign assistance to kin Muslim countries can be considered an action of foreign 
policy, whereby Muslim states helped their allies. This is a fair argument. But it was 
essentially the feeling of solidarity that drove the foreign policy, not national interest 
understood in its security or economic dimension. In addition, aid went to kin people, 
not to kin states. In Bosnia aid went to its Muslim population, not the whole 
population of the Bosnian state. Evidence also points to the fact that this type of aid 
had as a goal the promotion of certain religious beliefs.  
 
Although the media review (limited to major international newspapers only) did not 
display any other instances of kin solidarity,   many other examples can fairly be 
assumed, including those on grounds of faith, ethnic affiliation, or other bonds of 
association.  
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In conclusion, the point to make is that: solidarity which followed kinship was a 
factor of foreign aid to the Balkans. Its relative weight, as well as that of the other 
factors is not being assessed, but it is important that its existence as a factor is 
registered.  
 
  
2.9    Economic Interest:  Foreign Aid and Business Interests  
 
With the fact that donor-self interest   has been identified by the scholarship on aid as 
the predominant motive for giving, the economic aspect of that self-interest is 
definitely of strong relevance for the allocation of foreign assistance. Economic self-
interest is however a broad topic and it can interweave with development aid in 
myriad of ways.  
 
Scholarship has explored in detail the links between donor economic interest and aid 
allocation. One type of examination includes for example the study of trade volumes 
between the donor and recipient country as an indicator of the intensity of the donor 
economic interest in the recipient country. According to this logic the expectation is 
that more aid should go to bigger trade partners.169  
 
An additional approach should however take into account the fact that foreign aid 
itself is an industry. In this sense, aid does not only go to recipients who are relevant 
economic partners, but aid itself becomes the subject of economic interest.   Hence, 
there can be two essentially different ways in thinking about the relation between aid 
and donor economic interest: 
 
 a) aid is allocated to a country with the purpose of promoting certain economic 
interest of the donor, such as for example promoting exports from the donor country, 
or  investing in the exploitation of certain strategic natural resources, or  
b) aid itself, which has been motivated by other factors, such as moral duty, or 
strategic interest, does represent an economic interest.  
 
 The media review has highlighted quite a few situations when economic self-interest 
of the donors was a relevant factor of aid in the region of the Balkans.  
 
  An interesting case from the Balkans, which had also incited some disagreement 
between donors, notably between Germany (and the EU) and the United States, 
concerned the reconstruction of bridges over the Danube in the post-Kosovo war 
period in 1999. NATO had destroyed bridges in Serbia during   bombing campaign. 
This caused great damage to the Yugoslav but also regional economy. It also hurt 
business interests much beyond. Commercial boats could not sale because of the 
debris. Some big donors saw this as a priority issue of foreign assistance:   
 
“Germany has its own reasons for getting the tangled steel debris of the Varadin 
bridge hauled out of the water. This and the collapsed Liberty bridge further along 
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the river are blocking the Danube to commercial traffic from Germany, Austria and 
Hungary traveling to the Black Sea.”170 
 
Germany, and other countries whose trade interests were involved, wanted the bridges 
repaired immediately after the end of the Kosovo war. However, since Yugoslavia 
was under aid embargo, it could not receive any economic or reconstruction 
assistance, including for bridge repair. This   stirred tension in the donor community:  
 
 “... a row is brewing between the European Union and the United States over 
whether to finance the rebuilding of a bridge at Novi Sad, one of three Yugoslav 
bridges over the Danube bombed during the Kosovo conflict.”171 
 
In that period of time the Milosevic regime also impeded Western intentions.172 The 
central government run by Milosevic hindered the efforts of local authorities to work 
on repairing of the bridges with foreign help.  
 
The very first foreign aid the German government allocated to FRY, practically three 
days after the fall of Milosevic on 5 October 2000, was to commit aid for the clearing 
of the Danube:  
“The German government says it will grant Yugoslavia an immediate aid package of 
eight hundred and seventy thousand dollars.  ...The money will go towards clearing 
the Danube river.” 173  
A note of caution is perhaps needed at this point. This example should not serve to 
cause prejudice against the generous German assistance to the Balkans; Germany was 
the largest bilateral donor to the region and clearly not all that assistance was 
motivated by economic self-interest. Nevertheless, the episode is a qualitative insight 
into how different interests act as factor of foreign assistance.  
 Observing the second type of situation, whereby aid is as an economic interest in of 
itself, offers interesting material emerging from the Balkan experience.  
 
 In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the impending Balkan reconstruction effort 
incited excitement in business circles in donor countries. The reconstruction implied 
serious financial commitment by Western governments, and huge business 
opportunities, in particular for the construction industry.  Businesses in donor 
countries engaged their governments in lobbing for their interests: 
“American engineering groups have created special Kosovo departments, and 
dispatched executives to the province. Britain's big engineering firms have banded 
together into a Balkan "task-force", backed by the government, in the hope, 
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presumably, that economies of scale might apply to lobbying. "We don't want to get 
the crumbs, like we did in Kuwait," says Nigel Thompson, the task-force's chairman... 
The Italians, also frustrated in Kuwait and Bosnia, are better organised this time. The 
country's government and industry federation have each set up an organization to 
help match firms with projects.”174 
News reports note that such business considerations gained intensity practically 
simultaneously with the suspension of military activities:  
“Three days after British troops led the NATO advance into Kosovo; British 
Government officials plan to meet Tuesday with business leaders to devise a strategy 
for securing reconstruction contracts in Kosovo. They will try to offset a widespread 
view that British companies lost out in the race to rebuild Kuwait after the Persian 
Gulf war eight years earlier.” 175 
The media reports also show that business interests   had been cited as an argument 
for stronger national involvement in the region, such as for example greater US 
involvement in Kosovo:  
 
“U.S. participation also would enable U.S. companies to play a significant role in the 
reconstruction of Kosovo by reducing the prospect that the Europeans would use 
some form of tied aid to benefit solely European companies and by ensuring that 
business contracts are awarded under an open and transparent process.”176 
 
 The point is the following: big donor countries often did not have   direct economic 
interest in the devastated Balkan region, but the aid they allocated was in itself a 
relevant interest. Big portions of the delivered aid were naturally tied to purchases 
from the donor countries. Economic interests of donor countries, and of the business 
communities in donor countries, acted as factor of foreign assistance to the Balkans.  
 
 
2.10 Aid as Restitution of Damages  
 
The review of the international press reveals another function of foreign assistance to 
the Balkans, the function of restitution of damages.  This function should be 
differentiated from post-conflict reconstruction.  Restoring damages in this sense is 
not the same thing as reconstruction of damages directly produced by the warfare, and 
it relates to the damages suffered (indirectly) by the surrounding countries. These 
damages were inflicted in different ways, such as through disruption of trade due to 
war activities (which was potentially the most serious damage to the economies of the 
countries adjacent to zones of conflict), hosting of refugees, securing infrastructure 
for the passage and operations by military forces, or other collateral damages cause by 
the military operations. According to a report by the New York Times:   
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“The costs to the surrounding countries have been considerable, as trade was 
disrupted and as they absorbed thousands of refugees.”177 
 
In exchange for their cooperation (passage of troupes, using territories for military 
action, hosting refugees) and damages they have suffered, these countries were 
promised and given foreign aid. This assistance was not seen as “assistance” per se, 
but as a mode of restoring damages, and claimants insisted on it as to a rightful 
entitlement. Macedonia was one of the countries which offered its full support to the 
international community during the time of the NATO intervention in Kosovo. 
Macedonia allowed NATO to use its territory for the military operations, and in 
addition, it hosted between 250-300.000 thousand refugees from Kosovo. When the 
intervention was over, as international media have noted, Skopje insisted on “being 
paid”:  
“[former Macedonian prime minister] Kljusev, quoted by a Macedonian news agency, 
said the war against Yugoslavia had cost Macedonia 172 million dollars a month. ‘It 
is an insult to offer us credits for the damage we suffered. We want the damage to be 
paid for.’” 178 
Albania, which was the country which hosted the greatest number of refugees, around 
400.000, acted in a similar way. The aid that Albania and Macedonia wanted was not 
reward but, more like payment for services:  
“Albania, NATO's steadfast ally during the air campaign against Yugoslavia, has a 
blunt message for the Western powers: Show me the money. Foreign Minister Paskal 
Milo said in an interview. ‘It is not enough to say good words about the Albanian 
contribution during the crisis. We have heard a lot of this. . . . We will ask our 
partners to prove, as we say in Albanian, that they are not dividing their words from 
their deeds.’"179 
 
Restoring of damages to surrounding countries affected by the wars was a significant 
motive for foreign aid. Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia (during the war in 
Bosnia), Romania and Bulgaria all suffered damages caused by nearby conflicts.  
 
It should be noted that in this case the motive for and the function of aid were 
essentially different from cases of post-conflict reconstruction. In post-conflict 
reconstruction aid essentially serves its original function of helping. When it is used 
for restitution of damages, it is more resembling to payment for rendered services, 
which can be observed also from the behavior of the countries that claimed it.   
 
Additionally, countries which “cooperated” were obviously better positioned to claim 
such aid than countries which did not, which in a way conditions this aid to 
allegiance, in the case of the Balkans, to the international (donor) community. 
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Hypothetically, a country whose “services” would be used, but which would not have 
the position of an ally, could be less eligible for aid for restitution of damages.  
 
The concluding point overall is that: there is relevant evidence that foreign assistance 
in the Balkans also served the function of restoring damages and compensating for 
services rendered.  
 
  
 2.11 Concerns Over Aid Transparency, Effectiveness, Impact   
 
Everything noted so far in this chapter on motives and factors for giving (or 
withholding) of foreign assistance, had to do with rationales which went beyond 
development aid per se. These rationales related to considerations which did not 
pertain to aid effectiveness, performance, or impact, or in simpler of terms, with how 
aid money is actually being spent, and what is its impact? 
 
Bellow the political level, the development community has since the very beginning 
of foreign aid in the 50s of the last century been concerned with what are the actual 
results of development assistance. Interest in the effectiveness and impact of aid   had 
given rise over time to an entire scientific field of evaluation of foreign assistance. 
Naturally, aid which has very little effect, or has even counter-effects, in the sense 
that it produces more damage than utility, does not fulfill its purpose and should better 
not be given. Similarly, a type of aid which works better should be preferred over   a 
type of aid which does not work as well.  
 
In addition to the technical or developmental aspects of the spending of foreign aid 
money, there is the issue of accountability and transparency of the aid effort. Aid has 
often been reported to have been misappropriated, stolen, mishandled, or eaten by 
corruption. Such practices, which can be blamed either on the donor or the recipient 
side, have had the potential to influence donor motivation to commit aid. 
 
 Going into full detail on such practices would be beyond the scope of this writing.  It 
is important to note however that the issues relating to the transparency, effectiveness, 
and overall quality of the aid effort have been resurfacing in the Balkans over time, 
and they have had power over allocations of development assistance. 180  
 
The media review discloses quite a few instances when concerns over the actual use 
of foreign assistance in the Balkans have been a cause for debate, criticism, and even 
political anguish. Such concerns have had the power at times to strongly influence aid 
flows, or to cause reductions and withdrawals of foreign aid.  
 
For example, a high profile report on foreign aid to Bosnia in 1999 caused serious stir 
in the donor community. The report, which claimed serious amounts of aid to Bosnia 
had been misappropriated, hit a sensitive nerve with public opinion and caused 
political turmoil at high political levels in the United States. According to the writing 
of the New York Times:   
“As much as a billion dollars has disappeared from public funds or been stolen from 
international aid projects through fraud carried out by the Muslim, Croatian and 
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Serbian nationalist leaders who keep Bosnia rigidly partitioned into three ethnic 
enclaves, according to an exhaustive investigation by an American-led antifraud 
unit.” 181  
The report at stake had been produced by the Office of the High Representative in 
Bosnia (OHR), but its political effect was caused by the space given to it by The New 
York Times. Reactions came from the top levels of the US administration. The US 
State Department promptly discredited the report and said it hurt the country’s foreign 
aid effort in Bosnia:  
“James P. Rubin, the State Department spokesman, said yesterday that a New York 
Times article about corruption in Bosnia left readers with the misimpression that $1 
billion in foreign aid had been stolen... Mr. Rubin said that The Times article had hurt 
the Clinton Administration's efforts to gain support for foreign aid in Congress 
because people had drawn the conclusion that an enormous amount of foreign aid 
money had been lost in Bosnia.”182 
A report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) a year later echoed 
some of the earlier observations:  
“The [GAO] report said that the United States has not recovered nearly $900,000 in 
operating funds for the American Embassy and loan payments it had deposited in a 
Bosnian bank, BH Banka, which was involved in illegal activity. And the World Bank 
lost $500,000 in 1997 in a sophisticated fraud scheme involving false government 
procurement documents, the report said. Three years later, no arrests have been 
made, the report added. The G.A.O. found no evidence that American or other 
international aid is 'being lost to large-scale fraud or corruption.'’ But it asserted that 
Bosnian authorities may be using the foreign donations to make up for income the 
government has lost to crime. “183 
In 2003, an article at The New York Times titled “A Nation Unbuilt. Where Did All 
That Money in Bosnia Go which criticized international aid to the country on the 
grounds of ineffectiveness prompted a reply from the High Representative, Paddy 
Ashdown. In a letter of response to the paper, he explained why the “international 
investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been wasted”184 
 
Concerns over serious large-scale abuse of aid are only one, if the gravest, type of 
apprehension concerning the justifiability of aid spending. The recent chronology of 
ODA in the Balkans has recorded more than a few such instances.  
 
Beyond direct fraud however, there are a plethora of other concerns which have very 
relevant power to influence aid allocations. They comprise the standard issues relating 
to effectiveness (the ability of aid to achieve the stated goals); efficiency, or also called 
cost-effectiveness (the ratio between goals achieved and resources allocated); and 
impact (long term benefits, results of aid).  
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The point of conclusion is the following: issues concerning the overall quality of aid 
and the ability of aid to achieve its stated goals are relevant factors of aid allocation 
everywhere, and they have been so also in the Balkans. It should be noted that 
considerations or concerns about the quality of certain type of aid, or a certain project 
would, in theory, produce consequences only for that type of aid or project, but not for 
other components comprising the overall aid effort. In this sense, the reach of the 
consequences depends on the level the concern had affected. Concerns of technical or 
programmatic nature (such as resulting from evaluations concluding that certain aid is 
ineffective) would produce consequences at corresponding levels, that is among 
development aid professionals. Concerns at high political levels, such as the ones 
registered with the media review, can be expected to have consequences at political 
levels.   
 
 
2.12   Foreign Aid as a Promoter in the International Arena  
 
Development assistance is subject to internationally agreed commitments by rich 
donor states. Donor performance in the realm of foreign aid is definitely a factor of 
credibility. Foreign aid can be an instrument for promotion of donor countries in the 
international arena.   
The review of major international media finds some evidence of claims that   in some 
instances foreign aid in the Balkans was used as an instrument for self-promotion in 
the international arena.   A report by the International Herald Tribune makes that 
claim concerning Japan’s role as a donor in the region. According to the report, 
Japan’s aid commitments to the Balkan in the mid 90swere a check-book diplomacy 
motivated by grander national self-interest:  
“Japan has no vital interests in the Balkans ... So when Foreign Minister Yohei Kono 
begins a ... visit to Croatia  ..., his objective will be as much to open a dialogue with 
leaders of the region's warring states as to demonstrate that Japan can be an active 
player on the global stage, deserving a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council.”185 
Another news coverage on Japan’s engagement in Bosnia, a few years later, offers an 
explanation which essentially goes along the same line:  
“Japan is adopting a new, higher profile in Bosnia following criticism that it wasn't 
doing as much as other major economic powers.” 186   
However, a note of caution is warranted.  Comments, especially when they do not 
refer to statements by government officials, which can be taken as expressions of 
official policy, or do not refer to verifiable facts187, should always be analyzed in their 
political dimension.  
                                                 
185 International Herald Tribune, Japan's Diplomatic Blitz in Balkans, 25 April 1995.  
186 BBC, Japan Aid for Bosnia, Saturday, 4 April, 1998. 
187 For example a fact which is verifiable is whether Japan was criticized for not doing 
enough; where did criticism come from; how was it exactly expressed and so far.  
 
138
The remark that Nordic countries give aid as a way to have an active role in the 
international arena is essentially an expression of opinion. It should also be observed 
that this opinion does not come from   Nordic scholars. Similarly, a Japanese 
newspaper probably would not comment the visit of Japan’s Foreign Minister to 
Bosnia in the same way as the International Herald Tribune. Nor would for that matter 
British aid to the Balkans be commented (at least by Western media) in view of 
Britain’s desire to “be an active player on the global stage”.  
Nevertheless, the purpose of this writing is only to identify this particular aid factor 
in the framework of foreign assistance to the Balkans, and not to speculate on the real 
reasons for the visit of Japan’s Foreign Minister.  
Some of the cases discussed previously in this chapter, relating to peer pressure and 
donor rivalry, do bear resemblance to this particular aspect too. The political 
dimension of the foreign aid process is naturally unavoidable. What the Western press 
would call “seeking an active role”; Japan’s press could easily call “peer pressure” by 
Japan to Western donors to play their part. Whereas from the US point of view, the 
Nordic countries are big donors in order to “play an active role”, from the Nordic 
point of view, the US aid is too deprived of moral vision in its foreign assistance 
programs. Overall the point to make is that this interaction in the international arena 
can   and does act as a relevant factor of aid allocations.   
 
 
3. Conclusion  
 
The preceding pages attempted to give an overview of the motives and factors which 
guided the foreign aid process in the Balkans in the years of transition. The chapter 
relied on an extensive review of major international media   in order to explore the 
political reality of the foreign aid process to the Balkans. The media review produced 
evidence of many different situations which acted as determinants of the foreign aid 
process in the region.   
 
An important point to underscore is that the   approach used in the previous chapter - 
review of official policy statements, and the approach used in this chapter – review of 
international media, complement each other in the sense that the former provides the 
overall framework for discussing the motives and factors of development aid to the 
region, whereas the latter fills in this framework with the dynamic, political reality of 
the aid process.  
 
The preceding discussion presented numerous examples reported in the international 
press, which this text argues, had the power to shape aid allocations to the Balkans in 
different ways. In addition, the review of such examples offered a realistic view inside 
the conglomerate of foreign assistance to the Balkans. It is important to caution 
nevertheless, that the examples used were not selected according to their relevance or 
strength to shape allocations, but according to what had been at times recorded by the 
international media. As such, they can not be considered the most important, or the 
only motives and factors of foreign assistance, nor can there be speculation of their 
 
139
relative weight as a factor188. There should be no doubt however, that some of the 
cases covered in this review had tremendous impact on   foreign aid to the Balkans.  
 
The situations which were produced by the review of the international media were 
divided in 12 provisional categories according to their distinct characteristics. The 
categories were the following:  
 
1. Moral and Historic Duties, Concerns and Responsibilities 
2. Aid as Instrument of Foreign Policy I:  Reward and Punishment, Isolation of 
Opponents and Help to Allies 
3. Aid as Instrument of Foreign Policy II: Aid Suspension as Reaction to Wide 
Range of Political Situations   
4. Influence of Historic Myths 
5. Nexus to Military Intervention 
6. Foreign Aid as Arena of Donor Rivalry 
7. Fear of Migration  
8. Kin Solidarity  
9. Economic Interest:  Foreign Aid and Business Interests 
10. Aid as Restitution of Damages  
11. Concerns Over Aid Transparency, Effectiveness, Impact 
12. Foreign Aid as a Promoter in the International Arena  
 
The major factor for describing a situation as a separate category was whether that 
situation represented   a distinct factor of foreign assistance. As already said in the 
introduction to this chapter, all of these situations lie along the axis connecting the 
two opposite poles of aid motivations, self-interest and moral altruism.  Whereas 
some of them are more closely posited to the pole of self-interest, others are in closer 
proximity to the pole of moral altruism. Many of them are in the vast middle ground 
where different motivations interweave. The simple exercise of reading the titles 
describing these situations indicates to the prevalence of the motives connected to 
self-interest. As provisional as this observation may be, it should be underscored that 
is in accord with the dominant view in theory, which is that foreign as a tool of donor 
country national self-interest. It has already been discussed that most scholars do 
agree on the fact that national self-interest is a strong determinant of foreign 
assistance. Even the strongest proponent of moral altruism, Lumsdaine (1993) has not 
denied it. National self-interest, as it has also been discussed, is not a monolith 
category, but is composed of many different national self-interests.  The discussion in 
Chapter 1 has introduced the differences between national interest understood in the 
classical terms of national security, and the national interest understood in its 
economic dimension. The twelve situations described contain examples of situations 
whereby foreign aid was considered as a tool in service of both foreign policy interest 
widely understood, and in service of the economic interest of the donor country. 
Understandably, these two categories can not be strictly differentiated either.   
 
A point which is important to underscore however is that: this analysis is not to 
understand that the situations described above are the real factors of foreign 
assistance, replacing the officially stated motivations explored in the previous chapter. 
                                                 
188 The relative weight of different donor motivations was discussed in chapter one, in 
reference to Alesina and Dollar (1998) masterful study on the topic.   
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This would not be accurate. This text holds the position that the motivations stated in 
the official policy texts of donor countries are the real general motivations for aid to 
the Balkans. Aid was given in order to promote democracy, market economy, and to 
ensure peace and stability. When Western policy makers designed their ODA policies 
for the region, that is exactly what they had in mind: to promote democracy and the 
transition to market economy, and to make the Balkans a more stable place.  These 
statements were not just empty rhetoric, whereas the real factors would be those 
which emerge through the political dynamics observed through the media review. 
This text argues that those statements were the real political intentions for helping the 
Balkans. In a final analysis, those desired outcomes of foreign aid to the Balkans (and 
wider Eastern Europe) were in alignment with the interests of the West vis-à-vis the 
East. This should be taken as common knowledge and should not be further 
elaborated.  However, with this being said, the question is –what is the relation of the 
situations and the political dynamics described above, with the stated goals of ODA to 
the region? The simplest answer, even though not a satisfying one would be that they 
coexist. They are all part of the foreign assistance regime, of the foreign aid 
phenomenon. The overall framework is still defined by the trinity of democracy, 
market economy, and political stability, but that framework is filled with a live and 
dynamic matter of the myriad of factors, motives, and impulses which shape the final 
outlook of foreign assistance.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Who Gave Aid to Whom?  
Disaggregation of Foreign Assistance Flows to the Balkans 1990-2005  
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The process of intensive supply of foreign assistance to the countries in the Balkan 
region begun around 19 years ago, with the beginning of transition itself. In what is 
today still referred to as the Western Balkans region (countries of former Yugoslavia, 
minus Slovenia, plus Albania) the process of aid started earlier and with greater 
intensity in Albania, with its “opening” after the end of the country’s isolation created 
by the communist regime. It has from there soon shifted to the space of former 
Yugoslavia where the beginning of the wars had caused grave humanitarian crises and 
strong need of emergency humanitarian aid. 
 
Since first appearing on the donor maps, the Balkan countries have remained strong 
beneficiaries of ODA over the past 18 years, and the process of foreign aid to the 
region is at present not yet finished.  
 
The preceding chapters have discussed both the overall framework for foreign aid to 
the Balkans as part of post-communist Eastern Europe, and its particular circumstance 
which distinguishes it from the other transition countries in the wider region, that is, 
the wars, humanitarian crises, and post-conflict reconstruction needs.  
 
Close to two decades from the beginning of this process, - and with the most turbulent 
period in Balkan recent history hopefully over - the question of foreign assistance to 
the Balkans is timely and appropriate. The aim of this text is to provide an overall 
account of the process of foreign assistance to the Balkans, and to discuss the major 
determinants and characteristics of this process. This necessarily has to start from a 
bird-eye perspective and to provide answers to some of the very general questions 
concerning foreign assistance.  
 
Some of these general questions are: how much aid did the region actually receive? 
As simple and straightforward as it is, at least on the surface, the answer to this 
question is not, as one should expect, common knowledge. Was the amount the 
Balkans received a little or a lot, compared to needs, or compared to other recipients? 
Who were the major providers of foreign aid to the Balkans? Who were the major 
recipients? In addition, why did aid go to those major recipients as opposed to others? 
Why did some donors decide to give to certain recipients as opposed to others? What 
were the time dynamics and the forms of such assistance and so forth?  These are only 
the first in the series of questions to be answered in order to obtain the general picture 
of foreign aid to the Balkans.  The ultimate question of impact or effect of such 
assistance can not be separated from the question of the quantity of aid, its goals, the 
motives behind it, or the mode of supply. As such, these questions go to the core of 
the aid issue and have overarching importance.  
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As an illustration to this argument, an article at The New Your Times189 from 2003 
estimated foreign aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1996 – 2003, not 
counting relief and reconstruction, to between USD 5 and 15 billion. The almost USD 
10 billion in difference in this estimate, on a country whose GDP in the early 2000s 
was around USD 11 billion is indicative as  to the   specificity of the public debate 
surrounding aid to the Balkans. The presumable difference in impact of an amount of 
USD 10 billion is substantive.   
 
The opening question in this discussion therefore is – how much foreign assistance 
did the Balkans receive in the last 19 years of transition?   
 
 
 
2. Aid to Eastern Europe: ODA vs. OA  
 
Before moving to discuss the specific aid numbers concerning the Balkans, it is 
important to introduce some of the basic definitions and distinctions important to the 
debate.  
 
When discussing the aid flows to the countries of the Balkans, for purposes of 
comparison, this text will make occasional references to aid to other Eastern European 
countries. These countries will be divided into two groups. The first one comprises 
Romania and Bulgaria; countries which are immediate neighbors to the countries of 
the Western Balkans. The second group comprises the four Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The   
focus of the text is the Western Balkans; nevertheless comparisons   with the other 
post-communist transition countries are important in order to understand the 
specificities of foreign aid to the countries of former Yugoslavia (plus Albania).  
 
The important distinction to understand is that the development assistance given to the 
Western Balkan countries has been registered by the DAC as Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), whereas aid to countries from the two other mentioned groups has 
been counted as Official Aid (OA). This distinction is important to note for 
methodological purposes.  
Until 1993 the DAC of the OECD had a single list of developing countries which 
were eligible for ODA. Aid to these countries was registered by the DAC as Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). The changes brought about with the dismantling of 
the communist world prompted the question of how to count the aid which started to 
flow to the former communist countries. For this purpose the DAC introduced a 
second list of countries, called “Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition 
(Official Aid)” in 1993. This list included the other countries from Eastern Europe 
this text will occasionally refer to. The DAC abolished the Part II list and it went back 
to a single list of aid recipients in 2006.190  
                                                 
189  New York Times, Where Did All the Money in Bosnia Go? 16 February 2003.  
190 The following excerpts from the section of the  OECD website dedicated to the “History of 
the DAC lists of recipients” , 
http://www.oecd.org/document/55/0,3343,en_2649_34485_35832055_1_1_1_1,00.html   
explain in detail the shift from only ODA, to ODA/OA, and back:     
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Since Yugoslavia was eligible for ODA in the years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
it was already on the ODA list. Albania was added to the ODA list in 1989. Slovenia, 
which was in its own right completely absent from the “Balkan transition”   stayed on 
the Part I list until 2003, when it progressed to the Part II list.  
The creation of the Part II list did not happen easily and it was subject to debate inside 
the DAC. As early as 1989 big bilateral donors such as the United States and Japan 
wanted extension of ODA rules to the new transition countries, in order to have aid 
allocated to these countries count as ODA:  
 
“DAC Members fail to reach agreement on the appropriate recording of aid to 
Poland and Hungary. Japan, backed by the United States seeks agreement to use 
ODA funds for these countries. Other countries, especially France and the 
Netherlands, wish DAC aid presentations and work to remain concentrated in the 
‘traditional development countries (Fuhrer, 1996: 54)’”. 
 
Reporting was introduced on CEE countries in 1990 and extended to the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) in 1992 (Fuhrer, 1996: 58). In 1993 the Part II List was 
introduced.  
 
Why is this important and why is this particularly important for this text? There are 
several reasons.  
 
A lot of the scholarly writing on aid focuses only on ODA, as the “real” or 
“traditional” form of development assistance. For example, even the publications of 
the DAC in discussing aid to Europe, talk frequently only in terms of ODA and 
                                                                                                                                            
“The end of the Cold War signaled the emergence of new economic and political realities.  
New aid requirements arose in the transition economies of Eastern Europe, while rapid 
progress in East Asia reduced aid needs there.  A new list was devised to reflect these 
developments...This new ‘DAC List of Aid Recipients’ was introduced in 1993.  It was 
divided into two parts.  Only aid to ‘traditional’ developing countries on Part I of the List 
counted as ODA, for which there is a long-standing United Nations target of 0.7 per cent of 
donors' national income. Aid to the ‘more advanced’ developing and eastern European 
countries on Part II of the List was recorded separately as ‘official aid’....The List of Aid 
Recipients was reviewed every three years.  Countries above the World Bank High Income 
Country threshold (per capita annual income around USD 9 000 at the time) for three 
consecutive years progressed to Part II of the List at the end of a three-year notice period.  
Other countries could also be transferred to Part II after a notice period if they were above the 
World Bank lending limit (around USD 5 000 annually) for three consecutive years, 
following consideration by the DAC of their development and resource status...The List of 
Aid Recipients was reviewed every three years.  Countries above the World Bank High 
Income Country threshold (per capita annual income around USD 9 000 at the time) for three 
consecutive years progressed to Part II of the List at the end of a three-year notice period.  
Other countries could also be transferred to Part II after a notice period if they were above the 
World Bank lending limit (around USD 5 000 annually) for three consecutive years, 
following consideration by the DAC of their development and resource status....Data on aid to 
the following CEEC/NIS countries in transition, first collected in respect of 1990 flows, were 
recorded against Part II of the List of Aid Recipients (as “official aid”) until and including 
2004: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Ukraine.  Flows to Moldova were recorded against this 
category up to and including 1996.” 
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discuss only ODA (but not OA) recipient countries. Framed in these terms, the data 
regularly place the four Western Balkan countries, BiH, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (later Serbia and Montenegro), Albania, and Macedonia, among the top 5 
recipients of ODA in Europe. The writing on aid to Eastern Europe which is framed in 
this way, that is only in terms of ODA,   , disregards the Official Aid (OA), which has 
been given to Romania, Bulgaria, and the four CEE countries in substantial quantities. 
The WB countries rank top 5 among recipients of ODA, but the listing will be (if 
slightly) different when looking into recipients of ODA/OA. Some of the DAC 
statistical publications, which are core reference for any writing on aid, operate only 
with ODA whereas others with ODA/OA amounts. For example, the DAC annual 
statistical publication “Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid 
Recipients (OECD, 1999; OECD, 2000; OECD, 2001; OECD, 2002; OECD, 2003; 
OECD, 2005; OECD, 2006, OECD, 2007) considers as ODA recipients in Europe, the 
Western Balkan countries, Slovenia until 2004; Moldova starting with 1996; and 
Turkey, Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus (leaving the list at the same time with Slovenia). 
Ukraine and Byelorussia are counted starting with 2005, after having left the Part II 
list at the end of 2004. Most of the other recipients from that list became members of 
the EU in that year. OA recipients are presented but separately.  
 
Another DAC statistical publication “Development Aid at a Glance”191 with a focus 
on Europe, lists as main ODA recipients on the continent for the period 2002-2004, in 
the following order: Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, 
Turkey, and Macedonia.  This is of course accurate as far as ODA is concerned. But if 
one looks into the DAC Annual Report Series (OECD, 1998; OECD, 1999a; OECD, 
2001a; OECD, 2002a; OECD, 2003a; OECD, 2004; OECD, 2005a; OECD, 2007a; 
OECD, 2008a) which operates with combined ODA/OA amounts, the picture will be 
different. The top recipient (of OA) in Europe for several   major donors is 
consistently Poland.   For example; Poland has consistently been the biggest recipient 
of European Commission aid globally (OECD, 1998: 96; OECD, 1999a: 107; OECD, 
2001a: 108; OECD, 2002a: 100).  This particular point is being underscored in order 
to avoid misperceptions which can easily occur. Many scholars will write in terms of 
ODA only, and this will produce a distorted picture about aid flows to Eastern 
Europe. When writing on FA to this part of the world, it makes logical sense to 
compare across the country groupings. Analyzing ODA and OA separately does not 
make this possible.  
 
Aid to Eastern Europe (CEE + Romania & Bulgaria+ Western Balkans) and 
particularly aid to SEE (Romania & Bulgaria + Western Balkans) was shaped by 
factors which relevantly influenced the allocations across the different country 
groupings. What happened in the WB influenced aid to Romania & Bulgaria; what 
happened in CEE influenced the former, and so forth.  
 
Along this line, as already mentioned earlier in the theoretical discussion (see Chapter 
2; White, 2004), one of factors for the fall of ODA in the 1990s was the actual rise of 
OA. Scholars have been used to write about ODA, and scholarly thought on aid has 
for decades been focused on the Third World, so that the introduction of OA has not 
                                                 
191 The statistical publication does not feature a date of publication, or publisher, thus it is 
listed in the references without this information. The source of the publication is nevertheless 
the DAC web page.  
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even received a lot of attention in scholarly work on aid. Comparisons and research 
are often done solely within the frame of ODA without including OA. This approach 
is not suitable for this text. The research of aid to the Balkans needs to draw on 
relevant comparisons with the region’s closer and wider neighbors, and for this 
purpose it will have to discuss in parallel both ODA and OA. References nevertheless 
will be made to reports and publications which discuss foreign assistance in terms of 
ODA (most of them) and subsequently omit the OA countries from the discussion. 
Whenever possible this text will try to clarify the differences. Some of this is actually 
helpful in writing on aid to the Balkans, but there is also a downside to it. For 
example, the many DAC data analyses discuss aid to Europe only in terms of ODA 
and this makes the WB countries accounting for 80% of this aid. In this sense, all the 
research on the trends of aid to Europe, concerning for example sectoral composition, 
sector-specific allocations such as for education, or civil society and government and 
so forth, can be taken to be   relevant for the Balkans, as it represents 80% of the 
sample. Unfortunately, this approach disables such important comparisons with the 
OA countries. This is a serious setback. The analysis of the data done specifically for 
this text will try to correct for this as much as possible.  
 
 
 
3. How Much Aid Did the Balkans Need?  
 
 The issue of what was the Balkans’s need of foreign assistance received particular 
attention especially on occasions such as ends of wars, when talk of reconstruction 
would gain currency. There were two such major occasions in the region: the period 
after the signing of the Dayton peace accords which ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, 
and the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict in 1999. The need of reconstruction as a 
precondition for restoring life back to normal and to securing peace, on both 
occasions gave rise to debates concerning the need of assistance. Such estimates 
generally derived from assessment of direct and indirect damages caused by the war. 
What is observable from the review of the political debate on this issue is that such 
estimates varied substantially. Different actors produced different estimates by using 
different methodologies; the scope of the assessments differed – some estimates were 
concerned only with direct damages of war, or direct reconstruction needs, whereas 
others took into consideration the effects of sanctions, etc., The result was that there 
was no agreement on the actual needs of foreign assistance. This dissonance of views 
on the need of reconstruction assistance is observable both in the case of Bosnia and 
Kosovo. As reported by the New York Times at the time:  
“Nobody is certain of the price tag for Bosnia's recovery, only that it will be high. 
World Bank officials visiting in October [1995] identified $3.7 billion of urgent 
reconstruction needs in land controlled by the Bosnian Government and its Croatian 
allies. If areas under Bosnian Serb control were included, the team reported, 
reconstruction could cost $4 billion to $5 billion for just the next few years. And 
Christine Wallich, the economist heading the mission, said that only includes "what 
we think the priorities are." 192 
The political dimension of such estimates of reconstruction assistance needs can not 
be overlooked; neither can the obvious tension between estimates on the donor and 
                                                 
192 New York Times, The G.I.'s Don't Carry a Marshall Plan, 17 December 1995. 
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the recipient side pass unobserved. According to then Bosnian prime minister Haris 
Silajdzic, Western estimates of reconstruction needs were inadequate. In his view 
Bosnia needed at least USD 12 billion to meet its reconstruction needs.   
“’Four billion dollars is not enough,’ he told reporters who asked him to comment on 
diplomats' estimates for rebuilding Croatia and Bosnia, which were given in Rome on 
Friday. ‘We need at least three times that if we want to talk about reconstruction, for 
Bosnia alone.’”193 
The situation was similar was with the different estimates from the time after the 
Kosovo war:  
“Estimates of the total cost of rebuilding the Balkans, including aid to Albania and 
Macedonia, vary widely from Dollars 20bn (pounds 12.5bn) to Dollars 100bn 
(pounds 62.5bn).” 194 All major donor agencies had produced some estimates of what 
the reconstruction needs would be. In a view of the European Investment Bank (EIB):  
 
  “... the cost of reconstruction in the Balkans [could reach] 25-30 billion euro over the 
next three to five years. Bank officials say the amount represents the bare minimum 
needed to get the region's economy working again.”
195
 
 
Similarly, another major financial institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
had its own estimate. According to the IMF:  
 “helping Montenegro and Kosovo, both part of Yugoslavia, and Albania, Macedonia, 
Romania and Bulgaria could reach $1.25 billion to $2.25 billion a year for several 
years.”196 
The general conclusion is that there was no exact or commonly agreed estimate on 
how much the reconstruction of the Balkans would require:  
“The exact amounts involved in Balkan reconstruction are still vague. The European 
Union has pledged $500 million a year for the next three years for Kosovo alone; 
Western officials say as much as $30 billion over the next five years may be needed 
for the region as a whole.”197  
 
In addition all of these different assessments were based on different criteria, and took 
different types of costs into account. The criteria for the cost-assessment depended not 
only on the methodology employed but also on the political point of view:  
 
“A group of private Yugoslav economists recently estimated that NATO allies 
inflicted about $4 billion dollars of damage on Serbia during the Kosovo war, while 
they put the cumulative financial impact of sanctions at $30 billion.”198  
 
                                                 
193 New York Times, Bosnia Says It Will Need $12 Billion in Aid, 8 October 1995. 
194 The Guardian, 'Marshall plan' for Balkans: Reconstruction EU and US Braced for Multi-
Billion Dollar Bill, 11 June 1999. 
195 European Voice, EU Moves Swiftly to Create Agency for Rebuilding Balkans, Vol. 5 No. 
23, 10 June 1999. 
196 New York Times, World Leaders Join in Pledging Effort to Rebuild Balkans, 31 July 
1999. 
197 New York Times, Reform Urged as Condition For Yugoslavia to Get Aid, 21 June 1999. 
198 New York Times, Easing of Some Restrictions By West Could Happen Soon, 8 October 
2000. 
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Some round figures appeared to be more resounding than others (and the rounder the 
figure the more easily it resounded) but the obvious conclusion is that a) there was no 
consistent and commonly agreed estimate of how much reconstruction aid the region 
would need, and b) that probably such an estimate was difficult (if not impossible to 
produce). 
 
One symbolic way of discussing the amount of aid the region would need was to 
frame it in terms of peace vs. war. Assessments of the amounts of aid that went into 
the region included the regular comparisons of the cost of peace over war. In a letter 
to the Washington Post from 29 July 1999, just before the Stability Pact summit, the 
most engaged private philanthropist in this part of the world, George Soros, suggested 
that  the cost of rebuilding and integrating the Balkans would “hardly exceed those of 
the humanitarian intervention but (that) the benefits would be incomparably 
greater.”199 The expression “humanitarian intervention” as used here denotes the 
NATO military operation. Nevertheless, there were assessments which went in the 
opposite direction. According to a joint study by BBC and Jane’s Defence Weekly:   
“The war in Kosovo cost more than £30bn  ... The study... found that while the costs 
of waging war against the Serbian military machine were massive, the bill for 
rebuilding the shattered Balkans will be far higher...The BBC/Jane's research does 
not include the costs of environmental damage following bombing raids on oil 
refineries and industry. “200 
Similar observations resound    in a study produced by Serbian experts:  
“According to a preliminary estimate by Yugoslav economists, the Nato air strikes 
caused damage worth some 29.6 billion dollars, not counting damage to military 
installations, residential areas in Kosovo and the ecological impact.” 201 
Nevertheless, although the round figure is similar, the two estimates refer to 
essentially different types of damages. Whereas the Serbian estimate refers to direct 
damages by the NATO bombing, the BBC& Jane’s Defense Weekly also considers, 
for example, damages to Bulgaria ad Romania from the closure of the Danube.  
 
There are some additional angles to the discussion concerning the price of peace vs. 
war. According to relevant estimates, the NATO bombing campaign in Serbia cost 
between USD 2, 5 and 4 billion alone, or that is to say, comparably less than the aid 
amounts granted to the region.202 However, as recently as several years ago,  the cost 
of the military peace keeping presence in the region has been estimated at around 
USD 8,1 billion annually (  6 billion Euros), (UK Parliament, 2002). This amount 
easily outstrips the ODA allocation to the region in any single year since 1990, and 
even the peak year of 2002 when the overall ODA to the Balkans reached an all time 
high of USD 5, 4 billion. This fact has occasionally been used to argue in favour of 
more aid, or at least for countering the demands for less ODA to the Balkans. This is 
an interesting comparison, however it is only apparent. The research of the micro data 
                                                 
199 Washington Post, Balkan Opening, 29 July 1999. 
200 BBC, Kosovo War Cost £30bn, 15 October 1999. 
201 BBC, Reconstruction: Myth and Reality, 29 July 1999. 
202   Washington Post, Europe Wants Lead in Rebuilding Effort, 13 June 1999.  
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on aid allocations to the Balkans in Chapter 7 reveals that not seldom the finance for 
the military operations in the Balkans was registered as foreign assistance. In essence 
however, this only further underscores the conclusion that the funds spent for the 
military operation easily exceeded development aid.   
 
A conclusion which emerges from these comparisons and the review of these 
estimates is that: under the condition that these estimates were correct, or realistic, 
although the Balkans did receive a lot of aid, it was not at the level of   the damages 
caused by the wars. Further, and more specifically, the cost of foreign military 
presence in the Balkans outweighed the amounts of allocated ODA.  
 
In addition, the argument that “aid for peace” will cost less than the war, can 
(somewhat cynically) be considered an idealistic view propelled by moral vision of 
committed individuals, but not necessarily accurate in technical terms. As much as it 
true that the “costliest peace is cheaper than the cheapest war”,203  this is only valid, in 
realist terms, that is, before the war had actually taken place. Once the war has taken 
its toll, the cost of post-war restoration in technical terms proves to be much higher 
than the cost of destroying something. For example as noted by news reports at the 
time:  
 
“According to figures from the Danube Commission and others, the cost of replacing 
all eight bombed bridges over the vital river will be at least £80m - perhaps up to ten 
times more than the cost of destroying them.” 204 
 
Another comparison which was very common in the public debates concerning 
foreign assistance to the Balkans was that of aid to the Balkans as compared to 
assistance to Western Europe under the Marshal Plan.  
 
The myth of the Marshal plan interfered often in the debate surrounding Balkan 
reconstruction (see Chapter 4, section on influence of historic myths). One 
consequence of such comparisons has been the lament over the lack of donor 
commitment, compared to that from the time of the Marshal Plan, and subsequently, 
the sense of delusion with the foreign aid effort. Another consequence has been the 
fear in the donor community of what the word “Marshal Plan” brings in terms of 
financial expectations. The frequently heard logic has argued that foreign aid in the 
Balkans did not repeat the miracle of the Marshal Plan because aid commitments to 
the Balkans (in current prices) were much smaller than commitment to Western 
Europe within the Marshal Plan: “... questions over the scale of the financial 
provision ... mean the [Stability Pact] cannot compare with America's 1947 plan to 
reconstruct western Europe after the second world war.205 
 
This argument could quite frequently be encountered in foreign aid related 
discussions in the Balkans, and as such it relied on the fact of insufficient awareness 
of the total size of the aid effort to the Balkans. As data presented in the following 
                                                 
203 Reference has been made earlier to US President Clinton’s comparisons between the cost 
of peace and war (chapter 3); in the sense that the costliest peace is cheaper than the cheapest 
war.  
204 BBC, Kosovo War Cost £30bn, 15 October 1999 
205 The Guardian, 'Marshall plan' for Balkans: Reconstruction EU and US Braced for Multi-
Billion Dollar Bill, 11 June  1999 
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pages easily demonstrates, this argument is incorrect. The level of donor commitment 
in the Balkans easily matches that of the Marshal Plan.   The Marshal Plan supplied 
aid in the amount around of USD 90-100 billion in today’s prices206 to Western 
Europe in the period 1947-1951. The Western Balkans has received roughly half of 
that, that is, around USD 43 billion in the period 1990-2005. However the population 
of the Western Balkans (around 24-25 million people) is  much smaller than the 
population of Western Europe after WWII207, which automatically makes aid receipts 
per capita much bigger than what Western Europeans had  received with the Marshal 
Plan.  
 
Finally, the answer to the question “did the Balkans get a lot of aid” cannot be 
divorced from the realities of international relations.  At different points in time this 
issue had the power the raise tensions and cause disagreements in the donor 
community.  
 
As already discussed in Chapter 4, in the period after the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999 and the establishing of the Stability Pact, the US repeatedly criticized 
the EU over its small funding commitments. 208 The somewhat implicit deal between 
the Euro-Atlantic partners regarding the intervention in Kosovo was that the US 
would bear most of the cost of the military operation, whereas Europe would cover 
most of the reconstruction bill209. In the view of the US, the EU didn’t live up to this 
commitment in the immediate period after the end of the Kosovo crisis.  
 
At the same time, however, some EU member states felt that the Balkans was 
receiving far too much (EU) aid compared to needier places. The most vocal criticism 
in this regard was coming from the UK. Its view usually was that aid EU aid to the 
Balkans was motivated by political concerns rather than levels of poverty and human 
need,210 and that the EU was reducing its badly needed assistance elsewhere in order 
to have stronger presence in the Balkans.  
 
Disagreements similar to those from the aftermath of the Kosovo war can also be 
found in the immediate period after the end of the war in Bosnia. The following 
                                                 
206 This is the most realistic estimate of what would be today’s scope of the Marshall Plan, 
although in more relative terms, different authors have pointed out that it could be much 
larger. For example, Behrman (2007: 4)   agrees that in today’s prices the Plan would weigh 
around USD 100 billion, but he adds that as a share of US GNP that amount today would 
exceed USD 500 billion. An older title edited by Elwood (1988: 23) refers to the fact that 
President Ronald Reagan at the 40th anniversary of the Marshall Plan estimated its value in 
1988 dollars at USD 60 billion. The commentator (Leonard Silk) nevertheless, argues that in 
relative terms (compared to the size of the economy) and the fact that a big share of modern 
aid is military assistance, would be three times bigger, that is around USD 180 billion.  
207 In 1950 Italy had a population of 46, 8 million, Germany – 50, 8 million, France – 41, 8 
million, etc. See for example Tacitus Historic Atlas at http://www.tacitus.nu/historical-
atlas/population/.  
208 Washington Post, EU’s Commitment to the Balkans,  16 August 1999;  The Guardian, 
Balkans Wait in Vain for Western Funds: Stability US angry at EU’s Foot –Dragging on Pact 
Pledges,14 March 2000.  
209  Washington Post, Europe Wants Lead in Rebuilding Effort, 13 June 1999.  
210 The Guardian, Black Need but Only Whites Receive: Race Appears to be Skewing West’s 
Approach to Aid. Look at Kosovo. Then Look at Africa, 12 August 1999; The Guardian, Short 
Labels EU Worst Aid Agency in the World, 18 May 2000. 
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excerpt from international news reports is instructive in demonstrating the bargaining 
in the donor community over the sharing of the cost of assistance to the region: 
“President Clinton asserted recently that for peace to survive, Bosnians ’must have 
the food, the medicine, the shelter, the clothing so many have been denied for so long’  
and that ‘roads must be repaired, the schools and hospitals rebuilt, the factories and 
shops refurbished and reopened.’ Nevertheless, Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher told the House International Relations Committee that the United States 
would contribute a mere $200 million a year for three years...By contrast, President 
Jacques Chirac of France has said the European Union expects the United States to 
assume one-third of the reconstruction costs -- 10 times what Washington offered -- 
and the 15-nation European Union another third, with other wealthy countries like 
Japan and Saudi Arabia being asked to pay the remaining third. President Clinton's 
national security adviser, Anthony Lake, has dismissed this formula as ‘exorbitant for 
us.’ The Administration's preferred plan: international institutions like the World 
Bank finance half of the reconstruction, with the European Union and other countries 
paying the rest.” 211 
As evident from this news report, the cost of the post-war reconstruction in Bosnia 
was a subject of intense negotiations in the international community. The huge 
amounts of numbers which will be reviewed further in the text will provide the   
answer on the outcome of these negotiations.  
In conclusion, these were some of the big issues which pervaded the public debate 
concerning the overall supply foreign assistance to the Balkans212 : how much was 
needed, the cost of war vs. peace,  the revival of  the myth of the Marshal Plan, the 
bargains over the cost of reconstruction, and so forth.  
The short preceding outline lends  several conclusions: a) there was no common or 
clear idea of how much aid the Balkans needs, b) the figures of aid to the Balkans, 
thrown into the public debate were often imprecise and general, c) symbolic 
comparisons, such as the one to the myth of the Marshal Plan, and the cost of peace 
vs. war were common but often resulted with the wrong conclusions, d) the supply of 
aid to the region was not a coordinated and harmonious donor effort; donors often had 
strong disagreements over their financial roles in the endeavor.  
 
 
4.  How Much Aid Did the Balkans Receive?   
 
The data kept by the OECD DAC give a specific answer on the question of “how 
much” aid   the Balkan countries received in the period of transition. In the period 
1990-2005, the region   has received a total of USD 42, 8 billion (in constant 2006 
dollars). The biggest part of this amount has been contributed by DAC bilateral 
donors - USD 26 billion; multilateral donors have contributed USD 15, 9 billion; and 
the rest of USD 840 million has been allocated by other bilateral donors who are not 
members of the DAC (Table 1). Chart 1 below presents visually the shares of 
different types of donor in the total ODA to the region.  
 
 
                                                 
211   New York Times, The G.I.'s Don't Carry a Marshall Plan, 17 December 1995. 
212 There were naturally many specific issues which caused issue-specific debates.  
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Table 1: All ODA to Western Balkans 1990-2005; constant prices (2006 USD 
millions), disbursements213 
Type of Donor Amount (USD million) 
DAC bilateral 26 036,73 
multilateral 15 950,81 
non-DAC bilateral 840,39 
all ODA net 42 827,93 
 (source: DAC online statistical database)  
 
 
Chart 1:  All ODA to Western Balkans 1990-2005; shares by type of donor 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
  
This is a substantive amount of foreign assistance.  In order to get a better perspective 
of the magnitude of the support, the total aid flows to the Balkans can be compared to 
the other two groups of recipients in Eastern Europe; the first constituted by Romania 
& Bulgaria, and the second by the four CEE countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, and Slovakia.  
 
The total net ODA flows to Romania and Bulgaria have amounted to USD 11, 9 
billion in the period 1990-2004; 2004 is the last year data is available for. This is 
presented in Table 2 below.   
 
 
 
                                                 
213 According to the DAC’s Glossary a disbursement is “the release of funds to, or the 
purchase of goods or services for a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. 
Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or 
services valued at the cost of the donor.” See DAC’s Glossary at 
http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965478. 
The other unit measure of ODA flows is the commitment. According to the DAC a 
commitment is “a firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, 
undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a 
multilateral organization. Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected 
transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of disbursements. Commitments 
to multilateral organizations are reported as the sum of (i) any disbursements in the year 
reported on which have not previously been notified as commitments and (ii) expected 
disbursements in the following year.” See DAC’s Glossary at 
http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,3414,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965457 .    
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Table 2:  All ODA to Romania and Bulgaria 1990-2004; constant prices (2006 USD 
millions), disbursements 
Type of Donor Amount (USD million) 
DAC bilateral 4 720,15 
multilateral 7 028,26 
non-DAC bilateral 163,85 
all ODA net 11 912,26 
 (source: DAC online statistical database)  
 
In addition, Chart 2 below gives a visual overview of the shares of ODA by type to 
Bulgaria and Romania.  
 
 Chart 2:   All ODA to Bulgaria and Romania  
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
 
Even at this most general level of comparison, the difference between the countries of 
the Western Balkans vs. Romania & Bulgaria is quite obvious. Although much 
smaller in terms of population (est. 22 million people), the Western Balkans has 
received almost four times as much aid than the grouping composed by Romania & 
Bulgaria (est. 30 million people).   
 
The other observation which emerges clearly from this level of comparison is the 
inverted roles of bilateral and multilateral assistance; 61% of the total ODA to the 
Balkans was DAC bilateral, that is provided by governments which are members of 
the DAC, as opposed to 37% of the assistance which came from multilateral donors. 
This ratio is inverted for Romania & Bulgaria; 40% of the total aid was DAC 
bilateral, as opposed to 59% which was multilateral.  
 
Table 3 and Table 4 below provide full account of total ODA to the countries in the 
Western Balkans in the period 1990-2005,  to Romania & Bulgaria 1990-2004, and 
the four CEE countries (Poland, Check Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) for the 
same 1990-2004 period. The tables provide full information on receipts per country 
and over time, in a way that the time-dynamic of the ODA flows can be monitored 
and analyzed. Such analysis can produce relevant insights into the factors which 
determined the supply of foreign aid. These aspects will be a subject of detailed 
analysis with respect to the countries of the Western Balkans. Romania & Bulgaria 
and the CEE countries will be subject of occasional references, mostly for comparison 
purposes. 
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Table 3:  All ODA net to Western Balkans 1990-2005, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements  
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total 
                  
Alb 14,7 426,36 510,89 401,01 202,44 204,09 264,3 211,21 346,68 644,48 445,6 386,56 408,09 406,29 314,93 327,27 5514,9 
BiH .. .. 14,13 56,88 535,31 1041,6 998,01 1107,6 1162,7 1364,4 1067,8 912,2 765,59 621,39 717,27 569,15 10934,1 
Cro .. .. 0,01 .. 138,81 60,45 145,24 56,21 58,85 64,6 92,08 159,95 171,05 141,75 130,29 131,62 1350,91 
Mac .. .. .. 4,59 134,01 85,62 120,22 120,9 132,04 354,18 353,43 351,72 377,37 306,04 263,92 234,67 2838,71 
FRY/Ser .. .. .. .. 63,94 106,16 75,19 122,62 142,12 957,58 1690,5 1932,5 2550,5 1533,5 1235 1161 11570,48 
ex Yu 
unspec. 61,38 205,2 1751 3354 1326,7 520,13 380,19 98,35 145,62 580,32 461,96 211,82 1217,8 138,79 105,73 59,82 10618,83 
                                    
total 76,08 631,56 2276,1 3816,5 2401,2 2018,1 1983,2 1716,9 1988 3965,6 4111,4 3954,7 5490,4 3147,7 2767,1 2483,5 42827,93 
(source: DAC online statistical database)  
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Table 4: All ODA net to CEE, and Bulgaria and Romania, 1990-2004, constant prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements  
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 total 
                                  
Cz. Rep. 19,37 323,33 168,16 133,08 190,75 166,53 147,5 148,63 584,03 436,3 675,32 485,78 226,44 308,83 291,8 4305,85 
Hun 94,21 874,34 284,07 217,28 256,28 -293,9 230,86 220,56 304,31 350,24 380,81 641,12 226,55 289,95 316,6 4393,3 
Pol 1823,7 3419,9 1758,6 1362,9 2285 3929,8 1353,4 1126,8 1154,9 1617,9 2131,3 1490,1 1272,5 1409,9 1606,4 27742,89 
Slo. Rep. 9,67 160,51 82,11 68,71 100,89 113,9 115,08 90,72 200,81 428,93 170,65 251,72 215,76 187,98 243,28 2440,72 
                                  
total 1947 4778,1 2292,9 1782 2832,9 3916,3 1846,9 1586,7 2244 2833,4 3358,1 2868,7 1941,3 2196,7 2458 38882,76 
                 
                 
Bul 19,03 439,95 189,97 150,27 199,84 126,14 206,74 279,16 306,11 343,32 416,24 488,15 436,67 481,59 643,48 4726,66 
Rom 337,43 432,64 296,94 224,42 196,76 342,79 269,8 281,57 474,56 510,62 625,6 980,99 570,49 687,02 953,97 7185,6 
                                  
total 356,46 872,59 486,91 374,69 396,6 468,93 476,54 560,73 780,67 853,94 1041,8 1469,1 1007,2 1168,6 1597,5 11912,26 
                 
                                  
total 2303,4 5650,7 2779,8 2156,7 3229,5 4385,3 2323,4 2147,4 3024,7 3687,3 4399,9 4337,8 2948,4 3365,3 4055,5 50795,02 
(source: DAC online statistical database) 
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Further to the east, the four countries from the CEE have received a total of USD 38, 
8 billion in constant 2006 dollar prices, or by type of ODA (Table 5).  
 
Table 5:  All ODA to CEE 1990-2004, constant prices (2006 USD millions), 
disbursements  
Donor Type Amount (USD million) 
DAC bilateral 22 337,6 
multilateral 16 469,13 
non-DAC bilateral 76,03 
all ODA net 38 882,76 
 (source: DAC online statistical database)  
 
 
Chart 3 gives the shares of ODA by sources in the total flows to CEE countries in the 
period 1990-2004, the year when the entered the EU, and the last year data is 
available for.214  
 
  Chart 3:   All ODA to CEE 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
Again, the conclusion, even at this most general level of inspection of the numbers is 
that the Balkans was comparably more assisted, relative to its population size, than 
the region of CEE. However, the ratio of bilateral vs. multilateral ODA of the CEE 
region, as observable from Chart 3, is similar to that of the Balkans, rather than that of 
Romania and Bulgaria. The reasons for the different bilateral vs. multilateral ODA 
ratios will be discussed further in the text.  
 
The combined receipts of the three country groupings bring the total net ODA to these 
countries in Eastern Europe in the period 1990-2005 (2004 for Romania & Bulgaria, 
and the CEE countries) to USD 93, 6 billion (see Table 6 below).   
 
 
 
                                                 
214 The ODA to CEE does not take into account the category from the DAC database 
referenced as “ODA to CEE unspecified”, but only the ODA with specific country allocation. 
This is because “ODA to CEE unspecified” includes also the unspecified share already 
counted for the ex-Yu region. Including in the total aid flows to Eastern Europe also the 
unspecified ODA to CEE would further raise the amount.   
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Table 6: All ODA to Eastern Europe 1990-2005 (2004), constant prices (2006 USD 
millions), disbursements 
Region Amount (USD million) 
CEE 38 882,76 
Romania & Bulgaria 11 912,26 
Western Balkans 42 827,93 
Eastern Europe total 93 622,95 
 (source: DAC online statistical database) 
 
In addition, Chart 4 below presents the shares in total ODA of the Western Balkans, 
Romania & Bulgaria, and the CEE respectively.  
 
 Chart 4:  Shares in all net ODA to Eastern Europe  
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  (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
The data presented above provide the overall framework for discussing foreign aid to 
the region. The figure as it is registered with the DAC database should be taken as the 
definite amount of foreign aid to the Balkans in the period 1990-2005.  The region has 
received an exact total of USD 42, 8 billion in the period of transition. However, it is 
important to underscore that this is only the overall nominal amount.  This figure is 
only the tip of the iceberg in the exploration of the process of foreign aid to the 
Balkans. The major purpose of this writing, as already stated, is to provide the 
complete information on: how much, for what, for whom, from whom, and why, 
concerning foreign assistance to the Balkans. The nominal amount of aid the region 
has received is only the point of departure in this inquiry. Nevertheless, this 
explorations has to start from an initial overall amount, and in the case of the Balkans, 
this amount is USD 42, 8 billion.  
 
The nominal levels of assistance to the different sub-regions of Eastern Europe are 
already indicative of the differences concerning the levels of ODA allocation. It is 
already clear from the tables and charts presented above that the Balkans was 
substantially more assisted than the regions/groupings of comparison. This picture 
can be further enhanced by using additional measures of the levels of foreign aid. 
There are two other measures of development assistance that help clarify this fact; aid 
per capita, and aid as percent of GDP. When these indicators are compared across 
countries, they also represent an additional indicator of the considerable relative 
differences between countries from the same region. Table 7 below gives the values 
of aid per capita and aid as percent of GDP for the Balkan countries, Romania & 
Bulgaria, and the countries from the CEE region.  
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Table 7: Aid per capita and as percent of GDP; WB, Romania and Bulgaria, and CEE 
Country  Aid per capita,  (USD)                     
(1990-2005 average) 
Aid as % of GDP                              
(2003-2005)  
Albania 100,90   4,50  
BiH 180,34  6,90  
Croatia 22,11  0,36  
Macedonia 105,78  4,80  
Serbia 87,78  5,20  
  (1990-2004 average) (2002-2004)  
Bulgaria 36,95  2,50  
Romania 20,90  1,10  
  (1990-2004 average) (2002-2004)  
Hungary 27,66 0,32 
Czech Republic 27,02  0,29  
Poland 46,48  0,62  
Slovakia 29,87  0,66  
 (source: data combined from various sources, primarily from UNECE; source for 
data on ODA is the DAC)  
 
Table 7 clearly demonstrates the strong differences in aid receipts across the different 
regions. As it can be observed, with the notable exception of Croatia, aid to the 
Balkans as percent of GDP is, in some country by country comparisons,   more than 
20 times greater than to the CEE, such as for example between the Czech Republic 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
 In terms of aid per capita, the single largest aid recipient is Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
whose per capita average for the period 1990-2005 stands at USD 180, 34. This is 
around 9 times more than the least assisted country in per capita terms – Romania, 
whose 16 years average is USD 20, 90. This does come as a surprise because 
Romania was among the poorer countries in the region. The bias is in part result of 
the huge size of its population, but nevertheless Romania is quite less assisted in per 
capita terms even compared to larger countries from the CEE, such as Poland, which 
stands at USD 46, 48 in per capita terms.   Some of this is accounted for by 
differences in the type of aid received – Poland received huge amounts of debt relief.  
   
At this point the inquiry focuses only on how much the Balkans received in nominal 
an real terms. The answer concerning nominal aid is straightforward; how much that 
actually is in real terms, can be observed from the comparisons with the two other 
groups of recipients in Eastern Europe. With the exception of Croatia, both in per 
capita terms and in terms of aid as percent of GDP, the Western Balkan countries 
received substantially more foreign assistance than Bulgaria & Romania, and the CEE 
countries.  
   
 
 
5. Who Received Aid?  Country Shares of ODA to the Balkans  
 
The fact that the Balkans was a strong recipient of aid clearly does not mean that this 
assistance was equally distributed across the region. Obviously not every country in 
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the Balkans was assisted at the same level, which logical because not every country 
displayed the same level of need.  
 
One aspect of the country levels of assistance is already observable in Table 7 
displaying the values in terms of aid per capita and as percent of GDP. Provisionally, 
three sub-groupings can be identified within the Western Balkans according to 
amounts of ODA received. The first sub-grouping is represented by Bosnia alone, 
which easily tops the list, both in terms of aid per capita and as percent of GDP; the 
second sub-grouping includes Macedonia, Albania, and FRY/Serbia which have 
receipts per capita around the USD 100 mark (range between USD 87, 78 and 105, 
78), and as percent of GDP between 4, 50 and 5, 20 percent. The third sub-grouping is 
represented by Croatia. Both in terms of aid per capita and as percent of GDP Croatia 
received ODA in amounts much smaller than the rest of the region. Its receipts are 
obviously   smaller compared even to the receipts of the CEE group. It is fair to note 
that in terms of development assistance received, Croatia does not fit the profile of a 
Balkan recipient. Although obviously Croatia is part of the region geographically and 
politically, and in terms of participation in its recent turbulent history, Croatia was not 
part of the Balkans when it came to distribution of foreign aid. The only available 
explanation is   its quite higher level of economic development. GDP per capita in 
Croatia   is substantially higher compared to the rest of the Western Balkan 
countries.215 This indicates that a strong factor determining the allocation of foreign 
assistance was the level of economic development of the recipient countries. Even 
though Croatia suffered from war, had refugee crises, needed post-war reconstruction, 
and experienced problems with democratization, the fact that it had higher level of 
economic development made it either ineligible or less qualified for receiving 
development assistance for many of the donors who were active in the Balkans.  
 
Table 3 above presented the nominal country shares of aid to the Balkans. This is 
displayed visually by Chart 5 below.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
215 For example, according to data presented by the Balkan Observatory of the Vienna 
Institute for International Economic, in 2003 Croatia had a GDP per capita (at PPP) of Euro 
9,930; Macedonia – Euro 5,330; Serbia – Euro 5,530; Montenegro – Euro 4,990; Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – Euro 5,460; and Albania – Euro 3,940. See for more The WIIW Balkan 
Observatory, http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/reports07.html .  
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 Chart 5: Country shares of ODA to Western Balkans  
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
Chart 5 is very revealing as to who within the Balkans actually received the largest 
share of the Western assistance. The ranking is different from that based on per capita 
and percent of GDP criteria. Although Macedonia and Albania were relevant 
recipients in real terms, their participation in the total ODA to the region is rather 
modest. Together they account for 20 % of the total ODA to the Western Balkans. 
Croatia’s share is obviously even smaller. The bulk of the Western ODA to the 
Balkans went to two countries, Bosnia and FRY/Serbia, which together share over 
half (52 %) of total aid flows into the region. Aid to the region “unspecified” accounts 
for 26%, that is, more than a ¼ of the total aid to the region. If aid to “ex-Yu 
unspecified’ would be removed from the chart, and only country specific allocations 
are taken into consideration, Bosnia and FRY/Serbia would account for even a larger 
share(70 %) of foreign assistance  to the Balkans (Chart 6).  
 
 Chart 6:  Country shares of net ODA to Western Balkans (without ex-Yu unspecified 
amount)  
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
At this point it is important to underscore another important issue which poses a 
significant methodological problem, and that is the disaggregation of foreign 
assistance to FRY/Serbia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro since 2003, until Montenegro’s secession in 2006) had three distinct sub-
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entities: Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. These three entities differed in terms of 
foreign aid they received. Kosovo was clearly a strong recipient of foreign assistance 
after the NATO military intervention; Montenegro gradually developed a status of aid 
recipient different from Serbia, through the process of its political differentiation from 
the Milosevic regime. Serbia on the other hand was under an aid embargo largely 
through the 90s, and aid sanctions were only dropped (they had been partially dropped 
in the period after Dayton in 1995 and subsequently reinstalled) after the fall of 
Milosevic on 5 October 2000. Given these circumstances, the specific allocations 
across Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, cannot be obtained through the DAC 
database because the DAC records data at the level of countries.  Some idea about the 
shares of these entities in the total aid to FRY/Serbia can be obtained from looking 
into the data for individual donors and comparing those with the DAC total, and from 
the time dynamics of foreign assistance to FRY/Serbia. This disaggregation will be a 
subject of a separate section further in this chapter.  
 
  
 
6. When? Time-Dynamic of ODA Flows to the Balkans  
 
Important aspect for understanding the process of foreign aid to the Balkans is its 
time-dynamic. A static picture of foreign assistance to the Balkans is incomplete. The 
time -dynamics of aid supply is important for understanding the trends in foreign 
assistance overtime and the motivations behind them, but also its effectiveness and 
impact. Obviously, a billion dollar ad-hoc injection of aid over a single year can not 
have the same effect as a steady flow over a period of a decade and a half.   
 
An inquiry into the time-dynamic of ODA to the Balkans shows, expectedly, that 
each country in the region received development assistance with a different dynamic. 
Chart 7 below displays the general trend of all ODA to the entire region of the 
Balkans overtime, divided by major sources of supply, that is, DAC bilateral donors, 
multilaterals, and non-DAC bilaterals. The chart shows three major spikes, that is, 
strong upward movements in the aid flows in three particular years over the entire 
1990-2005 period. The first one is in 1993, the second in 1999, and the last in the 
period 2001-2002. These three spikes, observable at regional level, are a result of 
strong upward trends in both DAC bilateral and multilateral ODA, whereas the non-
DAC, which is a small contributor to the total, as can be seen from Chart 7, does not 
follow suit. The movements of the bilateral and the multilateral flows around these 
three periods of time do not have the same elevation, but nevertheless it is clear that 
they both respond in the same way. For example, from   Chart 7 it is clearly visible 
that the 1993 rise in total ODA is strongly influenced by the rise in multilateral 
assistance, whereas DAC bilateral aid follows suit but with a milder ascendance. This 
essentially indicates to a difference in the response (to a certain event acting as factor 
of ODA) by governments (bilateral donors) vs. multilateral organizations (multilateral 
donors).  
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Chart 7. Time-dynamic of net ODA to Western Balkans   
 (vertical axis: USD millions) 
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  (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
Additional inquiry into the composition of multilateral ODA around the period of 
time of the 1993 spike is necessary in order to determine the direct factor for the 
strong rise in foreign assistance. Table 8 below216 shows that this particular rise in the 
period 1991-1994, with the peak year being 1993, is mostly the result of the strong 
infusions of assistance by three multilaterals, the European Commission, UNHCR, 
and WFP. The very character of two of these three major donors, that is, the UNHCR 
and the WFP already clearly indicates the character of this spike in ODA to the 
Balkans. UNHCR is the UN agency in charge of care for refugees, and WFP operates 
emergency food supply. This rapid increase in aid was a response to the unfolding 
war in Croatia and Bosnia and the humanitarian emergency they had produced.   
 
Table 8: Selected multilateral donors to Western Balkans 1990-1995, constant prices 
(2006 USD millions) disbursements 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
       
EC 1,63 16,10 368,30 827,66 400,74 253,48 
IDA 0 0 2,55 32,88 91,46 93,43 
UNHCR 4,04 7,08 373,45 678,44 287,92 199,28 
WFP 0 0 23,1 238,28 183,91 102,07 
 (source: DAC online statistical database) 
 
                                                 
216 See complete information in Annex, Table 9.  
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The same exercise can be repeated with bilateral ODA. A closer look into the 
composition of bilateral foreign assistance around that period of time can help 
determine the direct source of the surge in ODA.  Table 9 below217 show the biggest 
rises in bilateral ODA in the period 1990-1995.  
 
Table 9: Selected bilateral donors to the Western Balkans 1990-1995, constant prices 
(2006 USD millions) disbursements 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
       
Germany 0,1 61,64 756,9 635,32 364,15 412,04 
Italy 40,81 442,85 204,91 262,87 65,11 86,45 
Netherl. 2,45 6,62 55,75 255,35 151,78 167,46 
Norway -1,11 3,48 6,58 66,17 178,7 118,02 
Sweden 0 5,87 114,53 155,38 127,68 61,69 
UK 0,02 0,68 8,33 168,2 161,73 65,13 
(source: DAC online statistical database)   
 
As evident from, the bulk of this rise comes from a big jump of German aid. Italian 
ODA is also at very high levels, but its destination is different. Whereas the German 
ODA is directed to “ex-Yu unspecified”, most of the Italian ODA is allocated to 
Albania.218   
 
The second big spike in ODA to the Balkans is in the period around 1999. Chart 7 
above shows that this rise is mostly a result of the rapid increase of bilateral aid; 
multilateral ODA follows suit but with a milder ascendance. The Annex219   shows 
that 1999 is a year with a big rise in ODA from practically all the bilateral donors 
present in the Balkans. The rise in multilateral ODA is a result of rising allocations by 
only two donors; the EC and UNHCR (see Table 10 below).   
 
Table 10:  EC and UNHCR ODA to Western Balkans 1998-2000, constant prices 
(2006 USD millions), disbursements 
Year 1998 1999 2000 
    
EC 419,16 993,08 1443,44 
UNHCR 2,17 1,12 148,01 
(source: DAC online statistical database)   
 
Most of the rise should logically be a response to the Kosovo emergency. Most of the 
EC increase went to ex-Yu unspecified; there is an increase in EC aid to Macedonia 
and Albania (which hosted huge number of refugees); there is almost a doubling of 
the aid to Bosnia, which is not related to the refugee crisis.220  However the years 
1999 and 2000 should be separated. In late 2000 there were events in Serbia proper 
which called for a strong donor response, thus it can be assumed that at least a part of 
the EC USD 1, 4 billion to FRY in 2000 is already a response to the democratic 
breakthrough in Serbia and the dropping of the sanctions against Belgrade.  
 
                                                 
217 See complete information in Annex, Table 1.  
218  Annex, Table 20.  
219 Annex, Table 1.  
220 Annex, Table 11 – Table 16.  
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Another major factor for the rise in 1999 is expectedly the creation of the Stability 
Pact, which definitely solicited some of the response. The Stability Pact marked a 
symbolic beginning of a huge effort to reconstruct the Balkans and it definitely had 
impact on aid allocations.  
 
 To go back to the point, the ODA rise in 1999 was largely a result of bilateral 
increases, which could be interpreted to mean that bilateral aid was more quick to 
respond to the 1999 emergency, or at least more engaged compared to the period from 
the early 90s and the response to the war in Croatia and Bosnia, where stronger 
bilateral response came from just a few donors. Nevertheless, to answer this question 
in full, one needs to look into the actual country destination of the allocations (with 
the already mention disaggregation problem between Serbia and Kosovo), and the 
composition of the ODA.   
 
The third big rise in ODA to the Western Balkans, when foreign aid to the Balkans 
reaches an all-time high, is the year of 2002. This is, as Chart 7 very clearly 
demonstrates, again caused by a surge in bilateral aid; multilateral ODA is actually 
declining by this period of time. Although quite a few DAC bilateral donors have a 
rise of their allocations in this particular year, the rise is a result of a strong response 
by just a few big bilaterals. This can be seen from Table 11 below221 which comprises 
the bilateral donors with a major increase in ODA in 2002 compared to the previous 
year.  
 
Table 11:  Selected bilateral donors to Western Balkans 2001-2003, constant prices 
(2006 USD millions), disbursements 
Year 2001 2002 2003 
    
Austria 68,34 150,24 52,87 
Germany 211,69 820,73 208,72 
UK 75,26 657,45 42,23 
Canada 65,02 190,68 29,92 
France 44,65 163,11 258,52 
US 516,11 820,08 475,73 
(source: DAC online statistical database) 
 
Table 11 shows that the rise of Western bilateral ODA to the region has gone from 
doubling of allocations in some cases, to almost 10-fold increases, such as in the case 
of UK aid to the region which jumps from USD 75, 26 million in 2001, to USD 657, 
45 million in 2002, to go back to USD 42, 23 million in the next year.  
 
It is reasonable to argue the single factor of this massive increase of Western bilateral 
ODA to the Balkans in 2002 was the extradition of former Serbian President, 
Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY at The Hague.222 Immediately after 5 October 2000 
                                                 
221 See complete information in Annex, Table 1.  
222 This has been confirmed by the extensive review of the media coverage on the 
international political dynamic at the time and on the role foreign assistance has played in the 
process, and has been discussed in Chapter 4. For additional sources corroborating this 
conclusion see for example: The Economist, Who is in Charge? The Yugoslavia Milosevic 
Leaves Behind: The Milosevic Effect Continues to Trouble Serbia and Montenegro, 7 July 
2001; The Guardian, Hague is Not the Place to Try Milosevic: The Tribunal is Effectively the 
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when Milosevic was brought down from power, sanctions on Serbia were dropped 
and aid started to flow in. Nevertheless, aid was made conditional on full cooperation 
with the ICTY and the first big condition to be met already by 2001, was the 
extradition of Milosevic. Milosevic’s extradition on 28 June 2001 caused a strong 
response in the donor community.  
 
In conclusion, the third and biggest rise in ODA to the Balkans was a response to 
events unfolding in one (but the biggest) country in the region, the extradition of 
Milosevic. Hence, the big rise in ODA to the region is accounted for by only one 
country – Serbia (FRY). This can be further corroborated by Chart 8 below, 
displaying the time-dynamic of ODA to the Balkans, by individual country.   
 
 
 Chart 8: Time-dynamic of all ODA to Western Balkans 1990-2005; by countries  
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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  (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
 Chart 8 complements the picture of the time-dynamic of ODA to the Balkans by 
breaking it down by countries. Form the chart it is clear that the biggest rises account 
for on ex-Yu unspecified ODA and aid to Serbia. Along the line of discussing the 
2002 peak of ODA to the Balkans, Chart 8 shows that it is also supported by a big 
spike of ODA to ex-Yu unspecified, which is identical to the spike produced by the 
bilateral surge to Serbia (FRY). There can be little doubt that the factor of this big rise 
is something else than the extradition of the former Serbian president.  The Annex223 
reveals that most of this increase to ex-Yu unspecified is a result of a big outpouring 
                                                                                                                                            
Legal Arm of NATO in the Balkans, 2 August 2001; The Guardian, Huge Aid Promise 
Prompted Handover, 29 June 2001; The Guardian, Milosevic Extradited: Donations: pounds 
1bn aid rewards Serbia: Relieved west stumps up cash to rebuild economy, 30 June 2001; 
New York Times,   The Handover Of Milosevic: The Overview. Milosevic Is Given To U.N. 
For Trial In War-Crime Case, 29 June 2001; Evans Gareth, Belgrade Needs Help, but the 
Aid Must Have Firm Conditions, International Herald Tribune, 27 June 2001; Washington 
Post, Serb Leaders Hand Over Milosevic For Trial by War Crimes Tribunal Extradition 
Sparks Crisis in Belgrade, 29 June 2001.  
223 Annex, Table 16.  
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of aid from one donor, the European Commission. EC aid to ex-Yu unspecified jumps 
from USD 71, 86 million in 2001 to USD 751, 78 million in 2002, that is to say, more 
than 10-fold.224 
  
In somewhat simplified terms perhaps, it can be argued that the entire, general story 
of foreign aid to the Balkans is told by Chart 8. The big changes in the dynamic of aid 
supply are result of war and emergency (ex-Yu unspecified trajectory) in the period 
1992-1994; war and post war reconstruction (Bosnia); and democratic opening and 
ousting of a dictator (FRY/Serbia). In this overall framework, assistance to Croatia is 
a rather consistent, monotonous line; the supply to Macedonia jumps in 1999  (due to 
the Kosovo refugee crisis), and keeps a higher level in the ensuing years; Albania 
rises in the early 90s, primarily due to strong inflows of Italian ODA, and in 1999, as 
a result of the Kosovo refugees crisis. This is of course the most general regional 
account; the story as it appears on the surface. An insight into the aid stories of the 
individual countries will definitely reveal in-country specific dynamics. However, in 
all of its simplicity,   the big picture presented by Chart 8 gives the factors and 
motivations for most of the aid to the Balkans.  
 
A note of digression is due on the case of Serbia. There is the following question: as 
the big surge of aid reward for democratization, or reward for final elimination of 
what the West has come to perceive a relevant political enemy in this part of the 
world? There is a substantial difference. In the first case, the supply of aid would be 
motivated by the ideological drive of faith in democracy. In the second case, it would 
be a more pragmatic tool of foreign policy which aims to deal with political 
opponents.  
 
 At this point a closer look is due into the time-dynamic of ODA to individual 
countries in the Balkans, in order to be able to observe their specific realities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
224 Unfortunately this particular allocation from the EC to the category of ex Yu unspecified 
in 2002 is a subject of strong discrepancy between the two DAC databases, the online 
statistical database and the Creditor Reporting System (CRS). The CRS will be explained and 
used extensively in the next chapters. Even though the CRS is not a full account of aid 
allocations, as it will be explained further in the text, it is very relevant for the inquiry as it 
contains micro data on ODA which is useful in determining the final ends of the aid 
allocations (see Chapter 7). The DAC online database and the CRS do not normally coincide 
and this is the reality in aid research which has to be accepted. However in this particular 
case, the discrepancy between what is reported by the DAC online statistical database 
(Annex,   Table 16) and what is reported by the CRS is huge. Whereas the DAC online 
statistical database has reported an allocation of USD 751,78 million to ex Yu unspecified in 
2002, the CRS has reported an amount of only USD 203,1 million (constant 2006 prices). A 
difference of around USD 550 million is unfortunately unaccounted for because of the 
reporting imperfections.  
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6.1 Albania  
 
Chart 9 below 225 displays the time-dynamic of all ODA to Albania in the 1990-2005 
period. The chart presents in much greater detail what is already observable from the 
overall time-perspective of ODA to the Balkans. There are two major spikes in the 
flow of ODA supply   to Albania. The first is caused by a bilateral surge in the very 
beginning of the 90s; the second is in 1999 and is caused by the response to the 
Kosovo refugee crisis. The second rise begins already in 1997 and it is probably at 
least in part a response to Albania’s domestic crisis related to the collapse of the 
pyramidal saving schemes which caused a situation of serious political instability in 
the country.  
 
The strong bilateral rise in the early 90s is quite specific in that it is by and large 
caused by the massive increase of ODA by one single bilateral – Italy. Italy’s 
development assistance to Albania jumps from USD 7, 08 million in 1990 to USD 
369, 55 million in 1991.226  Some of the motivations for Italy’s behaviour have 
already been discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 on motives and factors of aid to the 
Balkans.  
 
Nevertheless, for Chart 9 is evident that multilateral ODA soon follows Italy’s 
reaction; it rises from USD 2, 91 million in 1991 to USD 251, 87 in 1992.227 The 
lion’s share of this aid flow came from the EC which contributed USD 246, 06 
million.228 In this sense it can be argued that Italy was the first country (from obvious 
reasons) to react to the humanitarian circumstance in Albania, immediately after its 
opening, and that the EC soon followed suit.  
 
Chart 9:  Time-dynamic of all ODA net to Albania, 1990-2005  
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
                                                 
225 Chart 9 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 29 in the Annex. Chart 9 is a 
copy of Chart 31 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the 
chapter.   
226 Annex, Table 3.   
227 Annex, Table 11.   
228 ibid  
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Another moment worth mentioning is the visible rise in non-DAC bilateral ODA in 
the period 1991-1993. This assistance goes from USD 11, 48 million in 1991 to USD 
56, 53 million in 1993, in order to plummet down already in 1994.229 Part of this 
assistance has been provided by Arab countries. Aid from Arab countries to Albania 
rose from USD 0, 71 million in 1992 to USD 13, 53 in 1993, and it dwindled already 
in 1994.230   This is bilateral ODA provided by countries which are not members of 
the DAC. In addition, Albania was a relevant recipient of ODA from Arab agencies, 
which are included in the total multilateral receipts. Albania is the only country in the 
region where   Arab agencies (AA) rank on the top-5 multilateral donors.231  
 
In conclusion, the dynamic of ODA to Albania overtime was by and large factored by 
crises: humanitarian (and migrant) immediately after the opening; the political turmoil 
of 1997; and the 1999 Kosovo crisis. The first two of these crises were domestic, the 
third, which produced the high point of ODA to Albania in 1999, was a regional 
spillover – it was not a crisis in Albania but hosting of refugees from Kosovo.  
 
 
6.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)  
 
Chart 10 below 232 describes the time-dynamic of ODA to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
ODA marks a strong upward trend starting in 1993 and ending in 1995, which is the 
year of the end of the war and the Dayton peace agreement. From there on it marks a 
small decline, which from 1997 onwards changes into a new gradual rise, logically, 
produced by the reconstruction effort. The peak year of ODA to Bosnia is 1999.  
 
It is observable that the trend is dictated by the bilateral DAC ODA whereas 
multilateral aid pursues its own, more linear trend. ODA to BiH goes up and down as 
bilateral supply directs it. The peak in 1999, four years after the end of the war in the 
country, was most probably produced by the historic occasion of the creation of the 
Stability Pact, which impelled donor countries to make additional aid pledges. From 
that point on, ODA to BiH has a rather linear descending trend, with a smaller rise 
from multilateral aid in 2004.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
229 Annex, Table 29. 
230 This claim is made based on review of data from the DAC online statistical database.  
231 Annex, Table 36.   
232 Chart 10 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 30 in the Annex. Chart 10 is a 
copy of Chart 33 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the 
chapter.   
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Chart 10: Time-dynamic of ODA to BiH, 1990-2005  
 (vertical axis: USD millions) 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
 
The trend of non-DAC ODA is completely independent from the rest.  Part of it is aid 
from Arab countries. Bosnia was the strongest recipient of ODA from Arab countries 
in the region with a total of USD 231, 85 in the period of 1990-2005.233 
 
In addition, it should be noted that the rise of ODA to BiH corresponds with the 
decline of ODA to ex-Yu unspecified. The logic should be sought in the process of 
dissolution of former Yugoslavia. By the time the new successor states had been 
recognized, ODA to the region was registered as aid to ex-Yu unspecified. This is 
nevertheless only part of the story. This issue will be encountered also further in the 
text. The review of the micro data on aid allocations in Chapter 7 will show that there 
are considerable differences in reporting “habits” among donors, and not always it is 
possible to say why a certain donors registers the allocation to the category of “ex 
Yu” even though the description contained in the micro data indicates that the 
allocation has a country-specific outcome.   
 
 
6.3 Croatia  
 
Chart 11234 displays the flow of the different types of ODA to Croatia in the 1990-
2005 period.   The total ODA Croatia received in the transition period was 
substantially smaller compared to the rest of the countries in the region, and the 
dramatic trajectories of the trend-lines are at least in part a result of this state of facts. 
Some of the spikes are a reflection of increase in ODA by a single donor. For 
example. the strong upward rise in 1993, similar to Bosnia, corresponds to the decline 
of ODA to ex-Yu unspecified, and it is probably a result of the international 
recognition of the two countries which took place in 1992. Whereas the first big 
surge, in 1994 is a result of the combined effort of both bilateral and multilateral 
                                                 
233  This claim is made based on review of data from the DAC online statistical database. 
234 Chart 11 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 31 in the Annex. Chart 11 is a 
copy of Chart 35 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the 
chapter.   
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ODA, the bilateral spike in 1996 is caused by a single donor, Germany, and its aid 
injection of USD 95,46 million in that particular year.235 There is no relevant change 
in the behaviour of any other donor.  
  
Chart 11: Time-dynamic of ODA to Croatia, 1990-2005  
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
After the surge in 1994, multilateral ODA stays low with only a very mild ascendance 
over the years. The next bilateral rise, after 1994 and 1996, is in the period of 1999-
2001. This is again a result of the increase in allocation of just two donors, in this 
case Norway and the US. This is visible from Table 12 below.  
 
 
Table 12:  US and Norway ODA to Croatia, 1998-2001, constant prices (2006 USD 
millions), disbursements 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 
     
US 2,08 12,65 13,89 32,49 
Norway 24,93 6,82 8,72 31,53 
 (source: DAC online statistical database)   
 
Nevertheless, their individual dynamics differ. Norwegian ODA decreases towards 
1999, to rise again in 2001. US assistance marks a significant rise from 1998 into 
1999. A relevant assumption as to the factor influencing these trends is the democratic 
breakthrough in Croatia in early 2000, after the death of President Franjo Tudjman in 
December of 1999.  In its last years the Tudjman regime came to be increasingly 
perceived by the West as non-democratic. It is fair to assume that, given the very 
strong US engagement in democracy promotion, the rise of US assistance was related 
to the prospect of a democratic opening in Croatia. The flow of US aid over the years 
supports such an assumption; US ODA receives new, consistently higher levels 
compared to the pre-2000 period.236  Nevertheless, the same assumption could 
probably not be used concerning Norway. For one, Norway’s reaction was not 
consistent in the similar case of Serbia; there its assistance actually decreased after the 
democratic breakthrough. Thus, the reason for Norway’s injection of aid in that 
                                                 
235 Annex, Table 5.   
236 Annex, Table 5.   
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particular year needs further exploration, but that is beyond the scope of the present 
discussion. The final ends of (some of the allocations comprising) the Norwegian 
assistance to Croatia will be studied in Chapter 7.    
 
Finally and curiously enough, the rise of non-DAC bilateral  ODA to Croatia in 2001 
and 2002 is again the result of actions by a single donor, in this case the distant Korea, 
which in 2001 gave Croatia  USD 19,45 million, and in 2002 USD 26,06 million.237 
These allocations are loans, but which nevertheless meet the criteria to count as ODA. 
Given the small totals of other ODA to Croatia, these allocations by Korea obviously 
do make a difference on the chart of aid flows.  
 
It could be argued that this is a trade deal of some sort which nevertheless was 
registered as ODA. This could be argued from the fact that apart from these loans 
(and an USD 8, 61 million loan to Albania in 2004) Korea does not have a relevant 
donor presence in the Western Balkans. However, the registration of Korean 
assistance to Croatia is not an isolated example of registering such financial 
arrangements as foreign aid. It is the first one to be observed because of the fact that it 
strikes out given its relative size to other ODA flows Croatia has received.  The 
analysis of the micro data in Chapter 7 will identify other similar cases. This type of 
financial arrangement is nevertheless ODA, because it meets the criteria to be 
registered as ODA. Nevertheless it is also obvious that it strikes out from the 
mainstream of foreign assistance flows to the Balkans.    
 
 
 
6.4 Macedonia  
 
The time-dynamic of ODA to Macedonia is presented in Chart 12 below.238 Similarly 
to the takeoff of ODA in Bosnia and Croatia, ODA to Macedonia only picks up in 
1994; before that period of time whatever assistance the country had received; it was 
as part of ex-Yu unspecified. The original rise of ODA in 1994 is a result of 
multilateral action and in particular of aid infusions by two donors, the EC (USD 48, 
12 million) and the IDA of the World Bank (USD 48, 85 million).239 After the initial 
spike, multilateral (due to regular IDA allocations) and bilateral flows have a rather 
consistent trajectory until the year of 1999 when there is a strong peak in total ODA 
primarily caused by a bilateral surge, but also relevant rise in multilateral ODA. The 
factor for this rise is external to Macedonia; it is the Kosovo refugee crisis.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
237 This claim is made based on review of data from the DAC online statistical database.  
238 Chart 12 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 32 in the Annex. Chart 12 is a 
copy of Chart 37 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the 
chapter. 
239 Annex, Table 14.   
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Chart 12: Time-dynamic of ODA to Macedonia, 1990 – 2005  
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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  (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
Macedonia hosted between 200.000-300.000 refugees for a period of a couple of 
months in 1999, and this was the major factor for the huge increase in ODA funding.  
 
After the rise in 1999, the bilateral trajectory descends a little, only to rise further in 
2001 as a response, this time, to Macedonia’s confined war and humanitarian 
emergency in that year. Multilateral ODA does not follow this trend and marks a 
consistent decline from 2000 onward. This is a result of the decreasing aid supplies 
from two major donors, the EC and IDA.240 Macedonia’s peak year is 2002, from 
which point ODA starts to decrease.  
 
An interesting observation is that the 1999 Kosovo crisis established a stronger 
presence of some bilaterals also in Macedonia. Whereas some big donors had a strong 
aid response only to the 1999 emergency and withdrew immediately afterwards, 
others maintained their more relevant presence in the country. One such example is 
the US, which before 1999 had a very small, almost negligible presence in 
Macedonia. Starting with 1999 Macedonia becomes a strong recipient of continuous 
US assistance.241 
 
 
6.5 FRY/Serbia  
 
The time-dynamic of ODA to FRY/Serbia in the 1990-2005 period is presented on 
Chart 13 below.242 Flows to the country are rather dormant all the way to 1999. Serbia 
was in between sanctions for most throughout the 90s in which period it could not 
receive anything but basic humanitarian assistance. This is the major factor for the 
absence of more relevant assistance flows until 1999.  The first big rise of ODA 
                                                 
240 Annex, Table 14.  
241 Annex, Table 6.  
242 Chart 13 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 33 in the Annex. Chart 12 is a 
copy of Chart 39 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the 
chapter. 
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happens in 1999, and from the chart it is visible that is exclusively a result of bilateral 
flows. Without a doubt this is the response to the Kosovo humanitarian emergency.  
 
Multilateral ODA rises only in 2000 and 2001 during which year bilateral receipts 
remain on the level from 1999. Multilateral ODA dramatically collapses in 2002 
whereas bilateral flows skyrocket to produce the peak of ODA receipts in the Balkans 
in the entire period of transition (see Chart 13 below).   
 
Chart 13: Time-dynamic of ODA to FRY/Serbia, 1990-2005 (vertical axis: USD 
millions) 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
As Chart 13 indicates, the time-period 1998-2003 is the time of dramatic explosion in 
aid supply to FRY/Serbia. This invites closer inspection of the composition of that 
strong rise. Table 13 below gives in greater detail the trends in bilateral and 
multilateral ODA to FRY/Serbia in the period 1998-2003.  
 
Table 13:  DAC bilateral and multilateral ODA to FRY/Serbia 1998-2003, constant 
prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
       
DAC bil. 124,55 950,3 871,3 894,01 2539,3 987,08 
mult. 16,4 3,78 818,36 1030,3 4,52 519,31 
 (source: DAC online statistical database) 
 
At a closer look, the big oscillations of multilateral aid are produced by two donors 
only, the EC and UNHCR (Table 14), whereby the bulk of the difference is produced 
by the trend dictated by the EC.  
 
Table 14: EC and UNHCR assistance to FRY/Serbia, 1998-2002, constant prices 
(2006 USD millions), disbursements 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
      
EC 16,4 0 729,14 956,13 0 
UNHCR 0 0 87,03 65,85 0 
(source: DAC online statistical database) 
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A closer look is also necessary to get a better idea of the sources of the bilateral rise 
both in 1999 and 2002. The exponential rise of ODA to FRY/Serbia in the 1999-2002 
period is obviously a result of two distinct and unrelated factors; the first is the 
Kosovo crisis, and the second is the democratic changes in Serbia proper which 
started in October of 2000. 
 
The following, Table 15 presents the response of some of the major bilaterals and 
demonstrates which donors responded more strongly to events in 1999 and which to 
events in 2000/2001. 
 
Table 15: Selected DAC bilaterals to FRY/Serbia, 1998-2002, constant prices (2006 
USD millions), disbursements 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
       
UK 0,28 1,52 40,21 24,88 625,61 
US 7,68 43,91 125,54 239,31 554,23 
Germany 40,95 148,2 142,94 115,33 733,54 
Switzer. 8,73 95,00 41,18 47,9 30,99 
Norway 19,49 171,24 124,18 62,48 34,85 
Nether. 8,96 90,47 113,71 80,45 88,3 
Italy 2,09 51,99 31,22 51,29 5,47 
 (source: DAC online statistical database)   
 
 
It should be mentioned that a full account of aid to Serbia as opposed to aid to Kosovo 
and Montenegro cannot be produced solely from the DAC dataset. In order to get a 
clearer picture, this data has to be cross-referenced with data from other sources 
which operate a breakdown of allocations by Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. On 
the other hand, the sources of the bilateral big-bang in 2002 are evident; UK ODA 
jumps from very low levels to USD 625, 61 million in 2002; German aid jumps from 
USD 115, 33 in 2001 to USD 733, 54 in 2002. There is a substantial rise also in ODA 
from the US. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that Germany and the UK are the 
major culprits of the biggest rise in ODA to the Balkans in the 1990-2005 period. The 
question is naturally – why? The answer will be provided later in this chapter.  
 
 
 
6.6 Disaggregation of FRY  
 
Disaggregation of the aid flows to FRY represents a special methodological problem. 
The DAC only registers data by countries, which given the perplexity of the political 
situation in the Balkans over the last period and the (still) unresolved status issues, 
cannot provide the definite answer on the final destinations of aid supply. FRY was 
one country but had three distinct entities which had completely different relationship 
with the donor community. Serbia proper was under complete sanctions until October   
2000, and in this period it could only receive humanitarian aid; Kosovo was the 
playing field of the biggest humanitarian emergency in Europe after WW II; over the 
years Montenegro had broken off with the Milosevic regime and had became an ally 
to the West. Because of these factors it is logical to expect relevant differences in the 
status of Ser/Kos/Mon as aid recipients.  
 
 174
Full disaggregation of the aid flows to FRY is probably not possible. Many donors 
have registered their flows, for example in response to the Kosovo crisis, as aid given 
to the Balkans as a region, that is to say “ex Yu unspecified”. Whereas some donors 
do keep some sort of account of which allocations were made where (even if perhaps 
they were not reported to the DAC), other simply registered the flows as aid to the 
region. Because of this, comprehensive disaggregation of flows to FRY (even under 
the assumption that it would be theoretically possible) of each and every bilateral and 
multilateral would be beyond the scope of this inquiry. Instead, a partial review of 
some of the major donors, for whom (partial) data could be collected and compared 
from different sources, could be presented. The presentation will concentrate on two 
major donors, the EC and the US, given that they are some of the biggest donors to 
the region. The EC is the biggest donor overall, whereas the US is the second biggest 
bilateral. In addition to their relevance, it has to be underscored that the choice was 
supported by the availability of data.  
 
 
6.6.1 United States Aid Flows to FRY 
 
In addition to what is reported as US assistance to FRY in the DAC database, USAID 
maintains a separate database of US economic assistance, called the US Overseas 
Loans and Grants (Greenbook)243. This database does actually include a 
disaggregation of flows between Serbia & Montenegro on one side, and Kosovo on 
the other. This is presented on Table 16 below.  
 
Table 16:  US assistance to Serbia & Montenegro vs. Kosovo 1997 – 2005 constant 
prices (2006 USD millions) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Ser& Mon 2,00 12,90 
167,1
0 
372,0
0 
427,7
0 
291,4
0 
276,0
0 
266,9
0 
233,0
0 
of which          
Kosovo 0,10 0,10 16,10 
191,1
0 
186,9
0 78,10 
100,1
0 
116,5
0 
127,4
0 
Kosovo (%) 5,00 0,78 9,63 51,37 43,70 26,80 36,27 43,65 54,68 
 (source: USAID Greenbook)  
 
 
The data extracted from the Greenbook, as can be expected, does not correspond with 
the data reported under the US with the DAC. This is regularly the case when data   
from different   sources are compared. As this inconsistency is the rule rather than the 
exception in data comparisons, the intention should be to use it as analytical tool 
rather than lament over it as hindrance. For purposes of comparison, Table 17 below, 
an excerpt from the DAC records reminds of US aid disbursements to FRY/Ser and 
ex-Yu unspecified in the pertinent period.  
 
Table 17:  US assistance to FRY/Ser and ex-Yu unspecified 1997-2003, constant 
prices (2006 USD millions), disbursements 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
FRY/Ser 0 7,68 43,91 125,54 239,31 554,23 229,74 
ex Yu unspec.  0 0 59,51 0 0 0 0 
(source: DAC online statistical database)   
                                                 
243 Available at http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/. 
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What the two tables together confirm despite the utter discord of the data could be 
summarized as follows: a) US aid to the FRY clearly skyrocketed in 1999, from a 
very low level in the previous 1998, b) Kosovo represented a huge portion of the total 
aid to FRY in the 1999-2001 period. This is visible from Table 16 according to which 
Kosovo stood for 51, 37 % of total US aid to FRY in 2000, and 43, 70% in 2001. 
Actually, after a decline in 2002 ad 2003, as portion of the total, its share rises again 
in the 2004-2005 period.  
 
Unfortunately, the Greenbook   does not provide a breakdown of aid allocations 
between Serbia and Montenegro either. Another official source, a report to the US 
Congress from 2001 produced by the Congress Research Service (CRS, 2001) gives 
additional insights into this dimension (Table 18). The insight is partial because the 
table only operates with USAID data, and does not take into account aid amounts 
coming from other US government agencies – for example, most of the emergency 
aid for the refugees came through BPRM (Bureau for Population, Migration, and 
Refugees) of the State Department.  
 
This data is also in dissonance with other previously provided data, but nevertheless, 
the table is very useful for the inquiry: it demonstrates that the bigger, in some years 
the much bigger share of USAID assistance to FRY in the period before the fall of 
Milosevic, actually went to Montenegro. Given the huge difference in population size 
between the then two republics of FRY, the only conclusion to make is that - 
Montenegro benefited from very generous US assistance in this period of time.  
 
The already mentioned fact that data from different sources seldom correspond 
however, naturally raises the doubt of how relevant that data actually is? 
Unfortunately, these are constraints which cannot be avoided in discussing aid to 
FRY. 
 
In favour of Table 18 below, it can be said that it contains data which was part of an 
official report for US Congress, thus its credibility can in no case be doubted.  
Nevertheless, the data is only partial.    
 
Table 18:  USAID assistance to Serbia and Montenegro, 1998-2001 (USD millions)  
  1998 1999 2000 2001 
     
Ser 7,3 6,5 25 99,8 
Mon 4,9 41 35,1 72,3 
  12,2 47,5 60,1 172,1 
 (source: CRS, 2001: 3; note: figures for 2001 are estimates)   
  
A relevant point of  conclusion which can be made based on the  disaggregation of the 
aid flows to FRY with the help of additional data sources is that very little ODA went 
to Serbia before October 2000 and the removal from power of the Milosevic regime. 
Given the specific challenge presented, this is a significant induction. It should be 
mentioned that the review of the micro data in Chapter 7 can generally be of 
additional help in this problem – although it cannot provide definite precision either – 
however that would always depend on the particular donor and the level of detail it 
has reported to the DAC. In the particular case of the US unfortunately, also the micro 
data are not of much help for obtaining more information on the final destination of 
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the allocations (in terms of Serbia, Montenegro, or Kosovo) because the US is one of 
the donors who regularly not providing much additional detail on its ODA 
commitments.  
 
 
6.6.2 European Commission Aid Flows to FRY  
 
The EC was the prime donor to the region of the Balkans in the 1990-2005 period, 
and subsequently to FRY. Disaggregation of the EC aid flows to FRY is hence of 
particular importance to the inquiry. The point of departure for the closer exploration 
into ODA flows to FRY is naturally the data registered by the DAC. Table 19 below 
presents the data on EC ODA supply to FRY/Serbia and the category of ex Yu 
unspecified in the period 1998-2002.  
  
Table 19.  EC aid to FRY/Ser and ex Yu unspecified 1998-2002, constant prices 
(2006 USD millions), disbursements 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
      
FRY/Ser 16,4 0 729,14 956,13 0 
ex Yu unspec.     68,55 370,07 124,27 71,86 751,78 
(source: DAC online statistical database) 
 
Even if the DAC only registers data at country level, the amount of USD 370, 07 to 
“ex Yu unspecified” as opposed to zero assistance to FRY/Ser in 1999, is already 
indicative. Nevertheless, this is not to understand that Serbia did not receive 
absolutely any aid in 1999. The humanitarian emergency also involved Serb 
population from Kosovo which fled to Serbia. Under UNHCR rules they were not 
considered refugees in the legal sense of the definition of a “refugee”, since they 
moved in another part of what was legally the same country, and instead had the 
status of IDPs (internally displaced people).  
 
An EC publication on assistance to Kosovo provides additional insight into what was 
Kosovo’s share of what the DAC registers as aid to FRY/Ser. Table 20 below gives 
the amounts of EC aid to Kosovo alone in the period 1998-2000.244  
 
Table 20: Total EC aid to Kosovo 1998-2000, (Euro millions) 
  1998 1999 2000 total 
  7,50 505,27 360,00 872,77 
 (source: European Union Assistance, 2000: 4)  
 
notes: the amount of Euro 505, 27 million in 1999 is composed of: a) Euro 127 million of 
reconstruction assistance (Kosovo only), b) Euro 378, 27 million humanitarian aid (to the 
whole region).  
 
                                                 
244 The table is presented in its original format in the sense that the amounts are in Euro. No 
effort is made to convert the amounts in USD, which is the currency used for all data taken 
from the DAC throughout this text. The purpose of the data from the additional sources is to 
allow comparisons, and these general comparisons are possible even across currencies. In 
addition, conversion would not be of much help also because it is not known whether the data 
taken from EC sources are in current or constant Euros.  
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As the notes to the table already explain, the amount for 1999 is composed of 
reconstruction aid for Kosovo proper, and the amount of Euro 378, 27 as a regional 
response to the Kosovo crisis. This means that this amount benefited all the countries 
in the region that were affected by the humanitarian crisis.  
 
The next Table 21, provided by the same source, gives an additional breakdown of the 
amount of Euro 378, 27 allocated regionally, by recipient countries.  
 
Table 21.  EC 1999 humanitarian aid in response to the Kosovo crisis, breakdown by 
countries/entities (Euro millions) 
                             
 
     
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
(source: European Union Assistance, 2000: 4)  
 
As can be observed from Table 21, most of this amount also went to Kosovo, 
followed by Albania and Serbia.  
 
In addition, Table 22 presented below, benefit of the same source, provides further 
insight into the composition of the ODA to Kosovo in the period 1998-2000.  
 
Table 22. Total EC assistance to Kosovo 1998-2000, breakdown by categories, (Euro 
millions),  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (source: European Union Assistance, 2000: 4) 
        
        notes:    
 
1. efa = exceptional financial assistance,  
2. amount of Euro 127 million in 1999 is from OBNOVA245,  
3. amount of Euro 378, 27 million is regional “response to Kosovo crisis”. 
 
                                                 
245 (source:  The European Commission's Reconstruction Programme in Kosovo (OBNOVA), 
available at http://www.seerecon.org/kosovo/ec/obnova_1999.htm ).  
    
  
Kos 111,70 
Ser 70,30 
Mon 17,57 
Mac 39,81 
Alb 97,07 
BiH 2,50 
regional 39,32 
total 378,27 
  1998 1999 2000 total 
     
reconstruction  assistance 7,50 127,00 275,00 409,50 
humanitarian aid  378,27 50,00 428,27 
EFA   35,00 35,00 
total 7,50 505,27 360,00 872,77 
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The study of data is further complicated by the fact that EC reconstruction aid and 
humanitarian assistance are regularly provided from different budgets and distributed 
by different agencies. EC humanitarian aid is executed by the European Commission 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) whereas reconstruction aid is part of the EC 
development assistance programs, such as PHARE, OBNOVA, and subsequently 
CARDS and IPA. The research for this chapter could not identify a single, integral 
source which would provide a full breakdown of humanitarian and reconstruction aid 
to the entities within FRY over the entire time-period under study (1990-2005).246 
Thus, the option was to use data collected from several various sources. This produces 
inconsistencies but also provides alternatives to data which would be collected from a 
single source, which in lack of choices, would have to be accepted as the only valid 
one.   
 
Table 23 presented below, has been compiled from ECHO’s annual reviews and 
reports from the period 1999-2003, and it displays the EC allocations of humanitarian 
assistance to the Balkans, as reported per different years.  
 
Table 23. ECHO allocations 1999-2003, (Euro millions)247 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 total 
       
ex Yu 351,5     351,5 
WB/Balkans  98,7 83,5  7,66 189,86 
Serbia    37,5  37,5 
Mac/Kos    5,5  5,5 
  351,5 98,7 83,5 43 7,66 584,36 
 
note:  the term Western Balkans or Balkans as used in the ECHO reports and annual reviews 
comprises a different set of countries in different years, i.e. countries which at that point were 
still affected by the refugee crisis.  
 
Finally, Table 24 below is extracted from the CARDS mid-term evaluation and 
presents CARDS aid flows to FRY in the period 2001-2003.  
 
Table 24.  EC CARDS to FRY 2001-2003 (Euro millions)  
  2001 2002 2003 total 
     
Kos 139,87 121,64 17,4 278,91 
Mon 17,13 12,55 8,37 38,05 
Ser 197,24 160,38 142,79 500,41 
 total 354,24 294,57 168,56 817,37 
(source  DRNC, 2004)  
 
The data disaggregated in this way is unfortunately still incomplete. There is no 
comprehensive disaggregation by Ser/Kos/Mon for the whole range of years under 
inspection. Yet, what is available is still more than having to rely on the DAC register 
alone. The DAC database is the prime source for study of ODA globally, and it is the 
central register all countries and multilaterals report to. However, due to the specific 
                                                 
246 This is not to say that such an integral source does not exist; only that the extensive 
research of different EC sources did not produce it. 
247 (source:  ECHO, 1999; ECHO, 2000; ECHO, 2001; ECHO, 2002; ECHO, 2003; CEC, 
2003) data extracted from ECHO annual reviews and reports.  
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circumstances of the FRY case, data from the DAC alone gives a far incomplete 
picture. The peak years of 2000 and 2001, according to DAC data are still 
insufficiently explained with the data collected from additional sources. The DAC 
registers an amount of USD 729, 14 to FRY in the year of 2000. When compared with 
data from EC sources, the conclusion is that at least half of this amount went to 
Kosovo; Table 22 shows that in 2000 Kosovo received a total of Euro 360 million, the 
big share of which was for reconstruction. The next year of 2001, according to the 
DAC is the peak with USD 956, 13. This can be compared against Table 24 above 
which provides the CARDS allocations in 2001 for Ser/Kos/Mon. There is a huge 
difference from the DAC reported data which is unaccounted for.  One possible 
explanation for at least some of the difference – data discord can be charged for the 
rest 248– is the additional aid to Serbia, due to the political changes – which did not 
come from the CARDS, primarily in the form of micro-financial assistance.  
 
Despite the data challenge, the following conclusions are possible: a) in 1999 the 
largest share of the aid went to Kosovo; Serbia received some but proportionately 
little of the total ODA for FRY, and with respect to its population size, b) in 2000 the 
balance changed; from the data available it is obvious that at least a half went to 
Kosovo; humanitarian assistance is on the decline, and reconstruction aid rises; c) by 
2001 Serbia becomes a strong recipient of EC assistance.   
 
 
 
6.7 Ex-Yu Unspecified  
 
According to DAC guidelines, “Unallocated/Unspecified [is the] aid which cannot be 
assigned to another part of the table, and in the case of project or sector assistance, 
commitments for which the sectoral destination had not been specified. Includes aid 
to non-governmental organizations and administrative costs (OECD, 2006: 11).” 
 
A similar explanation can be found in the DAC statistical reporting directives, 
according to which, code 998 (unallocated/unspecified) should be used “only for 
forms of aid which cannot be assigned to another part of the table, and also, in the 
case of project or sector assistance, to record contributions for which sectoral 
destination remains to be specified by or in agreement with the donor (DAC, 2007: 
47).”  
 
A quarter of all ODA to the Western Balkans in the 1990-2005 period has gone to 
“Sts. of ex-Yu unspecified.” The bulk of it was in the period 1992-1994, as can be 
observed from Chart 14249 below.  
                                                 
248 It can be expected that at least some of the data discrepancies are due to the timing of their 
reporting. Due to delays in reporting to the DAC, what the European Commission registers as 
allocated in  for example 2000, the DAC will perhaps only register a year later. In addition, 
the DAC keeps records of both commitments and disbursements of ODA (the DAC data used 
in this writing refer to disbursements unless specifically specified otherwise). Other data 
record extracted from sources other than the DAC will sometimes make the difference 
between commitments and disbursements, but most often they will not.  
249 Chart 14 is produced on the basis of data contained in, Table 34 in the Annex. Chart 14 is a 
copy of Chart 41 in the Annex. Due to its pertinence it has also been copied in the body of the 
chapter.   
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 Chart 14:  ODA to ex-Yu unspecified, 1990-2005  
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
ODA to ex-Yu unspecified reached its peak in 1993 as a result of equal contribution 
of bilateral and multilateral flows. From then on it has declined and stayed small, 
with two subsequent rises; a smaller one in 1999, caused by a multilateral increase; 
and a bigger one in 2002, again a result of a multilateral surge, with a smaller 
bilateral contribution.  
 
The 1993 spike of ODA to states of ex-Yu unspecified is, assumedly, a result of the 
process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia, and the wars and humanitarian 
emergencies in Croatia and Bosnia. A lot of the humanitarian effort was regional and 
subsequently reported without a specific geographic allocation. This has an additional 
dimension: huge shares of humanitarian assistance are channelled through NGOs, and 
this type of aid, according to the DAC guidelines, comprises the category of 
geographically “unspecified” assistance.  
 
 The 1999 and 2002 rises were by and large result of supply of EC aid, which again 
was implemented as a regional effort. This rise is mostly accounted for by the amount 
of USD 751, 78 millions from the EC. Unfortunately, because data on this aid allocation in 
made by the EC in 2002, is not available in the CRS system, as already explained, the 
final destination of this ODA, both geographically and thematically cannot be 
discussed in more detail.  
 
 
   
7. Who Gave Aid to the Balkans?  
 
Following the discussion on how much aid the Balkans received in the 1990-2005 
period, who were the major recipients of ODA in the region, and what was the time-
dynamic of aid supply over the years, it is time to turn the attention to who were the 
major donors to the Balkans in this period of time.   
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Of the total USD 42, 8 billion the Balkans received in the 16-year period under 
scrutiny, USD 26 billion (61%) was DAC bilateral money, and USD 15, 9 billion 
(37%) was multilateral ODA. Very small portion of USD 840, 39 million accounted 
for on non-DAC bilateral ODA.  
 
It is important to disaggregate these amounts further in order to get a clear picture of 
who gave aid, to whom, and when. This will help to further clarify the process of 
foreign aid to the Balkans in the period of transition,  to identify the specificities of 
the donor-recipient relationships, and to draw conclusions about the motives and 
factors of aid, it s priorities, and possible impact.  
 
The Annex (Table 35 - Table 40) provides listings of the top 10 donors to the region 
(bilateral, multilateral, and combined) and listings of top 5 donors (bilateral, 
multilateral, and combined) to individual countries.  The exploration of the major 
donors to the region, and subsequently per individual countries starts from these 
rankings.  
 
As evident from Table 35, the top donor to the region in the transition period has been 
the European Commission with a total of around USD 10 billion, or roughly ¼ of all 
the ODA the Balkans received. The largest bilateral donors to the region have been 
Germany and the United States, with USD 4, 6 and USD 4, 3 billion respectively.  
 
The contributions from the top 10 biggest bilateral and multilateral donors 
combined250 total USD 33,3 billion, or 77,8 % of all the ODA to the region, out of the 
22 DAC bilaterals, and the 14 multilateral donors (or groups of donors) active in the 
Balkans in the observed period.  
 
At even a closer focus, the contributions from the top 3 donors to the region, the EC, 
Germany and the US, total USD 19 billion, or 44,4% of all the aid receipts of the 
region in the period of transition.  
 
This calculation has the purpose to underscore the important point that:  foreign aid is 
agglomerated and that most of the   aid giving (in nominal terms) originates from 
several largest donors. This issue has been noted in the theoretical discussion with 
regards to foreign aid globally.251 Clearly, the same is the case with the Balkans.  
 
Table  35 shows that with exception to the US, all the other donors listed on the top 
10 list of largest bilaterals to the Balkans are European countries, and seven of them, 
with the exception of Norway and Switzerland, are EU member states.252 The 
conclusion is that the largest share of aid to the Balkans has come from within 
Europe.  
 
The European Commission dominates the multilateral donor group by contributing 
63, 3% of all the multilateral supply.  
 
                                                 
250 Annex, Table 35.   
251 AUTHORS 
252 If the list would be further extended, the next countries are also EU members, Spain and 
Greece, and only after them comes Japan and Canada (Annex p. 1). 
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Given that the EC was the single largest donor to the region, it is relevant to look into 
the in-region distribution of its ODA. Chart 15 below presents the country shares of 
EC ODA to the Balkans.  
 
Chart 15. Country shares of EC ODA to Western Balkans, 1990-2005   
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  (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
 
Predictably, FRY/Serbia and BiH have received the largest shares, but it is noticeable 
that a big part of the EC ODA, 27% has been allocated to ex-Yu unspecified. If this 
item would be removed, Serbia’s and Bosnia’s share would further rise. The 
conclusion is: the largest share of EC assistance to the Balkans is accounted for by 
FRY/Serbia and BiH.   
 
Nevertheless, this is a static observation. It is also important to understand the time-
dimension of EC ODA to the region.  Chart 16 shows the time-dynamic EC foreign 
assistance to the region, and Chart 17 follows the time-dynamic by individual 
countries.  
 
Chart 16: Time-dynamic of EC ODA to Western Balkans, 1990-2005 
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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  (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
The look at the charts of the time-dynamics confirms some of the previously made 
observations concerning the trends of ODA in the Balkans. EC aid jumps in 1993, 
declines and stays stable for a few years and then it reaches its peak in the 1999-2001 
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period. After 2002 it visibly declines, getting close to the level from around 1995-
1996. The political events which acted as factors behind these trends have already 
been discussed earlier in this chapter: the wars in Croatia and Bosnia; the war in 
Kosovo; Milosevic’s fall from power which marked Serbia’s democratic 
breakthrough; and subsequently, Milosevic’s extradition to International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at The Hague.     
 
Chart 17: Time-dynamic of EC ODA to countries in Western Balkans, 1990-2005 
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Alb
BiH
Cro
Mac
FRY/Ser
ex Yu unspec.
 
 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
Chart 17 presents interesting information concerning the in-country time-dynamic of 
EC ODA to the Balkans.  The spikes in the ex-Yu unspecified trajectory are quite 
interesting, as they repeat successively in 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2002. Their origins 
can however be assumed to be different; 1993 – humanitarian aid combined with legal 
succession issues; 1999 – regional response to a humanitarian crisis (huge 
humanitarian aid channeled through NGOs, which is usually registered as 
geographically unspecified); 2002 – non-humanitarian (development) aid by the 
European Commission (in part attributable to the CARDS regional cooperation 
component). It is important to underscore that this is an informed assumption only, 
based on the data and other information available.  
 
The tables with the detailed numbers and the charts on the other major (top 10) 
bilateral donors to the Balkans are presented in the Annex (Table 17- Table 26). There 
are many consistencies in donor behavior, but there are also differences to be 
observed. Some of these will be noted in no particular order:  
 
The bigger part of the top 10 donors have a considerable portion of the ODA allocated 
to ex-Yu unspecified. However, the US is not part of this pattern; only a very small 
fraction, 2%, of its ODA to the Balkans goes to ex-Yu unspecified. The answer (or at 
least a part of it) could lie in the time-dynamic. The US becomes a relevant donor to 
the Balkans relatively later than most of the European donors, in any case, effectively 
after 1993, when the bulk of the bilateral ex-Yu unspecified has been allocated to the 
region. This fact further confirms the assumption that it is the process of dissolution 
of Yugoslavia, in connection with the international recognition of the new states, and 
in combination with the regional character of the war in Croatia and Bosnia, to 
produce relevant share of aid allocated to ex-Yu unspecified. Nevertheless, for some 
of the bilaterals, allocations to ex-Yu unspecified rise again around the 1999 period. 
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Some of this can be assumedly accounted for by the renewed rise of humanitarian 
assistance, which is largely distributed through NGOs, caused by the Kosovo crisis.  
 
Another observation is that: most of the major bilaterals fit in the pattern whereby 
FRY/Serbia and Bosnia are the major recipients of their assistance to the Balkans. The 
notable exceptions are Italy, the UK, and France.  
 
Italy is perhaps the most specific case. Entire 50% of its total ODA to the Balkans 
went to Albania. In addition, the chart displaying the time-dynamic253 shows that most 
of this ODA was allocated in the very beginning of the 90s.   
 
The charts of UK ODA to the Balkans254 demonstrate another donor behavior sui 
generis in the Balkans. Entire 45% of UK aid went to only one country, FRY/Serbia, 
and the bulk of this of in one single year, 2002. Another 43% went to ex-Yu 
unspecified. Beyond this, the UK gave very little aid to anyone else in the region.    
 
The third specificity concerns France. Entire 52% of its ODA went to Serbia alone; 
most of it in 1999 (indicating it was for Kosovo), and then in 2002 and 2003. At least, 
in the case of France, Bosnia did receive some aid, 25%, (in the case of Italy – 16%); 
unlike in the case of UK which allocated only 4% of its aid to Bosnia.  
 
An interesting exercise is to compare the allocations and allocation trends of some of 
the major donors to the region. Chart 18 displays the time-dynamic of ODA by the 
three largest donors to the Balkans, the EC, Germany, and the US.  
 
 Chart 18: Time-dynamic of EC, German, and US ODA to the Western Balkans, 
1990-2005 
(vertical axis: USD millions)   
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
                                                 
253 Annex, Table 20.   
254 Annex, Table 22.  
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The chart reveals some similarities but also differences among the three biggest 
donors to the Balkans. Germany and the EC are both engaged in the Balkan crises 
ever since the beginning; this is not the case with the US which gradually increases its 
aid after the Dayton peace agreement in 1995, which it helped broker. The EC 
engagement in the region is mildly stronger than that of Germany and the US until 
1999; at that point it radically outstrips the other two. Germany and the US have an 
almost identical pattern in the 1999-2004 period; it could be argued that the EC 
trajectory is similar in that it radically declines after 2002; but it does not slump and 
rises again between 1999 and 2002.  
 
In continuation of this exercise, Chart 19, displays the behavior of the donors whose 
allocations in the region were found to differ from the standard pattern found in the 
top 10 bilaterals. It presents the time-dynamics of Italy, France, and the UK, all of 
which in a different way were found to have allocated their ODA to the Balkans in a 
specific way.  
 
 Chart 19: Time –dynamic of Italian, French, and UK ODA to   the Western Balkans, 
1990-2005 
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
Chart 19 is particularly interesting to analyze. Italy’s ODA reaches (as already 
observed) its peak in the very early 90s (destination country being Albania); it shows 
a small rise in 1999 (Kosovo refugee crisis), and it declines from that point on, 
displaying no particular interest in subsequent events in Serbia. French ODA is very 
modest during the crises in the first half of the 90s; it peaks in 1999 (allocation of 
USD 155,51 million  to Bosnia, and USD 43,03 million to ex-Yu unspecified)  and 
then again in 2002/2003 (allocations of USD 148, 82 million and USD 244,17 million 
to FRY/Serbia). The UK allocations have already been mentioned above; practically 
all of its aid to the Balkans went only to FRY/Serbia, in the single year of 2002, and 
to ex-Yu unspecified.   
 
Finally, Chart 20 displays the behavior of the so called “like-minded” donors in the 
Balkans. The like-minded donors is a term often used to describe the generous donors 
from Northern Europe, such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and eventually 
the Netherlands. Due to the smaller size of these countries, their ODA   is smaller in 
nominal terms compared to ODA from the major global donors; however, in terms of 
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ODA as percent of GDP, the Nordic countries are the world’s most generous 
providers of foreign aid.  
 
Since Finland and Denmark have had more modest allocations in the region, the chart 
focuses on the other three, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands, who were very 
strong donors in the Balkans.  
 
Although all three donors display   consistency, Sweden’s trajectory is the most stable 
one, with smallest oscillations. None of the donors has a big climax in 2002, as is the 
case with most of the other donors featured above, with a minor exception of the 
Netherlands, which marks a smaller rise. The peaks are obviously in 1993 and 1999. 
This is consistent with most other donors, apart from the lack of enthusiasm in 2002.  
 
 Chart 20. Time-dynamic of Swedish, Norwegian, and Dutch ODA  
 to the Western Balkans, 1990 - 2005(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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  (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
Finally, in this section, it is important to make a closer examination of the allocations 
of the two other (second and third) biggest multilateral donors to the Balkans, 
IDA/World Bank, and UNHCR.  Chart 21 below, presents the country shares of IDA 
assistance to the region, whereas Chart 22 displays its time-dynamic. In addition, 
Table 9 to Table 16 in the Annex; offer a detailed presentation of the major 
multilateral donors to the region of the Balkans in the period 1990-2005.  
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Chart 21: Country shares of IDA ODA to the Balkans 
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  (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
It is evident from Chart 21   that most of the assistance provided by IDA went to 
Bosnia (40%) and Albania (29%). Macedonia and FRY/Serbia received quite smaller 
shares, whereas Croatia was not eligible for IDA funding.255 Logically, no IDA 
assistance was allocated to ex-Yu unspecified.  
One major observation from Chart 22 is that the time-dynamic of IDA assistance is 
ostensibly different from that of the other major donors.   
 
 Chart 22: Time-dynamic of IDA ODA to the countries in the Western Balkans, 1990-
2005 
(vertical axis: USD millions)  
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
                                                 
255 IDA eligibility is assessed based on level of economic development expressed in GDP per 
capita. The DAC records, register only one exception to Croatia’s non-eligibility for IDA 
funding. One small grant allocation is registered by the CRS. This will be revisited in Chapter 
7.  
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Albania is the first country in the region to start receiving IDA funding, followed by 
Macedonia; Bosnia joins only after Dayton and FRY-Serbia only after the 
cancellation of the sanctions. The oscillations in IDA assistance to the countries in the 
Balkans are notably different from the other trends in trajectory discussed previously 
as they can not be easily explained with the major political events in the region. Such 
is for example the sharp rise in IDA assistance to Bosnia in 2004. This rise is 
obviously a result of a new major loan from IDA to Bosnia, but it is not directly 
motivated by an obvious factor in the way ODA from other donors is. In addition, it is 
only logical that IDA assistance is related to political stability and it only kicks in 
after political turbulence has ended.  
 
The other major multilateral donor to the Balkans has been the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN agency in charge of refugees. Chart 
23 presents the country shares of UNHCR aid to the Balkans, whereas Chart 24 the 
time-dynamic of UNHCR allocations.  
 
The charts are quite self-explanatory. Most of UNHCR’s assistance to the Balkans 
(69%) was registered as allocated to ex-Yu unspecified, and most of it was actually 
allocated in the 1992-1993 period, during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. The 
motivation which underlay this assistance does not need particular explanation: this 
was humanitarian relief and help for the hundreds of thousands of refugees produced 
by the Croatian and Bosnian war. In addition, this helps further explain the 
phenomenon of the massive assistance which was allocated to “ex Yu unspecified”.  
 
 Chart 23:  Country shares of UNHCR ODA to the Western Balkans 
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  (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
UNHCR aid re-emerges during the crisis in 1999 but with much smaller intensity 
compared to the Croatian and Bosnian war. The last big crisis in the Balkans was 
primarily addressed by the EC and the other big bilaterals.  
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 Chart 24:  Time-dynamic of UNHCR ODA to countries in the Western Balkans, 
1990-2005  
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
The strong UNHCR presence in the Balkans is a distinct feature of the foreign aid 
phenomenon to the region. The Balkans did receive a lot of aid, but huge share of the 
total was directed at emergency relief, it aimed to help alleviate suffering. This was 
not assistance which supported economic development in the region. This additional 
dimension of the aid disaggregation process should be borne in mind in eventual 
considerations of impact of ODA to the region. Impact can not be assessed on the 
basis of the overall aid the Balkans received. There can not be such a thing as overall 
impact   of USD 42, 8 billion. There can be separately, impact of humanitarian 
assistance – assessed on basis of its goal to help suffering; impact of reconstruction 
aid – assessed against its goal to reconstruct, to restore the physical and social 
infrastructure, and so forth.  
 
 
 
8. Composition of ODA to the Balkans: Grants, Loans and Debt Relief  
 
One final aspect to take into consideration at this point, when disaggregating foreign 
assistance to the Balkans, is the composition of aid with respect to shares of grant aid, 
loans, and debt relief.  
 
Not counting the small share of non-DAC bilateral ODA, the ratio of grants vs. loans 
in the total foreign aid to the Western Balkans (DAC bilateral + multilateral) is in the 
order of 91% grants vs. 9% loans. Chart 25 below presents the shares of grants vs. 
loans, whereas Chart 26 displays the time-dynamic of grant aid vs. aid in loans over 
the 1990-2005 period.  
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 Chart 25: ODA grants vs. loans to the Western Balkans 
91%
9%
grants
loans
 
 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
  
The time-dynamic of the supply of grants and loans clearly shows their completely 
different trend over the years. Whereas grant aid goes up and down and produces the 
spikes in total ODA flows in the period around 1993 and 1999-2002, the supply of 
loans has a completely different trajectory, seemingly completely independent of 
major development in the Balkans which acted as strong factors of grant aid.  
 
 Chart 26: Time-dynamic of ODA grants and loans to the Western Balkans 
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
There are two major conclusions to be drawn from these charts: a)   ODA to the 
Balkans was by and large grant aid, and that subsequently, b) the factors of aid in the 
Balkans influenced primarily grant aid, whereas loans had their own trend which 
shows no reaction to major events in the region in the transition period. Most of the 
ODA loans to the region were extended by IDA; however, there was also a number of 
bilaterals which gave ODA in the form of loans.  
 
In order to   explore this aspect even further, the grants vs. loans ratio will be explored 
separately for DAC bilateral and multilateral aid.  
 
Chart 27 displays the time-dynamic of DAC bilateral grants and loans. The chart is 
very similar to the previous one. Contrary to the dramatic trajectory of the ODA in the 
form of grants, the loans have a completely “horizontal” trajectory.  
 
 191
 Chart 27. Time-dynamic of DAC bilateral ODA grants and loans to the Western 
Balkans 
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
In addition, Chart 28 presents the shares of DAC bilateral grants vs. loans, which 
further clarifies the picture: bilateral ODA is almost exclusively (98%) grants, with 
only 2% accounting for on loans.  
 
 Chart 28. DAC bilateral ODA share of grants vs. loans 
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  (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
Finally, the charts presenting the share of grants and loans of multilateral ODA (Chart 
29), and the time-dynamic of the DAC bilateral grants vs. loans (Chart 30), are 
predictable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 192
 Chart 29. Time-dynamic of multilateral ODA grants and loans to Western Balkans  
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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 (source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
 Chart 30. Share of grants vs. loans in multilateral ODA to Western Balkans.  
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(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
Obviously, loans are quite larger share of multilateral ODA than bilateral one. 
Whereas bilateral ODA to the Balkans was mostly in the form of grants, 19% of 
multilateral ODA was in the form of loans. A deeper look clarifies this picture further. 
Of the total multilateral loans to the Balkans, in the amount of USD 3, 1 billion, the 
lion’s share of USD 2, 5 billion was provided by the IDA. Basically, most of the ODA 
in the form of loans in the Balkans was given by the IDA/World Bank. The biggest 
share of this type of aid went to Bosnia (USD 1 billion), followed Albania (USD 762, 
44 million), then Macedonia (USD 410, 38 million), and finally FRY/Serbia (USD 
368, 72 million). Some of the ODA provided by the EC however also took the form of 
loans. Additional information on this issue will be provided in Chapter 7.  
 
Finally, perhaps the most interesting observation comes from looking into the share of 
net debt relief in total ODA to the Balkans. Debt relief is considered grant aid and it 
is share of the total grant ODA supplied in the region. The DAC statistics reveals that 
debt relief in the Balkans was exclusively a bilateral action. All the debt forgiveness 
in the region was done by bilateral donors; multilateral donors did not do any debt 
forgiveness.  
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Chart 31 below presents the time-dynamic of grant ODA to the Balkans, but as its 
sub-dimension it shows the trend of debt relief as a component in grant aid.   
 
 Chart 31: Time-dynamic of ODA grants and net debt relief to Western Balkans 
(vertical axis: USD millions) 
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(source: based on data from the DAC online statistical database) 
 
Debt relief amounted to USD 3, 1 billion of the total USD 25, 4 billion or 12, 2 
percent of the DAC bilateral grant ODA to the region. Chart 31 above   clearly 
demonstrates that a big share of the big bilateral ODA rise in 2002 was actually 
produced by - forgiveness of debt. It was not supply of fresh assistance; a big part of 
this outpouring of ODA (something over USD 2, 0 billion as visible from   Chart 31) 
was write-off of old debt.  
 
Given that this was the absolute peak of ODA supply to the Balkans, it is necessary to 
make a closer examination of the composition of this debt relief.  
 
Of the total debt relief in the amount of USD 3, 1 billion, the largest share of USD 2, 
5 billion, or 80, 91 percent was provided by the top 5 debt forgivers (Table 25) below. 
Of the total USD 3,1 billion in debt relief, USD 2,0 billion was provided in 2002.  
 
Table 25. Top 5 debt forgivers to Western Balkans  
top 5 debt forgivers  
Germany  720,86 
UK  701,14 
France  549,04 
US  376,85 
Canada  168,82 
total  2516,71 
(source: DAC online statistical database) 
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This observation adds a new dimension to the picture of foreign assistance to the 
Balkans. The big rise of ODA to the Balkans in 2002 was for the most part debt relief. 
The previous discussion indicated this big spike was overall produced by the rise of 
ODA to FRY. A closer look into the beneficiary countries of the top 5 debt forgivers 
above confirms this conclusion: FRY got 78% of Germany’s debt relief; 99% of UK’s 
debt relief; 68% of French debt relief; and 82% of the US debt relief.256 Canada, 
which ranks top 5, has reported 93% of its debt relief, all in the year of 2002, to   ex-
Yu unspecified.  
 
Given this state of facts established by the statistical data available from the DAC, 
additional research was made in the preparation work for this chapter, mostly through 
the method of media review, in order to collect more information on the factual 
situation concerning FRY/Serbia’s financial debt and the process of relief of this debt 
around the year of 2002. This research lent the following information.  
 
  Throughout the 90s Serbia’s debt to the Paris Club had remained un-serviced and at 
the time of the end of Milosevic regime it amounted to USD 4, 5 billion.257  The 
extradition of Milosevic to the Hague Tribunal opened the way for further support 
from the international community and in November of 2001 Serbia negotiated a deal 
with the Paris Club for 66% write off of Yugoslavia’s USD 4,5 billion debt. 
According to the deal: 
 
 “51 percent of the debt ($2.362 billion) is to be written off immediately, in 
combination with a medium-term arrangement to be signed between Yugoslavia and 
the International Monetary Fund.... the rest, $648 million (15 percent) , [is to] be 
written off at the expiry of the IMF arrangement...”  
 
Yugoslavia also got favorable conditions for the repayment of the remaining USD 1, 8 
billion.  In the words of then Serbian Minister of Finance Bozidar Djelic, that was the 
“largest debt forgiveness for a moderately developed country the Paris Club has 
granted in the past 45 years.”258  
 
The deal reached in Paris on 16 November 2001 had received its blessing during the 
visit of Prime Minister Zoran Dzindzic to Washington, earlier that month. 259 The 
debt to the US was also discussed at that occasion, as well as aid allocation for the 
                                                 
256 This claim is produced based on data from the DAC online statistical database.  
257 Web Site of Serbian Government, Paris Club Writes Off Two-Thirds of Yugoslavia's Debt, 
16 November 2001, http://www.arhiva.serbia.sr.gov.yu/news/2001-11/16/320989.html; 
According to the news:  “Yugoslavia's total foreign debt was estimated at around $12.2 
billion. One fourth of the total debt is owed to multilateral organizations, approximately the 
same to commercial banks at the London Club, and the largest part, some 45 percent was 
owed to the Paris Club. The remaining roughly four percent is a recently made debt to the 
Russian federation. The majority of the country's debt was accumulated during the communist 
leader Tito era, and was not serviced in the past ten years.”  
258 ibid  
259 Invest in Serbia webpage, Paris Club: US to Support Bid for Paris Club Mark-Down, 7 
November 2001, Washington, , http://www.invest-in-
serbia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=categories&op=newindex&catid=59&pagenum=
3  
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next fiscal year.260The United States, the UK, and France were the largest creditors to 
Serbia in the Paris Club.  
 
The review of the media from that particular period of time reveals at least some of 
the additional political motivation, or rather additional political conditioning for the 
generous debt write- off. In October of 2001 Prime Minister Djindjic stated that the 
Paris Club had offered a 2/3 debt write off if Belgrade encouraged the Serbs in 
Kosovo to vote at the upcoming elections.261 A statement coming from such a high 
ranking political official should be considered a credible source. Debt-relief to 
FRY/Serbia was conditioned with certain political concessions. Nevertheless, a note 
of caution is warranted at this point. This is not to understand that the debt write-off 
was only connected to the local elections in Kosovo. That was merely one additional 
step in the process of ongoing political conditioning. The outpouring of aid to 
FRY/Serbia in the 2001-2002 period, including the debt-relief, was primarily 
connected to the extradition of former president Slobodan Milosevic at The Hague. 
That fact is absolutely established. What these news report excerpts suggest is that 
also after that each successive step in the supply of ODA was conditioned with new 
concessions.  
 
To underscore again the major conclusion concerning the inquiry into the numbers of 
foreign assistance: big part of the ODA FRY/Serbia received in 2002 was debt-relief. 
Specifically, of the total USD 2, 5 billion ODA to FRY in 2002,262 USD 1, 8 billion 
was debt relief.263 Additional USD 145 million was loans.264 This leaves around USD 
500 million of “other” grant monies. This information is important for understanding 
the full picture of foreign aid to the Balkans.  The year of 2002 marked the absolute 
peak of ODA to the Balkans, with USD 5, 4 billion. However, USD 2, 0 billion of this 
amount accounted for on debt relief. Most of the debt relief was given to FRY.   
 
Although the huge debt relief was definitely a tremendous support to Serbia, it was 
not completely additional to aid, but it does seem to have been in serious part a 
replacement for aid. Mid 2001, soon after Miosevic’s extradition to The Hague, the 
media have registered discontent on the part of Serbian government with Western aid 
promises. For example, according to reporting by the BBC:   
                                                 
260  Invest in Serbia webpage, Paris Club: Two Thirds Debt Off, Says Pitic, 9 November 2001, 
Washington, http://www.invest-in-
serbia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=368;  In the words of former Serbian 
Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic after the meeting, "Beside support with our foreign debts, a 
very important solution for us was found - payment of a part of our debts to America in the 
amount of $43 million won't be covered from the assets planned as aid to Serbia in 2002," In 
addition, he made a reference to the agreed allocation of US ODA to FRY for the next 
2002:"...[the] House of Representatives and the Senate agreed that $115 million from the aid 
package to Yugoslavia worth 145 million in the next fiscal year go to Serbia".    
 
261 Web Site of Serbian Government, Paris Club Writes Off Two-Thirds of Yugoslavia's Debt, 
16 November 2001, http://www.arhiva.serbia.sr.gov.yu/news/2001-11/16/320989.html  
262 Annex, Table 33.  
263 The remainder of USD 216, 3 million to the total 2002 debt relief of USD 2, 0 billion was 
written off to ex Yu unspecified. As already mentioned, the biggest part of this write off came 
from Canada.  
264 DAC online statistical database  
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“The day after Slobodan Milosevic was extradited to The Hague last month, 
Belgrade’s cooperation seemed all worthwhile. That’s when the international donor 
conference in Brussels agreed $1.3bn in aid for the Yugoslav federation. But now it 
seems generosity is not as straightforward as Belgrade would like. Serbia’s prime 
minister, Zoran Djindjic, this week called Western aid a farce, saying delays 
threatened the whole reform process in Yugoslavia. He said the EU had promised a 
quick payment of €300m for August but that three-quarters of that money had to be 
used to pay back debts and the rest wouldn’t arrive until November.”265  
 
The same source registers EC Commissioner Chris Patten’s responses to Prime 
Minister Djindjic’s criticism of Western aid.266 This information should be considered 
of particular importance for understanding the political dynamic surrounding the 
foreign aid process. It is obvious that foreign assistance is far from being a process 
which is motivated by sheer altruism and detached from political reality. Some of it is, 
but there is also another domain in ODA which is closely related to international 
politics.  
 
This final part discussing the debt relief issue and its relevance for the ODA to the 
Balkans and FRY in particular, concludes the aspect of disaggregation of foreign aid 
flows to the Balkans concerning donors and recipients, bilateral and multilateral aid, 
and   the principal division of grant aid vs. loans. In addition the preceding discussion 
provided relevant observations concerning the time-dimension of foreign aid to the 
Balkans in the 1990-2005 period.  
 
 
 
 
9. Conclusion  
 
The preceding discussion offered an extensive disaggregation of the aid flows to the 
Western Balkans in the period 1990-2005. The tables and charts presented tell the 
story of the amounts of ODA the region has received and indicate the major donors 
and recipients of that assistance. In addition, they describe the time-dimension of the 
ODA phenomenon in the Balkans since the beginning of transition. The analysis of 
                                                 
265 BBC World Service Radio, Interview with Rt Hon Chris Patten, 19 July 2001 (transcript).  
266 ibid; Commissioner Patten’s response is instructive for understanding the reality of aid 
negotiations between FRY and the international community in that particular period of time:  
 
“... we’ve already committed €200m and spent most of it. We’ve already committed €240m 
and spent a lot of that. So that’s €450 [sic] for starters. There is then the €300m for macro 
financial assistance. What’s that going in for? It’s going in largely to relieve Yugoslavia of its 
international debts so it can start borrowing again from the European Investment Bank.... 
what Mr Djindjic is actually talking about isn’t help with his balance of payments, isn’t macro 
financial assistance, it’s budgetary assistance. What Mr Djindjic has in the short term is a 
problem in his third quarter in actually paying for things like salaries, in paying for things like 
pensions... But there is hardly a donor around who will agree. I mean, there are some bilateral 
donors who will agree to provide assistance to pay of a country’s salaries or to pay for a 
country’s pensions, but there aren’t many and people aren’t going to allow the European 
Commission to do that.”  
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the major trends in the foreign aid supply, provided indications of the major factors 
and events that have influenced the supply of that assistance.  
 
Most of the conclusions have already been presented next to the data. The Balkans 
has been a recipient of tremendous foreign assistance in the past decade and a half. It 
has received much more aid compared to other places in need, and Eastern Europe in 
particular. The data also confirms that contrary to common belief, the amounts of aid 
given to the Balkans by far exceed the assistance delivered under the mythical 
Marshall Plan.  
 
Nevertheless, the Western Balkans is not homogeneous in terms of ODA received. 
The levels of aid to Croatia are much lower compared to the other countries in the 
region, and they are low even compared to the receipts of the CEE countries. 
Although politically part of the region, Croatia was not a “Balkan” country in terms of 
foreign aid received. This is an important finding for the inquiry of the factors of aid 
to the region. It shows that a major factor for receiving ODA was the level of 
economic development of the country.  The bulk of the aid to the region went to two 
countries, Bosnia and FRY/Serbia. Nevertheless, the closer disaggregation of Serbia 
shows that Kosovo accounted for a huge part of this assistance, and that debt relief 
constituted a big part of the aid to Serbia proper after the fall of Milosevic.  
 
The picture is quite versatile on the donor side as well. What emerges as a conclusion 
is that the major European donors had very different roles in foreign aid to the 
Balkans. Germany was the top bilateral donor to the region; the UK and France had 
much lesser interest in the region and although they had strong donor presence, big 
part of it accounted for on debt relief; Italy had a relatively strong presence but by and 
large defined by its special relationship with Albania. The European Union was the 
strongest donor to the region overall.   
 
The trend of ODA overtime indicates the events which had strong influence on the 
supply of aid to the Balkans. Aid hiked several times in the period 1990-2005, and it 
had an all- time peak in 2002. The biggest increases were caused by humanitarian 
crises (1993 and 1999), post-conflict reconstruction need (1995 and 1999/2000), and 
democratic opening/ deposing of an autocrat (2000) followed by an extradition to an 
international court (the ICTY). The data presented above also suggest that different 
donors were to a different extent responsive to these different events.   
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CHAPTER 6  
 
Sectoral Disaggregation of Foreign Assistance to the Balkans  
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
After the   theoretical discussion in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the review of official 
donor policy statement in Chapter 3, and the review of the political reality 
surrounding the aid process in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 commenced the exploration of the 
numbers concerning delivery of foreign aid to the Balkans. Albeit not sufficient, the 
quantitative aspect of the ODA process is, naturally, essential for the research into 
foreign assistance to the Balkans. Actually, as stated in the very beginning, one of the 
major incentives for this text has been the realization that there has been to date very 
little systematic treatment of the numbers concerning aid to the Balkans in literature 
on ODA. Logically, the many issues or dilemmas relating to the process of aid to the 
region can only be discussed after the (basic) numbers have been ascertained.  
 
Chapter 5 opened some of the basic issues, such as how much, when, and who were 
the major donors and recipients. It discussed the basic distinction between grants, 
loans, and debt relief, and in addition, it discussed the particular challenge of 
assessing the aid process to Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, separately.  
 
Chapter 6 ahead continues the exploration of the numbers on aid by looking into the 
sectoral composition of ODA to the Balkans. The largest share of foreign assistance to 
the region was sector allocable aid (SAA), that is, it was allocated to one of the four 
major sectors: social infrastructure and services (SIS), economic infrastructure (EI), 
production, and multisector. In addition to the sector allocable aid (SAA), relevant 
share of ODA to the Balkans has been channeled into the category of humanitarian 
aid. Each of these sectors and categories is further composed of sub-sectors or sub-
categories, which will be discussed further in the text. The allocations to the recipient 
countries and the regional category of “ex Yu unspecified” can be fully disaggregated 
by sector and sub-sector which allows for a full insights into which donor assisted 
which sector and sub-sector, in which country, when, that is in what period of time, 
and so forth. This   produces additional interesting observations concerning     the 
inquiry on the factors of foreign aid to the Balkans.  
 
 
 
2. Note on the Creditor Reporting System (CRS)  
 
A note which is relevant for the methodology has to be made at the outset. The DAC 
of the OECD maintains two major databases of global aid flows. The first is the   
DAC online statistical database, which was extensively used in Chapter 5. The second 
is the Creditor Reporting System (CRS). The difference is that while the DAC 
database registers aid only according to few general parameters, the CRS allows aid 
allocations to be registered according to much more comprehensive criteria. These 
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criteria include for example sectors and sub-sectors (50 categories available), types of 
aid (9 categories available), channels (7 categories available), policy objectives (9 
categories available), regions of the world, income groups (7 categories available), 
purpose codes (195 categories available) and so forth. As such, the CRS can provide a 
lot of detailed information on the final destinations    of aid allocations.  
 
There is nevertheless a problem with the coverage ratio of the CRS. That is to say, the 
CRS is not a comprehensive account of donor activity because not all ODA activity 
has been reported to the CRS. In other words, the CRS data is partial. The DAC 
nevertheless notes that reporting to the CRS has gradually improved over time:  
 
“The completeness of CRS commitments for DAC members has improved from 70% 
in 1995 to over 90% in 2000 and reached nearly 100% starting from 2003 flows.”267     
 
It should also be borne in mind that the ratio differs by donors. Whereas some donors 
have reported most of their ODA to the CRS as far back as 1995, others have reported 
much smaller shares, or have not reported at all.  
 
This is unfortunately the challenge that each inquiry into ODA, including this one, has 
to deal with. This should be kept into consideration when studying the numbers on 
sectoral allocation in the Balkans. Nevertheless, it is comforting that the coverage 
ratio was over 90% by the year of 2000. This however means that the data for the 
decade 1990-2000, which is most of the period under exploration, is of lesser quality.   
 
The other important note which also relates to a challenge presented by the CRS 
database concerns the shifting from disbursements to commitments. Chapter 5 
operated with disbursements, as more accurate information on aid allocations. 
However, Chapter 6 will have to operate with ODA commitments.  The reason for 
this is simple. Whereas the CRS registers commitments starting from 1995, data on 
disbursements is only available starting with the years 2002-2003. The DAC itself 
does not recommend it, but even if an effort was attempted, the database does not 
have data on disbursement basis before 2002:  
 
“As to the analysis on CRS disbursements it is not recommended for flows before 
2002, because the annual coverage is below 60%, while it is around and over 90% 
since 2002 and is continuously improving”268 
 
Hence, study of data on commitment basis is the obvious choice. This logically means 
that data in Chapter 6 will not be consistent with data used in Chapter 5. Partly this 
comes from the difference between commitments (amounts the donor has pledged) to 
disbursements (amount the donor has actually distributed in a given period), and in 
part from the smaller coverage ratio of the CRS system compared to the DAC 
statistical database. This is of course a limitation, but (for an optimist researcher) it 
                                                 
267 CRS User’s Guide Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3343,en_2649_34469_17728989_1_1_1_1,00.html  
 
268 Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3343,en_2649_34469_17728989_1_1_1_1,00.html  
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can also be an additional source of information Overall however, these are the 
limitations any research into aid volumes has to encounter.  
 
 
 
3. Sectoral Disaggregation of Aid Flows to the Balkans  
 
CRS data offer incisive insight into the specifics and patterns of ODA to the Balkans. 
It allows the sectoral analysis of aid which is an additional important level of scrutiny 
of the foreign aid process to the Balkans. If the DAC database provided the general 
conclusions concerning the questions “who gave aid to whom”, and “when”, the CRS 
data gives an answer to the question “who gave aid for what”. This dimension of the 
exploration is essential to the inquiry.  
  
 The following pages will review the sector allocable aid (SAA) and the category of 
humanitarian aid.  
 
A relevant portion of all ODA to the Balkans has been SAA.269 The exception to this 
is FRY/Serbia where a much smaller part of the total assistance can be allocated to 
sectors, compared to the other countries in the region.270 The major reason for this is 
the much greater share of debt relief in total ODA receipts.   
 
The category of humanitarian aid   which is also   not sector allocable, has also 
contributed to this end in the case of FRY/Serbia but also Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
both countries humanitarian aid has accounted for about 1/5 of the total assistance 
they have received in the period 1990-2005.     Most of the sector non-allocable aid in 
the case of FRY/Serbia nevertheless accounts for on debt relief. As discussed in the   
previous chapter, FRY/Serbia was a strong recipient of debt relief ODA in the period 
after the fall of the Milosevic. The discussion will first focus on SAA and its sub-
sectors, whereas the last section in the chapter will deal with humanitarian aid.   
 
The CRS operates with four sectors comprising the sector allocable ODA:  
 
1. social infrastructure and services (SIS)  
2. economic infrastructure (EI) 
3. production sectors, and 
4. multisector  
 
These sectors are further subdivided into additional sub-sectors in the following way. 
The SIS sector comprises: 1. education, 2. health, 3. population, 4. water and 
sanitation (watsan), 5. government and civil society, and 6. other SIS (henceforth 
“other”).   
 
The EI sector   contains:  1. transport and storage, 2. communications, 3. energy, 4. 
banking and services, 5. business and other services.  
 
                                                 
269  For detail see Annex to this chapter.  
270 See section on FRY/Serbia in Annex to Chapter 5.  
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The production sector contains: 1. agriculture, 2. forestry, 3. fishing, 4. industry, 5. 
mineral resources and mining, 6. construction, 7. trade policy and regulations, and 8. 
tourism.  
  
Last, the multisector category contains the sub-sectors: 1. general environmental 
protection, and 2. other.  
 
A glance at the sectoral distribution of ODA to the Balkan region reveals much 
interesting information. The major conclusion emerging from a review of the four 
sectors is that there is clear and consistent pattern in the sectoral distribution of ODA 
across all countries in the Balkans (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 below presents the data on the sectoral distribution of ODA to the countries of 
the Balkans. The table shows that around half of the sector allocable aid in all of the 
countries in the region was invested in support for social infrastructure and services 
(SIS). The share of this ODA in all sector allocable aid (SAA) ranges quite precisely 
between 50 % and 53 %for all countries in the Balkans. Even the ODA registered by 
the DAC as going to ex Yu unspecified, in the sense that it cannot be attributed to a 
specific country – some of the factors for this were discussed in Chapter 5 – follows 
the pattern and has 45 % of the sector allocable assistance into the category of SIS.  
 
 
Table 1: Sectoral distribution of ODA to countries in the Balkans (%).    
 soc. infr. & ser 
(%) 
ec. infr. (%) production 
(%) 
multisector (%) total (%) 
Alb 50 27 7 16 100 
BiH 52 28 5 15 100 
Cro 53 21 4 22 100 
Mac 53 17 9 21 100 
FRY/Ser 50 27 5 18 100 
ex Yu. 45 42 6 7 100 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
The second largest sector is economic infrastructure (EI); the share of aid to the EI 
sector ranges between 17 % (Macedonia) and 28 % (BiH) for the countries in the 
region. Noticeably, the range is a bit more extensive compared to the category of SIS, 
but nevertheless quite consistent across countries. The exception is aid to ex Yu 
unspecified, where aid to EI is quite larger compared to the country recipients and it 
stands at 42 percent. A look into the sub-sectors comprising the sector of economic 
infrastructure reveals that this is mostly accounted for by aid to the sub-category of 
transport and storage (Table 2). This is an interesting finding but it should 
nevertheless  be borne in mind that SAA to ex Yu unspecified is also an exception to 
the rule, and it represents a small share, around 1/4 of all ODA charged to ex Yu 
unspecified.   
 
The situation is similar also with respect to multisector aid, which ranks third in terms 
of size, with country shares ranging from 15 % (BiH) to 22 % (Croatia).  
 
Finally, the smallest amount of SAA has gone into the production sector. This is in 
compliance with the global trends in aid allocation discussed previously, whereby aid 
for direct assistance to the economy (production) which was substantial in past 
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decades, has declined in recent times.271 Given its small size, the sector of production 
will not be analyzed in this chapter.  
 
Nevertheless, the major finding concerning the overall distribution of SAA to the 
Balkans concerns its consistency across countries. The shares of the four sectors in 
total sector allocable aid are largely consistent across countries. In all of the countries 
of the region assistance for SIS is about half of all SAA. This means that controlled 
for the size of debt relief and emergency and reconstruction assistance, whereby the 
latter in the region depended on the presence and intensity of conflict, the largest part 
of foreign aid to the Balkans went into the sector of SIS.  
 
What would be of particular interest in the analysis of the sectoral distribution of 
ODA to the Balkans would be to understand – how did this come about? What are the 
factors of this sectoral consistency across the countries in the region? This will be 
discussed further in this chapter.  
 
The sector of SIS is broadly defined; it comprises the 6 sub-sectors listed above in this 
sense, observing that the largest share of aid to the Balkans had gone into this sector 
still keeps things rather general.  It is relevant to find out how was ODA distributed 
across the 6 sub-sectors comprising the SIS sector. Table 2 below displays the shares 
of the 6 sub-sectors   and it allows for   identification of additional patterns in the 
allocation of foreign assistance to the region.   
 
What is clearly visible from Table 2 is that the entire SIS sector is dominated by one 
category – government & civil society (GCS).  
 
Table 2: Composition of the SIS sector (%) 
.  
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
Aid for GCS ranges in between 45 % (Macedonia) and 66 % (FRY/Serbia), and it 
clearly dominates the sector in all of the countries of the region. The regional category 
of ex Yu unspecified is not an exception in this regard.  
 
The second category in terms of size is the sub-sector of education and considerable 
consistency is observable also here; country shares range from 10 % (FRY/Serbia) to 
21 % (Croatia). Third in terms of size is water & sanitation, ranging from 6 % 
(FRY/Serbia) to 21 % (Albania). Follow health with modest receipts as share of the 
total, and population which has had almost negligible ODA receipts. The category of 
“other” is nevertheless substantial and it indicates that a relevant share of aid is 
                                                 
271 See Chapter 2 on foreign aid in the 90s. 
 edu. 
(%) 
health.  
(%) 
population  
(%) 
watsan  
(%) 
govt. & civ. 
soc. (%) 
other  
(%) 
total  
(%) 
Alb 16 8 2 21 46 7 100 
BiH 12 7 0 9 52 20 100 
Cro 21 1 2 10 53 13 100 
Mac 13 6 1 20 45 15 100 
FRY/Ser 10 6 1 6 66 11 100 
ex Yu. 14 6 0 6 65 9 100 
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lumped in this generic basket. As evident from Table 2, allocations to the sub-sector 
of “other” range between 7% in the case of Albania, to entire 20% in BiH.  
 
The major conclusion emerging from the disaggregation of aid to the SIS sector is 
that:  it is dominated by ODA to GCS. With the fact that SIS ODA is about half of all 
SAA, it is easy to reach the conclusion that a great share of foreign aid to the Balkans 
went for support to GCS. Quite less went for education and water & sanitation, and 
even less to health or population. As much as this is still rather generic, it is a relevant 
observation: most of the foreign assistance in the Balkans, roughly a quarter of all 
sector allocable aid, went for support to government & civil society.272 
 
There are at least two critical questions which derive from this observation. The first 
is   - why is this so? Or, what are the factors of this predominance of aid for 
government & civil society? Is this a result of the priorities of a few strong donors, or 
a common policy of all donors? Further, is this outcome a result of coordination 
among donors or it is a simple aggregation of separate individual actions?  
 
The second question, which is equally important is – what does this mean? What kind 
of aid does the category government & civil society entail, especially in view of the 
fact that a very tiny portion of ODA goes for “support to NGOs” per se?   
 
The second largest sector of ODA to the Balkans is economic infrastructure (EI). The 
sector comprises five sub-sectors: 1) transport & storage, 2) communications, 3) 
energy, 4) banking & financial services (BFS), and 5) business & other services 
(BOS). (Table 3).  
 
The disaggregation of the EI sector indicates to new interesting patterns. The first 
major observation is that the composition of the EI sector is different from that of the 
SIS sector. If consistency of sector shares across countries was a major characteristic 
of the SIS sector, it is lack of consistency which marks the EI field. Sector receipts 
across countries range from small to very large. For example, in the sub-sector of 
transport & storage they range from 9 % in FRY/Serbia to 46 % in Croatia; energy 
allocations range from 6 % in Macedonia to 48 % of total receipts in EI in Albania; 
similarly business & other services account for 16 % of EI allocations in Albania but 
they reach 70 % of total EI receipts in Macedonia (Table 3). The conclusions 
obviously is that contrary to the consistency of shares of the sub-sector in the SIS 
sector, the sector of EI is defined by the  large fluctuation of the sizes of its sub-
sectors.  
 
The constant category in EI ODA is the commitments for communications; they stand 
at 1-2 % for all the countries and for ex Yu unspecified, or in other words there was 
no donor interest in supporting communications in the region. Similar to the case with 
the category “population” in the SIS sector, communications is also a field where 
practically no donor allocated any assistance.  
 
 
                                                 
272 It should be borne in mind that the category “support to NGOs” is at the same time very 
small.  This description of aid is used when support to NGOs was an end in of itself, and not 
when NGOs acted as a channel for assistance which essentially had other goals.  
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Table 3: Composition of the EI sector (%).   
 transport & 
storage (%) 
comm.  
(%) 
energy  
(%) 
banking and 
fin. ser. (%) 
business & other 
ser. (%) 
total  
(%) 
Alb 26 2 48 8 16 100 
BiH 20 2 22 16 40 100 
Cro 46 1 9 5 39 100 
Mac 12 2 6 10 70 100 
FRY/Ser 9 2 33 15 41 100 
ex Yu unsp. 69 1 10 2 18 100  
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
In addition, the sub-sector of banking & financial services (BFS) has received a rather 
consistent level of support across countries, ranging between 5 and 16 % (2 % for the 
category of ex Yu unspecified).  
 
Overall, in the EI sector there is no clear aid predominance of one sub-sector as is the 
case of GCS in the SIS sector. The three sub-sectors transport & storage, energy, and 
business & other services (BOS), represent the largest part of ODA to the EI sector, 
with the fact that their country shares can vary considerably.  
 
As already mentioned, the sector of production, given its small share in total SAA is 
not a subject of disaggregation in this chapter.  
 
Finally, the last sector, the so called multi-sector aid is, composed of two categories, 
general environmental protection (GEP) and the category of “other”.  
 
Again, in this sector the consistency of the sector composition across countries (and in 
ex Yu unspecified) is its most obvious feature. In all of the countries in the Balkans, 
GEP ODA represents a tiny portion of multi-sector aid (between 2 and 12 %) whereas 
the generic category of “other” accounts for the bulk of aid registered as multi-sector 
(Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Composition of multisector ODA (%).   
 GEP (%) other  
(%) 
total  
(%) 
Alb 10 90 100 
BiH 2 98 100 
Cro 7 93 100 
Mac 7 93 100 
FRY/Ser 7 93 100 
ex Yu unsp. 12 88 100  
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
This can be interpreted in the following way: this ODA is allocable by sector, but 
nevertheless lacks specific characteristics which would tie it to one particular sector. 
This can understandably often be a case in reality, with projects often comprising 
many components aiming to reach goals relating to different sectors, such as for 
example one goal relating to education, other to health, etc.  
 
Following the general overview of the sectoral distribution of ODA to the Balkans, 
the major question is, as already mentioned earlier - what are the factors of this 
distribution? Such as for example, why is the sub-sector of GCS so predominant over 
other categories in the SIS sector? Is this a result of a common behavior by many 
donors, just one, or a few big aid suppliers to the region?  Or for example, what are 
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the factors for the inconsistent sub-sector shares across countries in the EI sector? 
Does this relate in any particular way to donor-recipient relationships, in the sense 
that it is caused by the stronger presence of certain donors in some countries as 
opposed to others?    
 
The following pages will provide a disaggregation of ODA sectors by recipient 
country, using the format of top-10 donor rankings. This will provide a clear insight 
into who are the major donors to certain sectors in the respective countries. The 
rankings are also combined with calculation of the share of a sub-sector allocation 
(for example education) of the sector concerned, i.e. SIS or EI, and a share of the 
allocation of the total SAA aid of the respective donor to the recipient. This permits 
analysis on several levels. The ranking gives an overview of major donors to certain 
sub-sectors; with the fact that a donor consistently ranks high in a certain sub-sector 
across countries, the conclusion can be drawn that is that it is that donor’s policy 
choice to allocate support to projects in that sub-sector. That is to say – the ranking 
indicates to the existence of a certain donor policy. Such policy can be consistent 
across countries or in some cases, when for example there are strong allocations to 
some countries but not to others, it can be result of a) ad hoc decisions, or b) results 
from policy choices which are not sector-driven, such as for example the policy of 
“regional champions”, that is the policy of some donors to forge special (often longer 
term) relationships with some countries from a certain regional setting. 
 
The disaggregation will start from the sector of SIS. It need not be comprehensive; the 
interest is to review the substantive sub-sectors and those sub-sectors which can 
provide conclusions about donor policies. In this sense, the sub-sectors of “other” (in 
both SIS and multisector) offer less analytical space as they do not lend information 
about the final ends of the assistance and thus they will not be taken into account. 
Nevertheless, they will be revisited during the analysis of the micro data in Chapter 7.   
At that level (of individual allocations) of analysis information can be distilled from 
the micro data which allows conclusions about the final ends of ODA allocated into 
the categories of “other”.  
 
The disaggregation of the SIS sector will include the sub-sectors of education, health, 
water & sanitation, and GCS. The sub-sector “population” will not be reviewed due to 
its minor significance in terms of allocations received.  
 
In the EI sector all of its five sub-sectors, transport & storage, communications, 
energy, banking & financial services, and business & other services will be reviewed.  
 
The sector of “production” given its small size will not be subject to scrutiny, and 
neither will the “multisector” which albeit not insignificant in terms of size, is 
dominated by the residual category or “other”.  
 
To summarize, the review will concentrate mostly on the SIS and EI sectors, whereby 
the SIS sector will be reviewed partially, with the categories of “population” and 
“other” omitted, whereas the EI sector will be reviewed in its entirety.  
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4. Donor Ranking: Social Infrastructure and Services (SIS)  
 
 
4.1 Education   
 
It has already been pointed out in Chapter 5 that the overall picture of foreign 
assistance is   dominated by a handful of biggest donors.  For example, 44, 4 % of the 
total ODA to the Balkans has come from the 3 largest donors, the EC, Germany and 
the US. This is also true for in-country situations, and it naturally applies to the sector 
allocable ODA.  
 
The discussion and the analysis in the following pages will be based on an extensive 
review of statistical data. As already mentioned, the top-10 rankings format will be 
followed in order to ensure that the most relevant donors are included in the 
discussion. These rankings, differently from the rankings in the previous Chapter 5, 
are   based on the (partial) data contained in the CRS, and only serve the purpose of 
understanding donor behavior within sector allocable aid (SAA), which is 
nevertheless the largest share of aid overall. However these rankings, this should be 
kept in mind, concern a shorter period of time (1995-2005) compared to the rankings 
in Chapter 5 (1990 – 2005), and are produced from data which is essentially partial in 
character. As such, these rankings are only provisional in character.  
 
  The bulk of the data produced in the preparation of this chapter, has been put in the 
Annex (see Annex to Chapter 6). The large amount of data in the Annex provides a 
complete sectoral disaggregation of all sector allocable aid (SAA) registered with the 
DAC. The most pertinent data has also been systematized and sorted into tables which 
serve as basis for discussion and analysis in this chapter. The ensuing discussion is 
completely based on the analysis of the data contained in the tables with donor 
rankings below.  
 
Allocations to  education (sub-sector of SIS) in the countries of the Balkans, are 
ranked in Tables 5-7 below (for complete information see Tables 31-37 in Annex) , in 
combination with the percentage share of allocations in the respective donor’s total 
SIS and total SAA aid to the recipient country. This format allows the discerning of 
interesting observations and comparisons.  
 
From the analysis of Table 5 , Table 6, and Table 7,  it appears that the sub-sector of 
education – and this lends itself as a conclusion concerning all other sub-sectors – is 
overall framed by a) donors’ sector- based policies, and b) donors’ country policies.  
 
The review of the tables shows that some of the major donors to the Balkans had 
strong and consistent across countries presence in education. For example, such donor 
would   definitely be Austria, whose presence in the sub-sector of education definitely 
outweighs its general presence in ODA to the region. Such donors are also Germany 
and the EC. With perhaps some minor exceptions, these donors have had consistently 
strong allocations in education across the region, and thus they significantly 
influenced the composition of ODA to education in the Balkans. Albeit with 
considerable variations, allocations to education represent a relevant percentage share 
of Austria and Germany’s aid to SIS and their total SAA. They are much greater in 
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the case of Austria, but nevertheless represent a relevant portion also of German SAA.  
For example,  in the case of Austria  allocations to the sub-sector of education 
represented: 35,57 % of its SIS and 33,06 % of all its SAA for Albania (Table 5); 
55,73% of its SIS and 51,58% of all its SAA to BiH (Table 5); 87,96% of its SIS and 
84,43% of all its SAA for Croatia (Table 6); 34,75% of its SIS and 32,27 of all its 
SAA for Macedonia (Table 6); 43,01 %  of its SIS and 40,60 % of all its SAA for 
FRY/Serbia (Table 7).   In the case of Germany allocations to the sub-sector of 
education represented: 12,00% of its SIS and 6,20 of all of its SAA for Albania (Table 
5); 47,41 % of its SIS and 27,09% of all its SAA for BiH (Table 5); 37,27 % of its SIS 
and 32,40 % of all its SAA to Croatia (Table 6); 20,91 % of its SIS and 10,94% of all 
its SAA for Macedonia (Table 6) ; and 29,09 % of its SIS  and 12, 92 % of all its SAA 
for FRY/Serbia (Table 7).      
 
It is fair to argue that such policies are not always fully sector based but that the final 
allocation is a resultant of the interaction of donor sector and country based policies. 
However, it is clear that for example in the case of Austria and Germany the choice to 
support education was a matter of consistent policy.   
 
On the other end, the tables show that there are donors who have strong presence in, 
for example, one country and thus significantly shape the education sub-sector in that 
country, but they are by and large absent from other countries in the region. Such is 
definitely the example of Dutch education ODA to Macedonia - USD 43, 22 million, 
and a large portion of Dutch SIS allocation (58, 81 %) and all SAA (30, 63 %) to 
Macedonia. The Dutch generous contribution to education in Macedonia  is however 
country-specific, in the sense that the Netherlands has not extended the same kind of 
support to education in the other countries in the  Balkans, as it can be seen  from 
Tables 5-7. This is an indication that the Dutch foreign aid policy was, at least with 
regards to this domain, more country than sector based. It has already been pointed 
out in the previous text, during the review of Dutch policy documents on foreign aid, 
that the Netherlands considers Macedonia its regional champion in the Balkans.  
 
Italy seems to have a similar, yet a bit relativized, stance concerning education. It has 
given USD 53, 92 million for education in Bosnia, which was huge portion of Italy’s 
allocation to SIS (57, 45 %) and of all its SAA to Bosnia (39, 20 %). In addition it 
ranks as a second largest donor to education in Albania, with USD 29, 18 million – 
their special relationship has already been discussed – but that practically concludes 
Italy’s relevant allocations to education in the Balkans.  The other countries in the 
region have received much smaller allocations: FRY/Serbia - USD 2, 03 million (not 
on top 10 lists), Croatia – USD 1, 42 million, Macedonia - USD 1, 01 million (not on 
top 10 lists).  This of course does not conclude the discussion on the factors that 
shaped Italy’s support to education in the Balkans273, but it can reasonably be 
concluded that Rome did not have a consistent policy of support to education in the 
region.   
                                                 
273 It is clear that Italy’s relevant contribution to education in Albania is a result of the overall 
huge amounts of ODA Tirana received from Rome. The huge allocation to Bosnia invites 
further thinking and analysis, also given the fact that it represents much bigger share of Italy’s 
SIS ODA and all SAA to that country. One assumption, valid also for other similar cases, is 
that the allocation was a result of Italy’s commitment to a particular large scale project (as 
opposed to a generic support to the sub-sector or many smaller projects) which required bug 
resources. This is of course only an assumption and it needs further testing.  
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The review of allocations to education further shows, for example, that a) the US had 
a considerably steady presence (minus Bosnia) in nominal amounts, which are of 
course a small share of the US total commitments in both SIS and all SAA; b) IDA 
funding  for education was steadily present in the region.  
 
In addition, similar to Austria, France had a strong and consistent, if varied by 
countries, presence in education in the region, which is at the same time sizeable share 
of total French commitment in both SIS and of its SAA. The conclusion from this is 
that education ranked high on the list of priorities for French ODA to the Balkans. 
This inquiry will be resumed in Chapter 7 when the analysis of the micro data will try 
to provide answers concerning the final ends of the individual sub-sector allocations, 
including the sub-sector of education.   
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Table 5: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of education, by recipient country 
  Alb 
EDU           
(USD millions) 
EDU           
as % of SIS 
EDU as         
% of SAA     BiH 
EDU           
(USD millions) 
EDU           
as % of SIS 
EDU as         
% of SAA 
           
1 Greece 106,09 71,36 65,42   1 Austria 93,28 55,73 51,58 
2 Italy 29,18 12,13 6,68   2 Germany 54,86 47,41 27,09 
3 Germany 25,51 12,00 6,20   3 Italy 53,92 57,45 39,20 
4 France 18,25 64,26 56,35   4 IDA 44,64 10,15 4,33 
5 IDA 15,45 7,38 2,34   5 Japan 17,49 16,69 7,56 
6 Austria 13,29 37,57 33,06   6 EC 15,50 3,54 1,47 
7 EC 13,24 4,76 2,13   7 France 9,95 54,02 31,24 
8 Switz. 11,38 39,28 21,11   8 Switz. 9,17 13,14 6,35 
9 US 8,66 4,33 2,05   9 Canada 6,74 5,00 4,56 
10 Spain 7,88 52,62 47,45   10 Finland 5,59 11,70 8,78 
           
    248,93           311,13     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
Table 6: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of education, by recipient country 
  Cro 
EDU           
(USD millions) 
EDU           
as % of SIS 
EDU as         
% of SAA     Mac 
EDU           
(USD millions) 
EDU           
as % of SIS 
EDU as         
% of SAA 
           
1 Austria 50,77 87,96 84,43   1 Netherl. 43,22 58,81 30,63 
2 Germany 41,75 37,27 32,40   2 EC 24,63 12,45 4,91 
3 EC 33,67 14,09 5,59   3 Germany 18,86 20,91 10,94 
4 US 9,26 7,17 3,32   4 US 15,39 7,97 3,62 
5 France 8,21 47,92 39,42   5 Switz. 9,18 34,07 14,69 
6 Italy 1,42 31,61 5,69   6 Austria 9,06 34,75 32,27 
7 Sweden 0,93 2,44 2,35   7 IDA 6,20 5,22 2,33 
8 Spain 0,77 11,51 11,06   8 France 5,68 50,59 47,09 
9 Japan 0,46 18,26 10,75   9 Norway 3,75 7,81 5,70 
10 Norway 0,39 0,69 0,43   10 UNICEF 1,62 33,60 32,48 
           
    147,62           137,58     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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Table 7: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of education, by recipient country 
  FRY/Ser 
EDU           
(USD millions) 
EDU           
as % of SIS 
EDU as         
% of SAA     ex Yu  
EDU           
(USD millions) 
EDU           
as % of SIS 
EDU as         
% of SAA 
           
1 Germany 96,46 29,09 12,92   1 Germany 9,31 49,10 32,17 
2 EC 75,47 6,93 2,57   2 Austria 7,88 90,32 89,94 
3 Austria 72,54 43,01 40,60   3 Italy 5,18 31,82 10,85 
4 France 29,57 71,77 46,20   4 Switz. 4,37 33,34 18,83 
5 IDA 23,00 20,45 4,41   5 Norway 1,72 1,85 1,37 
6 Canada 22,10 25,23 20,07   6 France 0,96 15,75 7,32 
7 Finland 13,78 27,25 22,36   7 Netherl. 0,77 11,13 4,34 
8 Norway 11,94 6,40 4,76   8     
9 Switz. 11,69 7,55 4,92   9     
10 US 6,56 0,78 0,45   10     
           
    363,11           30,19     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
 211
4.2 Health  
 
ODA receipts for in the sub-sector of health in the Balkans were overall quite small, 
second only to population, with a general conclusion being that most of the biggest 
donors to the region did not consider support to health to be a strong priority. The three 
biggest donors to the Balkans, the EC, Germany, and the US, have sporadic, inconsistent 
presence in the field of health in the region (see Tables 8-10; for complete information 
see Tables 38-44 in Annex)). For example, the EC   only made a relevant contribution to 
FRY/Serbia; the US biggest contribution of USD 6,35 million to Albania  was only 8,17 
percent of its SIS to that country; in the case of FRY/Serbia although the US ranks as 9th 
largest donors, its allocation is only 0,88 percent of its SIS  respectively.  Germany 
follows a similar pattern.  
 
Although there are donors who have one-off presence in health in the region, such as for 
example Canada’s aid to Bosnia of USD 33, 82 million, the major consistent donors to 
the sub-sector of health in the Balkans are Japan and IDA.  IDA has relevant 
contributions in all the countries of the region minus Croatia, which was generally 
ineligible for IDA funding. Nevertheless it needs to be reminded that IDA finance is 
generally in the form of loans. These loans are negotiated with the recipient countries, and 
in this sense the sectoral denomination is also determined by the recipient which overtime 
will have to repay that loan. It could be argued that the recipient also has a say in 
determining the sectoral allocation of grant ODA; as already mentioned during the review 
of the donor official policies (see Chapter 3) some of the donors determine the country 
priorities with bilateral agreements with the recipient government. Nevertheless, this text 
stands at the position that the recipient has much smaller possibility to influence the 
allocation of foreign assistance in the case of grant monies as compared to loans.    
 
What appears as relevant observation from Tables 8-10 is that  Japan has relevant 
although not fully consistent – Albania has a small contribution and Croatia none at all – 
presence in the field of health in the region. For example, Japan has given USD 58, 05 
million for health in BiH (ranked as top donor to Bosnia), which is 55,39% of its SIS and 
25,09 % of all its SAA to that country (see Table 8); its contribution  for health in 
Macedonia stands at USD 32,65  million (ranked as top donor), which is 26,42%  of its 
SIS and 22,55% of all its SAA (Table 9); Japan similarly has a relevant contribution in 
FRY/Serbia (ranked as 4th top donor).Overall, in the countries of the Balkans where Japan 
had stronger activity as a donor, the sub-sector of health was a consistent priority for its 
ODA. Albania is a bit of an exception to this;    its relatively modest receipts in health 
(USD 5,13 million)  from Japan are a big share of Japan’s SIS (75,61%)  to the country, 
but a small share of its overall SAA to Albania (8,47%) which indicates that Japan chose 
to channel its support to Albania into other sectors.  
 
Overall it can be concluded that given the small share of health in SIS ODA to the 
Balkans, it is by and large produced by Japan’s niche interest, IDA loans, and sporadic 
and hoc presence of other donors, which can be assumed to be  more a result of their 
country-based rather than sector-based policies.  
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Table 8: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of health, by recipient country 
  Alb 
Health          
(USD millions) 
Health          
as % of SIS 
Health          
as % of SAA     BiH 
Health          
(USD millions) 
Health          
as % of SIS 
Health         
as % of SAA 
           
1 Italy 27,71 11,52 6,34   1 Japan 58,05 55,39 25,09 
2 IDA 21,41 10,22 3,24   2 Canada 33,82 25,06 22,87 
3 US 16,35 8,17 3,88   3 IDA 31,80 7,23 3,09 
4 Greece 11,66 7,84 7,19   4 Switz. 18,70 26,81 12,96 
5 Sweden 8,65 26,12 18,93   5 Sweden 7,48 3,69 2,75 
6 Switz. 7,92 27,33 14,69   6 Netherl. 6,22 4,72 3,42 
7 UK 6,89 21,28 16,55   7 Italy 5,41 5,76 3,93 
8 France 6,73 23,69 20,77   8 Spain 4,98 2,73 2,09 
9 Germany 5,94 2,80 1,44   9 Austria 3,88 2,32 2,15 
10 Japan 5,13 75,61 8,47   10 UK 3,67 7,07 5,48 
           
    118,39           174,01     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
Table 9: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of health, by recipient country 
  Cro 
Health          
(USD millions) 
Health          
as % of SIS 
Health          
as % of SAA     Mac 
Health          
(USD millions) 
Health          
as % of SIS 
Health         
as % of SAA 
           
1 Norway 2,06 3,63 2,28   1 Japan 32,65 26,42 22,55 
2 Sweden 1,27 3,34 3,22   2 IDA 19,50 16,42 7,32 
3 Netherl. 1,04 16,77 7,04   3 Norway 5,15 10,73 7,83 
4 Canada 1,00 19,91 14,83   4 Italy 1,68 8,39 7,10 
5 UK 0,93 8,70 7,73   5 Germany 1,56 1,73 0,91 
6 US 0,41 0,32 0,15   6 UNICEF 0,73 15,16 14,65 
7 France 0,25 1,45 1,19   7 Spain 0,47 4,16 2,12 
8 Italy 0,13 2,94 0,53   8 France 0,42 3,71 3,45 
9 Spain 0,12 1,81 1,73   9 Greece 0,24 0,33 0,31 
10 
Germany 
0,02 0,02 0,01   10 US 0,20 0,10 0,05 
           
    7,23           62,60     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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Table 10: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of health, by recipient country 
  FRY/Ser 
Health          
(USD millions) 
Health          
as % of SIS 
Health          
as % of SAA     ex Yu  
Health          
(USD millions) 
Health          
as % of SIS 
Health         
as % of SAA 
           
1 EC 76,51 7,03 2,60   1 Norway 7,58 8,14 6,01 
2 IDA 30,19 26,84 5,79   2 Netherl. 2,92 41,97 16,35 
3 UK 22,27 15,16 14,30   3 Italy 1,76 10,82 3,69 
4 Norway 17,69 9,48 7,05   4 Luxemb. 0,52 23,29 22,65 
5 Japan 11,71 58,12 35,88   5 Austria 0,47 5,37 5,35 
6 Netherl. 9,32 8,24 5,23   6 Japan 0,27 36,48 1,52 
7 Canada 8,52 9,73 7,74   7 Switz. 0,23 1,79 1,01 
8 Spain 8,38 4,73 4,62   8 Finland 0,12 1,95 1,91 
9 US 7,40 0,88 0,51   9     
10 Luxemb. 6,13 26,22 15,86   10     
           
    198,13           13,87     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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4.3 Water & Sanitation  
 
Tables 11-13 rank the top 10 donors to the sub-sector of water & sanitation in the 
countries of the Balkans. As in the previous sub-sectors, the composition of the water & 
sanitation field results from sector-based and country-based policy decision of the donors.  
 
The analysis of Tables 11-13 presented below (for complete information see Tables 45-
50 in Annex) shows that Germany, the strongest bilateral donor in the region, has a 
consistent policy of support to water & sanitation in all of the countries in the Balkans. 
Germany’s support to water & sanitation varies as percentage share of its allocations to 
SIS across the countries in the region, from 19, 70 percent in Bosnia to entire 72, 50 
percent in Albania, but overall the contributions are relevant in all the recipient countries.  
 
For example, Albania has received USD 154,12 million , which was entire 72,50 %, of 
SIS and 37,43 % of all of Germany’s  SAA to   that country (Table 11); in Croatia 
Germany has allocated USD 50,62 million, which represented 45,19 of its SIS and 32,29 
% of its SAA to Zagreb (Table 12);  Macedonia received USD 48,67 million of German 
aid for watsan, which was 53,97 of German SIS and 28,25 % of its total SAA to Skopje 
(Table 12). Germany also ranked as top donor to watsan in FRY/Serbia with a 
commitment of USD 105, 94 million, which represented 31, 95 % and 14, 19 % of its SIS 
and SAA to that country respectively (Table 13).  
 
In addition, the review of Tables 11-13 demonstrates that the US is quite obviously 
absent from water & sanitation, whereas the EC has certain consistency and relevant 
nominal amounts even if at small percentage shares of its SIS allocations. The EC 
nevertheless ranks second in BiH with a contribution of USD 51,60 million (11,78 % and 
4,88 % of its SIS and SAA to the country respectively; Table 11); in Croatia with USD 
15,73 million ( yet only 6,58 % and 2,61 % of its SIS and SAA to the country 
respectively, Table 12); and in FRY/Serbia with USD 53,09  million ( only 4,88 % and 
1,81 % of its SIS and SAA to Belgrade respectively).    
 
An additional observation concerns the consistent Norwegian presence in the sector, and 
the considerable IDA funding. Country-based choices, as in other sub-sectors, complete 
the composition of the field, such as Italy’s traditionally strong contribution to Albania, 
Japan’s support to Macedonia (entire 70, 66 percent of its entire SIS allocations to the 
country), and curiously, Portugal’s ODA to the same country. Macedonia is evidently the 
only country in the Balkans which has received relevant Portuguese aid in the SIS sector. 
The discussion in Chapter 7 will use the micro data stored in the CRS to provide 
explanations concerning the strong and isolated ad-hoc contributions from donor 
countries with very small general presence in the region.  
 
Overall, it can be concluded that:  the field of water & sanitation has been heavily 
dominated by the strong and consistent presence of one large bilateral - Germany. It can 
be noted that German’s domination of the sub-sector of watsan is even stronger than for 
example Japan’s domination of the field of health. EC presence was to some extent 
relevant even if it represented small share of its SIS and SAA ODA to the region.     
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Table 11: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of water & sanitation, by recipient country 
  Alb 
watsan         
(USD millions) 
watsan         
as % of SIS 
watsan         
as % of SAA     BiH 
watsan         
(USD millions) 
watsan         
as % of SIS 
watsan         
as % of SAA 
           
1 Germany 154,12 72,50 37,43   1 IDA 68,00 15,46 6,60 
2 Italy 74,52 30,97 17,06   2 EC 51,60 11,78 4,88 
3 IDA 51,05 24,38 7,72   3 Norway 38,66 21,69 16,55 
4 Austria 18,76 53,02 46,66   4 Germany 22,79 19,70 11,25 
5 Norway 10,80 20,56 15,83   5 Switz. 16,08 23,05 11,15 
6 EC 9,82 3,53 1,58   6 US 15,19 4,96 1,66 
7 Luxemb. 7,41 100,00 100,00   7 Austria 15,00 8,96 8,29 
8 Sweden 3,56 10,76 7,80   8 Spain 9,98 5,47 4,19 
9 Switz. 1,70 5,88 3,16   9 Finland 8,13 17,00 12,76 
10 Greece 1,10 0,74 0,68   10 Netherl. 3,39 2,58 1,87 
           
    332,85           248,81     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
Table 12: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of water & sanitation, by recipient country 
  Cro 
watsan         
(USD millions) 
watsan         
as % of SIS 
watsan         
as % of SAA     Mac 
watsan         
(USD millions) 
watsan         
as % of SIS 
watsan         
as % of SAA 
           
1 Germany 50,62 45,19 39,29   1 Japan 87,33 70,66 60,32 
2 EC 15,73 6,58 2,61   2 Germany 48,67 53,97 28,25 
3 Norway 1,40 2,46 1,54   3 Portugal 18,88 63,92 63,92 
4 Italy 0,93 20,84 3,75   4 IDA 17,70 14,90 6,64 
5 US 0,79 0,61 0,28   5 Austria 16,09 61,74 57,34 
6 France 0,66 3,86 3,17   6 Italy 9,73 48,55 41,09 
7 UK 0,12 1,13 1,01   7 Spain 9,34 82,69 42,13 
8       8 Denmark 5,43 99,14 99,14 
9       9 Norway 3,18 6,64 4,85 
10       10 Switz. 3,07 11,41 4,92 
           
    70,26           219,42     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 216
 
 
 
Table 13: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of water & sanitation, by recipient country 
  FRY/Ser 
watsan         
(USD millions) 
watsan         
as % of SIS 
watsan         
as % of SAA     ex YU 
watsan         
(USD millions) 
watsan         
as % of SIS 
watsan         
as % of SAA 
           
1 Germany 105,94 31,95 14,19   1 Norway 5,49 5,90 4,35 
2 EC 53,09 4,88 1,81   2 Switz. 3,02 23,00 12,99 
3 Norway 17,40 9,32 6,93   3 France 2,31 38,07 17,70 
4 Switz. 13,02 8,41 5,48   4 Luxemb. 1,51 68,19 66,31 
5 Netherl. 11,30 9,98 6,34   5 Netherl. 0,58 8,41 3,28 
6 US 10,25 1,22 0,71   6     
7 Austria 9,42 5,58 5,27   7     
8 IDA 8,00 7,11 1,53   8     
9 Japan 6,66 33,06 20,41   9     
10 Sweden 6,11 5,15 3,07   10     
           
    241,18           12,91     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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4.4 Government & Civil Society  
 
The GCS sub-sector is of special importance for the sectoral analysis of ODA to the 
Balkans because of its substantial share in total foreign assistance commitments.  As 
already observed, it accounts for roughly half of all aid to the SIS sector, which in turn is 
around half of all SAA to the region. In other words, aid allocated for GCS is roughly ¼ 
of total SAA to the Balkans.   
 
Logically the question is - why? What are the factors of such strong predominance of 
GCS ODA? Tables 14-16 presented below (for complete information see Tables 59-65 in 
Annex) provide an overview of the allocations to GCS to the countries in the region by 
listing the rankings of top 10 donors to GCS in each individual country in the Balkans.  
 
As Tables 14-16 demonstrate, the strong position of GCS ODA is by and large 
determined by the policies of two major donors to the region, the European Commission 
and the United States.  
 
In all of the countries of the region (minus the category ex Yu unspecified) these two 
donors consistently rank as top two donors to GCS, substantially outstripping the 
contributions by any other donor.  In addition, this consistency of the EC and US support 
across countries is an indicator that support to GCS is a result   of their coherent policies.  
 
The EC support to GCS ranges from 66, 95 % of its total assistance in the SIS sector in 
the case of FRY/Serbia, to 90 %, and 92 % of SIS in the case of Albania. The US support 
to GCS ranges from 48, 61 % of its SIS to Croatia, to 93, 61 % in the case of FRY/Serbia. 
In the case of US assistance for GCS, it is observable that Croatia, which is at the far 
lower end (in terms of share of SIS; the US nevertheless ranks second with USD 97, 67 
million; Table 15), is the exception; all the other countries in the region have much higher   
GCS ODA as share of SIS from the US, with Macedonia being lowest at 77, 57 %.  It is 
fair to conclude that no other sub-sector has such consistently high percentage shares 
across countries.  
 
The conclusion is that in addition to being among the strongest donors to the region in 
absolute amounts, as discussed in Chapter 5, the EC and the US are the top donors to the 
GCS sub-sector. What more, GCS aid consistently accounts for large shares of their SIS 
allocations. The fact that two of the top donors to the region donate most of their SIS aid 
to GCS is the single strongest factor determining the predominance of GCS aid to the 
countries of the Balkans.  
 
Other donors, as observable from Tables 14-16 also have supply of GCS ODA as a 
consistent priority item in their SIS sectors. Such is the case with Norway, whose GCS 
ODA ranges from 51, 96 % as share of its overall SIS allocation to BiH, to 72, 58 % of its 
SIS to Croatia (the exception category of ex Yu unspecified stands at 74, 05 %); and with 
the Netherlands whose GCS allocations range from 31, 87 % as share of SIS in the case 
of Macedonia, to 85, 55 % in the case of Albania.  Sweden is a similar case in the sense 
that it is a constant provider of GCS ODA. For example,  Sweden ranks 8th as GCS 
contributor to BiH with USD 63,85 million, which represent 31,45 % and 23,43 % of its 
SIS and SAA to the country respectively;  its contribution for GCS in Croatia stands at 
USD 12,02 million (31,64 % and 30, 46% of its SIS and SAA respectively, Table 15); 
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and its commitment for GCS in Macedonia has been USD 19,33 million (entire 85,54 % 
of its SIS, and 44,18% of its SAA to the country; Table 15). 
 
Another interesting observation concerns Spain which ranks very high as a supporter to 
GCS only in the cases of BiH and FRY/Serbia. Given that its presence is not consistent 
across all the countries, but only in the countries which suffered emergency crises, it is 
reasonable to assume that Spanish GCS assistance was more driven by humanitarian 
motives or by factors otherwise related to the humanitarian emergencies. It is obvious that 
in the case of FRY/Serbia, Spanish GCS aid represented 91, 22 % of total SIS aid, and 
entire 89, 16 % of the total SAA. In other words almost all of the SAA which Spain 
donated to FRY/Serbia was registered as GCS assistance. The analysis of the micro data 
in Chapter 7 will offer additional interesting information concerning Spanish foreign aid 
for GCS in the Balkans.  
 
Another observation of donor specific behavior concerns Germany. Although Germany 
has been the strongest bilateral donor to the Balkans, it does not feature as strong 
supporter to GCS; it is listed as   4th largest donor to GCS in Croatia (Table 15), 7th 
largest to Macedonia (Table 15), and 5th largest to FRY/Serbia (Table 16), where it has 
also made the most substantial contribution as percent of SIS – 32, 77 %. In other words – 
smaller share of German ODA has been allocated for GCS in the Balkans.  Germany 
supplied less support for this category.   
 
In conclusion, the absolute predominance of the GCS sub-sector, which stands at half of 
all SIS aid and amounts to a quarter of the entire SAA ODA to the Balkans, is a result of 
the consistent behavior of the major donors to the region, including the US, EC, and to 
some extent also the Netherlands and Norway.  
 
It is fair to argue that this is a clear indicator where most of the foreign aid to the region 
went, and which donors allocated it there.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that saying that aid was given in support to 
government & civil society still does not completely answer the question what was 
actually this ODA spent on. It is more difficult to derive a conclusion about the ends of 
aid given to GCS as opposed to aid allocated for health, water & sanitation, or education, 
as the latter are more “specific”. In this sense, it could also be argued that the fact of the 
GCS’s predominance is a result of its lesser specificity: the field has strong receipts 
because its more generic definition incorporates ODA with a broader set of goals. This 
issue will be revisited in Chapter 7, which will provide additional useful information 
about the final ends of the allocations into the sub-sector of GCS in the Balkans.   
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Table 14: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of government & civil society, by recipient country 
  Alb 
GCS           
(USD millions) 
GCS           
as % of SIS 
GCS           
as % of  SAA     BiH 
GCS           
(USD millions) 
GCS           
as % of SIS 
GCS           
as % of  SAA 
           
1 EC 252,66 90,92 40,64   1 EC 303,46 69,31 28,72 
2 US 162,03 80,91 38,42   2 US 283,97 92,75 31,05 
3 Italy 81,27 33,78 18,60   3 Spain 154,55 84,74 64,95 
4 IDA 76,98 36,76 11,64   4 IDA 116,50 26,48 11,30 
5 Netherl. 30,32 85,55 44,28   5 Netherl. 101,57 77,16 55,83 
6 Norway 27,49 52,31 40,29   6 Norway 92,59 51,96 39,65 
7 Greece 26,11 17,56 16,10   7 Canada 71,46 52,95 48,32 
8 Denmark 22,41 80,75 80,48   8 Sweden 63,85 31,45 23,43 
9 UK 19,82 61,22 47,60   9 Austria 52,88 31,59 29,24 
10 Sweden 17,98 54,28 39,34   10 UK 29,87 57,55 44,61 
                      
  717,08      1270,69   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
Table 15: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of government & civil society, by recipient country 
  Cro 
GCS           
(USD millions) 
GCS           
as % of SIS 
GCS           
as % of  SAA     Mac 
GCS           
(USD millions) 
GCS           
as % of SIS 
GCS           
as % of  SAA 
           
1 EC 169,57 70,96 28,13   1 EC 150,07 75,85 29,92 
2 US 97,67 48,61 35,03   2 US 149,77 77,57 35,22 
3 Norway 41,29 72,68 45,60   3 Greece 70,55 94,97 89,05 
4 Germany 14,27 12,74 11,08   4 Norway 27,66 57,69 42,09 
5 Sweden 12,02 31,64 30,46   5 Netherl. 23,43 31,87 16,60 
6 UK 7,11 66,20 58,82   6 Sweden 19,33 85,54 44,18 
7 Austria 6,45 11,18 10,73   7 Germany 11,76 13,04 6,83 
8 Canada 3,86 76,92 57,28   8 Portugal 10,65 36,07 36,07 
9 Netherl. 3,56 57,19 24,02   9 Switz. 9,56 35,48 15,30 
10 Spain 1,75 26,31 25,27   10 UK 9,41 96,64 60,00 
                      
  357,56      482,17   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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Table 16: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of government & civil society, by recipient country 
  FRY/Ser 
GCS           
(USD millions) 
GCS           
as % of SIS 
GCS           
as % of  SAA     ex Yu  
GCS           
(USD millions) 
GCS           
as % of SIS 
GCS           
as % of  SAA 
           
1 US 787,30 93,61 54,62   1 Norway 68,92 74,05 54,65 
2 EC 728,75 66,95 24,81   2 Greece 27,54 99,98 99,97 
3 Spain 161,67 91,22 89,16   3 Germany 9,65 50,90 33,34 
4 UK 118,16 80,45 75,86   4 Sweden 8,67 99,81 99,27 
5 Germany 108,64 32,77 14,55   5 Finland 6,19 98,05 96,18 
6 Switz. 108,10 69,82 45,47   6 Italy 5,12 31,44 10,72 
7 Norway 105,66 56,63 42,08   7 Switz. 4,52 34,45 19,46 
8 Greece 102,57 89,12 72,94   8 Netherl. 1,84 26,55 10,34 
9 Netherl. 80,53 71,12 45,18   9 Portugal 1,59 99,83 99,83 
10 Austria 78,32 46,44 43,83   10 Spain 1,02 75,52 75,52 
                      
  2379,69      135,06   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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5. Donor Ranking: Economic Infrastructure (EI)  
 
 
5.1 Transport & Storage  
 
The second largest sector in foreign assistance to the Balkans has been the sector of 
economic infrastructure (EI). The following pages will discuss the commitments of 
major donors to the EI sector, using the statistical data from the CRS.  
 
The first sub-sector under review from the EI sector is that of transport & storage. The 
review of the Tables 17-19 presented below (for complete information see Tables 73-79 
in the Annex),  demonstrates that the sub-sector of transport & storage is dominated by 
multilateral ODA, with the EC and IDA clearly being the two strongest and most 
consistent donors  across the countries in the region.  
 
The case of EC aid to transport & storage is particularly interesting when observed as 
percentage share of total EC allocations to EI. As can be seen from Tables 17-19  in all 
the countries of the Balkans, including also the regional category of ex Yu unspecified, 
with the exception only to FRY/Serbia almost all of the EC aid to EI went to transport 
& infrastructure: Albania – 98,38 % ; BiH – 71,28 %; Croatia – 91,49 %; Macedonia – 
90,38 %; ex Yu – 80,95 %. Practically, with the exception to FRY/Serbia, and to a 
lesser extent BiH, almost everything that the EC financed in the Balkans in terms of EI 
was transport & storage.  
 
Worth noting in this regard is the observation that EC aid to transport & storage does 
not seem proportionate to specific country needs. This observation should be considered 
generally valid for many other similar situations. No particular effort will be made at 
this point to prove it by providing additional evidence of the state of need in the 
different countries, but it would rather be taken as statement of the obvious. For 
example, the EC aid for transport & storage to Croatia by far exceeds its support to 
Albania (and as a matter of fact all the other country recipients and the amount spent 
regionally. Thus the conclusion is that allocations are not factored (only) by the 
presence of need, but also by other considerations. This is again a statement of the 
obvious, but it nevertheless deserves attention. Chapter 7 will shed additional light on 
this finding.   
 
The IDA assistance to transport & storage in the region is considerable, with the 
exception to Croatia. For example, in the sub-sector of transport & storage IDA has 
allocated: USD 148,15 million to Albania (ranks first; Table 17);  USD 102,23 to BiH 
(ranks first, Table 17); USD 11,98 million to Macedonia (ranks second; the amount is a 
small share of IDA EI and SAA to the country; Table 18); USD 57,64 million to 
FRY/Ser (ranks second; the allocations represents small share of its EI and SAA 
respectively; Table 19).   It should nevertheless again be reminded that this is not grant 
aid but concessional lending, and that it also depends on the willingness of recipient 
governments to take the IDA loans.  
 
The US absence from transport & storage is more then obvious. The US has channeled 
some small funding in this field, but as can be seen from Tables 17-19, this is a rather 
symbolic share of the US commitment in EI in the region. In perhaps rather simplified 
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terms, the US was not interested in building roads (and other transport infrastructure) in 
the region.    
 
Macedonia’s receipts are obviously much smaller than everybody else’s, in part due to 
the quite smaller IDA commitment to this sub-sector. In addition, in the case of 
Macedonia and Croatia there were not enough donors to compile a top 10 ranking.  
 
Finally, in addition to the EC and IDA, a few other major donors appear as ad-hoc 
supporters, such as Germany to Albania (USD 32, 94 million), or Japan to BiH (USD 
48, 42 million). The case of Portuguese aid to BiH is also quite particular. Portugal has 
allocated USD 57, 51 million for transport & infrastructure in BiH, which is 100 
percent of Portugal’s commitment to EI in Bosnia. In addition to that, it is 100 percent 
of the entire Portugal’s commitment to EI in the Balkans overall. This can be observed 
from Tables 74 – 79 in the Annex (see Annex to Chapter 6); presenting all allocations 
to the sub-sector of transport & storage (Table 75 is BiH). This issue will be revisited in 
Chapter 7, where the analysis of the CRS micro data will try to give the specific answer 
concerning the final end of, among other, Portuguese EI aid to Bosnia.   
 
Again, one of the major observations concerning the sub-sector of transport & storage is 
that it has by and large been supported by multilateral ODA.    
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Table 17: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of transport & storage, by recipient country 
  Alb 
trans. & storage 
(UDS millions) 
trans. & storage 
as % of EI 
trans. & storage   
as % of SAA     BiH 
trans. & storage 
(UDS millions) 
trans. & storage 
as % of EI 
trans. & storage   
as % of SAA 
           
1 IDA 148,15 45,85 22,41   1 IDA 102,23 23,96 9,92 
2 Germany 32,94 21,89 8,00   2 EC 73,76 71,28 6,98 
3 EC 18,60 98,38 2,99   3 Portugal 57,51 100,00 81,56 
4 Italy 15,41 9,56 3,53   4 Japan 48,42 46,33 20,92 
5 US 6,49 4,38 1,54   5 France 4,08 32,86 12,80 
6 Canada 2,01 100,00 22,16   6 Netherl. 3,25 11,15 1,78 
7 Sweden 1,57 51,96 3,43   7 Austria 1,68 27,71 0,93 
8 Netherl. 1,02 40,82 1,48   8 Sweden 1,67 4,37 0,61 
9 Greece 0,75 33,79 0,46   9 Finland 1,63 11,08 2,56 
10 Austria 0,24 12,00 0,59   10 US 1,57 0,31 0,17 
           
    227,17           295,78     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
Table 18: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of transport & storage, by recipient country 
  Cro 
trans. & storage 
(UDS millions) 
trans. & storage 
as % of EI 
trans. & storage   
as % of SAA     Mac 
trans. & storage 
(UDS millions) 
trans. & storage 
as % of EI 
trans. & storage   
as % of SAA 
           
1 EC 124,37 91,49 20,63   1 EC 14,87 90,38 2,96 
2 Italy 1,83 67,27 7,34   2 IDA 11,98 11,37 4,49 
3 France 0,97 50,21 4,65   3 Japan 6,50 96,78 4,49 
4 Norway 0,76 5,00 0,84   4 Greece 2,59 77,18 3,27 
5 Canada 0,43 80,91 6,41   5 US 2,44 1,79 0,57 
6 US 0,28 0,28 0,10   6 Netherl. 1,75 5,98 1,24 
7 Spain 0,01 7,15 0,10   7 Germany 0,31 1,64 0,18 
8       8 Switz. 0,01 0,10 0,02 
9       9     
10       10     
           
    128,64           40,44     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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Table 19: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of transport & storage, by recipient country 
  FRY/Ser 
trans. & storage 
(UDS millions) 
trans. & storage 
as % of EI 
trans. & storage   
as % of SAA     ex Yu 
trans. & storage 
(UDS millions) 
trans. & storage 
as % of EI 
trans. & storage   
as % of SAA 
           
1 EC 61,27 8,69 2,09   1 EC 115,43 80,95 80,95 
2 IDA 57,64 17,57 11,06   2 Japan 15,17 98,82 86,27 
3 Netherl. 18,47 44,06 10,36   3 Norway 4,33 17,25 3,43 
4 Greece 16,09 88,06 11,44   4 Switz. 1,34 36,95 5,75 
5 Germany 12,44 4,61 1,67   5 France 0,50 7,98 3,81 
6 Sweden 7,17 13,64 3,60   6 Italy 0,09 27,29 0,19 
7 Norway 5,29 14,30 2,11   7 Netherl. 0,01 0,20 0,08 
8 France 5,15 27,37 8,04   8     
9 US 2,72 0,52 0,19   9     
10 Switz. 1,94 4,48 0,81   10     
           
    188,18           136,87     
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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5.2 Communications   
 
As can be observed from the statistical data, the sub-sector of communications is the 
least supported field in EI and beyond, and thus it does not offer much material for 
analysis. There is an obvious absence of major bilaterals, which in combination with no 
IDA support, leaves the field with very little support overall.  
 
There are just a few allocations which can actually be considered relevant by exceeding 
the amount of few million. Review of Tables 20-22 presented below (see also Tables 
80-86 in Annex for complete information), which contain the numbers on donor 
commitments to this sub-sector, shows that many of the allocations are smaller than 
USD 1 million.  
 
The overabundance of Italian aid to Albania produces the largest allocation in the field 
of communications in the region, of USD 12, 25 million (Table 20). Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Spain have registered modest contributions to Bosnia (Table 20), and 
the EC to FRY/Serbia (Table 22).  
  
It is interesting that some additional conclusions, which extend beyond the sub-sector of 
communications, can be derived from the fact of the smallness of the allocations to this 
field.   
 
For example, one observation concerns the almost complete French absence from the 
EI sector: even though its contributions (minus FRY/Serbia which stands at USD 1, 20 
million) are around a few hundred thousand USD, they still represent (in Macedonia 
and Albania) 80-90 % of French support to EI. The situation is somewhat different in 
BiH and FRY/Serbia.  
  
Overall, the sub-sector of communications was clearly the least supported field of ODA 
in the Balkans. Italian aid defined the receipts in Albania; Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Spain accounted for most of communications ODA to BiH; and the EC and the 
Netherlands were the strongest donors to FRY/Serbia.  
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 Table 20: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of communications, by recipient country 
  Alb 
comm.         
(USD millions) 
comm.         
as % of EI 
comm.         
as % of SAA     BiH 
comm.         
(USD millions) 
comm.         
as % of EI 
comm.         
as % of SAA 
                      
1 Italy 12,25 7,60 2,80   1 Sweden 9,32 24,41 3,42 
2 Greece 1,21 54,78 0,75   2 Switzerl. 9,06 30,38 6,28 
3 Switzerl. 0,78 14,56 1,45   3 Spain 8,07 17,62 3,39 
4 UK 0,46 76,94 1,11   4 US 2,67 0,53 0,29 
5 Netherl. 0,43 17,47 0,63   5 Netherl. 2,39 8,22 1,32 
6 EC 0,31 1,62 0,05   6 EC 1,63 1,57 0,15 
7 France 0,30 86,18 0,93   7 Norway 1,29 3,88 0,55 
8 Germany 0,19 0,13 0,05   8 France 0,44 3,51 1,37 
9 Sweden 0,01 0,46 0,03   9 Finland 0,41 2,81 0,65 
10       10 Canada 0,37 3,32 0,25 
                      
  15,96      35,66   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
Table 21: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of communications, by recipient country 
  Cro 
comm.         
(USD millions) 
comm.         
as % of EI 
comm.         
as % of SAA     Mac 
comm.         
(USD millions) 
comm.         
as % of EI 
comm.         
as % of SAA 
           
1 US 0,92 0,93 0,33   1 US 2,78 2,05 0,65 
2 France 0,63 32,44 3,00   2 EC 1,58 9,62 0,32 
3 Japan 0,18 35,92 4,28   3 Germany 1,20 6,40 0,70 
4 Germany 0,07 1,01 0,05   4 Netherl. 0,67 2,29 0,48 
5 Norway 0,05 0,33 0,05   5 Greece 0,57 17,02 0,72 
6 Netherl. 0,02 0,63 0,14   6 Italy 0,24 14,23 1,01 
7       7 France 0,18 91,36 1,52 
8       8 UK 0,18 5,87 1,13 
9       9 Norway 0,10 1,05 0,16 
10       10     
                      
  1,87      7,51   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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 Table 22: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of communications, by recipient country 
  FRY/Ser 
comm.         
(USD millions) 
comm.         
as % of EI 
comm.         
as % of SAA     ex Yu 
comm.         
(USD millions) 
comm.         
as % of EI 
comm.         
as % of SAA 
           
1 EC 11,17 1,58 0,38   1 France 1,46 23,35 11,15 
2 Netherl. 7,33 17,48 4,11   2 Netherl. 1,12 15,10 6,29 
3 Norway 3,52 9,52 1,40   3 Norway 0,18 0,71 0,14 
4 US 2,61 0,50 0,18   4 Finland 0,12 100,00 1,91 
5 Sweden 1,71 3,25 0,86   5 Italy 0,09 27,23 0,19 
6 UK 1,21 14,56 0,78   6 Japan 0,03 0,23 0,20 
7 France 1,20 6,38 1,88   7     
8 Canada 0,87 25,84 0,79   8     
9 Germany 0,61 0,23 0,08   9     
10 Switzerl. 0,58 1,35 0,25   10     
                      
  30,82      3,01   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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5.3 Energy  
 
Review of the Tables 23-25 presented below (Tables 87-93 in Annex) demonstrates that 
the sub-sector of energy received substantial amounts of the EI ODA to the Balkans.  As 
it can be observed from the statistical data,  support was not proportionately distributed 
across countries, and   the largest shares of the support for energy went to Albania, BiH, 
and FRY/Serbia, whereas Croatia and Macedonia received very small amounts. This calls 
for additional analysis.  One line of logic is that it has to do with the presence of conflict 
which produced the energy needs, in the sense that a lot of infrastructure needed 
reconstruction (for example the oil refineries and the related energy infrastructure in 
Serbia).   In Macedonia the conflict was confined, and to some extent in Croatia too and 
this resulted with smaller ODA for energy.  In addition to that, another factor was 
presented by the strong energy needs in Albania which are (still at present) much greater 
than in the rest of the region, due to much poorer energy infrastructure.274  
 
As evident from Tables 23-25, the energy field is quite strongly dominated by IDA 
funding, which is consistently and strongly present in all of the countries in the region. As 
a curiosity, the CRS has even registered presence of IDA funding (USD 8, 0 million) to 
Croatia, which is (generally) ineligible for IDA money. This USD 8 million allocation is 
clearly a one-off exception to this rule. For example, IDA allocations to the sub sector of 
energy included: USD 133, 22 million to Albania (IDA ranks second; Table 23); USD 
132, 25 million to BiH (IDA ranks first; Table 23); USD 54, 25 million to FRY/Ser (IDA 
ranks thirds; Table 25).  
 
Some of the patterns already discerned in other sub-sectors are also observable in energy. 
Italy is a strong donor to Albania; the only relevant EC contribution for energy has gone 
to FRY/Serbia, whereas everybody else in the region (with minor exception of BiH) has 
received no EC support. For comparison, EC energy ODA to FRY/Serbia amounted to 
USD 339,61 million (the EC ranks first; Table 25); the second largest EC commitment to 
energy in the Balkans was to BiH in the amount of USD 15,57 million (the EC ranks 6th, 
after Switzerland; Table 23). There has been no   EC support for energy to any other of 
the countries in the Balkans. The conclusion is quite straightforward: this was a country-
based policy urged by the particular situation in Serbia. Table 92 in the Annex shows the 
time-dynamic of EC energy ODA to FRY/Serbia.  As it can be seen from the table, the 
relevant allocations start in the year 2000. Before that Serbia was ineligible. Nevertheless, 
it least a part of this accounts for on the Energy for Democracy project which was 
discussed in Chapter 4. This will also be corroborated by the micro data in Chapter 7.  
 
  As evident from Tables 23-25, Germany, as in other fields, has contributed a lot in 
Albania and in FRY/Serbia. For example, its energy commitment to Albania was USD 
92, 89 million (or 61, 73 % of its EI aid to the country; Table 20); the commitment to 
FRY/Serbia was USD 173, 42 million (64, 26 % of its EI to the country). This practically 
concludes Germany’s relevant contributions for energy in the region (Bosnia received 
USD 9, 30 million; which ranked Germany as the 9th strongest donor to the field in BiH; 
Table 23).  
 
                                                 
274 The fact of the particular challenge of energy supply in Albania will be taken as common 
knowledge and it would not be substantiated with specific evidence.  
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The strong Japanese support for energy in Albania and BiH should also be mentioned.  
Japan has allocated USD 32,27 million for energy to Albania and it ranks as 4th largest 
donors (the allocation represents entire 99,81 % of Japan’s EI assistance to the country; 
Table 20); and USD 55,69 million to BiH (ranks 2nd; the allocations is 53,30 % of its EI 
ODA to the country; Table 20).As it can be seen from Table 88 in the Annex, Japan’s 
energy assistance to Albania was allocated in only two years, 1995 and 1996. Table 89 in 
the Annex shows that Japan’s contributions for energy to BiH took place the two 
subsequent years, of 1997 and 1998. Tables 88-93 in the Annex show that Japan did not 
make any other bigger contributions to energy in the region. This lends the conclusion 
that these allocations were a result of country-based decisions, and that Japan did not 
have a policy of supporting energy in the Balkans.  
 
   Spain has also made a relevant contribution to its regional champion – Bosnia.  Its 
allocation for energy to BiH is USD 36, 93 million and it represents entire 80, 60% of 
Spanish EI ODA to BiH.  
 
Norway appears as a consistent donor to energy throughout the region. In addition to the 
relevant nominal amounts, energy support represents huge percentage share of Norway’s 
EI allocations in the Balkans. For example Norway has committed:   USD 14,42 million 
to Albania ( 99,96 of its EI aid to the country); USD 25,08 to BiH (75,15% of its EI aid); 
USD13,78 million to Croatia (90,81 % of its EI assistance to the country); USD 6,50 to 
Macedonia (65,04% of its EI aid) USD and 22,85 million to FRY/Serbia (61,75% of its 
EI allocations to the country). It can be concluded that this was a result of consistent 
policy choice. Norway has chosen to channel from 2/3 to almost all its EI ODA to the 
sub-sector of energy.  
 
In conclusion: the sub-sector of energy has been consistently dominated by IDA; the EC 
(as usual) has made a big contribution only to FRY/Serbia. Most of the energy ODA in 
the region went to three countries: Albania, BiH, and FRY/Serbia.  
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Table 23: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of energy, by recipient country 
  Alb 
energy         
(USD millions) 
energy         
as % of EI 
energy         
as % of SAA     BiH 
energy         
(USD millions) 
energy         
as % of EI 
energy         
as % of SAA 
           
1 Italy 133,36 82,72 30,52   1 IDA 132,25 31,00 12,83 
2 IDA 132,22 40,92 20,00   2 Japan 55,69 53,30 24,07 
3 Germany 92,89 61,73 22,56   3 Spain 36,93 80,60 15,52 
4 Japan 37,27 99,81 61,51   4 Norway 25,08 75,15 10,74 
5 Norway 14,42 99,96 21,13   5 Switzerl. 18,30 61,34 12,69 
6 US 6,82 4,60 1,62   6 EC 15,57 15,05 1,47 
7 Switzerl. 2,41 44,80 4,47   7 Finland 12,65 86,11 19,86 
8       8 Canada 10,76 96,68 7,28 
9       9 Germany 9,30 17,47 4,59 
10       10 Austria 4,36 71,95 2,41 
                     
   419,39      320,91   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
Table 24: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of energy, by recipient country 
  Cro 
energy         
(USD millions) 
energy         
as % of EI 
energy         
as % of SAA     Mac 
energy         
(USD millions) 
energy         
as % of EI 
energy         
as % of SAA 
           
1 Norway 13,78 90,81 15,22   1 Switzerl. 9,89 98,14 15,82 
2 IDA 8,00 100,00 100,00   2 Norway 6,50 65,04 9,90 
3 US 2,14 2,17 0,77   3 Austria 1,80 91,22 6,41 
4 UK 0,11 8,23 0,89   4 US 1,78 1,31 0,42 
5 Canada 0,10 19,09 1,51   5 Germany 0,19 0,99 0,11 
6 Japan 0,07 14,41 1,72   6 Japan 0,02 0,36 0,02 
7 Belgium 0,03 100,00 1,57   7     
8 Italy 0,01 0,28 0,03   8     
9       9     
10       10     
                     
   24,24      20,18   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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Table 25: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of energy, by recipient country 
  FRY/Ser 
energy         
(USD millions) 
energy         
as % of EI 
energy         
as % of SAA     ex Yu 
energy         
(USD millions) 
energy         
as % of EI 
energy         
as % of SAA 
           
1 EC 339,61 48,14 11,56   1 Norway 9,07 36,13 7,19 
2 Germany 173,42 64,26 23,22   2 Netherl. 6,30 84,70 35,29 
3 IDA 54,25 16,54 10,41   3 France 4,28 68,67 32,79 
4 Switzerl. 32,71 75,68 13,76   4 Japan 0,06 0,39 0,34 
5 Sweden 28,76 54,69 14,43   5     
6 Norway 22,85 61,75 9,10   6     
7 Japan 11,14 97,49 34,13   7     
8 France 11,04 58,72 17,25   8     
9 US 10,23 1,96 0,71   9     
10 Spain 2,85 100,00 1,57   10     
                     
   686,85      19,71   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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 5.4 Banking & Financial Services   
 
The sub-sector of BFS was the second least assisted field in sector of economic 
infrastructure, after communication, as can be seen from Tables 26-28. The major 
receipts in the field of BFS were collected by two countries only, Bosnia and 
FRY/Serbia   . As in other cases, it is obvious that just a few major donors determined 
the situation in the sub-sector: IDA, the US, and Germany. The single largest donor to 
the Balkans, the EC was conspicuously absent from the field.  
 
IDA has obviously been the most consistent donor to BFS in the region. For example, 
IDA allocations to BFS included: USD 42, 72 million to Albania (ranks first; Table 
26); USD 33, 32 million to BiH (ranks second; Table 26); USD 201, 91 million to 
FRY/Serbia (ranks first; Table 28).  
 
 Most of the US support went to BiH; the US has committed USD 133, 02 million to 
the country (ranks first; Table 26). For comparison, Albania received only USD 7, 08 
million, and Croatia USD 8, 60 million for support to BFS from the US. Beyond this, 
the US made no other allocations to the sub-sector.     Germany relevantly supported 
FRY/Serbia (USD 54, 73 million), BiH (USD 29, 15 million), and Albania (USD 15, 
27 million).    Sweden had a sizeable contribution to BiH (USD 23, 54 million); the 
Netherlands made its only relevant allocation to its regional protégé Macedonia.  
 
Except for IDA, no other donor seems to have pursued a consistent policy of support 
to BFS. Clearly, some donors, such as the EC had a clear policy not to support this 
field. The rest was a result of country-based policy choices, such as, Dutch aid to 
Macedonia (USD 25, 14 million).  
 
Overall, beyond IDA, the US, and Germany, it is clear there was not much interest in 
the wider donor community to support BFS. Even amounts as small as USD 0, 05 
million had to be registered in order to populate the top 10 rankings, but even that for 
example did not complete the list in the case of Macedonia. Even donors who are 
traditionally   absent from the Balkans, such as Belgium or Ireland, entered the 
ranking as a result of the scarcity and the small size of the contributions.  
 
The EC has been absolutely absent from the field and it is obvious that this is a clear 
policy choice.   
 
In conclusion: the sub-sector of BFS is by and large determined by IDA and a few 
bigger allocations by some of the major bilaterals.  Clearly, there was not much 
interest in the donor community to support BFS in the Balkans, which resulted with 
the fact that the field is the second least assisted sub-sector after the sub-sector of 
communications.  
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Table 26: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of banking & financial services, by recipient country 
  Alb 
BFS           
(USD millions) 
BFS           
as % of EI 
BFS           
as % of SAA     BiH 
BFS           
(USD millions) 
BFS           
as % of EI 
BFS           
as % of SAA 
           
1 IDA 42,72 13,22 6,46   1 US 133,02 26,30 14,55 
2 Germany 15,27 10,14 3,71   2 IDA 33,32 7,81 3,23 
3 US 7,08 4,78 1,68   3 Germany 29,15 54,74 14,39 
4 Switzerl. 2,18 40,64 4,05   4 Sweden 23,54 61,67 8,64 
5 Sweden 1,39 45,94 3,03   5 France 5,02 40,45 15,77 
6 Belgium 0,90 100,00 76,78   6 Norway 2,33 6,99 1,00 
7 Greece 0,20 8,96 0,12   7 Switzerl. 1,81 6,07 1,26 
8 UK 0,14 23,06 0,33   8 Belgium 1,56 100,00 10,18 
9 Ireland 0,08 100,00 3,71   9 UK 1,53 10,16 2,28 
10 Italy 0,06 0,03 0,01   10 Italy 1,27 42,26 0,92 
                      
  70,01      232,55   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
Table 27: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of banking & financial services, by recipient country 
  Cro 
BFS           
(USD millions) 
BFS           
as % of EI 
BFS           
as % of SAA     Mac 
BFS           
(USD millions) 
BFS           
as % of EI 
BFS           
as % of SAA 
           
1 US 8,60 8,69 3,08   1 Netherl. 25,14 85,87 17,82 
2 Netherl. 3,29 99,33 22,18   2 Norway 2,61 26,14 3,98 
3 UK 1,19 91,77 9,88   3 Sweden 2,43 98,94 5,56 
4 France 0,33 17,16 1,59   4 Germany 2,01 10,70 1,17 
5 Italy 0,31 11,34 1,24   5 Italy 1,10 65,34 4,65 
6 Norway 0,27 1,76 0,30   6 UK 0,59 19,56 3,77 
7 Germany 0,26 3,87 0,20   7 Belgium 0,57 100,00 20,41 
8 Spain 0,09 92,85 1,24   8 Japan 0,05 0,77 0,04 
9 EC 0,06 0,04 0,01   9     
10 Japan 0,05 9,43 1,12   10     
                      
  14,44      34,51   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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Table 28: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of banking & financial services, by recipient country 
FRY/Ser 
BFS           
(USD millions) 
BFS           
as % of EI 
BFS           
as % of SAA     ex Yu 
BFS           
(USD millions) 
BFS           
as % of EI 
BFS           
as % of SAA 
          
IDA 201,91 61,54 38,73   1 Norway 2,51 10,01 1,99 
Germany 54,73 20,28 7,33   2 Switzerl. 1,70 46,98 7,32 
Switzerl. 7,77 17,97 3,27   3 Germany 0,37 100,00 1,29 
EC 7,52 1,07 0,26   4 Italy 0,09 27,65 0,19 
Sweden 6,23 11,84 3,12   5 Japan 0,05 0,35 0,31 
Netherl. 5,96 14,20 3,34   6     
UK 5,41 64,82 3,47   7     
Luxemb. 2,46 89,38 6,37   8     
Norway 2,11 5,69 0,84   9     
Belgium 1,89 100,00 7,08   10     
                    
 295,96      4,73   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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5.5 Business & Other Services  
 
A lot of the support channeled into the EI sector in the Balkans went into the sub-sector of 
business & other services (BOS).  . With the exception of Albania, in all other countries in 
the region receipts for BOS were a strong share of total EI allocations.  
 
What is interesting about the sub-sector of BOS is that practically no other field of ODA in 
the Balkans has been so strongly dominated by only one donor. In the case of BOS the 
dominant donor is the US. As evident from Tables 29-31 (complete information in Tables 
101-107 in Annex), not only that the US ranks consistently as top donor to BOS in all the 
countries in the region, but in addition to that, its allocations represent a very high percentage 
share (from 72, 42 % in BiH to 96, 80 % in FRY/Serbia) of total US ODA spending in the EI 
sector.  
 
In simple terms, the BOS sub-sector in the Balkans is by and large defined by the consistent 
US policy to support business development in the region. The   high percentage shares of 
BOS preclude the US presence in the other sub-sectors in EI.  
 
In addition to the US, IDA is consistently strong in BOS across the region. For example, IDA 
has committed: USD 158, 83 in BiH (Table 29); USD 93, 35 million in Macedonia (Table 
30); and USD 14, 30 million to FRY/Serbia (Table 31).     
 
Germany has been present with more modest amounts but has nevertheless been consistently 
present (USD 9, 19 million to Albania; USD 14, 78 million to BiH; USD 6, 34 million to 
Croatia; USD 15, 08 million to Macedonia; and USD 28, 67 million to FRY/Serbia).  
 
The Netherlands has made relevant contributions only to BiH (USD 20, 12 million) and 
FRY/Serbia (USD 10, 17 million). The EC, almost by the definition, has given the most of its 
BOS assistance   to FRY/Serbia (USD 285, 86 million).  
 
In regional terms nevertheless, as well as in each individual country, the sub-sector of BOS is 
an exclusive domain of US aid.  
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Table 29: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of business & other services, by recipient country 
  Alb 
BOS           
(USD millions) 
BOS           
as % of EI 
BOS           
as % of SAA     BiH 
BOS           
(USD millions) 
BOS           
as % of EI 
BOS           
as % of SAA 
           
1 US 127,83 86,24 30,31   1 US 366,22 72,42 40,05 
2 Germany 9,19 6,11 2,23   2 IDA 158,83 37,23 15,41 
3 Netherl. 1,04 41,71 1,52   3 Netherl. 20,12 69,11 11,06 
4 UNDP 0,38 100,00 17,93   4 Germany 14,78 27,77 7,30 
5 Italy 0,13 0,08 0,03   5 EC 12,39 11,97 1,17 
6 France 0,05 13,30 0,14   6 UK 11,47 76,22 17,14 
7 Sweden 0,05 1,64 0,11   7 Sweden 3,48 9,11 1,28 
8 Japan 0,02 0,04 0,03   8 Norway 3,15 9,44 1,35 
9       9 Italy 1,08 35,97 0,79 
10       10 Spain 0,69 1,51 0,29 
                      
  138,68      592,22   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
Table 30: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of business & other services, by recipient country 
  Cro 
BOS           
(USD millions) 
BOS           
as % of EI 
BOS           
as % of SAA     Mac 
BOS           
(USD millions) 
BOS           
as % of EI 
BOS           
as % of SAA 
           
1 US 87,05 87,94 31,22   1 US 128,80 94,85 30,29 
2 EC 11,52 8,47 1,91   2 IDA 93,35 88,63 35,03 
3 Germany 6,34 95,12 4,92   3 Germany 15,08 80,27 8,75 
4 Italy 0,57 21,10 2,30   4 UK 2,25 74,57 14,37 
5 Norway 0,32 2,10 0,35   5 Netherl. 1,71 5,86 1,22 
6 Japan 0,21 40,24 4,79   6 Norway 0,78 7,78 1,18 
7       7 Italy 0,34 20,43 1,45 
8       8 Greece 0,19 5,80 0,25 
9       9 Switzerl. 0,18 1,76 0,28 
10       10 Austria 0,17 8,78 0,62 
                      
  106,00      242,86   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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Table 31: Top 10 donors to the sub-sector of business & other services, by recipient country 
  FRY/Ser 
BOS           
(USD millions) 
BOS           
as % of EI 
BOS           
as % of SAA     ex Yu 
BOS           
(USD millions) 
BOS           
as % of EI 
BOS           
as % of SAA 
           
1 US 505,90 96,80 35,10   1 EC 27,16 19,05 19,05 
2 EC 285,86 40,52 9,73   2 Norway 9,01 35,90 7,14 
3 Germany 28,67 10,62 3,84   3 Switzerl. 0,58 16,06 2,50 
4 IDA 14,30 4,36 2,74   4 Italy 0,06 17,84 0,13 
5 Netherl. 10,17 24,26 5,71   5 Japan 0,03 0,21 0,18 
6 Sweden 8,72 16,58 4,37   6     
7 Norway 3,24 8,74 1,29   7     
8 Greece 1,61 8,82 1,15   8     
9 Canada 1,08 31,97 0,98   9     
10 UK 0,43 5,11 0,27   10     
                      
  859,97      36,84   
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
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6. Disaggregation of Sector Allocations per Donor  
 
Following the review of top donors to countries – per sector, the remainder of the chapter 
continues with the exercise of sectoral disaggregation of foreign assistance to the Balkans. 
Additional insights in this process can be obtained through another angle of refraction – 
disaggregation of the allocations to a sector by donor. Whereas the previous review provided 
information on top donors to a specific sector per country, i.e. top donors to education in Albania, 
this one provides a full sector breakdown per donor for the fields of SIS and EI, for example, all 
allocations made by the EC in education, health, BFS, and all other sub-sectors in the recipient 
countries.  
 
The exercise is similar to the previous one but it nevertheless allows   observations which were 
either not possible, or were more difficultly obtainable through the previous review.  
 
This phase of the review will encompass the major donors to the region. For this purpose it will 
consult the original ranking in Chapter 5 based on data for the period 1990-2005.  The exercise 
will involve the top 10 bilaterals plus Japan, and the top two multilaterals, the EC, and IDA. The 
third strongest multilateral donor, UNHCR, which ranks the top 10 combined list of biggest donors 
to the region (Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5), is not included, as the ODA provided by UNHCR is 
not sector allocable aid (SAA).   
 
Although Japan is not on the top 10 list of major bilaterals, the closer review of Japan’s 
commitments of SAA over the previous pages clearly showed that Japan was a relevant donor in 
the Balkans. For comparison, although the UK and France rank higher than Japan on the overall 
listing (the UK is 6th and France is 9th; Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5), as already observed, their 
volumes of aid have been created by debt relief to FRY/Serbia.   Because of this, the choice is 
made to also extend the review to Japan.   
 
The goal of this exercise is, to continue the exploration into the sectoral allocation of foreign 
assistance to the Balkans, to look for patterns and to analyze how donors made their decisions on 
aid allocation to the region.  
 
Overall, the sectoral commitments of 13 major bilateral and multilateral donors will be examined.  
 
 
 
6.1 European Commission  
 
The review begins with discussion of the foreign assistance flows of the largest donor to the 
Balkans, the European Commission. Table 32 presented below contains the allocations made by 
the EC to the countries in the Balkans in the sectors of SIS and EI. Some of the more interesting 
observations which can be discerned from Table 32 include:  
 
a) as already pointed out, the EC demonstrated consistency across countries in support 
of education. All Balkan countries received support for education;  
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b) in sub-sectors where the EC was active only by exception, such as the sectors of 
health, or energy, the exception was usually made in favor of FRY/Serbia;  
c) the EC was consistent in supporting  transport & storage (mostly funding for road 
infrastructure);  although as a rule the EC   did not  charge allocations to ex Yu, 
logically, there has been a substantial amount for transport & storage allocated to 
the category of  ex Yu (as assumedly some of the infrastructure was constructed 
regionally);  
d) FRY/Serbia received the lion’s share of EC support in the major sectors of SIS and 
EI;  
e) fields where the EC had more consistent presence were GCS (its major realm of 
activity) and education in SIS; and transport & storage in EI;  
f) as already observed most of the EC assistance   for EI in the Balkans was for 
transport  & storage;  
 
Table 32: EC allocations to the SIS and EI sectors (USD 2006 millions).  
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 13,24 15,50 33,67 24,63 75,47 0,00 
health 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 76,51 0,00 
watsan 9,82 51,60 15,73 1,33 53,09 0,00 
population 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
GCS 252,66 303,46 169,57 150,07 787,30 0,00 
other  2,17 67,28 20,01 21,81 154,61 0,00 
              
 277,90 437,84 238,99 197,85 1146,99 0,00 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
trans. & storage 18,60 73,76 124,37 14,87 61,27 115,43 
communications 0,31 1,63 0,00 1,58 11,17 0,00 
energy 0,00 15,57 0,00 0,00 339,61 0,00 
BFS 0,00 0,13 0,06 0,00 7,52 0,00 
BOS 0,00 12,39 11,52 0,00 285,86 27,16 
              
 18,90 103,48 135,94 16,45 705,43 142,59 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
 
6.2 Germany  
 
Germany was the strongest bilateral donor to the Balkans in the period of transition. German aid to 
the Balkans in the sectors of SIS and EI is presented in Table 33 below. Analysis of the statistical 
data contained in the table lends some of the following observations:  
 
a) Similar to the EC, Germany was consistent in supporting education in the region; 
all countries in the region received relevant support for education; 
 240
 
b) German ODA consistently supported water & sanitation.   Germany has been the 
single strongest donor in the field of water & sanitation to the point that it can be 
termed its niche interest in foreign aid to the region; 
c) relative to its size, Albania received the biggest share of German aid in SIS and EI; 
 
 
Table 33:  Germany’s allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions).  
 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 25,51 54,86 41,75 18,86 96,46 9,31 
health 5,94 0,09 0,02 1,56 5,23 0,00 
watsan 154,12 22,79 50,62 48,67 105,94 0,00 
population 6,87 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
GCS 10,32 27,93 14,27 11,76 108,64 9,65 
other  9,81 10,06 5,36 9,34 15,28 0,00 
              
 212,59 115,72 112,02 90,18 331,55 18,95 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
trans. & storage 32,94 0,00 0,00 0,31 12,44 0,00 
communications 0,19 0,01 0,07 1,20 0,61 0,00 
energy 92,89 9,30 0,00 0,19 173,42 0,00 
BFS 15,27 29,15 0,26 2,01 54,73 0,37 
BOS 9,19 14,78 6,34 15,08 28,67 0,00 
              
 150,49 53,25 6,66 18,79 269,86 0,37 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
 
6.3 United States  
 
The US has been the strongest bilateral donor to the Balkans, second to Germany. The major 
specificities of the US support to the region have already been pointed out in the previous review 
of top donor rankings, that is, strong presence in primarily two sub-sectors, GCS and BOS.  
 
Table 34 presented below corroborates this finding. The US has had some presence in practically 
all the other sub-sectors, but that presence is absolutely minor to its activity in its two major sub-
sectors of interest. As already mentioned earlier, the US had been obviously absent from the sector 
of transport & storage, which can also be observed from Table 34.  
 
In addition, it does appear that   the US overall commitments across countries are rather balanced, 
relative to country size, with a minor exception to BiH which appears to be the recipient most 
generously assisted by the US in the region.  
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Table 34:  US allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions)  
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 8,66 0,77 9,26 15,39 6,56 0,00 
health 16,35 0,55 0,41 0,20 7,40 0,00 
watsan 0,84 15,19 0,79 0,63 10,25 0,00 
population 8,79 0,00 9,47 0,19 7,05 0,00 
GCS 162,03 283,97 97,67 149,77 787,30 0,00 
other  3,58 5,68 11,42 26,91 22,51 0,00 
              
 200,25 306,15 129,01 193,08 841,06 0,00 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
trans. & storage 6,49 1,57 0,28 2,44 2,72 0,00 
communications 0,00 2,67 0,92 2,78 2,61 0,00 
energy 6,82 2,24 2,14 1,78 10,23 0,00 
BFS 7,08 133,02 8,60 0,00 1,17 0,00 
BOS 127,83 366,22 87,05 128,80 505,90 0,00 
              
 148,22 505,71 98,99 135,79 522,62 0,00 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
 
6.4 IDA 
 
IDA has been the 4th strongest donor to the region in the period of transition.  Table 35 presented 
below shows that, with the exception to a few sectors, and one country – Croatia, IDA has had 
varied yet consistent presence in the Balkans.  
 
The country which has received the largest share of IDA’s support to the region has been Bosnia.  
 
IDA’s absence from Croatia relevantly contributed to the status of Croatia as one of the least 
assisted countries in not just the Balkans, but also wider Eastern Europe.  
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Table 35:  IDA allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions) 
 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 15,45 44,64 0,00 6,20 23,00 0,00 
health 21,41 31,80 0,00 19,50 30,19 0,00 
watsan 51,05 68,00 0,00 17,70 8,00 0,00 
population 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
GCS 76,98 116,50 0,00 0,00 12,78 0,00 
other  44,51 179,00 0,00 75,41 38,52 0,00 
              
 209,41 439,94 0,00 118,81 112,48 0,00 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
       
trans. & storage 148,15 102,23 0,00 11,98 57,64 0,00 
communications 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
energy 132,22 132,25 8,00 0,00 54,25 0,00 
BFS 42,72 33,32 0,00 0,00 201,91 0,00 
BOS 0,00 158,83 0,00 93,35 14,30 0,00 
              
 323,09 426,63 8,00 105,32 328,11 0,00 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
 
6.5 Netherlands  
 
The Netherlands has been the 3rd strongest bilateral donor to the region in the period of transition, 
right after Germany and the United States.  
 
 The distribution of Dutch ODA in the SIS and EI sectors in the Balkans is presented on Table 36 
below. Analysis of the data contained in the table allows several interesting observations:  
 
a) GCS is the sector where the Netherlands has allocated most of its aid; in many other fields 
the Netherlands has quite a symbolic presence;  
b) in more than one case only one country in the region has received the bulk of the funding in 
a field: the case of education to Macedonia was already pointed out earlier; similar is the 
case of transport & storage to FRY/Serbia or to some extent BFS to Macedonia.  
c) evident is the absence of support to Croatia  ; the Netherlands belongs to the group of 
donors which chose not to support Croatia;  
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Table 36:  Dutch allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions) 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 0,28 1,35 0,00 43,22 3,06 0,77 
health 0,81 6,22 1,04 0,00 9,32 2,92 
watsan 0,09 3,39 0,00 0,00 11,30 0,58 
population 1,59 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,66 0,59 
GCS 30,32 101,57 3,56 23,43 80,53 1,84 
other  2,35 19,10 1,62 6,85 7,36 0,24 
              
 35,44 131,63 6,23 73,50 113,23 6,95 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
       
trans. & storage 1,02 3,25 0,00 1,75 18,47 0,01 
communications 0,43 2,39 0,02 0,67 7,33 1,12 
energy 0,00 3,35 0,00 0,00 0,00 6,30 
BFS 0,00 0,00 3,29 25,14 5,96 0,00 
BOS 1,04 20,12 0,00 1,71 10,17 0,00 
              
 2,49 29,12 3,31 29,28 41,93 7,43 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
6.6 Italy  
 
Italy was 4th largest bilateral donor to the region and it ranks 7th on the combined list of both 
bilateral and multilateral donors (Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5). As already discussed in the 
previous chapter, Italy was a donor sui generis in that its ODA to the Balkans has been strongly 
defined by its special relationship with one recipient – Albania.  
 
Even though Table 37 below is only a partial picture, as it only comprises two sectors in the realm 
of SAA, Italy’s position of a donor of particular profile   is also visible from here. First and 
foremost, Italy’s approach is defined by its special tie to Albania. In only one case, in the sub-
sector of education, another country (BiH) received a bigger allocation than Albania. In all the 
other fields it is obvious that there is one policy for Albania, and another policy for the rest of the 
region. For example, from Table 37 it can be observed that: 
 
a) Croatia received very little from Italy, even less than from the Netherlands; Italy was also 
in the group of donors which chose not to support Croatia;  
b) there is a strong disparity between allocations to SIS and allocations to EI; with the 
exception to Albania, Italy is almost absent from the EI sector; 
c) in line with what said above, as many other donors, Italy is almost completely disengaged, 
or only symbolically present in some fields, such as BFS, BOS, or population; 
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Table 37:  Italy’s allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions) 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 29,18 53,92 1,42 1,01 2,03 5,18 
health 27,71 5,41 0,13 1,68 5,60 1,76 
watsan 74,52 1,94 0,93 9,73 0,52 0,00 
population 3,20 2,61 0,02 0,00 0,10 0,00 
GCS 81,27 13,45 1,06 2,92 15,08 5,12 
other  24,74 16,52 0,92 4,70 9,00 4,22 
              
 240,61 93,84 4,48 20,04 32,33 16,29 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
trans. & storage 15,41 0,50 1,83 0,00 0,00 0,09 
communications 12,25 0,11 0,00 0,24 0,37 0,09 
energy 133,36 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
BFS 0,06 1,27 0,31 1,10 0,00 0,09 
BOS 0,13 1,08 0,57 0,34 0,16 0,06 
              
 161,21 3,00 2,72 1,68 0,53 0,34 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
6.7 Norway  
 
Norway was the 5th largest bilateral donor to the Balkans in the period 1990-2005. From what 
appears in Table 38, Norway was a donor active in all the sub-sectors under exploration, even if in 
some of them it had merely a symbolic presence. For example, from Table 38 it can be observed 
that:  
 
a) as with many other donors, most of Norway’s aid went to the sub-sector of GCS; 
b) Norway had relevant interest in water & sanitation; 
c) Norway acted as a strong supporter to the field of energy, consistently across the region;  
d) Norway is not in the group of donors who recognizing that Croatia was economically   
ahead of the other countries in the region withheld aid from Croatia. Croatia’s receipts 
from Norway in both SIS and EI are larger than both Albania and Macedonia’s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 245
 
Table 38: Norway’s allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions) 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 3,50 3,75 0,39 3,75 11,94 1,72 
health 4,77 3,52 2,06 5,15 17,69 7,58 
watsan 10,80 38,66 1,40 3,18 17,40 5,49 
population 0,03 1,26 0,74 0,93 1,06 0,32 
GCS 27,49 92,59 41,29 27,66 105,66 68,92 
other  5,96 38,42 10,93 7,28 32,82 9,04 
              
 52,56 178,20 56,81 47,94 186,58 93,08 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
       
trans. & storage 0,00 1,52 0,76 0,00 5,29 4,33 
communications 0,00 1,29 0,05 0,10 3,52 0,18 
energy 14,42 25,08 13,78 6,50 22,85 9,07 
BFS 0,00 2,33 0,27 2,61 2,11 2,51 
BOS 0,00 3,15 0,32 0,78 3,24 9,01 
              
 14,42 33,38 15,18 10,00 37,01 25,10 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
 
6.8 United Kingdom  
  
The United Kingdom ranks as the 6th largest donor to the Balkans in the period 1990 -2005 (Table 
35; Annex to Chapter 5). Nevertheless, is it has already been discussed in Chapter 5, big part of 
UK’s ODA to the Balkans has been in the form of debt relief, primarily to FRY/Serbia. This is 
why the UK was not much represented in the preceding discussion on sectoral disaggregation.  
Table 39 presented below offers the following observations:  
 
 
a) the only sub-sector where UK had relevant presence is GCS; actually the UK seems quite 
absent from all other sub-sectors, with some exception to health, and the allocations 
charged under “other”; 
b) Macedonia is conspicuously under-assisted by the UK; in the SIS sector it has received 
even less aid than Croatia; 
c) the UK belongs to the group of donors which have been  regularly inactive in the EI sector 
in the Balkans; Bosnia is a minor exception;  
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Table 39:  UK’s allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions) 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 0,27 0,62 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
health 6,89 3,67 0,93 0,00 22,27 0,00 
watsan 0,00 0,00 0,12 0,33 0,00 0,00 
population 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
GCS 19,82 29,87 7,11 9,41 118,16 1,14 
other  5,36 17,75 2,57 0,00 6,44 1,93 
              
 32,38 51,90 10,74 9,73 146,86 3,07 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
       
trans. & storage 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
communications 0,46 0,00 0,00 0,18 1,21 0,00 
energy 0,00 2,05 0,11 0,00 1,29 0,00 
BFS 0,14 1,53 1,19 0,59 5,41 0,00 
BOS 0,00 11,47 0,00 2,25 0,43 0,00 
              
 0,60 15,05 1,30 3,02 8,34 0,00 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
6.9 Austria                 
 
Austria ranked 7th on the list of largest bilateral donors to the Balkan in the period of transition 
(Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5). The preceding discussion particularly underscored Austria’s 
consistent support in the sub-sector of education. Table 40   below presents Austria’s overall 
allocations to the sector of SIS and EI.  The first observation which comes from Table 40 
containing the numbers on is that: 
 
a) Austria is almost completely absent from the entire EI sector.  This is clearly a deliberate 
policy choice to work primarily in SIS. Hence, Austria belongs to the group of donors who 
in the region of the Balkans were as a rule not active in the EI sector; 
b) In the SIS sector, as already mentioned,  it is obvious that Austria has strong and consistent 
(if varied) presence primarily in education,  
c)  Austria registered also some activity in GCS and water & sanitation.  
d) The bulk of Austria’s aid went to FRY/Serbia and BiH; Croatia was favored to both 
Albania and Macedonia.  
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Table 40:  Austria’s allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions) 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 13,29 93,28 50,77 9,06 72,54 7,88 
health 1,88 3,88 0,01 0,00 0,22 0,47 
watsan 18,76 15,00 0,00 16,09 9,42 0,00 
population 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
GCS 0,25 52,88 6,45 0,71 78,32 0,38 
other  0,58 2,26 0,48 0,21 8,15 0,00 
              
 34,76 167,38 57,72 26,06 168,65 8,72 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
trans. & storage 0,24 1,68 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,00 
communications 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
energy 1,74 4,36 0,00 1,80 0,00 0,00 
BFS 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 
BOS 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,17 0,02 0,00 
              
 1,98 6,06 0,00 1,97 0,11 0,00 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
6.10 Sweden  
 
Sweden ranked top 8th bilateral donor to the Balkan in the period of transition (Table 35; Annex to 
Chapter 5) The preceding discussion on sectoral disaggregation of ODA highlighted the 
characteristics of Swedish SAA.   Review of Table 41 presented below offers several more 
relevant observations concerning Swedish ODA in the SIS and EI sector. As can be seen from 
Table 41:   
 
a) most of Swedish ODA in the SIS sector was   allocated to the sub-sector of GCS; 
b) substantial amount of Swedish ODA was allocated  to the category “other”; 
c) most of the aid in SIS and EI went to BiH and FRY/Serbia, and these are the only 
recipients who benefited from relevant allocations in the EI sector;  
d) Sweden was conspicuously absent from the sub-sector of education;  
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Table 41: Sweden’s allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions) 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 0,00 2,54 0,93 0,76 0,98 0,00 
health 8,65 7,48 1,27 0,00 1,53 0,00 
watsan 3,56 0,00 0,00 0,40 6,11 0,00 
population 0,85 1,14 0,00 0,84 1,67 0,00 
GCS 17,98 63,85 12,02 19,33 59,94 8,67 
other  2,08 127,99 23,77 1,26 48,35 0,02 
              
 33,13 203,00 37,98 22,60 118,56 8,68 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
trans. & storage 1,57 1,67 0,00 0,00 7,17 0,00 
communications 0,01 9,32 0,00 0,00 1,71 0,00 
energy 0,00 0,17 0,00 0,00 28,76 0,00 
BFS 1,39 23,54 0,00 2,43 6,23 0,00 
BOS 0,05 3,48 0,00 0,03 8,72 0,00 
              
 3,02 38,17 0,00 2,46 52,58 0,00 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
 
6.11 France 
 
France ranked 9th on the list of top 10 bilateral donors to the Balkans in the period of transition 
(Table 35; Annex to Chapter 5). In addition to the highlights from the preceding discussion, Table 
42 below offers several more observations emerging from the statistical data on French ODA in 
the sectors of SIS and EI. As can be seen from Table 42:  
 
a) France’s ODA in the SIS sector, as already observed previously, was mostly allocated for 
education; 
b)    some amounts of French ODA to SIS were  allocated  to the category “other”; 
c) the only countries which  benefited from French aid in the sector of EI were BiH and 
FRY/Serbia;  
d) the biggest French allocation  in the sector of EI supported the energy needs in 
FRY/Serbia;  
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Table 42:  France’s allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions) 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 18,25 9,95 8,21 5,68 29,57 0,96 
health 6,73 2,13 0,25 0,42 1,36 0,00 
watsan 0,00 0,00 0,66 0,05 1,57 2,31 
population 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
GCS 0,96 0,83 1,12 0,77 2,00 0,22 
other  2,46 5,51 6,90 4,32 6,70 2,58 
              
 28,41 18,42 17,14 11,23 41,20 6,07 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
trans. & storage 0,00 4,08 0,97 0,00 5,15 0,50 
communications 0,30 0,44 0,63 0,18 1,20 1,46 
energy 0,00 2,87 0,00 0,00 11,04 4,28 
BFS 0,00 5,02 0,33 0,00 1,41 0,00 
BOS 0,05 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 
              
 0,35 12,41 1,93 0,20 18,80 6,24 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
 
6.12   Switzerland  
 
Switzerland ranked as 10th largest bilateral donor to the Balkans in the period 1990-2005 (Table 
35; Annex to Chapter 5). In addition to the conclusions concerning Swiss assistance from the 
preceding discussion, Table 43 below suggests a few additional observations concerning 
Switzerland’s ODA to the SIS and EI sectors. From what can be seen from Table 43:  
 
a) Switzerland   appears to have had varied presence across most sub-sectors in SIS and EI, 
with the exception of “population” which was avoided by most donors, and the field of 
BOS; in all the other sub-sectors, some, if modest, Swiss presence can be identified; 
b) Switzerland belongs to the groups of countries which felt that Croatia was too rich to 
receive assistance; it gave very little to Croatia (USD 0,96 million) in SIS and zero in EI; 
the total  Swiss SAA to Croatia is USD 4,86 million; 
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Table 43:  Switzerland’s allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions) 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 11,38 9,17 0,21 9,18 11,69 4,37 
health 7,92 18,70 0,00 0,00 2,59 0,23 
watsan 1,70 16,08 0,00 3,07 13,02 3,02 
population 1,67 0,06 0,00 1,71 0,73 0,00 
GCS 2,69 15,34 0,72 9,56 108,10 4,52 
other  3,61 10,41 0,03 3,42 18,70 0,97 
              
 28,97 69,75 0,96 26,95 154,82 13,11 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
trans. & storage 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 1,94 1,34 
communications 0,78 9,06 0,00 0,00 0,58 0,00 
energy 2,41 18,30 0,00 9,89 32,71 0,00 
BFS 2,18 1,81 0,00 0,00 7,77 1,70 
BOS 0,00 0,66 0,00 0,18 0,22 0,58 
              
 5,38 29,83 0,00 10,08 43,23 3,61 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
 
6.13   Japan  
 
The preceding discussion revealed Japan’s active role in several field of SAA. In addition, several 
interesting observations emerge from Table 44 which groups the data on Japan’s commitments to 
the SIS and EI sectors Some of the observations which emerge from the review of Table 44 
concern the following:  
 
 
a) unlike most other donor’s, Japan gave small portion of its aid to the Balkans to 
FRY/Serbia;  
b) following BiH which received most of Japanese SAA aid, Macedonia received a lot 
relative to its size;  
c) most of the  Japanese aid to Macedonia in the sectors under review results from one big 
allocation to water & sanitation (USD 87,33 million);  
d) Japan is in the group of countries which did not give, that is, gave only symbolic ODA to 
Croatia; total Japan’s SAA to Croatia is USD 4,31 million;  
e) as already observed previously, Japan was   active in the sub-sector of health; health was 
the niche domain of Japanese ODA in the Balkans.    
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Table 44:  Japan’s allocations to the sectors of SIS and EI (USD 2006 millions) 
SIS Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
education 0,47 17,49 0,46 0,22 0,84 0,00 
health 5,13 58,05 0,00 32,65 11,71 0,27 
watsan 0,17 0,12 0,00 87,33 6,66 0,05 
population 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
GCS 0,90 26,13 0,30 0,24 0,20 0,35 
other  0,11 3,02 1,77 3,15 0,74 0,06 
              
 6,78 104,82 2,54 123,59 20,14 0,73 
       
EI Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu 
       
trans. & storage 0,00 48,42 0,00 6,50 0,00 15,17 
communications 0,00 0,04 0,18 0,00 0,08 0,03 
energy 37,27 55,69 0,07 0,02 11,14 0,06 
BFS 0,05 0,22 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,05 
BOS 0,02 0,14 0,21 0,14 0,16 0,03 
              
 37,34 104,50 0,51 6,72 11,42 15,35 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS) 
 
 
7. Humanitarian aid  
 
Following the extensive analysis of the major sectors of the sector allocable aid (SAA), the last 
section of this chapter focuses on the category of humanitarian aid. This category is not part of 
SAA and it represents a separate category in the CRS.  Its importance for the sectoral, or thematic 
(in the sense that the word sector does not denote only sectors in the SAA registered by the CRS) 
analysis of ODA to the Balkans is given by its share in total CRS registered aid to the region. 
Table 45 below presents the total commitments the field of humanitarian aid to the countries in the 
region, and it also presents them as share in the total ODA (registered by the CRS) commitments 
to the Balkans. After the SAA which accounts for the largest share of ODA (with the exception of 
the category of ex Yu), the allocations for humanitarian aid represent the next largest item in the 
region. The situation is to some extent different in FRY/Serbia because of the large share of debt 
relief, discussed earlier in the text.  
 
Table 45: Humanitarian aid as share of all assistance, by recipient country 
  Alb BiH Cro Mac FRY/Ser ex Yu total 
        
all assistance 3973,85 8329,08 1636,68 2769,43 13737,49 2125,65 32572,18 
hum. aid as % of all ass. 415,77 1785,05 194,03 270,06 2498,53 1438,88 6602,32 
hum. aid as % of all ass. 10,46 21,43 11,86 9,75 18,19 67,69 20,27 
                
source (based on data from the DAC CRS)  
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The category of humanitarian aid is itself divided into three sub-categories of:  
 
a) emergency response; 
b) reconstruction relief & rehabilitation, and 
c) disaster prevention & preparedness.  
 
A review of the DAC CRS however shows the largest share of the commitments is by definition 
charged to the sub-category “emergency response”275 Most of the humanitarian aid to the Balkans 
has been registered in the category of “emergency response’ which accounts for over 90% of the 
humanitarian aid category. A small share of commitments by a very small number of donors has 
been charge to the sub-category of “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation”, whereas the sub-
category of “disaster prevention & preparedness” is for the time being completely unpopulated, 
that is, no donors registers commitments in that category. In addition, the review of the individual 
allocations (Chapter 7) absolutely no structural difference between the allocations in “emergency 
response” as opposed to “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation”. For this reason, the category of 
humanitarian aid will be reviewed in its entirety, and it will not be further disaggregated.  
  
As evident from Table 45, three provisional grouping can be made based on the share of 
humanitarian aid in total assistance registered by the CRS. The first grouping comprises the three 
countries where the share of humanitarian aid in total aid receipts is smaller, that is Macedonia, 
Albania, and Croatia. In these countries humanitarian aid moves around 1/10 of total (CRS 
registered) ODA. The second grouping is composed by BiH and FRY/Serbia where the share of 
humanitarian aid   is around 2/10 of overall assistance. Finally, the third grouping consists of the 
category of ex Yu where humanitarian aid allocations represent 2/3 of the total. This distribution of 
humanitarian aid allocations can be said to fall into the overall logic of ODA to the Balkans. The 
first group comprised of Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia, can be argued to have suffered lesser 
emergency and thus to have needed less humanitarian aid; the second group comprised of BiH and 
FRY/Serbia (strongest recipients of ODA overall) definitely had the right to claim most of the 
emergency assistance in the region; and finally, the third group represented by the residual 
category of  ex Yu unspecified was in essence, as already discussed earlier a major “register” for 
allocated ODA in the circumstance of secessions, successions, and convoluted status issues in the 
Balkans. In addition to the status issues   the other aspect of humanitarian aid commitments to ex 
Yu is also the fact that a lot of emergency aid was delivered through NGOs, and aid delivered 
through this channel has also often been registered as “unspecified”.    
 
As with the analysis of the SAA commitments in the previous sections of the chapter, the 
exploration of humanitarian aid is also done through a close review of the statistical data stored in 
the CRS. The full statistical data concerning humanitarian aid commitments is contained in Tables 
122 -127 in the Annex, whereas Tables 46 – 48 below in the chapter present the major donors to 
the category of humanitarian aid, by recipient countries.  
 
As evident from the tables, the strongest donor to the region, the EC, has been one of the strongest 
donors to the field of humanitarian aid in practically all of the countries in the region. The EC 
ranks consistently first or second; its major contribution of USD 744,25 million has been made to 
the category of ex YU (representing 83,23 % of EC’s total commitments to ex Yu); FRY/Serbia 
                                                 
275 See DAC CRS database at  http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW  
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has received USD 553,59 million (Table 48); BiH  - USD 501,72 million (Table 46); then follow 
Albania with USD 87,12 million (Table 46); Croatia with USD 60,24 million (Table 47); and 
Macedonia with USD 55,67 million.   
 
The US has had consistent yet varied presence across the region. Contrary to the EC and in 
consistency with its allocation policy, the US had not allocated any ODA to the category of ex YU. 
The US has made a major commitment of USD 705, 84 million to FRY/Serbia; a relatively smaller 
(by US standards) commitment to BiH of USD 110, 77 million; whereas the other countries in the 
region have received much smaller amounts (by US standards). The data shows that except in the 
case of FRY/Serbia where the commitment represents entire 27, 80 % of total US (CRS registered) 
allocations to that country, US allocations for humanitarian aid have regularly represented a small 
share of its overall ODA.  
 
Germany’s largest commitment in the humanitarian aid category has been made to FRY/Serbia, in 
the amount of USD 139,28 million; Bosnia has received USD 110,20 million; and the others 
(including ex Yu) have received relatively less.  
 
The Netherlands’s behavior in the field of humanitarian aid is interesting for observation. 
Netherlands has made a huge commitment to one country in the Balkans, BiH, in the amount of 
USD 540,89 million, which represented entire 64,81 % of total Dutch (CRS registered) ODA to 
Bosnia. Everybody else has received considerably less; FRY/Serbia has received USD 183, 18 
million (46% of total Dutch aid to the country); USD 45, 45 million has been allocated to ex Yu; 
and Croatia and Macedonia have received quite less.  
 
The UK has had relevant presence in the humanitarian aid field with several strong commitments, 
such as: USD 234,89 million to ex Yu (entire 92,78 % of its total to the category of ex Yu); USD 
221,79 to FRY/Serbia (ranks third; 19,94 % of its total ODA to the country); USD 56,30 to 
Albania; and USD 46,40 million to Macedonia. What is interesting is that the UK has not made a 
relevant humanitarian aid commitment to BiH; it does not rank the top 10 list.  
  
Switzerland in another bilateral which has been consistently present in the humanitarian aid field 
in the Balkans.  The major Swiss commitments have been made to FRY/Serbia - USD 174, 49 
million; and BiH – USD 130, 43 million. Albania has received USD 27, 37 million, whereas 
Macedonia and Croatia have received less (but Switzerland nevertheless ranks top 10). It can be 
observed that for Switzerland the allocations to humanitarian aid are regularly a relevant share of 
its total ODA. The conclusion from this is that Switzerland had a consistent policy to support this 
field.  
 
Another major bilateral which has registered relevant commitments in the field of humanitarian aid 
is Norway. Consistent to its policy to register a relevant share of its aid to the region to the 
category of ex Yu, Norway has made its biggest humanitarian aid allocation to this category, in the 
amount of USD 225,96 million (representing 59,93 % of total Norwegian ODA to ex Yu). Follow: 
FRY/Serbia with USD 143, 48    million; BiH with USD 55, 56 million; and Croatia with USD 37, 
44 million. Macedonia and Albania have received quite smaller humanitarian aid allocations, but 
they were also a smaller share of Norwegian ODA to these countries.    
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Italy also joins the list of bilaterals with consistent presence in the humanitarian aid field. In 
accordance to its overall ODA policy, Italy’s strongest commitment has been made to Albania, in 
the amount o USD 132, 28 million. Follows FRY/Serbia with USD 70, 55 million; and then BiH 
with USD 41, 02 million. Croatia and Macedonia have received less, as well as ex Yu. The 
conclusion nevertheless is that Italy has been consistently present in the field of humanitarian aid.  
In addition, Sweden has made relevant contributions to BiH, FRY/Serbia, and ex Yu, and Canada 
appears on the top ten lists in FRY/Serbia and ex Yu, but also in Croatia and Macedonia. Spain has 
made a relevant contribution to BiH (Table 46), and a smaller one in Albania (Table 46). IDA was 
only present in BiH and Macedonia.  One relevant donor which has been conspicuously absent 
from the humanitarian aid field is Japan. It only ranked the top 10 list in the case of ex Yu where it 
had allocated USD 34, 89 million, representing 54, 02 of its total ODA to that recipient.  
 
The conclusions which can be drawn from the preceding review include the following:  
 
 
a) almost all the major bilaterals had relevant and relatively consistent presence in the 
humanitarian aid field;  
b) from the multilaterals, the EC had strong and consistent presence, whereas IDA was only 
present in BiH and Macedonia. One important note to make in connection with the 
previous chapter is that: UNHCR is not included in the CRS database. Chapter 5 shared the 
information that UNHCR is one of the major multilateral donors to the region, ranking 3rd 
among the multilaterals (slightly behind IDA), and 6th on the combined list of largest 
donors to the region. UNHCR is by definition a donor which is closely involved in 
emergency operations. Thus, it is important to remember that the data on humanitarian aid 
allocations stored in the CRS do not include the ODA delivered by UNHCR; 
c) most of the biggest allocations were registered to FRY/Serbia and BiH; the exception to 
this rule are Norway, which regularly charges a lot of its aid to ex Yu, and the UK.  
 
 Overall, the category of humanitarian field was a relevant share of total ODA to the Balkans. 
Based on the CRS registered data it amounted to about 1/5 of the total assistance the region has 
received. If the amounts allocated by the UNHCR would be added to this, the share would rise 
substantially. The field was defined by the strong and consistent presence of all the major donors 
to the region. Most of the commitments were made to FRY/Serbia, BiH, and ex Yu, whereas 
Macedonia and Croatia accounted for a very small share of this type of ODA. Chapter 7 will 
continue the discussion of humanitarian aid through an allocation-level review of the major 
commitments.  
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Table 46:  Top 10 donors to humanitarian aid, by recipient country  
  Alb 
hum. aid  
(USD millions) 
all ass. (USD 
millions) 
hum. aid as 
% of all ass.     BiH 
hum. aid  
(USD 
millions) 
all ass. 
(USD 
millions) 
hum. aid as 
% of all ass. 
           
1 Italy 132,28 638,65 20,71   1 Netherl. 540,89 834,57 64,81 
2 EC 87,12 754,74 11,54   2 EC 501,72 1598,08 31,40 
3 UK 56,30 99,01 56,86   3 Switzerl. 130,43 285,15 45,74 
4 US 27,75 474,78 5,84   4 US 110,77 1171,65 9,45 
5 Switzerl. 27,37 89,40 30,61   5 Germany 110,20 438,73 25,12 
6 Austria 23,59 66,44 35,51   6 Sweden 87,30 362,76 24,06 
7 Spain 16,02 32,75 48,92   7 Spain 67,11 314,09 21,37 
8 Germany 14,77 440,79 3,35   8 Norway 55,56 330,32 16,82 
9 Norway 8,73 86,35 10,11   9 IDA 41,28 1161,03 3,56 
10 France 6,24 45,34 13,75   10 Italy 41,02 239,55 17,12 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)  
 
Table 47: Top 10 donors to humanitarian aid, by recipient country  
  Cro 
hum. aid  
(USD millions) 
all ass. (USD 
millions) 
hum. aid as 
% of all ass.     Mac 
hum. aid  
(USD 
millions) 
all ass. 
(USD 
millions) 
hum. aid as 
% of all ass. 
           
1 EC 60,24 666,78 9,03   1 IDA 61,87 410,80 15,06 
2 Norway 37,44 145,95 25,66   2 EC 55,67 604,55 9,21 
3 US 26,89 313,86 8,57   3 UK 46,40 72,41 64,08 
4 Germany 22,42 237,79 9,43   4 Netherl. 24,75 321,64 7,69 
5 Switzerl. 12,99 18,39 70,65   5 Germany 18,49 216,10 8,56 
6 Netherl. 8,67 25,21 34,39   6 US 17,43 471,22 3,70 
7 Belgium 6,06 8,47 71,52   7 Canada 15,20 18,98 80,11 
8 Italy 5,51 33,80 16,30   8 Italy 10,49 55,94 18,75 
9 Canada 3,60 10,35 34,76   9 Norway 5,87 83,19 7,05 
10 UK 3,55 15,64 22,71   10 Switzerl. 4,99 71,28 6,99 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)  
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Table 48: Top 10 donors to humanitarian aid, by recipient country  
  FRY/Ser 
hum. aid  
(USD millions) 
all ass. (USD 
millions) 
hum. aid as 
% of all ass.     ex Yu 
hum. aid  
(USD 
millions) 
all ass. 
(USD 
millions) 
hum. aid as 
% of all ass. 
           
1 US 705,84 2539,03 27,80   1 EC 744,25    894,19 83,23 
2 EC 553,59 3742,91 14,79   2 Norway 225,96    377,02 59,93 
3 UK 221,79 1112,11 19,94   3 UK 234,89    253,16 92,78 
4 Netherl. 183,18 398,23 46,00   4 Canada 48,37    59,55 81,23 
5 Switzerl. 174,49 425,38 41,02   5 Netherl. 45,48    82,85 54,90 
6 Norway 143,48 478,88 29,96   6 Japan 34,89    64,59 54,02 
7 Germany 139,28 1638,46 8,50   7 Sweden 32,17    40,90 78,66 
8 Italy 70,55 201,14 35,08   8 Germany 20,48    64,21 31,90 
9 Sweden 65,25 275,06 23,72   9 Italy 15,17    73,84 20,55 
10 Canada 56,95 167,66 33,97   10 Finland 9,61    16,31 58,95 
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS)  
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8. Conclusion  
 
The preceding pages have provided an extensive review of donor behavior in the two major 
sectors, social infrastructure and services (SIS) and economic infrastructure (EI) of all sector 
allocable aid (SAA) to the Balkan. In addition, they have reviewed the relevant commitments to 
the category of humanitarian aid, which after the SAA was the most relevant category of ODA to 
the region.   The extensive treatment of the SIS and EI sectors provided a thorough scan of donor 
activity in the two largest, most assisted sectors of aid in the Balkans. The ranking exercise showed 
which donors gave most aid to which recipients and in which fields. The sectoral disaggregation 
overall provided a complete information on how donors behaved across fields in the countries they 
assisted. In addition, the review of the humanitarian aid category presented its composition and the 
allocation patterns of the major donors to the region.  
 
The conclusions to be drawn from these reviews provide a relevant picture of donor behavior   and 
bring a step closer to answering the question on what were the factors of FA to the Balkans.  
 
At a most general level it can be concluded that the final architecture of foreign aid to the Balkans 
has been defined by the interweaving of donors’ sector-based and country-based policies.  
 
Sector-based means a strategic decision by the donor to allocate a relevant potion of its aid to a 
certain sector; country-based means a strategic decision by the donor to establish a particular 
donor-recipient relationship with one or a few countries, and to channel to them a relevant share of 
its aid. In the first case, the sector orientation can weigh influence which exceeds the donor interest 
in assisting a particular recipient country. In the second, the interest in supporting a country 
outweighs the interest in supporting a certain sector.  The sector-based and country-based 
categories are naturally provisional and not firmly delineated, as no donor is completely either 
sector of country oriented. As a matter of fact, many of the donors active in the Balkans pursued a 
policy of giving some aid to all the recipients. Nevertheless special donor-recipient relationships 
did also exist, as already discussed in this and the previous chapter. Some donors were more 
engaged in such relationships than others.   
 
What comes across quite clearly from the review of donor activity in SIS and EI is that omission, 
that is, the decision not to assist a country or a sector, is a sharper defining line than actual action.   
 
For example, quite a few donors pursued a policy of supporting everybody in the Balkans except 
Croatia. This was one of the starkest axes of difference between the major bilaterals. One group of 
major bilaterals had a position to give symbolic, or no assistance to Croatia, and the reasoning 
behind such policy is clear: it most probably follows or is similar to the allocation policy of the 
IDA, that is, countries with level of GDP above a certain threshold are not eligible for foreign 
assistance. Opposite to this policy stance there was a group of major bilaterals which donated 
substantial amounts to Croatia, and which actually favored it to other recipients in the region.  
 
The other obvious omission concerns certain sectors. For some donors it was obviously a matter of 
policy position not to be active in certain sectors. This emerges clearly from the fact the no 
recipient country had any allocations in that particular sector. The most obvious case of such 
policy is the sub-sector of population where most donors chose not to be active in. Health is 
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another example of a field where most donors, with the exception for example of Japan, did not 
channel much of their assistance. This list is quite longer: Germany avoided GCS; the US avoided 
transport & storage; unlike most others Sweden stayed out of education the EC was completely 
absent from BFS, and so forth. The review of humanitarian aid on the contrary, showed that most 
of the major donors to the region had relevant presence in this category. Japan is the only major 
bilaterals which has had smaller (compared to the other sectors) presence in the humanitarian aid 
category (as registered by the CRS).  
 
The reviews have disclosed many cases of country-exceptions to what were sector-based policies. 
These are cases when a donor would by definition not be active in a field, but there would be an 
the exception with respect to one country. Such is for example the EC activity in the field of 
energy; the only exception to EC’s policy not to allocate assistance in energy is FRY/Serbia; 
similar is also its behavior in the sector of health. Dutch support to education in Macedonia is a 
case in point, as it is also Japan’s support to water & sanitation to the same country. Quite a few 
donors have displayed such behavior in the Balkans. It could be concluded that in such cases, 
when a donor would make a country-exception to a sector-based policy, the exception was usually 
made in favor of a regional protégé.  
 
Further, what has already been pointed out earlier but also reemerges from the   reviews is that the 
foreign aid picture is by and large defined by a few, usually 2-4 strongest donors. The first review 
in the chapter provided rankings of 10 largest donors in sectoral terms, but is it is obvious from the 
tables that the biggest contributions usually come from just the few top ranked donors. In quite a 
few cases a top-10 donor ranking could not even be compiled for certain sectors in some countries. 
It is the policies of a few major donors, such as the EC and US policy to allocate huge quantities of 
aid to GCS, that have determined in large part the picture of foreign aid to the Balkans.  
 
On the other hand, smaller donors, or donors with smaller presence in this part of the world, such 
as for example Portugal or Spain, obviously had a policy of sporadic big allocations usually to one 
country, rather than smaller, proportionate contributions to more recipients in the region. Such are 
the examples with Portuguese aid to transport & storage in BiH, or similarly to Macedonia with 
the ODA for GCS and water & sanitation. The reasons for this type of behavior will further be 
examined in Chapter 7.   
 
Another point emerging from the tables under review is that donors’ policies were not consistently 
either sector or country based, but they differed across sectors. For example, in the field of 
education the donor would have the policy of allocating aid to all the countries in the region, and 
this is a real sector-based policy. But in the next field of health the same donor would give support 
to just one or two countries. This is observable in quite a few donors. At a more general level, from 
comparing donor behavior in SIS and EI, it emerges that quite a few donors concentrated most of 
their activity in SIS and had smaller, and in some cases only symbolic presence in EI.  
 
Finally, as already pointed out before, the reviews offer the conclusion that aid allocations were 
not always proportionate to need. The discussion on what defines need and how   need affects 
allocations is quite extensive in aid literature, and as such is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Nevertheless, the argument is that aid   in many cases obviously seemed not proportionate to 
needs.  The example was offered earlier of EC allocations to the sub-sector of energy: the only 
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country to get it was FRY/Serbia. While FRY/Serbia’s need was undeniable, with the fact that 
NATO bombing had destroyed infrastructure, Albania’s need of energy is also undeniable. The 
fact that FRY/Serbia got substantial amounts and Albania received nothing can not be explained 
with the presence or extent of need alone. Naturally, many other factors come into consideration: 
a) the fear from humanitarian catastrophe in Serbia, b) the political imperative, c) not just the 
intensity of the need but its urgency and political momentum, and so forth.  
 
The similar argument can be made concerning EC support to transport & storage. What can for 
example explain the significant difference in EC allocations to Croatia vs. Albania? Certainly not 
the extent of need.  Some of the answers   will come in Chapter 7 which will supply additional 
information concerning this issue.   
 
However, examples of this kind are numerous and they to one extent or another include all donors 
(yet some more than others). For example, a big allocation to one recipient and no support to 
anyone else does not mean that this recipient has demonstrated tremendous need, as opposed to 
everybody else who did not demonstrate such need. This is common sense. But also the opposite is 
true. For example, the policy of consistent and similar in size allocations to all the countries in the 
region, whereby the countries are quite different in terms of population size, offers the same 
conclusion.  
 
This of course is not necessarily incorrect in of itself. Given the fact that needs are always infinite, 
and in the region they are considerable (yet smaller compared to other parts of the world) it should 
not be pretended that a proportionate, scientifically measured response is always the preferred 
mode. A situation where a donor decided to allocate funding for the renovation of, for example, a 
100 schools per country, even in a situation where the number of schools per country will naturally 
differ (but all the countries would have many more than 100) is not an example of unreasonable 
decision.  Nevertheless, this is a matter of extent. After a certain level, such disproportionateness 
would be bound to reduce the quality of allocated aid. A situation where the needy consistently get 
very little and the better-off receives a lot defies the logic of foreign assistance.  
 
In conclusion, the extensive treatment of the sectoral distribution of ODA to the Balkans, which 
after the introduction, concentrated primarily on the major sector of SIS and EI, and in the last 
section reviewed the category of humanitarian aid, produced a number of relevant conclusions 
concerning the supply of foreign assistance to the Balkans. Some of the more interesting findings 
which have emerged during the sectoral analysis of ODA to the Balkans have been summarized 
below. The include the following:  
 
 
• there is a consistent pattern in the sectoral distribution of ODA across all countries in the 
Balkans; 
• a large part of foreign aid to the Balkans went into the sector of SIS;  
• the SIS sector has been   dominated by ODA for GCS; it accounts for roughly half of all 
aid to the SIS sector, which in turn is around half of all SAA to the region. In other words, 
aid allocated for GCS is roughly ¼ of total SAA to the Balkans;   
• a great share of foreign aid to the Balkans went for support to GCS; 
•  consistency of sub-sector shares across countries is  major characteristic of the SIS sector,  
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• a  lack of consistency of sub-sector shares across countries  marks the EI field; 
• ODA receipts   in the sub-sector of health in the Balkans were overall quite small, second 
only to population; the   general conclusion is that most of the biggest donors to the region 
did not consider support to health to be a strong priority;  
• major consistent donors to the sub-sector of health in the Balkans are Japan and IDA. 
• given the small share of health in SIS ODA to the Balkans, it is by and large produced by 
Japan’s niche interest, IDA loans, and sporadic and hoc presence of other donors;   
• Germany, which was the strongest bilateral donor in the region, had a consistent policy of 
support to water & sanitation in all of the countries in the Balkans; 
•  German’s domination of the sub-sector of watsan is  even   stronger than for example 
Japan’s domination of the field of health;   
• the EC and the US have been the top donors to the GCS sub-sector. What more, GCS aid 
consistently accounts for large shares of their SIS allocations. The fact that two of the top 
donors to the region donated most of their SIS aid to GCS, is the single strongest factor 
determining the predominance of GCS aid to the countries of the Balkans; 
• almost all of the EC aid to the sector of EI went to transport & storage; 
• The US was completely absent from  the sub-sector of transport & storage; 
•   the sub-sector of transport & storage has by and large been supported by multilateral 
ODA;    
• the sub-sector of communications has been the  least supported field in EI and beyond; 
•   French  ODA has been almost completely absent from the EI sector; 
• the largest amounts of  energy  ODA have been allocated to Albania, BiH, and FRY/Serbia, 
whereas Croatia and Macedonia received very small amounts; 
• the only relevant EC contribution for energy has been made to FRY/Serbia, whereas no one 
else in the region (with minor exception of BiH) has received any EC support for energy; 
the EC was conspicuously absent from the field;  
• the sub-sector of energy has been consistently dominated by IDA;   
•  there is practically no other field of ODA in the Balkans which has been so strongly 
dominated by only one donor.  as the sub-sector of f BOS  has been dominated by the  US; 
the BOS sub-sector in the Balkans has been by and large defined by the consistent US 
policy to support business development in the region; 
• FRY/Serbia has received the lion’s share of EC support in the   sectors of SIS and EI;  
• relative to its size, Albania received the biggest share of German aid in SIS and EI; 
• The country which has received the largest share of IDA’s support to the region has been 
Bosnia; 
• IDA’s absence from Croatia relevantly contributed to the status of Croatia as one of the 
least assisted countries in not just the Balkans, but also wider Eastern Europe;  
• GCS is the sector where the Netherlands has allocated most of its aid; in many other fields 
the Netherlands has quite a symbolic presence; nevertheless, the Netherlands has had very 
strong presence in the field of humanitarian aid;   
• most of Norway’s SAA aid has been allocated to the sub-sector of GCS; 
• the only SAA sub-sector where UK had relevant presence is GCS;   the UK has been quite 
absent from all other sub-sectors, with some exception to health, and the allocations 
charged under “other”; on the other hand, the UK has had more relevant presence in 
humanitarian aid; 
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• Macedonia is conspicuously under-assisted by the UK; in the SIS sector it has received 
even less aid than Croatia; 
• Austria has been almost completely absent from the entire EI sector; 
• most of Swedish ODA in the SIS sector has been   allocated to the sub-sector of GCS; 
substantial amount of Swedish ODA has been allocated  to the category “other”; 
• the only countries which  benefited from French aid in the sector of EI were BiH and 
FRY/Serbia;  
• unlike most other donor’s, Japan has given a small portion of its aid to the Balkans to 
FRY/Serbia;  
• following BiH which received most of Japanese SAA aid, Macedonia received a lot 
relative to its size;  
• all the major bilaterals had relevant and relatively consistent presence in the humanitarian 
aid field;  
• most of the biggest allocations in the humanitarian aid field were made to FRY/Serbia, 
BiH; and ex Yu.   
 
In conclusion, the previous discussion provided substantial amount on data on who gave aid to 
whom and for what in the Balkans in the period of transition. The disaggregation of the major 
components of ODA to the region has supplied detailed information on the sectoral and thematic 
priorities for development assistance to the Balkans. The extensive treatment of the topic identified 
trends and patterns in donor behavior and made possible some general conclusions concerning 
donors, sectors, and countries, such as that some sectors are dominated by certain donors; that 
some types of ODA, such as humanitarian aid, went primarily to certain countries, and so forth. 
This may seem as simple findings, but they should be assessed against the point of departure: the 
complete lack of any specificity concerning foreign assistance to the Balkans.  At this point   
foreign aid to the Balkans is no longer a large, fuzzy bundle of money allocated to a “region”. The 
shapes and the structure of the phenomenon have been studied, and it can be seen that foreign aid 
had different patterns in trends across the countries in the region. Most of the disaggregation was 
done on the donor side and the discussion identified relevant findings concerning the behavior of 
donors across sectors and across countries. Nevertheless, the conclusions were also possible 
concerning the recipients, such as that all of them half of all SAA was SIS, and half of all SIS was 
aid for GCS, and so forth. Even though Chapter 6 produced many conclusions, many questions, as 
already indicated during the discussion, are still unanswered. The next, Chapter 7, will go yet a 
step deeper in the exploration, and it will provide some additional layers of understanding of aid to 
the Balkans.  
 
One niche that has been consistent throughout the text has been the continuous reassessment of aid 
to the Balkans in the overall framework of motives and factors for foreign assistance. This 
framework, as already discussed, is posited between two distant poles of self-interest and moral 
altruism, and a vast middle ground in between; its specific configuration in the region has been 
produced by the general policy goals of democracy, market economy, and stability; and the inside 
of this framework has been filled by the political reality of aid and the factors of that political 
reality, as discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
The question at this point is – how do the findings in this chapter relate to this   framework? How 
can the sectoral disaggregation from the previous pages for example be put in a perspective vis-à-
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vis the motives of self-interest vs. altruism? Can a conclusion be made that a certain type of aid 
was more motivated by self-interest than another type of aid? Again, the argument would not be to 
conclude that aid was motivated by self-interest, nor is it possible to express that in quantitative 
terms, in the sense of “how much was it motivated by self-interest”? The statement that self-
interest is a strong factor of aid is already widely accepted in the literature on foreign assistance, 
and this text makes no effort at refuting it. On the contrary, it subscribes to the point of view. In 
this sense, and for the qualitative exploration which has been pursued so far, the question would 
hence not be “whether aid was motivated by self-interest” or “how much it was motivated by self-
interest as opposed to altruism”, but perhaps “where and how can such motivations be identified?” 
The central effort of this writing is the exploration of who gave aid, to whom, for what, and why, 
in the Balkans. In this sense, the idea would be to also look into the motivations for these who, for 
whom, what, and why and to identify potential causalities.  
 
Some of the factors of determination of aid supply to the region have nevertheless been identified 
throughout the preceding pages. For example, some of them are defined by the special donor-
recipient relationships, such as in the case of Italy’s special relationship with Albania (and the 
reasons and motivations of the such relationship); in other cases they have been defined by certain 
foreign policy goals which have at times been considered a priority. Arguably, had aid not been 
directly used to oust and extradite Milosevic in the case of Serbia, that country would have 
received much less aid than it did. And of course these defining lines are never straightforward; 
they always interweave with many other factors of possible influence.  
 
Based on the findings from the sectoral disaggregation certain assumptions can nevertheless be 
made. For example, it has been observed that most of what the EC had allocated in EI was for 
transport infrastructure. On the contrary, the US was almost complete absent from the field. The 
question is naturally, how come two of the biggest donors to the region   had such opposed 
policies? Comparing them around the motive of self-interest does seem to provide a logical 
answer. Good roads are in Europe’s interest much more than in the interest of the US. And it 
should be borne in mind that they are an incredibly expensive type of intervention. Similarly, the 
US was also almost completely absent from the sub-sector of energy. The same logic can apply: 
the US did not have a direct strategic interest in the issues. But in this case,   also the EC was 
almost completely, except in the case of Serbia. Can the same argument be put forth: that the EC 
did not have a direct interest in supporting the field of energy in the region? A look into the sub-
sector of energy (Tables 23-25) shows that the biggest consistent allocations in the field came from 
IDA (loans); Germany, to some extent Japan, and Italy (only for Albania). The question would 
logically be: what was their motivation to support this field?  
 
Similar questions can be asked concerning the other sectors. For example, most donors were 
absent from communication, but also from health; other donors, such as France and Austria, were 
almost completely absent from the entire EI field for example. Some donors were less active in 
other sub-sectors because they had concentrated all of their support in one sub-sector mostly, such 
as the case of US support to the field of BOS. And so forth. On the other hand, most donors had 
strong presence in the field of humanitarian aid, which going back to the theoretical discussion 
was the field of aid usually and naturally tied to moral concerns.   
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Whereas some assumptions in this direction can be made based on the sectoral disaggregation in 
this chapter, it is instructive to proceed to the next, Chapter 7, which through a process of 
allocation-level review of donor commitments will be able to provide some additional answers. 
The task of Chapter 6 has been concluded by presenting a detailed account of the sectoral 
composition of ODA to the Balkans.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
Who Gave Aid for What – Exactly? Review of CRS Database Micro Data on 
Foreign Assistance Flows to the Balkans   
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 7 ahead continues and concludes the extensive review of statistical data concerning 
foreign assistance to the Balkans which commenced in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 opened the 
investigation into amounts of aid to the region, by analyzing the general flows, directions, and 
types of aid registered in the DAC online statistical database. Chapter 6 proceeded with a sectoral 
disaggregation of the foreign assistance flows, by analyzing allocations from and to countries 
across the major sectors, sub-sectors, and categories. This chapter will go a step further and it will 
analyze the actual individual ODA allocations, or more precisely, the descriptions and the final 
ends of these allocations.  
 
The Creditor Reporting System (CRS) maintained by the DAC of the OECD contains micro data 
on a substantial number of foreign assistance flows, which not always but often contain additional 
information on the final ends of certain ODA commitments.  By analyzing this information, 
additional relevant insights are collected on what was in some situations foreign aid given for 
exactly. These insights, as hopefully this chapter will manage to demonstrate, can be valuable in 
providing a more comprehensive picture of foreign aid to the Balkans.  
 
A few more words are due to   explain the need for this exercise. Chapter 6 went deep into sectoral 
analysis of foreign aid to the region; it showed which donors were active in which sectors and sub-
sectors    in the countries of the Balkans. In addition to the four major sectors of sector allocable 
aid (SAA), that is, social infrastructure and services (SIS), economic infrastructure (EI), 
production, and multisector, the chapter extensively analyzed the sub-sectors comprising these 
sectors of SAA. In addition, the chapter explored the donor behavior in the field of humanitarian 
aid which has accounted for about 1/5 of all (CRS registered) ODA to the region. That review 
offered a well structured idea of where foreign aid to the Balkans went. Nevertheless, the 
conclusion was unavoidable that this did not give a full account of the matter. For example, 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that the biggest part of SAA to the Balkans went into the sector of SIS, 
and that the SIS sector itself is dominated by the category of government and civil society (GCS). 
The category of GCS is so dominant that it accounts for roughly half of all SIS aid, or 1/4 of all 
SAA. In other words, most aid to the Balkans was for support to government & civil society 
(GCS).  
 
As much as this can be a potentially interesting piece of information, it does not tell the whole 
story. The question which naturally arises is – what were the final ends of aid allocated into the 
GCS field?  
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The CRS offers    an additional sub-categorization of GCS into “GCS general” and “GCS conflict, 
peace and security” but this is also insufficient. Therefore, the effort was necessary to engage in an 
even closer inspection of the allocations comprising the GCS sub-sector in an attempt to: 
 
 a) potentially discover the final ends of aid to the Balkans, and  
b) discern additional patterns of donor behavior.  
 
Thus, Chapter 7 provides a sort of a thick description of the foreign assistance allocations to the 
Balkans, for the period data is available for. The largest part of the data for this analysis is stored 
into the Annex to Chapter 7. The text will use these data, and   in addition it will refer to other 
information from the CRS database, and other sources when possible of appropriate.  
 
The Annex contains tables with data on the major years and major allocations of foreign 
assistance from donors to recipients and across sectors.  
 
Several important notes are due at the outset:  
 
a) The range of years covered is 1995-2005, as this is the period the CRS has coverage of. 
This was already mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 6. The previous chapter also 
discussed the fact that the coverage of the CRS improved over the years, that is to say, 
records from more recent years have higher rate of coverage than records of less recent 
years.  However, it has to be underscored again that the CRS is not a comprehensive   
record of aid data. In addition, the coverage, but also the level of description vary across 
donors. The extent or the level of detail depends exclusively on how donor countries report 
their allocations to the DAC. As the analysis in this chapter will show, and as it is very 
visible from the tables in the Annex, there can be a big difference in the specificity of 
descriptions across donors.  
 
An older DAC publication based on CRS data titled Aid Activities in South-East Europe 
1990-1998 (OECD, 1999) can serve as a source of additional data for the period 1990-
1994, which is at present not included in the CRS database. Unfortunately, the publication 
registers data according to categories compared to the ones used by the CRS at present, 
which somewhat reduces its utility.  
 
 
b) Amounts are presented in commitments, again for reasons of coverage. The reason for this 
is technical and needs to be explained in detail. Whereas the CRS contains data on 
commitments starting with 1995, data on disbursements are only available for the past 
several years, starting with 2003/4. Naturally, given the time-period of interest for this 
research (1990-2005), the choice was to use the category of commitments. Another 
important note concerns the type of amounts: the CRS database contains the option of 
using constant 2006 USD, and this was the type of amount used, in consistency with 
previous chapters. However, the micro data on individual allocations was only available in 
current USD. In order to give as accurate idea as possible of the relevance of certain 
allocations, the tables in the Annex provide the amount in both constant 2006 USD (on the 
left) and in current USD for the respective year (on the right).    
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c) The tables in the Annex provide   a detailed account of allocations of foreign aid but they 
are not a complete list of all allocations. This is important to remember. The purpose of 
this aspect of the analysis is not to account for all the amounts; this has already been done 
in Chapter 5. The purpose is to research the final ends of the major foreign aid allocations 
and to describe the purposes of aid. Hence, the Annex contains the bigger more relevant 
allocations   for the inquiry. In reality, the Annex contains a substantive number of all 
registered allocations above USD 0, 5 million. In addition, when relevant, or appropriate, 
even quite smaller allocations have been reviewed, going as low as USD 0, 2 million. This 
was done in order to produce comparisons or underline certain patterns in donor behavior. 
For example, such an exercise could occasionally demonstrate that the major, big 
allocations were sometimes   part of a consistent pattern of allocations for ends which were 
arguably, motivated by donor self-interest or even a particular kind of donor self-interest, 
whereas on the opposite end, donor self-interest was less evident in the smaller allocations.   
In addition, for all donors except IDA, the allocations presented in the Annex are grant 
money except when specified otherwise; on the contrary, for IDA, allocations are loans, 
except when specified otherwise.  
 
d) The Annex contains data from the sectors of SIS, EI, multisector, and from the field of 
humanitarian aid which also accounted for a relevant share of overall ODA. The production 
sector, in view of its small size, has not been a subject of inquiry. Given its size and 
relevance, the SIS and the EI sectors were broken down to their constituent sub-sectors. 
The sub-sector of population as negligible has not been looked into, consistent with the 
approach taken in the previous chapter. The multisector, as smaller compared to the SIS 
sector, was taken in its entirety, that is, it was not broken down to its sub-sectors.  
However, in contrast to Chapter 6 which did not break down the multisector aid because 
most of it was placed in the generic category of “other”, this chapter does produce detailed 
analysis of the content of the multisector category. The motive is the same with what said 
above concerning GCS aid – to try to find as specific and accurate as possible descriptions 
of the final ends of foreign assistance. The category of humanitarian aid also has three sub-
categories; however most of the aid is registered into one of these sub-categories called 
“emergency response”, and only a small share in the second called “reconstruction relief & 
rehabilitation”, whereas the third one titled “disaster preparedness” is dormant. Because of 
this the Annex follows the commitments to the field of “emergency response” and where 
the commitments are relevant, introduces also the second sub-category of “reconstruction 
relief & rehabilitation”. Nevertheless, as the section on humanitarian aid below will show, 
the descriptions in this category unfortunately do not have strong analytical value.  
 
e) Allocation descriptions are presented in their original form, including also the language 
they were reported in. Translation is provided where needed and or/possible.276   
 
 
The analysis goes by sectors, thereby trying to identify and describe patterns in donor behavior. 
Correlations will in continuity be made with Chapter 6. Whereas Chapter 6 identified trends and 
patterns at the level of sector and sub-sector, Chapter 7 dives inside sectors and reveals 
                                                 
276 In some cases translation was not needed, as in the view of the author, the descriptions was 
comprehensible in the language it was reported.  
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information that are not available at the level of sector or sub-sector, but only at level of 
allocations.   
 
 
 
2. Allocation-Level Review of the SIS Sector  
 
2.1 Education  
 
 
Section 4.1 of Chapter 6 provided   sector-level observations concerning donor contributions to the 
sector of education. In particular, the consistent presence of Germany and Austria has been noted, 
across all countries in the region of the Balkans; strong EC presence has also been observed. 
Among other more relevant donor activity in the sector of education. the section has also registered 
the case of Italy’s aid to Bosnia, and Dutch aid to Macedonia, thereby discussing sector vs. 
country-orientated donor behavior.  
 
Given that Austria is one of the strongest donors to the sub-sector of education across countries in 
the Balkans, it is interesting to start this part of the review by looking into the final ends of 
Austrian allocations for education in the region.  
 
The Annex to this chapter contains the tables with Austria’s major allocations in the sub-sector of 
education: Austria to BiH (Table 6);   to Croatia (Table 12); to FRY/Serbia (Table 19). The Annex 
does not have a table with Austrian allocations for education to Albania and Macedonia; the reason 
for this is the lack of bigger Austrian allocations for education to these counties.277      
 
The first   pattern to be discussed concerns Austria’s presence in education .Namely, the tables in 
the Annex convincingly show that significant parts of Austria’s contributions for education, across 
countries and years have been consistently made   for imputing student costs. Imputed student 
costs represent the costs for students from these countries who study in Austria.  
 
Below is a short listing   of a few of the major Austrian allocations for imputed student costs as 
share in Austria’s total commitments to education:  
 
- in BiH in 1996, USD 4,1 million (current prices)  out of USD 7,2 million (current prices); 
- in BiH in 1998, USD 4,0 million (current prices) out of USD 6,7 million (current prices); 
- in BiH in 2003, USD 8,7 million (current prices) out of USD 9,1 million (current prices); 
- in Croatia in 1996, USD 5,7 million (current prices) out of USD 6,0 million (current prices); 
- in FRY/Serbia in 2003, USD 5,1 USD (current prices) out of USD 5,6 million (current prices); 
 
It is observable that allocations for imputed student costs represent a significant share, always 
more than half and in some cases more than 90% of Austria’s ODA for education in the region. 
                                                 
277 This is also visible from Table 5 in chapter 5; Austria’s contribution for education to Albania (USD 13, 
24 million over a 10-year period) is substantially smaller compared to the contributions to other countries in 
the region.  
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What can be said in conclusion is that: there is a strong systematic pattern of imputing student 
costs in Austria’s assistance to education in the Balkans. This is the single strongest factor for 
Austria’s heavy presence in the sub-sector of education.  
 
The situation with German aid to education is practically identical, as can be seen from the tables 
in the Annex: to BiH (Table 7); to Croatia (Table 13), to Macedonia (Table 16); to FRY/Serbia 
(Table 21). Even more than in the case of Austria, German allocations in the sub-sector of 
education have been committed to the purpose of imputing student costs.   
 
An easy comparison lends the conclusion that this is not the case with other donors, with the 
potential exception to the case of Italy’s generous assistance for education to BiH of USD 36, 5 
million (current prices) in 1996, of which entire USD 33, 5 (current prices) was registered as 
“experts and scholarships” (Annex, Table 8).  
 
Unlike Austrian and German assistance which is consistent across years, Italian contribution to 
BiH was in one single year – 1996. At this level of description, with no more data available (there 
is no additional description in the macro data), it is difficult to conclude what was the final end of 
that allocation; it is possible that substantial part of that contribution has gone for a large 
scholarship program that was initiated in that particular year. Big part of Italy’s education aid to 
Albania in 1995 is also registered as “scholarships” – it is possible that money is committed in a 
single year for a program which will unfold over the next several years – but there is not sufficient 
data to conclusively argue that Italy had a similar practice as Germany and Austria.  
  
Overall however, the conclusion from the allocation-level review is that the strong German and 
Austrian presence in the sub-sector of education is by and large accounted for with the 
registration of imputed student costs. This naturally legitimately raises the question - have Austria 
and Germany been hosting more students from the Balkans compared to other countries in 
Europe? A substantiated and researched answer to such a question would be clearly beyond the 
scope of this chapter. However, at the level of common public knowledge, there is no indication to 
support such a claim.  Taking that logic even further, compared for the size of the country, 
Austria’s contributions to education far outweigh Germany’s (see respective tables in Annex) even 
though Germany is a much larger country and it would be logical that it hosts more students from 
the region.    
 
 The conclusion is that their strong presence in education, quite stronger than that of many other 
strong donors to the region is due to how they calculated their contributions to education, and  
foreign assistance overall. They belong to the group of donors who regularly impute student costs 
as ODA in support of education. This is a legitimate practice with the DAC but it does need to 
follow the statistical directives for reporting. DAC reviews of both Austria and Germany’s 
development have at times expressed concerns or made recommendations for improving the 
reporting of imputed student costs. For example, a DAC peer review of Austrian development 
cooperation, from 1999 notes the practice of Austria’s over-reporting of imputed student costs and 
recommends changes:  “According to the DAC Statistical Directives, imputed student costs are 
eligible for inclusion in ODA if they are part of a conscious policy of development co-operation 
which includes specification of the costs in official budgets. However, Austria seems to use a 
retroactive method by totaling the running costs of Austrian universities and higher education 
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establishments, dividing it by the total number of students to obtain the unit cost per student, and 
then multiplying it by the number of students from developing countries. (By law, students from 
developing countries are exempted from paying tuition fees.) In other words, any student 
originating from a developing country who is studying any subject, irrespective of developmental 
objectives, could be included and counted under ODA. Austria needs to modify its treatment of 
this component, as well as to make information more transparent.”278  
 
DAC official publications from the subsequent years have regularly been underscoring the fact that 
Austria’s mode of calculating imputed student costs is not in line with DAC statistical directives ( 
OECD, 2002;).   “Past Reviews have criticized this practice as its share of total ODA 
disbursements has been high compared to other DAC Member countries. Hitherto, Austrian 
authorities have not modified their practice in calculating imputed student costs despite the 
suggestions by the DAC (OECD, 2000:19).”  
 
According to a more recent DAC peer review on Austria   (OECD, 2004) Austria has responded to 
the concern about the reporting of imputed student cost expressed by the DAC in 1999, and it has 
brought its reporting in line with the DAC statistical directives since (OECD, 2004: 68). The 
review notes that “Austria was among the first DAC members to record as ODA the cost to its 
taxpayers of providing education to developing country nationals (OECD, 2004: 78).” The review 
explains the reasons for the concerns expressed in 1999: “The 1999 Peer Review noted that 
Austria used a retrospective calculation method that effectively counted the value of subsidized 
education for any student from a developing country, regardless of the developmental focus of the 
studies concerned. The Peer Review urged Austria to modify its procedures in this respect and 
make its methodology more transparent. ... The main ground for objection to Austria’s reporting 
was the lack of developmental focus in the selection of courses. The Austrian authorities therefore 
agreed to eliminate from their reporting a range of courses considered to have less developmental 
relevance, including historical, linguistic and artistic studies, as well as philosophical and 
theological subjects. The statistical impact has only been minor, reducing the item by a few per 
cent compared to the previous methodology (OECD, 2004: 78).”   
 
A recent DAC peer review of German development aid (OECD, 2006) notes that “close to 70% of 
the aid to the education sector consists of the imputed costs of subsidized tertiary education 
(OECD, 2006: 32). This, according to the document “is a relatively significant portion of ODA 
that does not contribute to strengthening education systems in developing countries and may have 
a limited impact on capacity development in the education sector (OECD, 2006: 32).”  The review 
also notes that “Germany is among the few DAC members to include significant amounts of 
imputed student costs in ODA (OECD, 2006: 32), and that the share of this type of ODA has 
increased from 6% in 2000 to 9% of German ODA in 2004 (OECVD, 2006: 32).   In addition, the 
documents notes that as “recommended by the last DAC Peer Review, Germany revised the 
reporting procedures for these costs in 2002. Reporting no longer includes the costs for students in 
certain disciplines (e.g. language, culture, art and sport) and excludes students who stay in 
Germany after graduation on an ‘IT Green Card’ (OECD, 2006:33)” The reviews suggests that 
“Germany will need to exclude from its reporting of imputed student costs the students who stay in 
                                                 
278Austria: Development Cooperation Review 1999, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_34603_2412638_1_1_1_1,00.html )  
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Germany on a permit issued according to a new immigration law that came into force on 1 January 
2005 (OECD, 2006: 33.” The review reiterates this recommendation again in the document: 
“Given the increased scope for foreign students to stay in Germany upon completion of their 
studies, it is important for the government to continue to monitor closely the reporting of such 
costs (OECD, 2006: 35).” In essence, the DAC review acknowledges the fact that Germany has 
improved the reporting of imputed student cost since 2002, but it recommends that “Germany will 
need to maintain close monitoring of such costs which have more than doubled since 2000 
(OECD, 2006: 75)”.     
 
 The conclusion pertaining to the imputing of student costs was the first interesting finding from 
the allocation-level review of foreign assistance. Moving further in the review, the tables in the 
Annex provide additional information about donors activity in this sub-sector of ODA in the 
Balkans. For example, Austria was quite engaged in helping higher education institutions; a few 
donors were interested in supporting vocational education, and so forth.  Unfortunately, little can 
be concluded on the final ends of big part of EC aid to education because of the generic 
descriptions of its allocations. The US aid is consistent, as noted already in Chapter 6, but it is only 
a small share of overall US aid commitments; IDA had relevant contributions in the form of loans.  
 
Finally, another interesting observation concerns France. Chapter 6 noted that French presence in 
education was rather consistent and in addition to that, represented a relevant share of French total 
SIS commitments. The tables in the Annex nevertheless only capture French education allocations 
to FRY/Serbia, because only in this country they exceed the threshold of around USD 2 million in 
a single year, that was taken as a criterion for registering the allocations (the tables register “major 
years and allocations”). Nevertheless, detailed review was anyway conducted of the final ends of 
French contributions for education in the region. The most frequent descriptions, that is, which 
repeated the most, and which were also quite consistent across countries comprised some of the 
following279:  
 
1. FRANCAIS : FORMATION ENSEIGNANTS (Alb), 
2. ENSEIGNT DU FRANÇAIS : SECONDAIRE (Alb), 
3. ENSEIGNT DU FRANÇAIS : SUPERIEUR (Alb), 
4. APPUI A L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU FRANCAIS DANS LE SECONDAIRE (BiH)  
5. APPUI A L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU FRANCAIS A L'UNIVERSITE DE SARAJEVO (BiH) 
6. RELANCE DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU FRANCAIS DANS LE SYSTEME EDUCATIF CROATE (CRO) 
7. CREATION SECTION BILINGUEFRANCO CROATE SANS UN ETABLIS. SCOLAIRE (CRO) 
8. SOUTIEN À L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU FRANÇAIS EN MILIEU (CRO) 
9. ASSOC. D'ENSEIGNANTS DU FRANCAIS (FRY/SER) 
10. ENSEIGNT DU FRANÇAIS : PRIMAIRE (FRY/SER) 
11. ENSEIGNT DU FRANÇAIS : SECONDAIRE (FRY/Ser)280 
 
                                                 
279 Source of the descriptions: Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the DAC. Available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW   
280 Translation: a) French: formation of education process (Alb); b) teaching French – high school (Alb); c) 
teaching French – university (Alb); d) support to teaching of French in high school (BiH); e) support to 
teaching of French in university (BiH); f) re-introduction of French classes in the Croatian education system 
(Cro); g) creation of bilingual French-Croatian classes (Cro); h) French classes in the community (Cro); i) 
association of teachers of French (FRY/Ser); j) teaching French: primary (FRY/Ser); k) teaching French: 
secondary (FRY/Ser).  
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All of these allocations evidently contribute towards the promotion of French language in 
education in the Balkans. It is important to note that these are not the only type of French 
allocations to education in the region.  Actually, usually the largest allocations are titled 
“EDUCATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION”, and the CRS database would have many smaller 
allocations of the type described above, combined with fewer, or a single “TECHNICAL 
COOPERATION” budget line. Nevertheless, this does not distract from the conclusion that a large 
share of French ODA to education in the Balkans has been spent for the promotion of the French 
language. With the fact that French aid to education was at the same time a large part of total 
French SIS and SAA - roughly around half of its SIS commitment and in the case of FRY/Serbia 
over 70 % - it can be concluded that – a big, relevant part of French aid to the Balkans in the years 
of transition went for the promotion of French language.   
 
 
 
2.2   Health  
 
As already discussed in Chapter 6, the sub-sector of heath represents a small share of the sector of 
SIS. This is naturally a result of the fact that many donors have chosen to have small presence and 
activity in this field. As Chapter 6 concluded, the sub-sector of health has by and large been 
defined by the presence of IDA and Japan, which were the donor with most consistent presence in 
the field. In addition, the strong Canadian contribution to only one country, Bosnia, was observed.   
 
The tables in the Annex provide an interesting description of the very diverse purposes of   health 
allocations   in the Balkans, ranging from building of a hospital, maintenance of a medical 
helicopter, emergency medical needs, and so forth (see respective tables in Annex). IDA does not 
provide specification of its contributions beyond a generic description, but nevertheless IDA 
money is of lesser interest for this inquiry because it is loan money. The assumption is that IDA 
would lend for a purpose defined by recipient governments themselves, or a purpose agreed 
between governments and IDA.  
 
Japan’s behavior on the other hands is rather interesting to observe. In addition to occupying a 
niche position in the sub-sector of heath, by being the sole donor with sustained, consistent 
presence, Japan is also specific in terms of the type of contributions it makes. Namely, Japan’s 
foreign assistance by and large has taken the form of   equipment donation. This is also true for the 
other sectors Japan is present in but it is perfectly visible in the health sub-sector. It is consistent 
both across countries and over years (for example Table 31 – Japan to BiH; Table 34 – Japan to 
Macedonia; Table 36 – Japan to FRY/Serbia).  
 
Japan is not equally present in all the countries of the region, as already pointed out in the previous 
chapter, but when present, it supplies its assistance in the form of equipment.  
 
In addition to IDA and Japan, Canada is a donor with a strong contribution to health in the 
Balkans. Since Canada has not been considered a major donor   to the region, it has not been 
included in the Annex. It is hence analyzed separately from data taken directly from the CRS.  
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Canada has had consistent supply of aid to the health sector in BiH starting with 1996, until the 
last year of interest, 2005. The amounts vary over the years;   the smallest annual contribution is in 
2003 -   USD 0, 2 million (USD 0, 1 million in current prices), the largest is USD 9, 6 million 
(USD 7, 9 million in current prices) in 2004. The descriptions of individual allocations include281:  
 
1. CARE REACH PROGRAM - 1.3125 (1996) 
2. UNICEF EXPANDED IMMUNIZATION PROG - 0.4399 (1996)  
3. QUEEN'S FAMILY MEDICINE - 2.0765 (1997) 
4. FAMILY MEDICINE/PRIMARY HEALTH PROJECT - 1.7480 (2000) 
5. HEALTH: PHC REFORM FM DEVPT - 3.8185 (2001) 
6. HEALTH PLAN (ALSO BASIC) - PRIMARY HEALTH CARE - 7.6852 (2004)  
 
Unfortunately, not much can be concluded from the micro data on Canadian health ODA to BiH. 
The channels of delivery are identified in such cases, such as CARE, or UNICEF. The rest of the 
information can be of use for analysis of specific programmatic priorities, such as primary or 
family health, and so forth.  
 
Overall, given the fact that the field of health is small, the allocation-level review does not reveal 
much new information. Apart from IDA, the sub-sector of health is defined by Japan’s donations 
of equipment, and Canada’s commitment to health reform in Bosnia. The rest accounts for on   
smaller allocations for very diverse ends by different donors.   
 
 
2.3   Water Supply and Sanitation  
 
The sub-sector of water & sanitation is overall clear-cut in terms of the final ends of ODA 
allocations. There is a standard range of purposes which populate the list of descriptions, and there 
is not much difference between the different donors as concerns allocation purposes. The 
allocation descriptions registered with the CRS most commonly indicate activities such as:  
 
1. REHABILITATION OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS; 
2. WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION; 
3. CLEAN-UP (WASTE MANAGEMENT); 
4. WATER TREATMENT OF PLANTS; 
5. HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM; 
6. WASTE RECYCLING; etc. (see respective tables in Annex) 
 
These descriptions are consistent across donors and regularly repeated. This suggests that 
activities which can be charged to the sub-sector of watsan are specific in nature and limited in 
range. Most of the ODA to the watsan sector has been allocated for ends related to water supply 
and waste management. It is important to mention also that most of this ODA is obviously capital 
investment oriented, since all of these operations involve relevant infrastructure work.   
 
As already discussed in Chapter 6, Germany was the strongest donor to the sub-sector of water & 
sanitation in the region, with contributions which were both nominally relevant, and in addition to 
                                                 
281 Source of the descriptions: Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the DAC. Available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW   
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that, represented a relevant share of Germany’s SIS aid.  In terms of description of purposes there 
is strong consistency between the final ends of Germany’s allocations with those of other donor 
countries. What only became more clearly visible in this chapter   is that a relevant share of 
German watsan allocations are loans. The tables in the Annex contain notes in brackets for the 
allocations that represent loans (for example, see Table 43 – Germany to Albania; Table 49 – 
Germany to BiH; Table 57 – Germany to Macedonia; Table 59 – Germany to FRY/Serbia).  
 
 At this point it is worth mentioning that fewer   donors have been opting for giving ODA loans.  
Most of the allocations are grant aid, and many donors   do not have the policy option of operating 
ODA loans. Just a few of them    use loans as a form of ODA, and these allocations are clearly 
marked in the Annex. Germany appears to be the bilateral donor which has most extensive use of 
loans as a form of aid.  
 
What is nevertheless absolutely visible is that loans are usually related to bigger allocations. 
Smaller allocations would by rule be grants; bigger contributions, as the micro data in the CRS 
demonstrate, can occasionally be loans. This is completely the case for example with Italy’s 
watsan allocations for Albania. Table 44 in the Annex presents the major years (the years with 
biggest flows) and the major allocations in Italy’s water & sanitation ODA to Albania. They are 
all, without exception loans. Germany’s loan vs. grant portfolio in watsan is more varied; many of 
the biggest allocations are loans, but there are also quite a few which are grant money. Germany 
clearly used an approach which insisted on stronger recipient commitment to the project, by 
accepting a share of the burden in financing the project, even if with concessional loans.    
 
The observation concerning German and Italian loans to the watsan sub-sector is one of the most 
interesting   in the allocation-level review of ODA. Tables 1-6 below present all the loans in the 
sectors and categories under review in this chapter. ODA loans (not counting the loans by IDA) 
are overall a small portion of total ODA to the region. But what is apparent from the tables is that 
in some sub-sectors more than others, donors preferred the loan to the grant option. This was 
usually the case, as evident from the descriptions in the micro data, with the interventions which 
involved larger scale investment.  
 
Another marked moment in water & sanitation is Japan’s huge contribution to Macedonia of USD 
81, 0 million (84, 1 in current prices) in the single year of 2003. It is obviously huge share of 
Japan’s total ODA contribution to the country and even to the region. This is Japan’s investment in 
one big water project in Macedonia, the construction of the Zletovica dam. It is naturally,   an 
ODA loan.  
 
Phrased in rather simple terms, the conclusion is that whenever an allocation clearly strikes out in 
terms of size from the allocation pattern of that particular donor, it is most probably a loan.    
 
Nevertheless, this should not be taken in an strict axiomatic sense; for example, it is visible form 
the tables in the Annex (Table 43 in comparison with Table 59) that relatively smaller share of 
German watsan aid to FRY/Serbia was a loan compared to Albania. As even better evident from 
Tables 1-6 below, both FRY/Serbia and Albania received sizeable German grants in the water & 
sanitation sector, but in addition to that, Albania also received a sizeable loan.  
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Without going into general hypotheses which cannot be fully supported with the data available, it 
is sufficient to concentrate on the documented cases and carefully conclude that a relevant number 
of the bigger individual (usually investment oriented) allocations to watsan in the Balkans were 
loans. Nevertheless, it should be kept in consideration that the share of loans (minus IDA) in ODA 
to the Balkans was overall small; only in some sub-sectors the loan was the preferred form of 
assistance.   
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Table 1: All loans to Albania by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: 
comparison to grants) 
ALB                
  Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total grants 
               
Germany SIS/watsan .. .. 4,45 1,43 .. 6,52 15,85 8,65 17,09 .. 6,16 60,15 93,97 
Italy SIS/watsan 6,97 18,22 .. .. .. 40,56 .. .. .. .. 7,66 73,42 1,10 
Italy SIS/health           6,49 6,49 5,94 
Germany EI/TS  32,94          32,94 0,00 
Italy EI/comm. 11,56           11,56 0,69 
Germany EI/energy .. .. .. .. 23,73 .. .. 3,33 .. 49,05 16,78 92,89 0,00 
Italy EI/energy .. 7,12 .. .. .. 16,75 .. 41,55 55,81 .. .. 121,24 12,12 
Japan EI/energy 12,98 24,26          37,25 0,03 
Germany EI/BFS 4,83 .. .. 6,80 .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,28 14,91 0,35 
Germany EI/BOS 3,45 .. .. .. 3,39 .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,84 2,35 
Germany Multisector .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,66 2,96 .. .. 5,62 24,67 
                              
             463,31  
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database) 
 
 Table 2: All loans to Bosnia & Herzegovina by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the 
right: comparison to grants) 
BiH               
  Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total grants 
               
Germany SIS/watsan          6,36  6,36 16,43 
Spain SIS/watsan         7,74   7,74 2,24 
Portugal EI/TS        5,47 .. 42,47 9,58 57,51 0,00 
Spain EI/comm.     3,51 .. .. 3,60    7,11 0,96 
Sweden EI/comm.    5,23        5,23 4,09 
Japan EI/energy    31,72        31,72 23,95 
Spain EI/energy    31,24        31,24 5,70 
Sweden EI/BFS    1,21        1,21 22,33 
                              
             148,12  
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database) 
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Table 3: All loans to Croatia by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: 
comparison to grants) 
Cro               
  Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total grants 
               
Germany SIS/watsan         48,22   48,22 2,40 
EC EI/TS        108,64    108,64 15,73 
                              
             156,85  
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database) 
 
 
 
Table 4: All loans to Macedonia by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: 
comparison to grants)  
Mac               
  Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total grants 
               
Germany SIS/watsan        8,65    8,65 40,02 
Japan SIS/watsan         80,57   80,57 6,75 
Portugal SIS/watsan      18,88      18,88 0,00 
Spain SIS/watsan          9,34  9,34 0,00 
                              
             117,44  
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database) 
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 Table 5: All loans to FRY/Serbia by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: 
comparison to grants) 
FRY/Ser               
  Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total grants 
               
Germany SIS/watsan      6,83      6,83 99,11 
France EI/energy           10,89 10,89 63,53 
Germany EI/energy       67,46 .. .. 4,55 37,87 109,88 0,15 
                              
             127,60  
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database) 
 
 
Table 6: All loans to ex Yu unspecified by donor (minus IDA) and sector; commitments, USD 2006 millions, (last column to the right: 
comparison to grants) 
ex Yu               
  Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total grants 
               
EC EI/TS        115,43    115,43 0,00 
EC EI/BOS        27,16    27,16 0,00 
                              
             142,59  
(source: based on data from the DAC CRS database) 
 
 
 
 
2.4   Government and Civil Society (GCS)   
 
The sub-sector of GCS has been one of the major reasons to pursue a review of ODA to the Balkans 
at allocation- level. As it has already been stressed earlier, GCS represents a substantive part, 
around half, of all SAA, that is to say, of the largest segment of development assistance to the 
region, and around ¼ of total receipts. However, concluding a sectoral review of ODA by saying 
that roughly a quarter of all aid was given for GCS falls short of answering the question what was 
this ODA actually allocated for.  This question is the one that impels the investigation of the 
allocations comprising the sub-sector of GCS.   
 
Chapter 6 has already concluded that the strong position of GCS aid to the Balkans was result of the 
coherent policies of a few major donors, primarily the EC and the US. Both of them acted as strong 
donors the GCS sub-sector in all of the countries in the region. In addition to these two, Chapter 6 
pointed out the consistent contributions by the Netherlands and Norway, and made a mention of the 
case of Spanish GCS aid to FRY/Serbia and BiH.  
 
 The review resumes from where Chapter 6 has left it off, by closely scrutinizing all the bigger 
allocations in the sub-sector of GCS. It has to be admitted though that even at this level of scrutiny, 
there are limitations in determining the final ends of the allocations. This limitation can simply not 
be overcome. A major factor for this is the lack of detail in the descriptions supplied by certain 
donors. This is definitely the case with US allocations.  
 
The examination of the descriptions of US allocations (Table 72- Albania; Table 82 – BiH; Table 
86 – Croatia; Table 94 – Macedonia; Table 105 – FRY/Serbia in the Annex) to GCS does convey a 
certain idea of the purposes of the allocations, even though their generic character prevents more 
conclusive analysis.  
 
Some of the more common descriptions of US allocations to GCS include:  
 
1. ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES (Alb); 
2. CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING (Alb); 
3. INCREASE INVOLVEMENT - CIVIL SOCIETY ECONOMIC/POLITICAL DECISION MAKING (Alb); 
4. LEGAL SYSTEMS THAT BETTER SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES & MARKET REFORMS 
(Alb); 
5. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (Alb); 
6. RULE OF LAW (Alb);  
7. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE (Alb); 
8. HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: CIVIL SOCIETY (BiH); 
9. GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION: HUMANITARIAN (BiH); 
10. STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY (BiH); 
11. REDUCED HUMAN SUFFERING AND CRISES IMPACT -- DEMOCRATIC REFORM (BiH); 
12. A MORE PARTICIPATORY, INCLUSIVE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (BiH); 
13. SUSTAINABLE MINORITY RETURNS (BiH); 
14. ECO. & DVT POLICY: CRITICAL PRIVATE MARKETS EXPANDED & STRENGTHENED (BiH);  
15. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (Cro); 
16. MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND IMPROVED GOVERNANCE (Cro); (see respective 
tables in Annex) 
 
In addition, some of the more specific descriptions include:  
 
1. ANTI-CRIME TRAINING & TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (Alb); 
2. DESTRUCTION/CONVERSION: MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION (Alb) 
3. INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND FOR DEMINING AND MINE VICTIMS ASSISTANCE (Alb); 
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4. INDEPENDENT MEDIA (BiH); 
5. DEMINING (BiH);  
6. POLICE TRAINING (BiH);  
7. TREASURY ADVISORS (Cro); 
8. EXPORT CONTROL AND RELATED BORDER SECURITY ASSISTANCE (Cro); (see respective tables in 
Annex). 
 
The descriptions differ in their explanatory strength. Some more easily point to the purpose of the 
allocation and the character of the program financed, whereas others are simply too generic to 
provide clearer idea of the allocation goals. For example, a description such as “rule of law” even 
though general, suggests that the intervention has to do with some kind of legal reform; on the other 
hand, a description such as “more effective citizen participation and improved governance” is just 
too generic to give a closer hint of the final end of the allocation.  
 
On the other hand, the descriptions of GCS allocations as a whole give a fairly good idea of the 
philosophy, or ideology driving US foreign assistance.  The key words used include: civil society, 
citizen participation, democracy, democratic governance, private enterprise, market reform, and 
the like. It is true that the final end is often lacking or it cannot be identified   through the 
descriptions, but they are (at least) effective in describing the ideological underpinnings of US 
assistance.   
 
The descriptions of EC allocations for GCS provide (compared to the US ones) on the average more 
information about the final ends of EC GCS ODA. The list below comprises the most common or 
most often repeated descriptions, whereas the tables in the Annex (Table 73 – Albania; Table 83 – 
BiH; Table 87- Croatia; Table 95 – Macedonia; Table 106 – FRY/Serbia) contain all the major EC 
allocations for GCS in the region. The list presented below provides a synthesis – description of the 
most common ends of EC allocations, whereas the tables in the Annex also provide the amounts 
and thus present the full picture   which also indicates the shares of certain allocations in the total 
commitment.  
 
Quite a few interesting observations emerge from the review. For example, the tables in the Annex 
show that many of the biggest EC allocations for GCS in the Balkans were for covering the cost of 
international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
 
A review of the GCS allocations in Bosnia and FRY/Serbia shows that  repeatedly the biggest 
allocations are for the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in BiH, and UNMIK in Kosovo 
(Table 83 and Table 106). This is an important observation concerning both EC’s strong presence in 
GCS, and the share of GCS in total ODA to the region overall.  
 
The list presented below contains some of the most common (most often repeated) descriptions of 
EC allocations to the sub-sector of GCS:  
 
1. GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION (Alb); 
2. CBC ALBANIA/ITALY (Alb);  
3. ALBANIA COP 98 CUSTOMS (Alb); 
4. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT (Alb); 
5. JUDICIAL REFORM (Alb); 
6. ASYLUM & MIGRATION (Alb); 
7. POLICE (Alb); 
8. INTERAGENCY CO-OPERATION IN FIGHT AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING (Alb); 
9. GENERAL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OT ALBANIAN STATE POLICE (Alb); 
10. POLICE ASSISTANCE MISION (Alb); 
11. SUPPORT BORDER POLICE AND CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES (Alb); 
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12. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING IN BIH (BiH); 
13. CUSTOMS PROGRAMME 2000 (BiH); 
14. SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT MEDIA IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (BiH); 
15. SUPPORT FOR THE OHR (BiH); 
16. SUPPORT TO THE BUDGET OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN BOSNIA (BiH); 
17. ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME 2002 - TAXATION AND CUSTOM (BiH); 
18. REFORM OF PUBLIC ADMISTRATION (BiH); 
19. SUPPORT TO BIH POLICE FORCE (MANAGEMENT,ORGANISATION, PREMISES) (BiH); 
20. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT:BORDER CROSSING (BiH); 
21. ASYLUM AND MIGRATION (BiH); 
22. SUPPORT TO MIGRATION MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES (BiH); 
23. SUPPORT TO THE BUDGET OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE (BiH); 
24. CUSTOMS AND TAXES (BiH); 
25. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT (BiH);  
26. PUBLIC FINANCE (Cro); 
27. MODERNISATION OF JUSTICE (Cro); 
28. INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGMENT (Cro); 
29. POLICING AND ORGANISED CRIME (Cro); 
30. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM (Cro); 
31. ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING (Cro);  
32. SUPPORT FOR TRANSPORT AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN KOSOVO (FRY/Ser); 
33. SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATING COST FOR UNMIK(FRY/Ser); 
34. PROVISION OF TECH. ASSIT. IN THE FIELDS OF CUSTOM&TAXATION(FRY/Ser); 
35. SUPPORT FOR THE OPERATING COSTS OF THE EU PILLAR OF UNMIK 2002(FRY/Ser); 
36. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - FORMULATION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY(FRY/Ser); 
37. ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR SERBIA - NATIONAL PROGRAMME - TAX & 
CUSTOM(FRY/Ser); 
38. BORDER POLICE REFORM(FRY/Ser);282 
 
 
It is easy to observe that that there is a (natural) difference between the final ends of EC allocations 
and the US allocations discussed previously. Some of the most frequent descriptions   pertain to 
border management, judicial reform, migration, police reform, and customs and taxes reform. 
These ends are naturally combined with the already mentioned costs for international 
administrations, and with many other allocations, such as pertaining to economic development or 
human rights.   
 
These ends, it is fair to argue, can be interpreted to be in connection with security interests related 
to movement of people and goods across borders. It can also be naturally argued that these final 
ends are part of the agenda of bringing the countries in the Balkans closer to the European Union. 
That should also be a fair argument. However, the indications to the obvious domination of the 
security aspects of such “accession” can not be overlooked. Related to this, the review of the 
allocation descriptions identified potentially similar strategic concerns in the delivery of Italian aid, 
particularly to one country – Albania. For example, as evident in Table 68 – Italian GCS ODA to 
Albania (and also from Table 108 – Italian “other” SIS ODA to Albania, some of Italy’s foreign 
assistance was used for construction of prisons in the country. It does appear that in this particular 
case (concerning small share of Italian ODA to Albania) foreign assistance was, at least in part, 
guided by strategic security interests.  
 
                                                 
282 Source of the descriptions: Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the DAC. Available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW   
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To go back to the final ends of EC GCS aid, it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that 
allocations for borders, customs, police, and related have been the most common allocations in EC 
ODA to the sub-sector of GCS. A review of the tables in the Annex also demonstrates that these are 
allocations of considerable financial weight. It is easy to observe (at the level of detail recorded by 
the CRS) that these allocations easily outweigh in size the, also quite less numerous, commitments   
for example democracy or human rights promotion.   
 
The further review of the Annex reveals that quite a few of the sizeable allocations of other donors 
also go for the cost of maintaining the international administration and international forces in the 
region. This is evident in the case of Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Norway. For example, 
some of the bigger allocations from Austria to BiH (Table 74), were charged for:   
 
1. SFOR: UN PEACE KEEPING MISSION - 10.0039, and 
2. UN PEACE-BUILDING: BILATERAL PARTICIPATION EUFOR - 4.4733  
 
 
The case is the same with Austria’s GCS ODA for FRY/Serbia (Table 96), with some of the major 
allocations including:   
 
1. UN PEACE MISSION: INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO - 4.2443 
2. UN PEACE MISSION UNMIK - 5.6163 
3. UN PEACE-BUILDING: BILATERAL PARTICIPATION KFOR - 7.5466 
 
 
Although its descriptions are formulated differently, the same is obvious for Italy’s aid to BiH 
(Table 75), where the cost for:   
 
“OBSERVERS UN MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 2.8453”283 
 
is one of the major allocations, and for Italy’s GCS ODA to FRY/Serbia (Table 98), where one of 
the major allocations is for:  
 
“PROVISIONAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FOR KOSOVO RECONSTRUCTION - 2.2011” 
 
 
The same is the case with Portugal’s ODA to BiH (Table 79) where a major budget line is for:   
 
“UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - 6.8533” 
 
and Spanish aid to both BiH (Table 80) and FRY/Serbia (Table 101).284  The same can be found in 
Swiss commitments to FRY/Serbia (Table 103), where some of the biggest budget lines were for 
the cost of KFOR:  
 
1. SWISSCOY [KFOR] - 25.9845  
2. SOUTIEN À LA KFOR - 24.4079285 
                                                 
283  Source of the descriptions: Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the DAC. Available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW   
 
284 The descriptions of Spanish allocations for GCS to FRY/Serbia are written for some years in Spanish and 
other years in English, although it is evident that the allocations names repeat.  
285 Translation: Support to KFOR.  
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A review of Norwegian allocations displays the same situation.  In addition to Norway’s strong 
commitment to mine action in BiH (Table 78), Croatia (Table 85), and FRY/Serbia (Table 100), 
within its GCS ODA, some of the bigger lines are for the cost of Norway seconded police forces in 
the region.   
1. UN INTERIM POLICE TASK FORCE - 1.4821 (BiH); 
2. POLICE SECONDMENT - 1.4184 (BiH); 
3. SECONDMENTS 12 POLICE OFFICERS - 1.1445 (BiH);  
 
 
This point will be further discussed in the final conclusions to the text, but what emerges as a 
relevant conclusion is the following: the cost of military presence (and in addition to that, 
international civilian administrations) was not separate or additional to ODA, but it was actually a 
part of ODA. This finding comes in contrast to some discussions from international reports which 
were cited in earlier chapters, arguing that aid to the region was smaller than the cost of military 
presence in the region. What appears from the allocation-level review is that they were often (for 
some of the donors) one and the same.  
 
The DAC rules of what can be reported as ODA do not completely exclude allocations which 
finance activities conducted by military of police agencies. There is a rather complicated set of rules 
which decide under what circumstances these exceptions can be made. For example, a DAC 
document explain when and for what exactly aid to military, for peacekeeping, or civilian police 
work can be reported as ODA. According to the DAC   :  
 
“The supply of military equipment and services, and the forgiveness of debts incurred for military 
purposes, are not reportable as ODA.  On the other hand, additional costs incurred for the use of the 
donor’s military forces to deliver humanitarian aid or perform development services is ODA-
eligible (OECD, 2001).”  
 
Similarly:  
 
“The enforcement aspects of peacekeeping are not reportable as ODA. However, ODA does include 
the net bilateral costs to donors of carrying out the following activities within UN-administered or 
UN-approved peace operations: human rights, election monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilized 
soldiers and of national infrastructure, monitoring and training of administrators, including customs 
and police officers, advice on economic stabilisation, repatriation and demobilization of soldiers, 
weapons disposal and mine removal.(Net bilateral costs means the extra costs of assigning 
personnel to these activities, net of the costs of stationing them at home, and of any compensation 
received from the UN.)  Similar activities conducted for developmental reasons outside UN peace 
operations are also reportable as ODA, but not recorded against the peacekeeping code.  But 
activities carried out for non-developmental reasons, e.g. mine clearance to allow military training, 
and are not reportable as ODA (OECD, 2001).”286  
 
The DAC also stipulates a provision concerning what can be reported as ODA in the realm of 
civilian police work:  
 
“Expenditure on police training is ODA, unless the training relates to paramilitary functions such as 
counter-insurgency work.  The supply of the donor’s police services to control civil disobedience is 
not reportable (OECD, 2001).” 
                                                 
286 See for example DAC Statistical Reporting Directives, pages 19-20, (OECD, 2000a).    
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An extensive treatment of this issue would be beyond the scope of this chapter which essentially 
focuses on disaggregation of foreign assistance to the Balkans. Nevertheless, it should be 
mentioned that the issue of expanding the definition of ODA to allow the reporting as ODA of more 
security and military related expenses has recently loomed large in the donor community.287 A 
DAC meeting from March 2005 has also allowed the inclusion of “non-military security sector 
reform, control of small arms and light weapons, and conflict resolution”288  Some donor countries 
have advocated for an even more flexible definition.289  A wide network of development NGOs has 
advocated against such an expansion of the ODA definition.  290 There is no need to go much in 
dept into this issue. The point is to indicate that it has recently been dominating the DAC agenda. 
The argument of this writing however is that, even under the previous more restrictive definition of 
ODA, it is quite obvious that military, security related costs, and costs of the functioning of the 
international  administrations in the Balkans accounted for a very large share of all GCS ODA, and 
in that sense, of ODA overall. Again, it is not under dispute that these expenses are legitimate if and 
when reported according to the DAC statistical directives. Going into the issue if this was the case 
in the Balkans would exceed the scope and the capability of this (individual) research effort. 
However, the argument is underscored that this aid accounted for a large share of total ODA to the 
Balkans.  
 
A review of the allocations in the Annex also evidences that some of the other major bilateral 
allocations, such as Dutch contribution to BiH or Swiss to FRY/Serbia, are for programming 
commitments towards major multilaterals. One of the Dutch major contributions to Bosnia:  
 
“ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 22.5963(THROUGH WB)”  
 
is for a program implemented though IDA. Similarly, one of the biggest Swiss contributions to 
FRY/Serbia, registered by the CRS DAC as:  
 
“ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING [EBRD] - 16.3487” 
 
was, as already discussed in Chapter 6, for the country’s membership fees to the EBRD:  
 
At this point it is important to underscore once again that the preceding discussion   , is 
nevertheless not an exhaustive treatment of each and every allocation in the GCS sub-sector.   
 
                                                 
287 For more on this issue see for example: Michael Brzoska, Analysis of and Recommendations for 
Covering Security Relevant Expenditures Within and Outside Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
paper 53, Bonn International Center for Conversion; Michael Brzoska, Extending ODA or Creating a New 
Reporting Instrument  for Security-related Expenditures for Development, Development Policy Review, , 
Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 133-150, 2008; Marie Söderberg, ODA: a Tool for Poverty Reduction or Managing 
Security Relations, The European Institute of Japanese Studies at Stockholm School of Economics; The 
Reality of Aid Management Committee, The Reality of Aid 2006. Focus on Conflict, Security, and 
Development, Ebon Books & Zed Books, 2006.   
288  Canadian Coalition to End Global Poverty, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Security, 
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 285
 
The purpose of the discussion so far has not been to cover and include all allocations (nor is this 
practically possible, given that the CRS itself does not provide 100% coverage) but to look into the 
major contributions in an effort to understand the main features of the GCS field. Some of this 
work was done in the previous chapter, by understanding the donor composition of the field, that 
is, by showing who are the major donors to GCS. Chapter 7 takes the effort further and engages in 
an allocation-level review of the sub-sector.  
 
It is fair to argue that some interesting observations did emerge from the effort to explore the GCS 
sub-sector. They would include some of the following: 
 
1. the contributions of the two major donors to the sub-sector of GCS, the US and the EC, 
differed markedly from one another; 
2. relevant share of EC’s allocations to the field went for actions pertaining to border 
management, judicial reform, migration, police reform,  customs and taxes reform; 
3. some of the bigger allocations by the EC and some of the other EU donor countries -  from 
the available data there is no evidence that this was the case with the US -   went for the cost 
of the international civilian administration and the military presence in the region;  
4. some of the big bilateral allocations were  channeled to/through multilateral organizations;  
5. the factor for such a huge share of the GCS sub-sector in total ODA to the Balkans was the 
fact that it “hosted” the substantial cost of the international civilian administration and the 
military presence in the region.  
 
 
 
2.5   Other  
 
As already pointed out, the sub-sector of “other” was not a subject of review in Chapter 6. The 
reason for this was its generic character. Chapter 6 explored the sectoral distribution of ODA to the 
Balkans in an effort to understand which fields received how much aid and by which donors. Given 
its generic description, the category of “other” could not help this purpose. This is the reason why it 
was not included in the sectoral analysis of foreign aid to the region Nevertheless, the sub-sector of 
“other”, its full name being “other social infrastructure and services”   was by no means small and it 
accounted for between 7% in Albania and 20% in BiH of total SIS (see Chapter 6). It was, for 
example, substantially larger than the sub-sector of health and a bit smaller compared to the field of 
water & sanitation.  
 
However, whereas the category of “other” had lesser explanatory value at the sector and sub-sector 
level review, the situation changes when the review is done at the level of allocations.  In this sense, 
it is worth the effort to review the descriptions of the allocations to the sub-sector of other social 
infrastructure & services.  
 
 The descriptions pertaining to the major years and major allocations to the sub-sector of other SIS 
are contained in Table 108 to Table 132 in the Annex.   
 
 As the name of the category itself already points out, the allocations registered with the sub-sector 
of other have been made for   a variety of different purposes.  
 
A review of the tables indicates that Sweden was one of the donors with more consistent presence 
in the category, and in addition to that Swedish allocations also show consistency across countries.  
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Some of the most common descriptions of Swedish allocations to the category of “other”   include:  
 
1. HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.5233 (BiH) 
2. HOUSING POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MGMT. :CARITAS RECONSTRUCTION - 2.0051 (BiH) 
3. RECONSTRUCTION OF 320 HOUSES IN FIVE COMMUNITIES IN NORTH EAST BIH - 4.6610 (BiH) 
4. SANSKI BRIDGE - RECONSTRUCTION OF 350 HOUSES FOR RETURNEES - 5.5971 (BiH) 
5. LOW-COST HOUSING - 5.7937 (BiH) 
6. HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 3.2640 (Cro) 
7. RECONSTRUCTION OF APPROXIMATELY 500 HOUSES FOR MINORITY RETURNEES - 3.6384 
(Cro) 
8. HOUSING : KOSOVO - 2.5741 (FRY/Ser) 
9. HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 2.9660 (FRY/Ser)  
 
 
The conclusion is not difficult to make: most of Sweden’s allocations in the sub-sector of other SIS 
have been made for housing. Some allocations as it can be observed were made for the purpose of 
support to employment, and even several allocations have been made for culture, however, by and 
large the Swedish presence in the category of “other” has served the purpose of housing 
reconstruction in the Balkans. Along this line, it is easy to observe that BiH and FRY/Serbia were 
the major recipients of this type of assistance, which is logical, given that those two countries would 
have been expected to demonstrate the most serious need in this respect. 
 
This model has been followed by the Netherlands which has registered several bigger allocations to 
BiH, for the same final end of housing (Table 112).  
 
Norway has had some moderately relevant presence in the sub-sector of “other”, mostly in BiH 
(Table 113) and FRY/Serbia (Table 126). The allocations have been made for a variety of ends such 
as for example:  
 
1. MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: SOCIAL - 3.4658 (BiH) 
2. MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: HOUSING - 3.0698 (BiH) 
3. WAR VICTIMS & EMPLOYMENT - 1.5391 (BiH) 
4. EMPLOYMENT: STABILITY PACT SOUTH EAST EUROPE [through World Bank] - 1.8530 (BiH) 
5. CHILD ALLOWANCES PROJECT - 6.2873 (FRY/Ser)  
 
 
It is evident that also in the case of Norway there are several allocations made for housing, but the 
list of descriptions is nevertheless also populated by other purposes.  
 
The EC is easily the strongest donor to the category of “other” (Table 116 – BiH, Table 119 – 
Croatia, Table 125 – Macedonia; and Table 130- FRY/Serbia). The list of common descriptions 
comprises:  
 
1. ECONOMIC REGENERATION + SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN BIH - 18.3059 (BiH) 
2. EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT. - 8.2981 (BiH) 
3. HOUSING REPAIR&RELATED ACTIVITIES - 22.0289 (BiH) 
4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND REVITALISATION - 16.9453 (Cro) 
5. INTEGRATED REHABILITATION PROGRAMME FOR KOSOVO - 34.9335 (FRY/Ser) 
6. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR SERBIA IN 2001 - 40.5696 (FRY/Ser) 
 
Again, there are strong references to housing, and in addition, to employment as specific purposes. 
Nevertheless, there is no clear domination of one type of activities or programs over all others, 
which means that ODA went, as the name of the category itself indicates, for various different 
purposes.  
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In conclusion, it can be said that the sub-sector of “other” often comprised the activities which 
could not be registered under the other sub-sectors in SIS, such as education, health, watsan, or 
GCS. Some of these major purposes, such as for example housing and employment, have fairly 
logically emerged during the review.  
 
 
3. Allocation-Level Review of the Sub-Sector of Economic Infrastructure   
  
 Tables 133 - 238 in the Annex list the descriptions of the major allocations to the EI sector, 
comprising its sub-sectors of transport & storage, communications, energy, banking & financial 
services (BFS), and business & other services (BOS).  
 
Chapter 6 already discussed some of the major features of the EI sector. This discussion   continues 
in this chapter through the process of allocation-level review of donor commitments to the sub-
sectors comprising the field of EI.   
 
 
 
3.1 Transport & Storage  
 
The previous chapter produced the observation that the sub-sector of transport & storage has been 
strongly shaped by the presence of two major multilaterals, the EC and IDA. Chapter 6 further 
observed that most of the EC presence in the EI sector has been concentrated in this particular field; 
IDA on the other hand has significant presence in the other sub-sectors of EI as well. In addition to 
the consistent presence of EC and IDA, Chapter 6 noted the ad-hoc, country-oriented activity of 
some bilaterals such as Germany, Japan, and interestingly, Portugal. The sector-level review of 
ODA could not offer explanations of these activities. The commitments of these donors will in this 
stage of the discussion be reviewed at the level of allocation.  
 
The descriptions listed in Table 136 - Albania, Table 141 – BiH, Table 143 – Croatia, Table 145 – 
Macedonia;    Table 152 – FRY/Serbia, and Table 156 – ex Yu, present the final ends of the EC 
allocations to the sub-sector of transport & storage. The exact amounts to recipient countries were 
discussed earlier in the text (Chapter 5), - the CRS does not offer a complete coverage – but the 
tables nevertheless can again serve to reiterate some earlier observations.   
 
It is visible from the tables that Croatia, Bosnia, FRY/Serbia, and ex Yu received the bulk of the 
commitments, whereas the amounts pledged to Albania and Macedonia were quite smaller. This 
pattern of distribution has been commented in Chapter 6 with respect to how it corresponds to the 
needs in the different countries of the region. It was observed that Croatia which is economically 
quite ahead than the rest has received disproportionately large share of the assistance compared to 
level of need.  
 
The allocation-level review corrects this picture by showing that the largest allocations for 
Croatia, which were made in the year 2002 were   loans.  Table 143 fortunately291 describes the 
specific ends of these allocations which pertain to the:  
 
                                                 
291 Fortunately because many of the descriptions of EC allocations are generic in nature and it is not possible 
to conclude the final ends or purposes of the ODA flows. In this case however, they are absolutely specific.  
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1. RIJEKA-ZAGREB MOTORWAY [loan] - 56.5450  
2. ZAGREB-AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL [loan] - 18.8483   
 
The case is the same with the large allocation to the category of ex Yu (Table 156) for “RAILWAYS 
REHABILITATION [loan] - 80.1055”. The description reveals that this is also a loan. The point is the 
following: it was these substantial allocations which have determined the size of the EC assistance 
for transport & storage and indirectly to the whole of EI. The question is logically asked why 
should Croatia which is so much economically ahead compared to Albania or Macedonia, receive 
such abundant ODA? The fact that these allocations are actually loans completely changes the 
picture. These loans since given under concessional terms qualify as ODA, but they are 
nevertheless financial resources which have to be repaid. Logically, since Croatia was not eligible 
for concessional lending from IDA, it was cheaper for it to lend from the EC.  
 
In addition, in terms of their final ends of the allocations are straightforward. They comprise roads, 
railroads, ports, and related items of transport infrastructure. IDA commitments consistently 
through the text, and as already explained, are not given much attention on account of being loans.  
 
Moving to the bilateral donors, Chapter 6 indicated the relevant German presence in transport & 
storage. Review of the tables shows that this was strongly country-based and that Albania was the 
only country in the region which benefited from large German ODA for transport & storage. 
However, the review of the tables in the Annex demonstrates this was again loan money for 
rehabilitation of Tirana airport in 1996. Essentially, Germany financed, with a loan qualifying as 
ODA, the modernization of the main Albanian airport (see Table 133).  
 
The second strong bilateral commitment in the sphere of transport & storage concerns Japan’s 
activity in BiH (Table 139). The major observations are that this was a) grant money, and b) 
allocated over longer period of time (not a single-year allocation). The descriptions comprise items 
such as:  
 
1. REHAB. PUBLIC TRANSPORT SARAJEVO - 7.7190 
2. ROAD CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT - 12.2383 
3. PROJECT FOR REHABILITATION OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IN MOSTAR - 6.3292 
4. THE PROJECT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF DOBOJ BRIDGE AND MODRICA BRIDGE - 9.4634  
 
 
Whereas the final ends are clear-cut, including roads, public transport, bridges, and in addition, the 
standard element in Japan ODA – equipment donation is visible, a relevant conclusion is that Japan 
had sustained, over years, development operations in Bosnia.  
 
In addition, Japan had a sizeable contribution to the category of ex Yu in 2002 (Table 154). The 
description reveals that this was for “REHABILITATION OF THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY 
IN BELGRADE CITY - 14.7763”. In this sense it is not clear why it was charged to ex YU rather than to 
FRY/Serbia. The explanation should probably be sought in the rules which donors follow when 
making their reports to the DAC. Norway is another of the very few donors which consistently 
reported relevant allocations to the category of ex Yu.  
 
 
Finally the third bilateral which registered relevant commitments to transport & storage is, 
interestingly, Portugal, and its activity concerns only BiH. Table 140 presents Portugal’s allocations 
to BiH in the major years of 2002, 2004, and 2005. The major conclusion is, again, that they are 
loans (see also Tables 1-6 in this chapter). The descriptions comprise:  
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1. SUPPLY OF FREIGHT WAGONS [loan] - 3.6754 
2. DELIVERY OF FREIGHT WAGONS TO FEDERATION RAILWAYS [loan] - 39.7564 
3. SUPPORT TO IMPORTS FROM PORTUGAL [loan] - 9.2180  
 
 
The descriptions demonstrate that the case of large Portuguese ODA to BiH is a loan for Bosnian 
railways, most of which was spent on buying freight wagons from Portugal. Because of the 
favorable terms of the project, it qualified as ODA. This however explains why Portugal had such 
sizeable allocations to only one country in the region and it was almost completely absent from 
others. This is the case when a commercial venture, due to the favorable terms of the deal, can be 
registered as ODA. Several such examples have been identified during this review.   
 
 
 
3.2 Communications  
 
As already discussed in the previous chapter, the sub-sector of communications was the least 
assisted field in the EI sector. Tables 157 – 164 display the major years and allocations in this 
economic sub-sector in the Balkans.  
 
Beyond the fact that allocations were overall small, again, some of the major ones were also 
nevertheless loans. This was the case with the single biggest allocation in the field, made by Italy to 
Albania in 1995 (Table 157). The CRS generically describes it as “loan for telecommunications”.  
 
Even some of the quite smaller allocations, such as for example from Spain to BiH (Table 158) and 
Sweden to BiH (Table 159) are in the form of loans.  Switzerland (Table 160) is a sort of exception 
with a relatively sizeable allocation to BiH of USD 8, 3 million (in constant 2006 prices). Tables 1-
6 (this chapter) also allow a comparison of these loans against the grants the donors countries have 
committed in the same sub-sectors. This comparison, for example allows to speculate whether the 
loans were additional to the grants, or the donor preferred ODA loans for the respective sub-sector.  
 
A few of the other more relevant allocations, such as from the Netherlands, Norway, and the EC, all 
of which have been made to FRY/Serbia, were for the purpose of support to the media. This is a 
final end which arguably stands at the crossroad between support to communications and 
democracy aid.  
 
Overall, the only conclusion which is additional to the ones already made in Chapter 6 is that a 
large share of the   yet small allocations made to the sub-sector of communications, was in the form 
of loans.  
 
 
3.3 Energy  
 
Tables 165-196 in the Annex present the major years and allocations to the sub-sector of energy in 
the Balkans.  
 
The preceding review in Chapter 6 has concluded that IDA was one of the strongest donors to the 
sub-sector of energy in the region, followed by the EC and several bilaterals. Given that IDA 
allocations are of lesser interest for this discussion, the focus will be place on the other donors.  
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Chapter 6 also observed that the largest share of the energy funding in the Balkans was allocated to 
Albania, BiH, and FRY/Serbia, whereas Croatia and Macedonia received substantially less ODA 
for energy.  
 
Germany was one of the bilateral donors with strongest presence in the sub-sector of energy. The 
Annex shows that German energy ODA went mostly to two countries, Albania and 
FRY/Yugoslavia. Whereas the final ends for these allocations are straightforward in the sense that 
their purposes are energy production or transmission, the descriptions demonstrate that, once again, 
some the major allocations were loans. Some of them comprise:  
 
1. HYDRO ELEC. SUPPLY FINANCE: SOUTH [loan]- 19.0662 (Alb) 
2. TRANSMISS. LINE TIRANA-PODGORICA [loan] - 47.9301 (Alb) 
3. HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS [loan] - 12.4285  (Alb) 
4. UNTIED FINANCIAL CREDIT FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR [loan] - 45.7896 (FRY/Ser) 
5.  REHA. OF BAJINA BASTA HYDRO POWER PLANT [loan]- 37.2856 (FRY/Ser)  
 
 
While it is important to point out that not all German energy allocations were loans, it is evident 
that the major ones were.  
 
The same is the case with Italy. Italy features as a strong donor in the sub-sector of energy only 
with respect to Albania, but as evident from Table 166, the largest share of Italian energy aid is in 
the form of loan. The same is the case with Japanese energy ODA to Albania (Table 167) and the 
BiH (Table 174), as well as with Spain’s energy ODA to BiH (Table 177) and even France’s ODA 
to FRY/Serbia (Table 185). Tables 1-6 in the body of the chapter also put these allocations in 
perspective.   
 
Overall, the conclusion from the allocation-level review of the commitments to the sub-sector of 
energy is that some the major contributions into this field, especially the ones involving major 
capital investment, were in the form of loans. On the other hand, the final ends of the energy related 
allocations were clear and they pertained to production, transmission, distribution, and consumption 
of energy.  
 
 
 
3.4 Banking & Financial Services  
 
Tables 197-214 in the Annex present the descriptions of the major allocations to the sub-sector of 
banking & financial services (BFS) to the region. As already pointed out in Chapter 6, the BFS field 
was a small recipient of ODA, larger only from the lest assisted sub-sector of communications. The 
field has been strongly determined by IDA presence, followed to a smaller extent by several other 
donors.  
 
The review of the descriptions provides a standard range of purposes, or final ends of the BFS 
allocations to the region. They comprise:  
 
1. CREDIT FOR NOO'S I RURAL A.URBAN REGIONS [loan] - 3.2314 (Alb) 
2. COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL SECTOR - 3.439 (Alb) 
3. MICROCREDIT – 12.0 (Alb) 
4. DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND - 4.5789 (BiH) 
5. CREDIT GUARANTEE FUND (CGF) - 4.5789 (BiH) 
6. PRIVATISATION FEDBH BANKS - 0.6273 (BiH) 
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7. BOSNIA RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE - 110.086 (BiH) 
8. INFORMAL/SEMI-FORMAL FIN. INSTITUT. - 4.4998 (Mac) 
9. CREDIT INFRASTRUCTURE / PROMOTION OF SME IN SERBIA - 5.0841 
 
 
Evidently, the BFS sub-sector contains allocations made in support of    economic and financial 
development, for program activities ranging from micro credit, support to banks, guarantees for 
credits and insurance funds, privatization, and so forth.  
 
The field has registered some extent of loans although not as much as in the sub-sector of energy 
for example, and there are also examples of equity investment, such as in the case of Swiss 
allocations for FRY/Serbia (Table 211).  
 
Overall, beyond an insight into the final ends of the contributions, the allocation-level review does 
not reveal much new material for analysis beyond what has already been observed at sector-level.  
 
 
3.5   Business & Other Services  
 
Tables 215-238 in the Annex present the major allocations in support of business & other services 
(BOS) in the region. The sector-level observations were presented in the previous chapter; the field 
is strongly dominated by the US; there is relevant IDA presence; and Germany has also been active 
in the field. The EC ODA was relevant only in the case of FRY/Serbia and to smaller measure in 
BiH.  
 
One major hindrance for more detailed review of the final ends of the allocations in the BOS sub-
sector is the insufficient information provided by one of its major donors, the United States. The US 
has been the top donor to BOS in all the countries of the region, but the descriptions it has supplied 
of its BOS ODA are overall very generic. They do convey a general idea of what the assistance had 
been dedicated for, but unfortunately they do not provide any additional detail. Some of the 
descriptions, which are in addition very repetitive, as can be observed from the Annex, comprise:  
 
1. PRIVATE ENTERPRISES DEVELOPMENT- 1.868 (Alb) 
2. PRIVATE MARKETS - 13.513 (Alb) 
3. ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 2.019 (Alb) 
4. GROWTH IN NUMBER OF SELF-SUSTAINING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 6.56 (Alb) 
5. PRIVATIZATION & ENTERPRISE RESTRUCT. - 24.457 (BiH) 
6. PRIVATE MARKETS - 51.986 (BiH) 
7. HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: BUSINESS SERVICES - 
6.635051 (Cro) 
8. PRIVATE MARKETS - 7.833 (Cro) 
9. GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 8.245 (Cro) 
10. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 13.273 (Mac) 
11. ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR - 10.429 (Mac) 
12. PRIVATE MARKETS - 102.428 (FRY/Ser) 
13. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROWTH - 12.259 (FRY/Ser)  
 
Essentially, several generic descriptions repeatedly describe the final ends of the large and 
numerous US allocations to the BOS sub-sector. This unfortunately does not provide enough 
information for more substantiated analysis.  
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The situation is not much different in the case of the EC.  Its major allocation in the BOS sub-
sector, which was made to FRY/Serbia in 2001 in the amount of USD 128, 5 million, was simply 
described as “SUPPORT FOR SERBIA 2001” (see Table 235).   
 
Some of the descriptions of the allocations made by the other donors present in the field comprise 
items such as:  
 
1. BUSINESS START-UP PROGRAM [loan] - 3.4891 (Germany  to Albania) 
2. PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT - 1.9066 (Germany to BiH) 
3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION - 1.8642 (Germany to BiH) 
4. HARMONISED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ENTERPRISE SECTOR RECOVERY - 6.2142 
(Netherlands to BiH) 
5. SOCIO ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF SREBRENICA - 6.5309 (Netherlands to BiH)  
6. TRUST FUND-BANK REFORM AND PRIVATISATION - 1.2344 (Sweden to BiH) 
7. ECONOMIC REFORM: CORPORATE GOV... REGIONAL FUND. TRADE & INSURANCE SECTOR - 
11.8027 (EC to BiH) 
8. BUSINESS START-UP PROGRAM [loan] - 6.9783 (Germany to Macedonia)  
9. TOURISM SECTOR - 0.6868 (Germany to FRY/Serbia)  
10. FINANCING OF SALES AGENTS - 2.0481 (Netherlands to FRY/Serbia) 
11. MIER BUSINESS INCUBATOR TRAINING - 1.7499(Norway to FRY/Serbia) 
12. MIER RESTRUCTURING OF JAT AIRWAYS - 0.5812 (Norway to FRY/Serbia) 
13. BUSINESS SERVICES: TRANS-BALKAN FUND [equity investment] - 5.0731 (Norway to ex Yu)  
 
 
The descriptions provided by the different donors are quite diverse. They include a number of final 
ends ranging from business startup programs, employment, to tourism, and reconstruction of an 
airline.   
 
Unfortunately the data concerning this sub-sector remains somewhat scarce. For example, 
Macedonia received 70% of its EI ODA in the BOS sub-sector. Large part of this came from a big 
IDA loan, described in the CRS with the generic line “ENTERPRISE SECTOR – 85.0” (Table 202). 
Even a larger part came from the US, but given the generic descriptions of US allocations it is not 
possible to determine more closely the final ends of that assistance. This is naturally, hypothetically 
possible through an extensive review of the final reports on the IDA and US ODA for these 
purposes, pending that those reports are public.   
 
 
 
4. Multisector Allocation-Level Review   
 
The   last sector to be reviewed at allocation-level within the scope of SAA is the so-called 
“multisector”. Tables 239-267 in the Annex present the descriptions of the major allocations donors 
have directed to this sector. Unlike the other sectors which were reviewed above, this one will be   
reviewed in its entirety and it will not be further disaggregated to its sub-sectors. The reason for 
this is the fact that the multisector comprises only two sub-sectors, a) general environmental 
protection (GEP)  and b) other, whereby more than 90% of allocations to the countries in the 
Balkans (88% for ex Yu) have been registered to the generic category of “other” (Table 4 in 
Chapter 6). 
 
Especially because of this reason the multisector was not object of inquiry in Chapter 6, as was 
neither the sub-sector of “other” in the SIS sector.  
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The reason, it should be reiterated, was the fact of their generality. To say that 90% of the 
allocations to the field called multisector (which stood at between 15-22 % of total SAA for the 
countries in the Balkans) went into its sub-sector called “other” does not have great explanatory 
power. However, this is what made even more relevant, and actually called for review of these 
fields at the level of allocations.   
 
One of the major donors to the “multisector” was the EC.  The EC made consistently large 
multisector allocations to all the countries in the Balkans  
These allocations comprise items such as:  
 
[Table 245: EC to Albania] 
  
1. COP ALBANIE 1996 - 35.9695292 
2. MULTISECTOR AID - 34.4934 
3. ALBANIA COP 1998 - 26.9116 
4. MULTISECTOR AID - 19.5374 
5. SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR ALBANIA IN 2001 – CARDS - 29.5618 
 
 
[Table 251: EC to BiH] 
 
1. 1999 EC REFUGEE PROGRAMME FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 73.8242 
2. 2000 INTEGRATED RETURN PROGRAMME FOR BIH - 46.4543 
3. SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA IN 2001 - 36.6957 
4. REFUGEE RETURN AND HOUSING SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR BIH - 33.4050 
5. ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME 2002 FOR BOSNIA & HERZEG. - NATIONAL PROGRAMME - 
56.3970 
 
 
[Table 255: EC to Croatia] 
 
1. RETOUR DES REFUGIES CROATIE - 9.2157293 
2. REFUGEE RETURN PROGRAMME FOR CROATIA IN 2001 - 20.7774 
3. ANNUAL PROGRAMME 2002 FOR CROATIA - 52.7754 
4. ACCREDITATION SYSTEMS; PLANT HEALTH. VETERINIARIAN SYSTEM - 2.8242 
5. MULTISECTOR AID - 30.3443 
 
[Table 259: EC to Macedonia] 
 
1. COP FYROM 1996 /MA9602-05 - 13.653 
2. COP FYROM 1997 - 16.9990 
3. NATIONAL PROGRAMME 2000 - 14.9294 
 
[Table 265: EC to FRY/Serbia]294 
 
1. RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIQUE AU KOSOVO - 66.5956 
2. EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROG. SERBIE - 163.1186 
3. RECONSTRUCTION DU KOSOVO - 129.020 
                                                 
292 The micro data on EC allocations is sometimes reported also in French. The translation of this item in 
English is “COP Albania”.  
293 Translation: “Refugee return Croatia” 
294 Translation: “1. Economic reconstruction in Kosovo; 2. Emergency assistance program Serbia; 3. 
Reconstruction of Kosovo; 4. Reconstruction of Infrastructure and Economic Development.”  
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4. RECONSTRUCTION DES INFRASTRUCTURES ET DVLT ECONOMIQUE - 157.5892 
5. SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR KOSOVO IN 2001 - 39.8531 
 
 
EC allocations have strongly shaped multisector aid, and in turn, a big share of EC aid has been 
channeled through the multisector category. Table 265 shows that USD 758, 4 million (constant 
2006 prices) of EC ODA to FRY/Serbia in the critical year of 2000 was registered as multisector 
aid.  The descriptions of the allocations differ in specificity and character across countries. They 
generally – not in all cases - manage to convey the purpose of the contribution, although they do 
not supply additional detail..  
 
Several other donors have had a consistent presence in multisector aid. Although their share is 
quite smaller compared to the dominant position of EC aid, their allocations are nevertheless 
significant.  
 
Germany has had steady presence in multisector ODA across the region, as demonstrated by Table 
239 – Albania; Table 247 – BiH; Table 256 – Macedonia; and Table 261 – FRY/Serbia.  
The descriptions of some of the major German allocations registered as multisector ODA comprise 
items such as:  
 
1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNAL INFRA. - 6.9745 (Alb) 
2. URBAN DVPT:SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUND - 3.2685 (Alb) 
3. STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.1557 (Alb) 
4. EQUITY INVESTMENT - 9.9080 (Alb) 
5. SOCIAL INVESTMENT FUND [loan] - 1.9272 (Alb) 
6. MULTISECTOR AID - 5.0237 (BiH) 
7. EQUITY INVESTMENT - 12.4285 (BiH) 
8. MULTISECTOR EMERGENCY AID TO SERBIA- 4.7119 (FRY/Ser) 
9. STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.4136 (FRY/Ser) 
10.  EQUITY INVESTMENT - 19.2642 (FRY/Ser) 
 
Some of the descriptions repeat across countries and they give additional insight into the types of 
contribution that Germany registered as multisector ODA, such as equity investment, study and 
expert funds, etc.  
 
The US was another bilateral with a relevant consistent presence in multisector ODA, as shown by 
Table 244 – Albania; Table 250 – BiH; Table 254 – Croatia; Table 258 – US to Macedonia; and 
Table 264 – FRY/Serbia.  
 
The descriptions of some of the major US allocations registered as multisector ODA, as registered 
by the CRS micro data comprise:  
 
1. IMPROVED PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL SVCES - 3.0860 (Alb) 
2. MULTISECTOR: ACCELERATED DEVPT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES - 3.1700 (Alb) 
3. CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.6410 (Alb) 
4. U.S. PEACE CORPS - 1.1480 (Alb) 
5. CHEMICAL AGENT ELIMINATION TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT - 6.7570 (Alb) 
6. MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 3.1600 (BiH) 
7. BOSNIA MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE / SERVICES - 60.6010 (BiH) 
8. URBAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE - 7.5000 (Cro) 
9. SETTLEMENT: HUMANITARIAN - 15.8710 (Cro) 
10. SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 4.9900 (FRY/Ser)  
11. ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES: PROJECT ASSISTANCE - 
13.0580 (FRY/Ser) 
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The descriptions suggest that a variety of different ends motivated the allocations registered as 
multisector ODA. The environmental ends are naturally present, given that general environmental 
protection is a sub-sector of the category, but in addition, there is a combination of diverse purposes 
ranging from private enterprises, the Peace Corps, municipal infrastructure and services, settlement, 
and so forth.  
 
In addition to the US and Germany, some of the other bilaterals which have had relevant amounts 
registered as multisector ODA include Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, etc. Some of their major 
allocations comprise items such as:  
 
1. MULTISECTOR AID - CONTRIBUTION TO IFAD - 1.8501 (Italy to Albania) 
2. TIR PORTO ROMANO [CLEAN UP OF THE PORTO ROMANO HOT SPOT]-  6.0877 (Netherlands to 
Albania) 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 5.0524 (Switzerland to Albania) 
4. RURAL LIVELIHOODS - 4.3209 (UK to Albania) 
5. SUPPORT GROUP BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA [through MGI]  - 14.7447  (Italy to BiH) 
6. MULTISECTOR AID - 2.3698 (Switzerland to BiH) 
7. MULTISECTOR AID [Caritas Prijedor] - 2.3712 (Switzerland to BiH)  
8. TOPOLA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (TRDP) - 2.8047 (Sweden to FRY/Serbia)  
 
 
Evidently, allocations went for a variety of different ends, which is essentially consistent with the 
description of the sector itself – multisector aid, that is aid which crosses sectors, can not be 
determined to belong to only one sector and so forth.  
 
The analysis of allocation descriptions unfortunately has its limitations presented by the level of 
detail supplied by donors. One should nevertheless bear in mind that even this level of detail is a 
relative novelty in the practice of donor reporting to the DAC, and that it is only of recent date. The 
review of multisector ODA has been for example hampered by the inability to secure more detail on 
the dominant allocations by the EC. Some general ideas are possible, such as that a lot of it was 
related to the crisis situations in the Balkans, and the needs of refugee populations, reconstruction, 
and so forth, but this is as deep as the discussion can go based on the information contained in the 
DAC CRS.  
 
 
 
5. Humanitarian Aid: Allocation-Level Review  
 
Section 7 in Chapter 6 introduced the category of humanitarian aid and it included it in the sectoral 
disaggregation of overall foreign assistance. The sub-components of the category were introduced, 
but the additional disaggregation has not been conducted because, as already explained, the largest 
part of all commitments have been registered in the first sub-category of “emergency response”, 
only a small share has been reported into “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation”, whereas the third 
one titled “disaster preparedness” is dormant in the case of the Balkans, that is, there are no 
registered commitments in this sub-category.  
 
The major findings Chapter 6 suggested were that all major donors had relevant and consistent 
presence in humanitarian aid (UNHCR is not listed in the CRS), and that the largest share of all 
humanitarian aid, logically, has been allocated to two countries in the region, BiH and FRY/Serbia.  
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The exploration of humanitarian aid continues in this section through a discussion of the 
descriptions of individual donor allocations.  The overall conclusion however is that: the allocation-
level review of humanitarian aid does not have much relevant analytical usefulness. The reason is 
the by and large generic, standardized descriptions used by most donors in identifying the final ends 
of their allocations. An occasional specific description appears, but that is usually an exception. 
Some of these descriptions will be presented and discussed; however, the overall conclusion is that 
the CRS data concerning the category of humanitarian aid does not offer much additional material 
for analysis.  
 
Tables 268 – 347 in the Annex list the descriptions of major years and allocations in the category of 
humanitarian aid. Most of the allocations are registered in the sub-category of “emergency 
response”; the occasional descriptions in the sub-category of “reconstruction relief & rehabilitation” 
are presented in continuation (next) to the ones in “emergency response” and are appropriately 
marked, but they are not placed in a separate section. The level of detail presented in the 
descriptions does not a allow for much differentiation between the two. One major factor of 
distinction, as the name of the category itself indicates, is that the second, “reconstruction relief & 
rehabilitation” by definition should involve construction or rehabilitation work, and because of this 
is it logically related to housing and shelter programs.  
 
The key words  used repeatedly in the descriptions of humanitarian aid allocations include some of 
the following: Kosovo refugees, humanitarian aid, emergency food aid, aid to refugees, 
emergency/distress relief, aid to refugees in recip. countries, reconstruction relief,   rehabilitation 
of houses, return of refugees, Kosovar refugees.  
 
Practically, these several words, in a variety of different combinations represent most of the 
descriptions available. This unfortunately tells very little about the final ends of the allocations 
which account for a relevant share of ODA to the Balkans. It does convey the idea, the general 
sense of what humanitarian aid was used for, but it does not go beyond that. Some conclusions are 
possible, such as for example an idea of how big a share of those commitments was given for 
Kosovar refugees, or for example, insight into the allocations which were channeled for the 
specialized agencies which dealt with the refugee crises. An additional idea emerges concerning 
some of the program goals by the frequency of the key words, such as shelter, food, repatriation, 
and so forth.   
 
Overall, most of the conclusions concerning humanitarian aid came from the sector level review: 
that most donors had relevant and consisted presence, and that most of this aid went to BiH and 
FRY/Serbia (roughly 1/5 of their total ODA receipts).  All of this is grant aid; a lot of it is 
channeled through specialized multilaterals and NGOs. Some of the, yet generic, final ends are 
observable from the key words which have been used in the descriptions.  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
 The preceding pages provided an extensive review of the individual allocations made in the major 
sectors and categories of foreign assistance to the Balkans. The review allowed a real micro 
perspective of the foreign assistance amounts committed and it is fair to say that it supplied new 
and relevant information concerning the final ends of ODA to the region. Not all the descriptions 
have been equally useful however, both by donor and by sector. For example some donors, such as 
the US, or IDA, have generally supplied very generic descriptions of the final uses of their foreign 
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assistance. On the other hand, the descriptions by practically all donors in the humanitarian aid 
category have been very generic and could not serve as a source of much relevant information.  
 
Overall however, it can be assessed that the inquiry conducted in this chapter did produce some 
interesting findings concerning the final ends of individual ODA allocations in the Balkans. Some 
of these findings which have been identified in the review included the following:   
 
 
1. Significant share, always more than half and in some cases more than 90% of Austria’s 
ODA for education in the region has accounted for on imputing of student costs; there is a 
strong systematic pattern of imputing student costs in Austria’s assistance to education in 
the Balkans. This is the single strongest factor for Austria’s heavy presence in the sub-sector 
of education; the situation with German aid to education is practically identical; even more 
than in the case of Austria, German allocations in the sub-sector of education have been 
committed to the purpose of imputing student costs.  An easy comparison lends the 
conclusion that this is not the case with other donors; 
2. Large share of French ODA to education in the Balkans has been spent for the promotion of 
the French language. With the fact that French aid to education was at the same time a large 
part of total French SIS and SAA -  roughly around half of its SIS commitment and in the 
case of FRY/Serbia over 70 % -  it can be concluded that – a big, relevant part of French aid 
to the Balkans in the years of transition went for the promotion of French language; 
3. The final ends of foreign assistance in the sub-sector of watsan are specific in nature and 
limited in range. Most of the ODA to the watsan sector has been allocated for ends related to 
water supply and  waste management; 
4. As already discussed in Chapter 6, Germany has been the strongest donor to the sub-sector 
of water & sanitation in the region, with contributions which were both nominally relevant, 
and in addition to that, represented a relevant share of Germany’s SIS aid; What only 
became more visible in this chapter   is that a relevant share of German watsan allocations 
are loans; 
5.  The US was one of the major donors to the sub-sector of GCS.   The key words used to 
define the final ends of UC GCS allocations include: civil society, citizen participation, 
democracy, democratic governance, private enterprise, market reform; 
6. Some of the most frequent descriptions of EC allocations to the sub-sector of GCS    include 
words like:  border management, judicial reform, migration, police reform,  customs and 
taxes reform;  
7. Sizeable allocations by the EC and other European bilaterals to the sub-sector of GCS went   
for the cost of maintaining the international administration and international forces in the 
region. This is evident in the case of Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Norway; 
8. Most of Sweden’s allocations in the sub-sector of other SIS have been made for housing. 
9. Some of Italian foreign assistance to Albania was used for construction of prisons; that is to 
say, it seems to have been directly motivated by security concerns. There is no evidence that 
Italian ODA in other countries of the region was used for the same purpose;        
10.  The largest EC  allocations in transport & storage  for Croatia, which were made in the year 
2002 were   loans;   
11.   Albania was the only country in the region which has benefited from large German ODA 
for transport & storage. However, the review of the tables in the Annex demonstrates this 
was   loan money for rehabilitation of Tirana airport in 1996; 
12. Large share of the   yet small allocations made to the sub-sector of communications, was in 
the form of loans;  
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13. IDA was one of the strongest donors to the sub-sector of energy in the region, followed by 
the EC and several bilaterals; 
14. One major hindrance for more detailed review of the final ends of the allocations in the BOS 
sub-sector is the insufficient information provided by one of its major donors, the United 
States; 
15. EC allocations have strongly shaped multisector aid, and in turn, a big share of EC aid has 
been channeled through the multisector category 
16. A variety of different ends motivated the allocations registered as multisector ODA. 
Allocations served a variety of different ends, which is essentially consistent with the 
description of the sector itself; 
17. Most donors had relevant and consisted presence in humanitarian aid, and most of their aid 
went to BiH and FRY/Serbia (roughly 1/5 of their total ODA receipts).   
 
Chapter 7 and its findings have to be looked in connection with Chapter 6 and the conclusions 
which came out of the sectoral disaggregation of foreign assistance. The two are in a close logical 
nexus, and Chapter 7 offers further clarification to the findings produced by the sectoral 
disaggregation. For example, at the level of sectors Austria and Germany have ranked as the 
strongest donors to the sector of education; the review of the individual allocations however showed 
that the reason for this has been the calculation of imputed student costs. An interesting finding was 
also produced with regards to French commitments for education, which at the same time 
represented a sizeable share of all French assistance to the Balkans: namely, that a large share of 
those commitments has been used for the promotion of French language.  
 
In addition, the allocation level review showed (this could also be obtained at the level of sector) 
that relevant part of the sizeable allocations which involved capital investment, be it in the sector of 
water & sanitation, energy, transport & storage – have been in the form of loans. This is an 
important finding. It can further be disaggregated by pointing out that some donors, such as for 
example Germany; have used loans as a form of ODA more extensively than other donors. 
However, what appears valid as a general conclusion is that donors were more inclined to supply 
investment type ODA in the form of loans. This is not to say that there were no grants in investment 
type ODA; that would not be accurate. However, a relevant share of such types of intervention has 
been in the form of loans. In addition, whereas some donors were more or less regularly involved in 
such types of projects, others were obviously not or were very little present. For example, the US 
was almost completely absent from types of activities which involved large scale investment (the 
sub-sectors of transport & storage, energy, water & sanitation); some of the bigger bilaterals such as 
France or Austria were by and large absent from EI, and so forth.  
 
As underscored previously, the sub-sector of GCS   provided a major incentive for the allocation-
level review of ODA to the Balkans. GCS represents ½ of SIS, and respectively ¼ of total SAA, or 
in other words a large share of all aid to the Balkans. It was important to look into this sub-sector 
and try to understand the final ends of the allocations. Chapter 7 has produced some relevant 
information in this respect. The allocation-level review has shown that a relevant share of GCS aid 
(as registered by the CRS) has been used for the cost of military and civilian administrations in the 
Balkans. Evidence of this has been found in the descriptions of the allocations primarily by the EC, 
but also of some of the major bilaterals such as Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Norway. 
Unfortunately a precise breakdown cannot be provided (an estimated one would be possible) but it 
needs to be reminded that the CRS is not an all-inclusive register of data on aid. Either way, this is a 
major conclusion. It dismantles some of the popular comparisons between the cost of aid vs. the 
cost of peace keeping operations, as it shows that often they were not separate but were one and the 
same. In addition, this is a major factor of inflation of foreign aid to the Balkans. If the cost for the 
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civilian and military presence in the region would be subtracted from the total, foreign aid to the 
Balkans would amount to considerably less. In addition, the fact that the allocation-level review 
finds that this was a practice for some of the donors to the region,   does not automatically exclude 
the others. For example, the US has been the other major donor to the GCS sub-sector, together 
with the EC. Unfortunately, US allocation descriptions are far too generic to offer an idea if the US 
has been calculating aid costs together with its share of the cost for the international civilian and 
military administration in the region.  
 
Another interesting conclusion concerns for example the difference of the final ends between the 
two major donors to GCS, the EC and the US. The analysis has been hampered by the lack of 
information provided by the US, but nevertheless some conclusions are possible based on the 
comparison of the key words in the EC and the US terminology. The final conclusion is that the EC 
key words indicate most often to institutional reform which is primarily concerned with security 
ends. Such key words repeatedly used by the EC in the titles of its programs are, as already 
suggested:  border management, judicial reform, migration, police reform, and customs and taxes 
reform. This clearly suggests that a lot of the EC funding for GCS went for the security of the 
borders, control over the movement of people and goods across borders, and related. On the other 
hand, the US rhetoric was completely different and it included the standard terms such as 
democracy, and markets which have already been identified during the review of the policy texts.  
 
It is fair to argue that the self-interest, in the form of classical security interest (for the EU borders) 
is clearly discernible in a large portion of EC commitments in the GCS sector. In this sense, some 
of Italy’s allocations to Albania indicate to the presence of the same type of self-interest in Italy’s 
foreign aid allocation. For example, some of Italy’s allocations to Albania in both GCS and the sub-
sector of “other” clearly indicated that they had been used for reform of the penitentiary and 
specifically for construction of prisons.295 This indicates to the existence of a clear security goal in 
Italian foreign aid to Albania.296At the same time, Albania is the only country in the region where 
Italy had supported this type of programs. It should be underscored that these programs do not 
appear to be a large part of the total.  
 
Another finding which emerges form the review of individual allocations, and which could not be 
made based on the sectoral review alone, concerns the sporadic relevant commitments by donors 
which overall had very limited presence in the region. Such is the example of Portuguese aid to BiH 
in 2002-2005 or to Macedonia in 2000.  This has almost exclusively been in the form of loans.  
 
 Going back to the very incentive for commencing the allocation level review, which is the question 
of the composition of the GCS sub-sector, it can be concluded that a relevant part of this ODA went 
for the cost of civilian and military administrations in the region. If it is accepted that this cannot be 
considered development aid by definition, and this text argues that position, the conclusion is that 
its calculation as aid relevantly inflated the amount of total ODA to the Balkans.  
 
In addition to this, but also stretching beyond, there is evidence which indicates to the presence of 
clear security interests in the final goals of foreign assistance to the region. This is primarily the 
case of EC GCS ODA to the Balkans.  
                                                 
295 This could hypothetically mean something else, for example that the activity served the purpose of 
improving the conditions in the prisons,  however, but then the analysis would have to go with the 
assumption that the description misstates what it says, which is that, the allocation went for “construction of 
a prison”.  
296 The overall context and the fact of presence of security risk would be taken as common knowledge and it 
would not be specifically elaborated.  
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However, the security interest was not the only form of self-interest observed. For example, the 
strategy of French foreign aid for education clearly served the promotion of French cultural 
interests. On the other hand, other bilaterals such as Germany and Austria have inflated their ODA 
commitments to education by consistently imputing student costs.  
 
Finally, the chapter came to the conclusion that the donors which supplied aid for capital 
investment committed a relevant of it in the form of loans. Many other donors did not support 
capital investment in the region at all, or did it in very small amounts.   
 
In a final analysis, this last phase of the inquiry can be argued to have identified relevant presence 
of donor self-interest, and in connection with this, practices of “inflation” in the supply of foreign 
aid to the Balkans.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The preceding pages attempted to answer the basic questions of who gave aid to the Balkans, to 
whom, for what and why. As explained in the very beginning of this writing, these questions have 
been invited by the understanding that the phenomenon of foreign assistance to the Balkans had 
been generally under-researched in the scholarship on aid. Even though the region of the Balkans 
has been a very strong aid recipient over the past 18 years, it appears that this process has attracted 
rather little scholarly attention. Foreign aid to the Balkans has been an inseparable part of the 
region’s painful transition and of the extensive and intensive international intervention over the past 
two decades. But whereas these other aspects have been thoroughly researched and discussed, the 
foreign aid to the Balkans has somehow remained insufficiently explored. This was the key 
motivation for this work.  
 
This should be specified a bit further. The particular aspect of foreign assistance to the Balkans 
which has remained under-explored is the overall,   regional one, which looks at the process in its 
entirety.  Many thematic, sectoral, in-country, and other related studies have been produced over the 
years on particular sides of this phenomenon, for example, on democracy assistance in Serbia,   
gender work in Kosovo, micro credit in the Balkans, civil society promotion,  NGO development 
across countries or regionally, and so forth. However, there has not been a work of synthesis which 
would explore the process as a whole. This has been the focus of this writing. In essence, the central 
inquiry of this research has been the one used in the title - who gave aid to the Balkans, to whom, 
and why.  The title itself is homage to the   seminal article by Alesina & Dollar (1998) Who Gives 
Foreign Aid to Whom and Why, and even the topic of the inquiry is essentially the same. Alesina & 
Dollar have looked into the global patterns of distribution of foreign assistance and discussed the 
underlying motivations. This writing has done practically the same, only on a much smaller sample 
– the region of Balkans. Nevertheless, the approaches are absolutely different. Whereas the Alesina 
& Dollar work rests on econometric methodology, this writing has used qualitative methods (the 
ones the author can command) and essentially worked on a detailed (as possible) disaggregation of 
the foreign assistance effort to the Balkans. In this sense, the focus was not on stipulating a thesis 
which would then be confirmed or falsified, but on exploring the phenomenon inside-out.  The 
research managed to produce relevant findings concerning the supply of ODA to the Balkans in the 
period of transition. It is fair to say that the basic questions have been answered. The extensive 
statistical data used in Chapter 5, 6, and 7 have provided detailed answers on who gave aid to the 
Balkans, to whom, but also for what. In addition, a lot of attention has been paid to the essential 
question of why. In essence, the question “why” has been the overall framework for the discussion. 
This is the question which searches for the motivation to give foreign assistance. This has been a 
steady, consisting niche throughout the entire text, starting with Chapter 1 which has discussed the 
major streams in the theory, through Chapter 3 which reviewed the official policy texts of some of 
the major donors to the Balkans, Chapter 4 which attempted to capture the political reality of the 
supply of foreign assistance to the region, and finally Chapter 7 which looked at the level of 
individual allocations to answer the question what has ODA   to the Balkans been allocated for 
exactly. It can be said that the discussion on motives for aid managed to shed a lot of light on what 
were some of the factors which influenced the supply of foreign assistance to the region.  
 
As a result, the picture of foreign aid to the Balkans, previously an undefined whole, has obtained 
its contours, structure, dynamic, logic, and in addition to that, it has been finalized with a 
substantial amount of detail.  
 
 302
 
Some of the common myths have been dismantled, such as the one that the aid to the Balkans could 
not match the grand Marshal Plan for post- World War II Europe. An easy comparison of the 
receipts per capita proved that is a misconception. The Balkans has received a lot more in per capita 
terms than Western Europe during the Marshall Plan.  In addition, the detailed review of allocations 
in Chapter 7 has revealed that the comparisons between foreign assistance on one side and the costs 
of military intervention on the other do have the tendency to appear misguided.  
 
The analysis of the numbers on foreign assistance has shown that neither was the Balkans 
homogeneous as a recipient, nor was the donor community unanimous in its ODA policies towards 
the region. The countries in the region differed substantially between each other in terms of ODA 
receipts. In this regard, the most drastic difference identified has been the one between Croatia and 
the rest. The research of the numbers showed that in terms of ODA received Croatia was not a 
“Balkan country”, and what more, it showed that Croatia received even less aid than most of the 
CEE and SEE countries. This logically invited the conclusion that the level of economic 
development of the recipient was a major factor determining the supply of ODA in the Balkans. 
This was the only factor which distinguished Croatia from the other countries in the region: Croatia 
had also experienced war, humanitarian emergency, and difficulties with democratization. And yet, 
the amounts of aid it has received were substantially smaller compared to everyone else. The factors 
for this outcome have also been explored. The research has further shown that this was has not been 
a result of a consistent pattern in donor behavior. Whereas on one side there was a group (the larger 
one) of donors which preferred to give very little, or essentially not to give foreign aid to Croatia, 
there was also a group of donors which actively supplied relevant amounts to the country.  
 
 The exploration of the question of who gave aid to whom in Chapter 5 also presented some of the 
other particular donor - recipient relationships in the region, and overall it produced the information 
on who were essentially the major donors to the Balkans. Chapter 6 further disaggregated this by 
sectors, and finally Chapter 7 produced interesting information concerning the exact final ends of 
ODA allocations.  
 
The largest share of the foreign assistance to the region has essentially gone to two countries, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which has subsequently been 
(transformed and) renamed into Serbia and Montenegro. The text presented the particular challenge 
in disaggregating ODA within FRY/Serbia and tried to provide some indications about the possible 
distribution based on comparisons of data from several sources. The research confirmed the 
assumption that until the year of 2000 a significant share of the aid receipts has gone to Kosovo. 
The data comparison has also shown that Montenegro has   been a significant beneficiary of the 
ODA registered to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the period before the dropping of the 
sanctions against Serbia.  
 
 In addition Chapter 5 has reviewed the time-dynamic of ODA to the Balkans and discussed it 
against the backdrop of political developments in the region. The conclusion has been that the 
major factors of supply have included: war, humanitarian emergency, post-conflict reconstruction, 
and the democratic breakthrough in Serbia combined with Milosevic’s extradition to The Hague. 
 
Chapter 6 provided an extensive sectoral disaggregation of foreign assistance to the region, taking 
into account the most assisted sectors in SAA, which has been the largest part of aid to the Balkans, 
and including also the category of humanitarian aid which was also a substantial part of total ODA 
to the region. Whereas Chapter 5 provided the information on the total amounts of aid and its 
breakdown by donors and countries, Chapter 6 has started to paint the picture of what has this ODA 
essentially been allocated for?  The sectoral disaggregation for example showed that half of all SAA 
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(consistently across countries) has been allocated to the sector of social infrastructure & services 
(SIS), and that within this sector half of all aid has gone for support of the sub-sector of government 
and civil society (GCS). Essentially, ODA for GCS has accounted for the largest share of total 
foreign assistance to the Balkans. This naturally invited the question     what for? The answer to this 
question has subsequently been produced by Chapter 7.  
 
  Chapter 6 has provided a lot of relevant information about the structure of foreign assistance to the 
Balkans. It has shown for example, that here has not been an even representation of donors across 
sectors. What Chapter 6 has shown was that donors have had their preferred sectors and sub-sectors 
of operation, and that this sum of different donor preferences has produced the total picture of aid to 
the Balkans. The conclusions to Chapter 6 contain all of the major findings to this end, but just as a 
remainder, the sectoral analysis has shown: that the sub-sector of GCS has been dominated by two 
major donors to the region, the EC and the US; that quite a few relevant donors to the Balkans had 
very small to irrelevant presence in the EI sector; that almost all of the EC  ODA for the  EI sector 
has been allocated for building transport infrastructure; that most of the donors to the region did not 
want to work in health, and so forth.  
 
Yet, as much as Chapter 6 has produced relevant information about the allocation of ODA across 
sectors, that still did not explain what aid has been allocated for exactly. This was the topic of the 
subsequent chapter.  Chapter 7 undertook an extensive review of the descriptions of the major 
allocations by sectors and across countries and has shown, through a close-up of available data, 
what have been the final ends of these allocations. This inquiry had its limits: the descriptions by 
the US have been far too generic to yield any relevant information about the final ends of aid 
commitments, except to provide a sense of the rhetoric used for the different programs. In addition, 
the descriptions by all other donors have been generic concerning the allocations in the category of 
humanitarian aid, and very little relevant information could be obtained from the extensive review 
of the allocations in this category which accounted for around 1/5 of all aid to the Balkans. 
Nevertheless, Chapter 7 has managed to supply a lot of pertinent information concerning the supply 
of ODA to the Balkans. Things which could not be seen based on the sectoral analysis in the 
previous chapter, have become much clearer after the allocation-level analysis. For example, the 
inquiry has pointed to the fact that a relevant share of GCS ODA has been allocated towards the 
cost of operation of the military and civilian administration in the region. The discussion also paid 
reference to the DAC rules according to which this is a legitimate practice under specified 
conditions, and in addition to that pointed to the recent debate concerning the further relaxation of 
the DAC rules to allow even greater flexibility in reporting these types of costs as ODA. This 
discussion, as already pointed out, does not enter into the question of the legitimacy of the practice 
of reporting these types of costs   as ODA in the Balkans. That would be beyond the scope of this 
research, and it would possibly constitute a separate research topic in its own right. However, as it 
is visible from the Annex to Chapter 7, these types of costs represented a substantial share of all 
GCS reported ODA, and for quite a few of the smaller donors to the region, such as Portugal or 
Spain, they represented most of the foreign assistance from these donor countries to the region. 
Essentially, these donors did not make any contribution, or made very little (grant) contribution, 
beyond what they have given to the military and civilian administrations in the Balkans, and beyond 
their engagement in humanitarian aid. To this extent the argument is firmly based in fact. In 
addition, it is evident from the tables in the Annex to Chapter 7 that these allocations were by 
definition made to these bilateral donors’ segments or units in these administrations. Again, this text 
does not (have any evidence to) dispute the assumption that these allocations were in line with DAC 
rules for reporting of ODA – although obviously there is a movement in the development 
community which considers these rules to be   too flexible – however, the fact remains, that some 
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donors (with smaller presence in the region) have made very little contribution beyond this type of 
allocations.  
 
Beyond just the sub-sector of GCS, Chapter 7 offered other interesting findings, such as for 
example concerning the reasons for the strong Austrian and German presence in education, that is 
the imputing of student costs, or the priority of a large part of French ODA in the region, that is, the 
promotion of French language.  
 
An interesting question for the conclusion of this text definitely concerns how the findings which 
have emerged from the statistical data correspond with the findings from the policy texts of the 
major donors to the region. Or in other words, do the numbers of foreign aid to the region 
correspond with the declared priorities of ODA? Did donors allocate the resources for the 
achievement of goals they declared as priority ones? The analysis of the policy texts has indicated 
there most of the major donors to the region have operated with a standard range of goals for their 
foreign assistance to the region. These goals have included, in the shortest possible summary, 
promotion of democracy, market economy, and peace & stability. In addition to these, the goal of 
European integration has over time emerged as a goal for both EU and non-EU countries.  These of 
course are the ultimate mission statements for ODA to the region, and as such they have been 
preceded by many prior and action-oriented goals, such as emergency relief in the situations of 
humanitarian crisis, or post-conflict reconstruction with the immediate task of restoring conditions 
for life in the aftermath of war. The strong commitment to humanitarian goals, including also post-
conflict reconstruction, has been visible in many of the sectors, sub-sectors, and categories. Starting 
from humanitarian aid which accounted for a huge share of the total and has been mostly concerned 
with emergency relief and relief reconstruction (housing etc.), through the multisector which has 
comprised many of the commitments for reconstruction, and the respective sub-sectors, such as for 
example energy (restoring destroyed capacities in FRY/Serbia).  
 
Nevertheless, reflection on the relationship between the general policy declarations and the actual 
commitments of foreign assistance is to some extent possible. A note of caution is perhaps 
necessary. This can only be done provisionally: it is not possible to make a specific breakdown of 
amounts of aid for democracy, market economy, and peace& stability. This should be considered as 
self-evident and no particular effort will be made to explain why is this so. However, it should be 
understood that this is the limitation.  This text cannot argue with certainty a statement of the type:  
“this much has been allocated for democracy.” That is not possible. However, this being said, it is 
possible to make some approximate, rough notes on the basis of the findings from the sectoral and 
allocation-level analyses. For example, the sectoral analysis gives an idea which sub-sectors could 
possible contain the allocations for support to the goal of promotion of market economy. It is only 
logical to seek them primarily in the sub-sector of BFS and BOS, then in the GCS, and to extend 
the search, perhaps also in the multisector. It is more difficult to expect that these allocations could 
be contained in humanitarian aid, water & sanitation, education, or related. The same exercise could 
also be done with the goals of democracy, and peace & stability.  In doing so, the exercise would 
also give ideas about which donors were more engaged in pursuing these goals then others. For 
example, if a donor was completely absent from the sub-sectors which were more pertinent to 
democratic development or economic transformation, that it could be argued that such a donor had 
less input into the democracy and market economy promotion project.    It is again important to 
note that this text cannot argue in terms of absolutely precise amounts or specific correlations, and 
this is why it resorts to the use of formulations such as “a large share”, “the most”, “much more”, 
“by and large”, “possibly”, “a relevant share”, and so forth. It is also for example perfectly 
plausible, and to be expected, that donor priorities would change over time.   
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In addition to the sectoral analysis, this exercise could also be pursued through a review of the 
major allocations in the Annex to Chapter 7. However, also here the descriptions are only a limited 
tool; the challenge is the lack of accurate descriptions by some of the major donors. For example, it 
is obvious that some donors are much more than others engaged in the sub-sectors which more 
closely correlated with the goal of promoting market economy. This can be observed from the 
tables with the rankings in Chapter 6, and in addition, the same observation can be derived from the 
review of the allocation descriptions. The same argument could be made with respect to democracy. 
At the level of sub-sectors these allocations would logically be sought in GCS ODA, and perhaps 
the search could be extended to the multisector. As already pointed out several times, the sub-sector 
of GCS is vast. One observation here, limited   to the two major donors to GCS, that is, the US and 
the EC, would be that the rhetoric of democracy promotion is much more evident in the US 
allocation, even though, the issue of the generic US descriptions should nevertheless be kept in 
mind as a limitation. In the EC allocations it can be fairly argued, it is much less frequent compared 
to the goals of customs reform, police reform, and the like. The allocations of some of the Nordic 
donors do have frequent use of   terms such as “human rights. This observation, it should be 
reminded, is not new. In his Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve, Carothers (1999)297 has 
noted that the rhetoric of democracy promotion by far exceeded the actual allocations made for the 
same purpose in the foreign assistance operations of the US. This exercise actually agrees with this 
at a general level, even though it points out to the difference between the US and the EC, whereby 
in this comparison the US does seem more committed to the goal of democracy compared to the 
EC. One possible observation concerning this issue can be that the US was probably the first donor 
which set the goals of democracy and market economy as foreign assistance priorities for the entire 
Eastern Europe, with the Balkans included. The comparison of the provisions of the US SEED Act 
and the original PHARE regulation of the then European Community lends that conclusion 
(Chapter 3). The first PHARE did not operate with the term “democracy”; it has been only 
subsequently complemented with PHARE Democracy which aimed to reflect Europe’s growing 
engagement in the field as the 90s were unfolding. However, going beyond the EC and the US, it is 
observable from both the sectoral and allocation level analysis that some donors have been simply 
less involved with political development as well as with ideologically (capitalist) driven economic 
transformation. Looking at Japan’s engagement in the region for example, such an impression is 
obvious. Japan has preferred to work in health more than any other area, and even beyond health, its 
engagement has been focused on more classical (yet appreciated) work with equipment   donation. 
In addition, Germany, which was the largest bilateral to the region, has been by and large absent 
from the GCS field, with the exception of FRY/Serbia, possibly related to Germany’s commitments 
under the Stability Pact whose promoter it was. As a note of clarification, Germany has some 
nominal presence in GCS, but its commitments are smaller compared to a) its own commitments to 
other sub-sectors, which is an indicator of priority, and b) the GCS commitments of other (also 
much smaller) donors; to the extent that Germany even rarely ranks on the top 10 lists in the field of 
GCS. This can be taken as a relevant indication that Germany, as a major bilateral was less 
interested in the theme of democratic development, again, in comparison to its other priorities.  
However, it should again be underscored that the goal of this discussion is not to find how much 
were democracy and market economy represented in the work of some donors compared to others. 
The text limits the argument to the point that although these goals were consistently present in the 
policy texts of all major donors, at the level of actual allocations, donors differed substantially in 
how much ODA they have contributed to these priorities.  The situation can be said to be similar 
with the goal concerning peace & stability, with the fact that peace & stability is even more vaguely 
defined than the previous two. Many different types of activity can be considered to contribute to 
peace & stability; it is even less possible to have specificity in discussing allocations to the latter 
                                                 
297 See Chapter 2 
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compared to the former two goals.  Starting with the emergency goals of humanitarian aid, through 
post-conflict reconstruction, and a variety or social and economic goals, everything can be said to 
contribute to peace &stability. Even the other goals relating to political and economic development 
can be argued to contribute to this end, or to be fused. In this sense, the task of discussing the 
relationship between policy declarations of peace & stability and the actual allocations towards this 
end does seem to become elusive.     
 
One further angle   of looking on this question of consistency between policy texts and actual 
allocations can be provided by the fact of the - consistency of allocations across countries. In other 
words, a donor which would be actively promoting the goals of democracy and market economy, 
would be expected to the have consistency in the allocations supporting these ends, across the 
countries of the region. A mere look at the tables in Chapter 6 shows this is often not the case. For 
example (Table 32 in Chapter 6) the EC seems consistent primarily in the field of GCS and 
transport & storage, and with smaller nominal amounts in education. Germany (Table 33 in Chapter 
6) seems most consisted in the sub-sector of education and water & sanitation, and so forth.  
 
In this sense, what can be argued as a final conclusion is that: at the level of rhetoric the ideological 
goals of democracy and market economy did rank high in the policy statements of donors. 
However, thy appear to have been used, by some donors more than others, as idealized statements 
of vision, without consistent reflection in donors’ operational foreign assistance policies.  
 
Finally one last question concerns the issue of motivations. The issue of motives for aid has been 
assigned a framework role in this discussion. The theoretical discussion of foreign assistance 
actually started with the question what motivates donors to give aid? In this sense, was aid just 
another tool of foreign policy, or it was an expression of genuine humane internationalism? This 
question equally applies to foreign assistance in the Balkans: was aid an instrument of foreign 
policy and donor interest, or was it a result of an altruistic desire to help? The answer concerning 
the Balkans does not differ from the answer concerning aid overall, or aid in other parts of the 
world. The answer is that aid to the Balkans was motivated by both: by donor self-interest but also 
by moral altruism. If the question is which of the two motives dominated, the answer could be 
sought in the scholarship of aid. There is a wide consensus in aid literature that national self-interest 
is by and large the strongest motive to give. A note of caution is due here: it was discussed early in 
the text that the same motives do not have the same importance for the same donors. Whereas for 
some donors self-interest is a strong determinant of their foreign assistance programs, for other 
donors (the Nordic countries are most often mentioned in this respect) humane internationalism 
appear to be a much stronger motive. Again, this text will not phrase things in specific quantitative 
terms. The role of this text was more oriented towards finding out where this self-interest could be 
identified in foreign aid to the Balkans? And in addition, what kind of self-interest it was? What 
emerges as a conclusion is that self-interest could be identified in many different forms.  For 
example, for France it had to do with the promotion of French culture; Italy had direct security 
interests to take care of and this reflected in some specific operational ends of its ODA programs, 
but also in the special relationship which it had with Albania. A similar argument can be made 
concerning the final ends of some commitments of European Commission aid.  When and where 
donor countries were obligated to support the maintenance of the military and civilian 
administrations in the Balkans, it can be argued that self-interested reflected in the channeling of 
assistance through their national units in these administrations, which also in a sense meant, 
covering the costs of these institutions. Controlling the cost of aid can also be seen as a donor-self 
interest, and in this sense, staying away from costly investment type intervention, or supporting it 
primarily through loans, can also, arguably, be considered to at least take into account donor 
interest. ODA loans are nevertheless ODA, but there should be little doubt that some isolated cases 
 307
 
registered as loans, such as between Portugal and Bosnia, or South Korea and Croatia, were at all a 
result of policy driven by the desire to help. Another way of controlling for the cost of ODA, or in 
other words, inflating the reported foreign assistance, is for example the imputing of student cost, a 
practice for which Austria has consistently been reminded   by the DAC, until it made an effort to 
correct in and align it with the DAC reporting rules a few years ago. In addition, when generous 
contributions were eagerly expected and needed, a big part of them has been allocated through 
forgiveness of old debt, and so forth. In conclusion, the review of foreign aid to the Balkans does 
reveal many instances when aid functioned as a tool of or took into account the donor self-interest. 
The review of the political reality and political discussions which surrounded aid supply to the 
region has shown many instances when aid was considered as a tool of one type of interest or 
another. Probably the most emblematic example concerns Milosevic’s extradition to The Hague.  
The numbers undisputedly show, and this is closely corroborated by other direct sources, that aid 
was probably the strongest tool utilized for the achievement of this political gal. And at the same 
time it was the currency to pay for it. However, this is only the most famous example. The review 
of the media has show that foreign assistance was a frequently used foreign policy tool consistently 
over the years in the Balkans. But again, this does not   mean that countries of concern to the 
foreign policy of donor countries automatically received more. The situation of Croatia makes that 
very clear.  
 
This eventually brings to a conclusion the inquiry into foreign assistance to the Balkans in the 
period of transition. The central question of who gave aid, to whom, for what, and why, has been 
answered extensively. The largest part of the inquiry rested, and many of the answers have come, as 
intended, through the detailed analysis of the numbers on aid stored in the DAC global registers. 
This exploration of the numbers of ODA to the Balkans has been the persistent aim of this research 
endeavor from its very inception. The tables and charts in the chapters, and the extended statistical 
data stored in the annexes provide detailed information about the flows of foreign supply to the 
region. Foreign aid to the Balkans is no longer the undefined whole from the beginning of the text. 
The preceding chapters have revealed the donor structure, sectoral composition, time-dynamic, final 
ends, and major motivations for development assistance to the region.  
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 CHAPTER 5 - ANNEX
DISAGGREGATION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FLOWS TO THE BALKANS 1990-2005
Table 1: DAC bilateral ODA to the region of Western Balkans (by donor)*
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia 0,01 0,24 0,03 1,29 1,84 4,18 4,7 1 0 73,7 9,5 1,33 0,18 0,5 0,6 0,32 99,42
Austria 14,11 49,8 192,62 174,98 175,75 136,42 126,64 80,67 80,45 128,86 94,7 68,34 150,24 52,87 60,31 76,72 1663,48
Belgium 0,01 0 2,8 0,33 2,96 2,68 5,6 8,49 7,52 19,7 15,46 18,55 78,24 5,78 2,49 4,09 174,7
Canada 0 0,01 0,03 37,18 14,91 15,3 39,99 13,47 25,01 73,44 65,9 65,02 190,68 29,92 22,94 19,88 613,68
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0,77 2,89 3,39 8,01 9,66 6,41 45,65 63,06 65,09 22,85 30,7 18,03 276,51
Finland 2,02 9,17 34,44 9,58 11,01 7,25 18,73 15,97 18,07 42,57 27,57 30,26 20,81 19,91 47,03 14,01 328,4
France 5,9 7,29 12,25 16,53 13,9 9,9 19,56 19,53 19,23 219,58 69,67 44,65 163,11 258,52 30,91 113,5 1024,03
Germany 0,1 61,64 756,9 635,32 364,15 412,04 67,85 103,61 122,34 250,51 320,95 211,69 820,73 208,72 165,3 162,87 4664,72
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 15,75 35,2 56,27 93,53 127,08 110,7 110,58 183,92 74,88 81,61 889,52
Ireland 0 0 0,95 3,87 1,74 5,75 8,92 3,67 4,04 10,92 5,03 3,84 4,98 4,24 3,31 4,68 65,94
Italy 40,81 442,85 204,91 262,87 65,11 86,45 131,13 50,7 42,17 166,55 127,34 110,32 64,72 60,66 61,18 32,63 1950,4
Japan -0,21 0,9 0,91 0,62 7,22 7,76 28,76 50,64 74,78 98,05 41,22 39,54 38,34 95,05 44,06 157,37 685,01
Luxemb. 0 0 3,06 1,95 2,34 2,4 3,43 3,37 3,66 16,58 16,91 13,33 15,58 11,08 10,42 9,57 113,68
Netherl. 2,45 6,62 55,75 255,35 151,78 167,46 135,32 146,19 136,34 221,8 228,62 256,97 188,78 116,67 94,04 73,08 2237,22
New Zel. 0 0,06 0,05 0,25 0,08 0,28 0,03 0 0 1,24 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,99
Norway -1,11 3,48 6,58 66,17 178,7 118,02 104,56 107,02 120,43 283,7 202,05 142,34 188,59 152,29 127,72 110,37 1910,91
Portugal 0 0 0 0 1,38 0,45 0 0,19 1,43 2,9 5,96 5,67 3,47 4,19 8,9 18,51 53,05
Spain 0,13 0,14 1,15 3,82 0,81 14,33 16,96 10,47 39,35 124,54 112,97 87,48 145,24 92,52 52,27 33 735,18
Sweden 0 5,87 114,53 155,38 127,68 61,69 66,42 80,06 40,07 89,85 82,96 120,55 99,91 100,46 97,72 111,1 1354,25
Switz. 0,22 3,32 25,29 39,56 34,15 48,37 46,28 25,61 34,18 148,86 113,22 114,93 89,73 97,36 90,28 84,65 996,01
UK 0,02 0,68 8,33 168,2 161,73 65,13 111,1 79,22 48,27 93,06 213,58 75,26 657,45 42,23 33,37 116,19 1873,82
US 0 0 39,13 65,95 36,16 103,78 207,41 237,02 289,42 443,35 334,99 516,11 820,08 475,73 407,27 348,41 4324,81
total 26.036,73  
*Western Balkans = Alb, BiH, Cro, Mac, FRY/Ser, and ex Yu unspecified. 
Source:   all data in the Annex to Chapter 5 are taken from the DAC online statistical database
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Table 2: DAC bilateral ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient country)
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 11,95 411,97 238,12 140,86 84,59 84,94 138,44 145,67 122 339,47 196,56 210,82 232,94 269,46 173,67 187,66 2989,12
BiH .. .. .. .. 408,02 817,88 724,18 669,68 769,13 909,18 649,49 525,63 392,28 376,96 314,79 299,14 6856,36
Cro .. .. .. .. 64,22 47,37 137,15 33,46 41,56 36,65 59,21 104,1 103,17 93,13 94,88 65,6 880,5
Mac .. .. .. .. 35,75 26,21 28,06 35,94 39,06 169 150,17 227,38 243,79 204,9 171,78 169,52 1501,56
FRY/Ser .. .. .. .. 63,94 95,72 75,08 96,76 124,55 950,3 871,3 894,01 2539,3 987,08 617,95 828,34 8144,3
ex Yu 
unspec. 52,51 180,1 1221,6 1758,3 697,65 200,41 59,62 98,6 76,39 205,1 334,6 138 405,08 103,94 92,63 40,33 5664,89
total 64,46 592,07 1459,7 1899,2 1354,2 1272,5 1162,5 1080,1 1172,7 2609,7 2261,3 2099,9 3916,5 2035,5 1465,7 1590,6 26036,73
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TOTAL DAC BILATERAL TO WESTERN BALKANS 
(full overview of allocations by recipient countries) 
Table 3: DAC bilateral to Albania
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. 0,02 0,01 .. 0 .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. 0,05
Austria 1,94 5,71 8,67 3,23 2,07 3,58 3,5 5,5 5,86 25,07 7,23 3,51 2,44 4,31 5,24 4,3 92,16
Belgium .. .. 0,18 .. 0,32 0,68 0,09 0,21 .. 4,11 1,37 .. .. 0,01 0,39 0,53 7,89
Canada .. .. .. 0,13 .. 0,06 .. 0,55 0,64 0,3 1,99 3,86 2,09 2,22 1,36 0,67 13,87
Denmark .. .. .. .. 0,77 2,89 3,39 2,01 2,27 3,07 5,32 6,14 4,8 2,48 0,03 0,36 33,53
Finland 0,02 0,68 0,31 0,25 0,26 0,24 0,12 1,16 0,51 0,48 0,48 0,67 1,29 1,53 1,45 0,73 10,18
France 0 0,66 1,96 2,59 7,04 1,2 3,49 2,82 2,37 3,44 2,77 3,11 4,23 4,05 6,93 13 59,66
Germany 2,77 29,88 16 22,11 19,2 21,05 34,52 31,47 27,99 29,05 28,18 36,17 34,08 24,05 24,16 30,94 411,62
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,24 19,76 22,79 41,08 20,21 20,75 22,44 102,2 20,71 25,16 301,34
Ireland .. .. .. .. 0,15 0,02 0,16 0,21 0,27 0,36 0,86 0,1 0,43 0,5 0,68 0,72 4,46
Italy 7,08 369,55 161,79 61,45 13,97 18,96 35,3 42,48 18,78 103,86 29,34 34,63 35,43 24,74 19,19 8,88 985,43
Japan 0,1 0,18 0,39 0,34 6,95 2,97 2,28 10,08 2,71 13,51 6,08 6,58 4,13 10,28 8,92 16,53 92,03
Luxemb. .. .. 0,23 0,21 0,25 0,08 0,92 0,45 0,45 4,28 1,74 .. 0,43 0,85 1,03 1,58 12,5
Netherl. 0 0,74 3,57 3,25 9,37 5,67 9,93 10,83 7,66 2,84 6 17,87 16,49 14,83 11,56 9,39 130
New Zel. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
Norway 0 3,5 0,64 1,02 0,77 1,46 0,95 2,15 3,99 11,29 6,17 5,25 9,22 8,14 9,83 7,04 71,42
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01
Spain 0,01 0,14 0,72 .. .. 0,18 0,01 0,32 1,62 17,05 2,64 2,47 2,14 2,23 1,76 8,23 39,52
Sweden 0 0,26 3,99 2,14 0,24 0,33 0,46 1,15 1,32 6,6 0,54 5,7 5,48 6,13 5,84 8,84 49,02
Switz. 0,03 0,67 1,88 4,43 7,5 12,04 13,09 5,21 4,48 22,85 9,88 8,12 12,09 11,63 7,41 9,66 130,97
UK 0 0 0,01 1,44 2,81 3,4 2,88 1,98 1,17 21,93 13,63 7,76 6,6 5,47 4,25 3,93 77,26
US 0 0 37,78 38,25 12,91 10,12 21,11 7,33 17,12 28,3 52,13 48,11 69,13 43,81 42,93 37,17 466,2
total 11,95 411,97 238,12 140,86 84,59 84,94 138,44 145,67 122 339,47 196,56 210,82 232,94 269,46 173,67 187,66 2989,12
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Table 4: DAC bilateral to BiH
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. 0 .. 0 .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. 0,02
Austria 0 0 0 0 149,66 113,75 106,15 56,78 49,21 37,88 33,92 21,63 15,53 17,84 19,46 26,67 648,48
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. 0,97 2,98 5,67 5,21 7,77 1,97 9,38 2,72 0,79 0,57 1,59 39,62
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 1,42 .. 12,12 19,64 22,44 8,23 16,42 10,76 9,85 7,15 8,41 116,44
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5,33 3,37 2,96 4,25 12,34 0,62 2,27 2,89 1,18 35,21
Finland .. .. .. .. .. 2,11 16,93 11,01 11,13 10,46 6,19 6,92 6,33 7,96 6,18 4 89,22
France 0 0 0 0 0 2,92 8,23 6,38 6,61 155,51 30,5 3,25 3,43 2,43 3,54 29,41 252,21
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 331,32 41,16 39,22 52,3 80,95 132,59 39,84 26,81 24,82 30,62 26,51 826,14
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. 9,33 14,26 31,27 2,81 10,33 14,65 8,72 6,51 7,74 1,32 106,94
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,69 3,43 0,27 0,36 3,62 2,49 2,28 1,25 0,79 1,51 24,69
Italy 0 0 0 0 27,84 62,76 86,12 10,69 22,77 8,4 52,75 8,01 9,46 5,84 8,13 2,74 305,51
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. 21,16 31,92 57,88 32,42 20,9 9,44 15,1 52,02 20,18 15,64 276,66
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. 0,44 1,11 1,97 2,11 1,78 1,46 0,98 0,54 0,81 0,39 0,21 11,8
Netherl. 0 0 0 0 60,72 93,18 109,9 117,97 108,01 110,38 68,91 82,45 53,25 29,29 26,09 21,71 881,86
New Zel. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,04 0,03 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,15
Norway 0 0 0 0 107,78 52,99 75,02 69,79 51,24 56,22 53,47 29,45 37,61 29,38 20,9 19,13 602,98
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,19 1,43 1,34 1,72 1,45 3,24 1,35 7,87 9,85 28,44
Spain .. .. .. .. 0,09 14,15 16,59 9,35 35,04 47,08 60,45 43,19 43,47 38,41 27,08 6,42 341,32
Sweden 0 0 0 0 61,85 42,79 31,29 36,34 29,61 37,57 32,38 43,53 37,45 40,08 34,88 48,22 475,99
Switz. 0 0 0 0 0 15,51 20,98 8,78 15,96 22,85 15,83 17,48 20,27 15,44 12,82 16,79 182,71
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,84 2,46 4,53 9,24 10,06 8,96 9,91 15,31 11,57 6,81 79,69
US 0 0 0 0 0 83,53 167,67 226,02 261,54 260,76 99,96 153,75 84,78 75,31 65,94 51,02 1530,28
total 0 0 0 0 408,02 817,88 724,18 669,68 769,13 909,18 649,49 525,63 392,28 376,96 314,79 299,14 6856,36
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Table 5: DAC bilateral to Croatia
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. 0 .. 0,04 .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,18 0,2 0,08 .. 0,61
Austria 0 0 0 0 9,27 8,16 6,73 8,71 6,56 6,45 7,21 5,53 4,72 4,26 5,12 5,23 77,95
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. 0,29 .. 1,65 1,41 1,25 1,14 1,62 0,17 0,19 0,13 0,02 7,87
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 .. 0,56 1,65 0,39 0,91 4,31 1,73 2,02 0,92 0,42 12,97
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,15 1,56 .. .. .. 0,13 0,08 0,28 0,36 2,56
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,16 0,47 1,12 2,17 0,74 0,18 0,07 0,08 0,06 6,05
France 0 0 0 0 0 1,67 2,57 3,32 2,37 2,69 2,63 2,21 3,63 3,75 3,98 3,59 32,41
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 10,85 95,46 -4,46 -4,01 2,29 7,59 2,33 3,08 -3,38 2,49 7,2 119,44
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,06 0,21 0,2 0,08 0,03 0,31 0,09 0,28 1,34
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,05 0,03 0,05 .. .. .. .. 0,14
Italy 0 0 0 0 4,66 0,03 1,25 -3,49 -4,83 -4,35 -2,88 -2,97 -4,04 -0,69 0,7 -1,57 -18,18
Japan .. .. .. .. .. 0,31 0,1 -0,83 0,83 0,44 1,48 3,17 0,52 0,96 0,63 0,45 8,06
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 .. 0,1 0,15 0,04 .. .. 0,74 0,39 0,13 0,53 2,14
Netherl. 0 0 0 0 2,03 2,38 1,09 0,84 0,95 0,34 6,72 4,61 2,31 3,21 2,45 0,35 27,28
New Zel. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
Norway 0 0 0 0 7,51 5,72 8,89 15,26 24,93 6,82 8,72 31,53 20,82 19,32 18,28 16,76 184,56
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,15 .. 0,01 0,05 0,28
Spain .. .. .. .. 0,41 .. 0,35 0,71 2 0,56 0,47 0,94 0,97 0,59 0,62 0,36 7,98
Sweden 0 0 0 0 26,13 4,12 3,57 3,48 1,99 2,38 3,98 9,3 7,58 7,95 7,09 5,78 83,35
Switz. 0 0 0 0 0 4,86 4,06 0,46 1,95 0,99 2,72 4,38 1,99 1,54 0,49 0,23 23,67
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,62 2,09 1,43 2,33 2,23 3,6 2,86 2 2,43 1,89 21,48
US 0 0 0 0 14,21 8,86 12,42 3,67 2,08 12,65 13,89 32,49 55,42 50,36 48,88 23,61 278,54
total 0 0 0 0 64,22 47,37 137,15 33,46 41,56 36,65 59,21 104,1 103,17 93,13 94,88 65,6 880,5
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Table 6: DAC bilateral to Macedonia
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. 0 .. 0,04 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04
Austria 0 0 0 0 4,88 0,12 0,26 0,28 1,62 5,12 3,92 2,79 3,2 3,82 3,25 4,55 33,81
Belgium .. .. .. .. 2 0,74 .. 0,37 0,73 2,04 0,59 .. 0,12 .. 0,59 0,37 7,55
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 0,53 .. .. 0,67 1,05 1,01 16,86 3,11 1,62 0,87 0,32 26,04
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,36 1,57 0,35 1,98 0,61 1,39 3,12 0,56 0,23 10,17
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,5 0,02 0,05 .. .. .. 0,71 1,46 0,41 3,15
France 0 0 0 0 0 0,78 1,64 3,05 1,13 10,87 12,61 1,5 2,84 2,35 4,5 3,1 44,37
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 5,79 8,44 3,69 5,11 17,27 9,65 18,02 23,22 30,37 18,62 29,34 169,52
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,18 0,32 0,44 2,68 2,26 4,57 71,21 2,32 1,92 3,85 89,75
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. .. 0,02 0,02 0,37 0,47 0,16 0,2 0,01 1,29
Italy 0 0 0 0 3,27 0,03 0,08 0 0,56 2,37 3,04 8,63 6,88 10,03 6,12 2,66 43,67
Japan .. .. .. .. .. 4,44 5,15 9,34 10,75 23,07 6,79 19,73 3,91 4,58 3,85 10,56 102,17
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,22 .. 0,37 0,3 0,59 .. 0,27 1,75
Netherl. 0 0 0 0 14,98 8,15 0,63 10,54 10,76 17,77 33,28 68,36 25,12 36,67 29,93 30,57 286,76
New Zel. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
Norway 0 0 0 0 0,34 0,02 0 0,02 0,28 12,45 1,67 11,05 18,4 15,68 15,48 13,56 88,95
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,56 4,24 4,1 0,07 1,53 .. 0,06 11,56
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. 0,06 0,95 .. 0,03 0,03 .. 2,53 0,89 4,5
Sweden 0 0 0 0 2,53 0,15 0,55 1,14 0,45 9,92 0,6 9,28 8,61 6,82 9,56 11,48 61,09
Switz. 0 0 0 0 0 2,86 3,1 5 2,73 6,65 12,94 7,92 7,99 5,39 12,66 9,36 76,6
UK 0 0 0 0 0 1,33 1,73 1,33 1,18 16,37 12,1 10,74 10,4 2,63 3,15 2,89 63,85
US 0 0 0 0 7,75 1,27 6,21 0 1 38,22 43,47 42,45 56,52 76,51 56,53 45,04 374,97
total 0 0 0 0 35,75 26,21 28,06 35,94 39,06 169 150,17 227,38 243,79 204,9 171,78 169,52 1501,56
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Table 7: DAC bilateral to FRY/Serbia
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 67,27 9,5 1,18 .. 0,3 0,52 0,32 79,09
Austria 0 0 0 0 9,87 10,81 0,03 9,4 17,2 54,34 42,42 34,74 124,15 22,45 26,69 35,55 387,65
Belgium .. .. .. .. 0,64 .. .. .. 0,17 4,53 10,39 7,55 75,23 4,79 0,81 1,58 105,69
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 13,23 .. 0,24 2,41 47,66 .. 0,44 .. 14,21 12,64 10,06 100,89
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,15 0,51 0,03 .. 1,33 11,67 1,41 18,87 8,27 42,24
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,14 2,83 28,84 16,32 18,54 12,18 8,95 36,96 8,81 135,57
France 0 0 0 0 0 1,5 3,63 3,96 4,17 4,04 16,76 33,03 148,82 244,17 9,41 59,4 528,89
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 43,28 42,97 33,69 40,95 148,2 142,94 115,33 733,54 132,86 89,41 68,88 1592,05
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,78 1,71 46,75 91,67 70,25 8,16 72,58 13,26 51 356,16
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. 0,39 0,5 0,83 0,98 1 0,77 1,18 5,68
Italy 0 0 0 0 15,37 4,67 8,38 -0,01 2,09 51,99 31,22 51,29 5,47 15,86 -0,01 16,58 202,9
Japan .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 0,04 0,09 0,04 0,07 4,07 0,13 0,33 11,63 10,34 113,96 140,74
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10,26 12,97 10,91 12,51 0,64 7,9 6,83 62,02
Netherl. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,00 6 8,96 90,47 113,71 80,45 88,3 29,72 24,01 11,06 452,68
New Zel. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,24 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,24
Norway 0 0 0 0 1,13 5,02 3,63 9,14 19,49 171,24 124,18 62,48 34,85 59,5 45,5 36,78 572,94
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. .. 0,22 7,75 8,02
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 0,63 58,26 2,26 40,83 38,27 17,95 20,26 17,1 195,65
Sweden 0 0 0 0 36,93 14,31 13,53 26,46 6,7 24,29 45,46 52,56 33,98 39,48 40,35 36,49 370,54
Switz. 0 0 0 0 0 2,86 2,81 3,55 8,73 95 41,18 47,9 30,99 63,24 56,89 48,59 401,74
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,06 1,05 0,28 1,52 40,21 24,88 625,61 16,6 10,16 96,58 816,95
US 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,68 43,91 125,54 239,31 554,23 229,74 192,99 191,57 1584,97
total 0 0 0 0 63,94 95,72 75,08 96,76 124,55 950,3 871,3 894,01 2539,3 987,08 617,95 828,34 8144,3
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Table 8: DAC bilateral to ex Yu unspecified
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia 0,01 0,24 0,03 1,27 1,83 4,18 4,62 1 .. 6,43 .. .. .. .. .. .. 19,61
Austria 12,17 44,09 183,95 171,75 0 0 9,97 0 0 0 0 0,14 0,2 0,19 0,55 0,42 423,43
Belgium 0,01 .. 2,62 0,33 .. 0 2,53 0,59 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,08
Canada .. 0,01 0,03 37,05 14,91 .. 39,99 .. .. 1,6 53,76 23,13 172,99 .. .. .. 343,47
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,38 .. 34,1 42,64 46,48 13,49 8,07 7,63 152,8
Finland 2 8,49 34,13 9,33 10,75 4,9 1,68 .. 3,11 1,62 2,41 3,39 0,83 0,69 0,9 .. 84,23
France 5,9 6,63 10,29 13,94 6,86 1,83 0 0 2,58 43,03 4,4 1,55 0,16 1,77 2,55 5 106,49
Germany -2,67 31,76 740,9 613,21 344,95 -0,25 -154,7 0 0 -27,25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1545,95
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,41 0,4 0,02 .. 31,16 .. 33,99
Ireland .. .. 0,95 3,87 1,59 5,73 0,03 .. 3,49 9,74 .. .. 0,82 1,33 0,87 1,26 29,68
Italy 33,73 73,3 43,12 201,42 0 0 0 1,03 2,8 4,28 13,87 10,73 11,52 4,88 27,05 3,34 431,07
Japan -0,31 0,72 0,52 0,28 0,27 0 0,03 0,04 2,57 28,54 1,9 0,49 14,35 15,58 0,14 0,23 65,35
Luxemb. .. .. 2,83 1,74 2,09 1,82 1,4 0,85 0,95 .. 0,74 1,07 1,06 7,8 0,97 0,15 23,47
Netherl. 2,45 5,88 52,18 252,1 64,68 58,08 13,77 0,01 0 0 0 3,23 3,31 2,95 0 0 458,64
New Zel. .. 0,06 0,05 0,25 .. 0,24 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,6
Norway -1,11 -0,02 5,94 65,15 61,17 52,81 16,07 10,66 20,5 25,68 7,84 2,58 67,69 20,27 17,73 17,1 390,06
Portugal .. .. .. .. 1,38 0,44 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 1,31 0,8 0,8 4,74
Spain 0,12 .. 0,43 3,82 0,31 .. .. .. .. 0,64 47,15 0,02 60,36 33,34 0,02 .. 146,21
Sweden 0 5,61 110,54 153,24 0 -0,01 17,02 11,49 0 9,09 0 0,18 6,81 0 0 0,29 314,26
Switz. 0,19 2,65 23,41 35,13 26,65 10,24 2,24 2,61 0,33 0,52 30,67 29,13 16,4 0,12 0,01 0,02 180,32
UK 0,02 0,68 8,32 166,76 158,92 60,4 104,97 70,31 39,68 41,67 135,35 19,32 2,07 0,22 1,81 4,09 814,59
US 0 0 1,35 27,7 1,29 0 0 0 0 59,51 0 0 0 0 0 0 89,85
total 52,51 180,1 1221,6 1758,3 697,65 200,41 59,62 98,6 76,39 205,1 334,6 138 405,08 103,94 92,63 40,33 5664,89
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Table 9: Multilateral ODA to Western Balkans
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
EBRD 0 0 0 0 2,62 3,92 4,88 5,54 13,69 2,47 3,18 9,19 8,18 11,35 7,63 11,44 84,09
EC 1,63 16,1 368,3 827,66 400,74 253,48 452,4 425,83 419,16 993,08 1443,4 1478,9 1105,9 687,94 669,84 513,34 10057,76
GEF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,19 0,04 0,12 1,4 2,23 2,37 2,56 2,39 11,3
GF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,43 3,07 4,49 9,99
IDA 0 0 2,55 32,88 91,46 93,43 214,67 140,46 285,21 239,6 189,14 149,79 252,11 269,32 464,11 187,86 2612,59
IFAD 0 0 0 0 0,95 2 9,71 1,09 8,65 16,89 6,88 4,7 7,59 8,48 8,35 7,84 83,13
IMF* 0 0 0 15,14 27,02 11,86 0 31,05 25,59 21,94 17,82 7,01 -5,25 -5,27 -5,98 -5,48 135,45
UNDP 3,68 2,58 1,21 2,04 2,37 1,96 7,58 7,18 11,58 14,09 2,96 5,92 4,03 6,47 5,96 6,24 85,85
UNFPA 0,55 0,67 1,14 0,34 0,78 0,8 1,03 0,6 0,91 1,15 0,53 2,8 3,17 1,91 0,61 0,77 17,76
UNHCR 4,04 7,08 373,45 678,44 287,92 199,28 3,41 2,57 2,17 1,12 148,01 118,74 94,4 60,79 42,56 35,52 2059,5
UNICEF 0 0,37 17,17 26,32 26,32 26,89 26,16 4,36 6,11 3,47 3,62 2,48 3,13 2,9 3,23 4,49 157,02
UNTA 1,72 1,17 0,9 1,46 1,41 1,7 2,35 2,29 2,66 3,16 2,58 3,19 2,63 3,34 4 4,38 38,94
WFP 0 0 23,1 238,28 183,91 102,07 48,81 -50,5 0,52 1,79 0,3 2,56 0,08 2,68 0,45 1,3 555,35
AA** 0 0 0,77 0 0,23 1,24 2,23 1,6 2,47 2,88 1,29 5,39 7,48 2,17 4,74 9,59 42,08
Chart 1: Composition of multilateral ODA to WB (top 5 donors) total 15.950,81  
notes:
*SAF+ESAF+PRGF
** Arab Agencies
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Table 10: Multilateral ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient country)
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 2,75 2,91 251,87 203,62 117,64 112,88 121,64 62,7 219,37 292,07 248,06 172,06 163,79 126,47 127,8 130,78 2356,41
BiH .. .. .. 44,62 118,37 183,43 230,68 376,27 364,67 431,66 393,94 358,71 344,25 235,49 368,44 242,83 3693,36
Cro .. .. .. .. 74,58 12,76 8,07 22,73 16,78 27,42 32,43 35,89 41,5 44,28 34,3 62,53 413,27
Mac .. .. .. 4,53 98,24 59,4 92,16 84,96 92,61 176,53 201,17 122,09 130,62 99,09 87,41 57,64 1306,45
FRY/Ser .. .. .. .. .. 10,44 0,11 25,86 16,4 3,78 818,36 1030,3 4,52 519,31 592,21 288,34 3309,58
ex Yu 
unspec. 8,87 25,06 536,72 1569,8 616,9 319,72 320,57 -0,45 69,08 370,22 125,91 73,07 801,02 32,24 0,97 2,05 4871,74
total 11,62 27,97 788,59 1822,6 1025,7 698,63 773,23 572,07 778,91 1301,7 1819,9 1792,1 1485,7 1056,9 1211,1 784,17 15950,81
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Table 11: Multilateral ODA to Albania
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
EBRD .. .. .. .. 1,35 2,38 0,58 0,35 6,53 -1,78 0,19 1,87 0,99 0,75 1,09 1,66 15,96
EC .. .. 246,06 151,36 41,49 45,02 73,54 32,86 111,32 156,75 134,83 100,47 44,12 39,9 46,41 80,02 1304,15
GEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 0,04 0,03 0,5 0,99 0,27 0,29 0,15 2,33
GF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
IDA .. .. 2,55 32,88 42,61 47,59 37,28 23,45 79,04 99,79 82,87 46,29 102,55 67,92 67,38 30,24 762,44
IFAD .. .. .. .. 0,95 2 2,76 0,78 2,83 6,57 2,02 3,2 5,15 6,67 2,76 2,41 38,1
IMF* .. .. .. 15,14 27,02 11,86 .. .. 10,06 21,94 14,9 7,01 -3,72 1,92 2,49 2,76 111,38
UNDP 2,1 1,68 0,94 1,84 1,77 1,04 2,47 0,87 3,41 3,18 3,08 2,09 1,79 1,79 2,1 1,49 31,64
UNFPA 0,39 0,51 1,1 0,33 0,79 0,65 0,45 0,3 0,71 0,75 0,28 0,61 0,48 0,38 0,36 0,41 8,5
UNHCR .. .. 0,01 .. 0,26 0,24 0,32 0,52 0,77 0,41 6,43 3,31 2 1,39 0,65 1,24 17,55
UNICEF .. 0,37 0,48 1,17 1,06 1,26 2,25 1,31 1,44 0,61 1,56 0,7 0,92 0,77 0,69 1,08 15,67
UNTA 0,26 0,35 0,73 0,9 0,11 0,7 0,91 0,66 0,49 1,24 0,58 0,57 0,48 0,53 0,96 0,75 10,22
WFP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,37 .. .. 0,12 0,6 2,58 0,46 1,3 5,43
AA** .. .. .. .. 0,23 0,14 1,08 1,6 2,34 2,57 1,29 5,32 7,44 1,6 2,16 7,27 33,04
total 2,75 2,91 251,87 203,62 117,64 112,88 121,64 62,7 219,37 292,07 248,06 172,06 163,79 126,47 127,8 130,78 2356,41
Chart 2: Composition of multilateral ODA to Albania (top 5 donors) 
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Table 12: Multilateral ODA to BiH
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
EBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,86 2,59 5,05 3,44 0,74 3,02 2,39 1,19 0,27 0,82 20,37
EC .. .. .. 44,62 0,48 177,2 76,73 283,65 174,3 325,15 303,57 239,94 186,26 159,83 130,71 169,31 2271,75
GEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
GF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. 126,49 80,85 169,82 84,1 56,8 83,41 125,9 55,06 218,58 56,84 1057,85
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,95 0,31 4,76 9,31 2,97 .. 1,4 0,67 1,91 2,2 30,48
IMF* .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,22 4,12 5,89 6,3 6,51 -2,94 0,28 1,38 1,84 0,84 0,87 25,42
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,45 0,3 0,2 0,36 0,17 0,08 0,08 0,4 0,25 0,35 2,64
UNHCR .. .. .. .. 117,59 .. .. .. .. .. 31,01 30,1 25,61 14,87 11,48 8,36 239,02
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 4,51 13,24 2,02 2,98 1,98 1,21 0,59 0,7 0,64 0,83 0,96 29,66
UNTA .. .. .. .. 0,19 0,24 0,69 0,66 1,13 0,75 0,41 1,22 0,49 0,42 0,99 0,8 7,99
WFP .. .. .. .. .. 0,16 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,16
AA** .. .. .. .. .. 1,1 1,15 .. 0,13 0,06 .. 0,07 0,04 0,57 2,58 2,32 8,02
total 0 0 0 44,62 118,37 183,43 230,68 376,27 364,67 431,66 393,94 358,71 344,25 235,49 368,44 242,83 3693,36
Chart 3: Composition of multilateral ODA to BiH (top 5 donors) 
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Table 13: Multilateral ODA to Croatia
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
EBRD .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,18 1,6 1,67 1,78 0,57 0,28 1,46 1,64 0,76 0,93 0,8 11,68
EC .. .. .. .. .. 9,56 0,59 20,35 12,84 25,04 17,87 20,07 26,38 31,64 25,3 52,91 242,55
GEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,13 .. 0,09 0,47 0,49 1,39 1,57 1,62 5,76
GF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,26 0,39 1,94 3,59
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
IMF* .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,04 0,05 1,4 0,16 1,39 1,45 0,14 0,3 0,16 0,22 0,39 0,56 6,26
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. 0,15 0,13 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,28
UNHCR .. .. .. .. 73,27 .. .. .. .. .. 13,28 13,05 12,3 7,73 4,72 3,42 127,77
UNICEF .. .. .. .. 0,16 2,34 4 0,2 0,29 0,06 0,23 .. .. 0,22 0,23 0,25 7,98
UNTA .. .. .. .. 1,1 0,48 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,3 0,54 0,54 0,53 1,06 0,77 1,03 7,4
WFP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
AA** .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
total 0 0 0 0 74,58 12,76 8,07 22,73 16,78 27,42 32,43 35,89 41,5 44,28 34,3 62,53 413,27
Chart 4: Composition of multilateral ODA to Croatia (top 5 donors) 
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Table 14: Multilateral ODA to Macedonia
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
EBRD .. .. .. .. 1,26 1,36 1,84 0,93 0,33 0,24 0,33 0,37 1,69 4,85 2,05 1,32 16,57
EC .. .. .. 4,53 48,12 11,26 34,35 13,31 35,75 116,07 133,76 90,43 97,38 54,42 83,43 49,01 771,82
GEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,43 0,75 0,71 0,57 0,38 2,84
GF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,3 0,63 1,93
IDA .. .. .. .. 48,85 45,84 50,9 36,16 36,35 55,71 49,47 20,09 23,66 37,58 .. 5,77 410,38
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,06 1,01 1,89 1,5 1,04 1,14 3,68 3,23 14,55
IMF* .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31,05 15,53 .. 2,92 .. -1,53 -7,19 -8,47 -8,24 24,07
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 0,33 0,19 0,35 1,23 1,38 0,82 0,57 1,33 1,07 1,27 8,59
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 -0,01 .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,04
UNHCR .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,92 1,88 1,2 0,56 10,26 6,43 5,38 4,56 2,28 2,23 37,7
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,66 1,57 0,83 1,4 0,82 0,62 1,03 0,81 0,72 0,73 1,09 10,28
UNTA .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,23 0,25 0,61 0,64 0,85 0,55 0,68 0,91 0,87 0,77 0,94 7,31
WFP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,31 -0,04 0,1 .. .. 0,37
AA** .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
total 0 0 0 4,53 98,24 59,4 92,16 84,96 92,61 176,53 201,17 122,09 130,62 99,09 87,41 57,64 1306,45
Chart 5: Composition of multilateral ODA to Macedonia (top 5 donors) 
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Table 15: Multilateral ODA to FRY/Serbia
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
EBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,26 1,47 3,8 3,29 6,84 16,66
EC .. .. .. .. .. 10,44 0,11 25,86 16,4 .. 729,14 956,13 .. 402,15 383,99 162,09 2686,31
GEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,13 0,24 0,37
GF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,17 1,38 1,92 4,47
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 108,76 178,15 95,01 381,92
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
IMF* .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,72 1,3 2,43 .. 1,29 0,59 .. 7,33
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 2,11 2,61 1,13 .. .. 5,94
UNHCR .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 87,03 65,85 .. .. 23,43 20,27 196,58
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,16 0,7 0,55 0,75 1,11 3,27
UNTA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,5 0,18 0,22 0,46 0,51 0,86 2,75
WFP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,79 0,3 2,13 -0,48 .. -0,01 .. 3,73
AA** .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,25 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,25
total 0 0 0 0 0 10,44 0,11 25,86 16,4 3,78 818,36 1030,3 4,52 519,31 592,21 288,34 3309,58
Chart 6: Composition of multilateral ODA to FRY/Serbia (top 5 donors) 
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Table 16: Multilateral ODA to ex Yu Unspecified
 Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
EBRD .. .. .. .. 0 0 .. .. .. .. 1,64 1,21 .. .. .. .. 2,85
EC 1,63 16,1 122,24 627,15 310,65 0 267,08 49,8 68,55 370,07 124,27 71,86 751,78 .. .. .. 2781,18
GEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
GF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
IDA .. .. .. .. 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
IMF* .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
UNDP 1,58 0,9 0,27 0,2 0,45 0,6 -0,74 0,07 0,13 .. .. .. 0,13 .. 0,97 2,05 6,61
UNFPA 0,16 0,16 0,04 0,01 -0,01 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,36
UNHCR 4,04 7,08 373,44 678,44 96,8 199,04 0,17 0,17 0,2 0,15 .. .. 49,11 32,24 .. .. 1440,88
UNICEF .. .. 16,69 25,15 25,1 18,12 5,1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 90,16
UNTA 1,46 0,82 0,17 0,56 0 0,05 0,15 0,01 0,05 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,27
WFP .. .. 23,1 238,28 183,91 101,91 48,81 -50,5 0,15 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 545,66
AA** .. .. 0,77 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,77
total 8,87 25,06 536,72 1569,8 616,9 319,72 320,57 -0,45 69,08 370,22 125,91 73,07 801,02 32,24 0,97 2,05 4871,74
Chart 7: Composition of multilateral ODA to ex Yu unspecified (top 5 donors) 
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TOP 10 BILATERAL DONORS TO THE REGION OF WESTERN BALKANS
Table 17: German ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 2,77 29,88 16 22,11 19,2 21,05 34,52 31,47 27,99 29,05 28,18 36,17 34,08 24,05 24,16 30,94 411,62
BiH 0 0 0 0 0 331,32 41,16 39,22 52,3 80,95 132,59 39,84 26,81 24,82 30,62 26,51 826,14
Cro 0 0 0 0 0 10,85 95,46 -4,46 -4,01 2,29 7,59 2,33 3,08 -3,38 2,49 7,2 119,44
Mac 0 0 0 0 0 5,79 8,44 3,69 5,11 17,27 9,65 18,02 23,22 30,37 18,62 29,34 169,52
FRY/Ser 0 0 0 0 0 43,28 42,97 33,69 40,95 148,2 142,94 115,33 733,54 132,86 89,41 68,88 1592,05
ex Yu 
unspec -2,67 31,76 740,9 613,21 344,95 -0,25 -154,7 0 0 -27,25 0 0 0 0 0 0 1545,95
total 0,1 61,64 756,9 635,32 364,15 412,04 67,85 103,61 122,34 250,51 320,95 211,69 820,73 208,72 165,3 162,87 4.664,72    
Chart 8: German ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries) Chart 9: Recipient country share of German ODA to WB
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Table 18: US ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0 0 37,78 38,25 12,91 10,12 21,11 7,33 17,12 28,3 52,13 48,11 69,13 43,81 42,93 37,17 466,20
BiH 0 0 0 0 0 83,53 167,67 226,02 261,54 260,76 99,96 153,75 84,78 75,31 65,94 51,02 1530,28
Cro 0 0 0 0 14,21 8,86 12,42 3,67 2,08 12,65 13,89 32,49 55,42 50,36 48,88 23,61 278,54
Mac 0 0 0 0 7,75 1,27 6,21 0 1 38,22 43,47 42,45 56,52 76,51 56,53 45,04 374,97
FRY/Ser 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,68 43,91 125,54 239,31 554,23 229,74 192,99 191,57 1584,97
ex Yu 
unspec 0 0 1,35 27,7 1,29 0 0 0 0 59,51 0 0 0 0 0 0 89,85
total 0 0 39,13 65,95 36,16 103,78 207,41 237,02 289,42 443,35 334,99 516,11 820,08 475,73 407,27 348,41 4.324,81    
Chart 10: US ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries) Chart 11: Recipient country share of US ODA to WB
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Table 19: Dutch Oda to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions);disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0 0,74 3,57 3,25 9,37 5,67 9,93 10,83 7,66 2,84 6 17,87 16,49 14,83 11,56 9,39 130,00
BiH 0 0 0 0 60,72 93,18 109,9 117,97 108,01 110,38 68,91 82,45 53,25 29,29 26,09 21,71 881,86
Cro 0 0 0 0 2,03 2,38 1,09 0,84 0,95 0,34 6,72 4,61 2,31 3,21 2,45 0,35 27,28
Mac 0 0 0 0 14,98 8,15 0,63 10,54 10,76 17,77 33,28 68,36 25,12 36,67 29,93 30,57 286,76
FRY/Ser 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,00 8,96 90,47 113,71 80,45 88,3 29,72 24,01 11,06 452,68
ex Yu 
unspec. 2,45 5,88 52,18 252,1 64,68 58,08 13,77 0,01 0 0 0 3,23 3,31 2,95 0 0 458,64
total 2,45 6,62 55,75 255,35 151,78 167,46 135,32 146,19 136,34 221,8 228,62 256,97 188,78 116,67 94,04 73,08 2237,22
Chart 12: Dutch ODA to Western Balkans Chart 13: Recipient country share of Dutch ODA to WB
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Table 20: Italian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 7,08 369,55 161,79 61,45 13,97 18,96 35,3 42,48 18,78 103,86 29,34 34,63 35,43 24,74 19,19 8,88 985,43
BiH 0 0 0 0 27,84 62,76 86,12 10,69 22,77 8,4 52,75 8,01 9,46 5,84 8,13 2,74 305,51
Cro 0 0 0 0 4,66 0,03 1,25 -3,49 -4,83 -4,35 -2,88 -2,97 -4,04 -0,69 0,7 -1,57 -18,18
Mac 0 0 0 0 3,27 0,03 0,08 0 0,56 2,37 3,04 8,63 6,88 10,03 6,12 2,66 43,67
FRY/Ser 0 0 0 0 15,37 4,67 8,38 -0,01 2,09 51,99 31,22 51,29 5,47 15,86 -0,01 16,58 202,90
ex Yu 
unspec. 33,73 73,3 43,12 201,42 0 0 0 1,03 2,8 4,28 13,87 10,73 11,52 4,88 27,05 3,34 431,07
total 40,81 442,85 204,91 262,87 65,11 86,45 131,13 50,7 42,17 166,55 127,34 110,32 64,72 60,66 61,18 32,63 1950,40
Chart 14: Italian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries) Chart 15: Recipient country share of Italian ODA to WB
(minus Croatia)
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Table 21: Norwegian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient country)
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0 3,5 0,64 1,02 0,77 1,46 0,95 2,15 3,99 11,29 6,17 5,25 9,22 8,14 9,83 7,04 71,42
BiH 0 0 0 0 107,78 52,99 75,02 69,79 51,24 56,22 53,47 29,45 37,61 29,38 20,9 19,13 602,98
Cro 0 0 0 0 7,51 5,72 8,89 15,26 24,93 6,82 8,72 31,53 20,82 19,32 18,28 16,76 184,56
Mac 0 0 0 0 0,34 0,02 0 0,02 0,28 12,45 1,67 11,05 18,4 15,68 15,48 13,56 88,95
FRY/Ser 0 0 0 0 1,13 5,02 3,63 9,14 19,49 171,24 124,18 62,48 34,85 59,5 45,5 36,78 572,94
ex Yu 
unspec. -1,11 -0,02 5,94 65,15 61,17 52,81 16,07 10,66 20,5 25,68 7,84 2,58 67,69 20,27 17,73 17,1 390,06
total -1,11 3,48 6,58 66,17 178,7 118,02 104,56 107,02 120,43 283,7 202,05 142,34 188,59 152,29 127,72 110,37 1910,91
Chart 16: Norwegian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient country)  Chart 17: Country shares in Norwegian ODA to WB
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Table 22: UK ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0 0 0,01 1,44 2,81 3,4 2,88 1,98 1,17 21,93 13,63 7,76 6,6 5,47 4,25 3,93 77,26
BiH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,84 2,46 4,53 9,24 10,06 8,96 9,91 15,31 11,57 6,81 79,69
Cro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,62 2,09 1,43 2,33 2,23 3,6 2,86 2 2,43 1,89 21,48
Mac 0 0 0 0 0 1,33 1,73 1,33 1,18 16,37 12,1 10,74 10,4 2,63 3,15 2,89 63,85
FRY/Ser 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,06 1,05 0,28 1,52 40,21 24,88 625,61 16,6 10,16 96,58 816,95
ex Yu 
unspec. 0,02 0,68 8,32 166,76 158,92 60,4 104,97 70,31 39,68 41,67 135,35 19,32 2,07 0,22 1,81 4,09 814,59
total 0,02 0,68 8,33 168,2 161,73 65,13 111,1 79,22 48,27 93,06 213,58 75,26 657,45 42,23 33,37 116,19 1873,82
Chart 18: UK ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries) Chart 19: Country shares of UK ODA to WB
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Table 23: Austrian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 1,94 5,71 8,67 3,23 2,07 3,58 3,5 5,5 5,86 25,07 7,23 3,51 2,44 4,31 5,24 4,3 92,16
BiH 0 0 0 0 149,66 113,75 106,15 56,78 49,21 37,88 33,92 21,63 15,53 17,84 19,46 26,67 648,48
cro 0 0 0 0 9,27 8,16 6,73 8,71 6,56 6,45 7,21 5,53 4,72 4,26 5,12 5,23 77,95
Mac 0 0 0 0 4,88 0,12 0,26 0,28 1,62 5,12 3,92 2,79 3,2 3,82 3,25 4,55 33,81
FRY/Ser 0 0 0 0 9,87 10,81 0,03 9,4 17,2 54,34 42,42 34,74 124,15 22,45 26,69 35,55 387,65
ex Yu 
unspec. 12,17 44,09 183,95 171,75 0 0 9,97 0 0 0 0 0,14 0,2 0,19 0,55 0,42 423,43
total 14,11 49,8 192,62 174,98 175,75 136,42 126,64 80,67 80,45 128,86 94,7 68,34 150,24 52,87 60,31 76,72 1663,48
Chart 20: Austrian ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries) Chart 21: Country share of Austrian ODA to WB
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Table 24: Swedish ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0 0,26 3,99 2,14 0,24 0,33 0,46 1,15 1,32 6,6 0,54 5,7 5,48 6,13 5,84 8,84 49,02
BiH 0 0 0 0 61,85 42,79 31,29 36,34 29,61 37,57 32,38 43,53 37,45 40,08 34,88 48,22 475,99
Cro 0 0 0 0 26,13 4,12 3,57 3,48 1,99 2,38 3,98 9,3 7,58 7,95 7,09 5,78 83,35
Mac 0 0 0 0 2,53 0,15 0,55 1,14 0,45 9,92 0,6 9,28 8,61 6,82 9,56 11,48 61,09
FRY/Ser 0 0 0 0 36,93 14,31 13,53 26,46 6,7 24,29 45,46 52,56 33,98 39,48 40,35 36,49 370,54
ex Yu 
unspec. 0 5,61 110,54 153,24 0 -0,01 17,02 11,49 0 9,09 0 0,18 6,81 0 0 0,29 314,26
total 0 5,87 114,53 155,38 127,68 61,69 66,42 80,06 40,07 89,85 82,96 120,55 99,91 100,46 97,72 111,1 1354,25
Chart 22: Swedish ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries) Chart 23: Country shares of Swedish ODA to WB
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Table 25: French ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0 0,66 1,96 2,59 7,04 1,2 3,49 2,82 2,37 3,44 2,77 3,11 4,23 4,05 6,93 13 59,66
BiH 0 0 0 0 0 2,92 8,23 6,38 6,61 155,51 30,5 3,25 3,43 2,43 3,54 29,41 252,21
Cro 0 0 0 0 0 1,67 2,57 3,32 2,37 2,69 2,63 2,21 3,63 3,75 3,98 3,59 32,41
Mac 0 0 0 0 0 0,78 1,64 3,05 1,13 10,87 12,61 1,5 2,84 2,35 4,5 3,1 44,37
FRY/Ser 0 0 0 0 0 1,5 3,63 3,96 4,17 4,04 16,76 33,03 148,82 244,17 9,41 59,4 528,89
ex Yu 
unspec. 5,9 6,63 10,29 13,94 6,86 1,83 0 0 2,58 43,03 4,4 1,55 0,16 1,77 2,55 5,00 106,49
total 5,9 7,29 12,25 16,53 13,9 9,9 19,56 19,53 19,23 219,58 69,67 44,65 163,11 258,52 30,91 113,5 1024,03
Chart 24: French ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries) Chart 25: Country shares of French ODA to WB
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Table 26: Swiss ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries)
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0,03 0,67 1,88 4,43 7,5 12,04 13,09 5,21 4,48 22,85 9,88 8,12 12,09 11,63 7,41 9,66 130,97
BiH 0 0 0 0 0 15,51 20,98 8,78 15,96 22,85 15,83 17,48 20,27 15,44 12,82 16,79 182,71
Cro 0 0 0 0 0 4,86 4,06 0,46 1,95 0,99 2,72 4,38 1,99 1,54 0,49 0,23 23,67
Mac 0 0 0 0 0 2,86 3,1 5 2,73 6,65 12,94 7,92 7,99 5,39 12,66 9,36 76,6
FRY/Ser 0 0 0 0 0 2,86 2,81 3,55 8,73 95 41,18 47,9 30,99 63,24 56,89 48,59 401,74
ex Yu 
unspec. 0,19 2,65 23,41 35,13 26,65 10,24 2,24 2,61 0,33 0,52 30,67 29,13 16,4 0,12 0,01 0,02 180,32
total 0,22 3,32 25,29 39,56 34,15 48,37 46,28 25,61 34,18 148,86 113,22 114,93 89,73 97,36 90,28 84,65 996,01
Chart 26: Swiss ODA to Western Balkans (by recipient countries) Chart 27: Country shares of Swiss ODA to WB
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Table 27: All ODA net to Western Balkans*
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 14,7 426,36 510,89 401,01 202,44 204,09 264,3 211,21 346,68 644,48 445,6 386,56 408,09 406,29 314,93 327,27 5514,9
BiH .. .. 14,13 56,88 535,31 1041,6 998,01 1107,6 1162,7 1364,4 1067,8 912,2 765,59 621,39 717,27 569,15 10934,1
Cro .. .. 0,01 .. 138,81 60,45 145,24 56,21 58,85 64,6 92,08 159,95 171,05 141,75 130,29 131,62 1350,91
Mac .. .. .. 4,59 134,01 85,62 120,22 120,9 132,04 354,18 353,43 351,72 377,37 306,04 263,92 234,67 2838,71
FRY/Ser .. .. .. .. 63,94 106,16 75,19 122,62 142,12 957,58 1690,5 1932,5 2550,5 1533,5 1235 1161 11570,48
ex Yu 
unspec 61,38 205,2 1751 3354 1326,7 520,13 380,19 98,35 145,62 580,32 461,96 211,82 1217,8 138,79 105,73 59,82 10618,83
total 76,08 631,56 2276,1 3816,5 2401,2 2018,1 1983,2 1716,9 1988 3965,6 4111,4 3954,7 5490,4 3147,7 2767,1 2483,5 42827,93
* All ODA net = DAC bilateral + multilateral + non-DAC bilateral
Chart 28: Country shares of all ODA net to Western Balkans
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Table 28: All ODA net to Western Balkans (breakdown by type)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
DAC bil. 64,46 592,07 1459,7 1899,2 1354,2 1272,5 1162,5 1080,1 1172,7 2609,7 2261,3 2099,9 3916,5 2035,5 1465,7 1590,6 26036,73
mult. 11,62 27,97 788,59 1822,6 1025,7 698,63 773,23 572,07 778,91 1301,7 1819,9 1792,1 1485,7 1056,9 1211,1 784,17 15950,81
non-DAC 0 11,52 27,75 94,75 21,26 46,92 47,39 64,69 36,44 54,17 30,22 62,7 88,15 55,39 90,28 108,76 840,39
all ODA 76,08 631,56 2276,1 3816,5 2401,2 2018,1 1983,2 1716,9 1988 3965,6 4111,4 3954,7 5490,4 3147,7 2767,1 2483,5 42827,93
Chart 29: All ODA net to Western Balkans (breakdown by type) Chart 30:  Shares of types of ODA to WB
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Table 29: All ODA net to Albania (breakdown by type) 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
DAC bil. 11,95 411,97 238,12 140,86 84,59 84,94 138,44 145,67 122 339,47 196,56 210,82 232,94 269,46 173,67 187,66 2989,12
mult. 2,75 2,91 251,87 203,62 117,64 112,88 121,64 62,7 219,37 292,07 248,06 172,06 163,79 126,47 127,8 130,78 2356,41
non-DAC 0 11,48 20,9 56,53 0,21 6,27 4,22 2,84 5,31 12,94 0,98 3,68 11,36 10,36 13,46 8,83 169,37
all  ODA 14,7 426,36 510,89 401,01 202,44 204,09 264,3 211,21 346,68 644,48 445,6 386,56 408,09 406,29 314,93 327,27 5514,90
Chart 31: All ODA net to Albania (breakdown by type) Chart 32: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to Alb
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Table 30: All ODA net to BiH (breakdown by type) 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
DAC bil. 0 0 0 0 408,02 817,88 724,18 669,68 769,13 909,18 649,49 525,63 392,28 376,96 314,79 299,14 6856,36
mult. 0 0 0 44,62 118,37 183,43 230,68 376,27 364,67 431,66 393,94 358,71 344,25 235,49 368,44 242,83 3693,36
non-DAC 0 0 14,13 12,26 8,92 40,32 43,15 61,63 28,93 23,55 24,41 27,86 29,06 8,94 34,04 27,18 384,38
all ODA 0 0 14,13 56,88 535,31 1041,6 998,01 1107,6 1162,7 1364,4 1067,8 912,2 765,59 621,39 717,27 569,15 10934,10
Chart 33: All ODA net to BiH (breakdown by type) Chart 34: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to BiH
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Table 31: All ODA net to Croatia (breakdown by type)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
DAC bil. 0 0 0 0 64,22 47,37 137,15 33,46 41,56 36,65 59,21 104,1 103,17 93,13 94,88 65,6 880,50
mult. 0 0 0 0 74,58 12,76 8,07 22,73 16,78 27,42 32,43 35,89 41,5 44,28 34,3 62,53 413,27
non-DAC 0 0 0,01 0 0,01 0,32 0,02 0,02 0,51 0,53 0,44 19,96 26,38 4,34 1,11 3,49 57,14
all ODA 0 0 0,01 0 138,81 60,45 145,24 56,21 58,85 64,6 92,08 159,95 171,05 141,75 130,29 131,62 1350,91
Chart 35: All ODA net to Croatia (breakdown by type) Chart 36: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to Cro
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Table 32: All ODA net to Macedonia (breakdown by type)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
DAC bil. 0 0 0 0 35,75 26,21 28,06 35,94 39,06 169 150,17 227,38 243,79 204,9 171,78 169,52 1501,56
mult. 0 0 0 4,53 98,24 59,4 92,16 84,96 92,61 176,53 201,17 122,09 130,62 99,09 87,41 57,64 1306,45
non-DAC 0 0 0 0,06 0,02 0,01 .. .. 0,37 8,65 2,09 2,25 2,96 2,05 4,73 7,51 30,70
all ODA 0 0 0 4,59 134,01 85,62 120,22 120,9 132,04 354,18 353,43 351,72 377,37 306,04 263,92 234,67 2838,71
Chart 37: All ODA net to Macedonia (breakdown by type) Chart 38: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to Mac
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Table 33: All ODA net to FRY/Serbia (breakdown by type) 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
DAC bil. 0 0 0 0 63,94 95,72 75,08 96,76 124,55 950,3 871,3 894,01 2539,3 987,08 617,95 828,34 8144,30
mult. 0 0 0 0 0 10,44 0,11 25,86 16,4 3,78 818,36 1030,3 4,52 519,31 592,21 288,34 3309,58
non-DAC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,17 3,5 0,85 8,2 6,67 27,09 24,81 44,31 116,6
all ODA 0 0 0 0 63,94 106,16 75,19 122,62 142,12 957,58 1690,5 1932,5 2550,5 1533,5 1235 1161 11570,48
Chart 39: All ODA net to FRY/Serbia (breakdown by type) Chart 40: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to FRY/Ser
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
DAC bil.
mult.
non-DAC
all ODA
70%
29%
1%
DAC bil.
mult.
non-DAC
Page 33 of 38
Table 34: All ODA net to ex Yu unspecified (breakdown by type) 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
DAC bil. 52,51 180,1 1221,6 1758,3 697,65 200,41 59,62 98,6 76,39 205,1 334,6 138 405,08 103,94 92,63 40,33 5664,89
mult. 8,87 25,06 536,72 1569,8 616,9 319,72 320,57 -0,45 69,08 370,22 125,91 73,07 801,02 32,24 0,97 2,05 4871,74
non-DAC 0 0,04 -7,29 25,9 12,1 0 0 0,2 0,15 5 1,45 0,75 11,72 2,61 12,13 17,44 82,20
all ODA 61,38 205,2 1751 3354 1326,7 520,13 380,19 98,35 145,62 580,32 461,96 211,82 1217,8 138,79 105,73 59,82 10618,83
Chart 41: All ODA net to ex Yu unspecified (breakdown by type) Chart 42: Shares of types of aid in total ODA to ex Yu unsp.
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TOP DONORS TO WESTERN BALKANS 
Table 35: Top 10 donors to Western Balkans
constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
5 5 5
6 6 6
7 7 7
8 8 8
9 9 9
10 10 10 Austria 1663,48Switzerland 996,01 Arab Agencies 42,08
UK 1873,82
Sweden 1354,25
France 1024,03 IFAD 83,13
EBRD 84,09
UNHCR 2059,5
Italy 1950,4
Norway 1910,91
Austria 1663,48 UNDP 85,85
UK 1873,82 IMF 135,45
The Netherlands 2237,22
Italy 1950,4
Norway 1910,91 UNICEF 157,02
WFP 555,35
Germany 4664,72
US 4324,81
IDA 2612,59
The Netherlands 2237,22 UNHCR 2059,5
US 4324,81 IDA 2612,59
top 10 bilateral top 10 multilateral top 10 combined
Germany 4664,72 EC 10057,76 EC 10057,76
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Table 36: Top 5 donors to Albania
constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
5 5 5
Table 37: Top 5 donors to BiH
constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
5 5 5 Germany 826,14Nroway 602,98 UNICEF 29,66
The Netherl. 881,86
Germany 826,14
Austria 648,48 IFAD 30,48
UNHCR 239,02
EC 2271,75
US 1530,28
IDA 1057,85
The Netherl. 881,86 IDA 1057,85
US 1530,28 EC 2271,75
US 466,2
top 5 bilateral top 5 multilateral top 5 combined
Switzerland 130,97 AA 33,04
Germany 466,2
Germany 411,62
Greece 301,34 IFAD 38,1
IMF 111,38
EC 1304,15
Italy 985,43
IDA 762,44
US 466,2 IDA 762,44
Italy 985,43 EC 1304,15
top 5 bilateral top 5 multilateral top 5 combined
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Table 38: Top 5 donors to Croatia
constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
5 5 5
Table 39: Top 5 donors to Macedonia
constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
5 5 5 Germany 169,52Greece 89,75 EBRD 16,57
The Netherl. 286,76
Germany 169,52
Japan 102,17 IMF 24,07
UNHCR 37,7
EC 771,82
IDA 410,38
US 374,97
The Netherl. 286,76 IDA 410,38
US 374,97 EC 771,82
Germany 119,44
top 5 bilateral top 5 multilateral top 5 combined
Austria 77,95 UNTA 7,4
UNHCR 127,77
Germany 119,44
Sweden 83,35 UNICEF 7,98
EBRD 11,68
US 278,54
EC 242,55
Norway 184,56
Norway 184,56 UNHCR 127,77
US 278,54 EC 242,55
top 5 bilateral top 5 multilateral top 5 combined
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Table 40: Top 5 donors to FRY/Serbia
constant prices (2006 USD millions); disbursements
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
5 5 5 Norway 572,94France 528,89 UNDP 7,33
UK 816,95
UK 816,95
Norway 572,94 EBRD 16,66
UNHCR 196,58
EC 2686,31
Germany 1592,05
US 1584,97
US 1584,97 IDA 381,92
Germany 1592,05 EC 2686,31
top 5 bilateral top 5 multilateral top 5 combined
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CHAPTER 6 - ANNEX
SECTORAL DISAGGREGATION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO THE BALKANS
Table 1: All ODA to Albania (selected categories)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
198,76 222,61 193,16 278,46 806,41 430,57 266,54 413,34 429,49 394,85 339,65 3973,85
188,55 214,56 166,53 221,27 438,30 391,05 232,98 355,62 385,43 319,67 318,20 3232,17
54,80 29,87 104,05 104,75 209,74 248,20 129,62 123,49 243,73 168,49 195,49 1612,23
88,33 128,37 0,20 44,24 110,13 81,95 10,82 148,79 101,45 96,26 62,53 873,07
23,71 11,91 10,34 18,44 66,90 12,33 27,64 15,44 17,48 19,06 16,88 240,13
21,72 44,42 51,94 53,85 51,53 48,57 64,90 67,90 22,76 35,85 43,30 506,75
4,46 0,00 1,07 24,75 88,48 0,19 11,01 29,55 27,21 36,65 0,01 223,39
.. .. .. 17,32 70,17 0,12 2,46 26,02 20,60 31,34 0,01 168,04
5,39 4,39 23,81 28,84 277,61 28,12 19,48 15,19 1,57 4,72 6,66 415,77
0,07 0,15 0,53 0,19 0,82 0,18 0,94 0,19 10,64 3,10 9,92 26,73
0,12 .. .. 1,29 .. 1,14 0,35 0,34 0,12 2,42 1,79 7,56
0,17 3,51 1,00 1,28 0,36 1,40 0,72 12,07 3,87 27,11 2,00 53,49
20,65 2,98 43,14 48,94 169,03 87,31 63,35 55,99 80,77 83,79 89,12 745,07
(of which) 
20,65 2,92 43,04 48,48 166,22 85,03 58,13 46,10 71,83 79,90 80,14 702,45
.. 0,05 0,10 0,46 2,81 2,28 5,22 9,89 8,93 3,89 8,98 42,63
notes:
CRS = Creditor Reporting System
*cps = conflict, peace and security 
all assistance
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)
social infr. & services (I)
economic infrastructure (II)
production sectors (III)
multisector (IV)
comm. aid/gen. prog. ass.
(of which) gen. budget support
emerg. ass. and reconstruction
refugees in donor countries
support to NGOs
unspecified/unallocated
govt. and civil society
govt. and civil society - general
govt. and civil society -cps**
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS*
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Chart 1: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to Albania
Chart 2: Shares of SAA to Albania
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Table 2: All ODA to Albania, by type of aid
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
102,45 158,49 18,02 20,99 55,50 63,06 16,99 95,54 132,14 98,28 79,49 840,96
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19,50 1,88 0,08 6,14 27,60
23,31 7,61 26,65 19,42 173,39 108,03 91,38 76,91 165,75 88,61 92,58 873,64
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 41,55 .. .. .. 41,55
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 55,81 .. .. 55,81
IP & TC .. .. .. 2,73 0,66 .. 0,05 .. 3,29 56,05 46,40 109,18
SP & TC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,74 0,33 1,07
73,00 56,52 148,49 235,32 576,86 259,48 158,11 179,84 70,62 151,09 114,71 2024,04
198,76 222,61 193,16 278,46 806,41 430,57 266,54 413,34 429,49 394,85 339,65 3973,84
Chart 3: All ODA to Albania; shares of types of aid
note: 
there is a slight difference between  the total by type of aid (3973,84)
and the total in the previous table  (3973,85).
The difference results from the DAC database.
only TC
IP & SP 
IP & SP & TC
only IP
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS
other
total
only SP
21%
1%
22%
1%
0% 3%
1%
51%
only IP
only SP
only TC
IP & SP 
IP & SP & TC
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SP & TC
other
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Table 3: Albania, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
8,83 2,26 1,80 5,04 12,42 35,14 17,87 17,09 103,10 32,64 22,96 259,17
0,92 1,77 1,30 29,14 15,47 19,93 8,35 9,23 8,13 11,25 24,13 129,61
3,85 3,02 .. 1,50 1,26 3,61 5,05 0,87 2,59 3,12 0,94 25,82
16,03 19,50 26,53 19,55 1,67 92,11 17,15 25,45 38,96 26,24 51,61 334,80
20,65 2,98 43,14 48,94 169,03 87,31 63,35 55,99 80,77 83,79 89,12 745,07
4,52 0,33 31,27 0,57 9,90 10,10 17,86 14,86 10,19 11,45 6,73 117,76
54,80 29,87 104,05 104,75 209,74 248,20 129,62 123,49 243,73 168,49 195,49 1612,23
Chart 4: SIS ODA to Albania; sub-sectors
Chart 5: SIS ODA to Alb; sub-sector shares
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water and sanitation
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other 
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education
health
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
education
health
population
water and sanitation
govt. and civil soc.
other 
16%
8%
2%
21%
7%
46%
education
health
population
water and sanitation
govt. and civil soc.
other 
Page 4 of 179
Table 4: Albania, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
17,49 62,69 0,10 21,42 33,48 17,88 3,80 22,55 32,84 9,95 4,97 227,17
11,56 0,25 0,09 1,18 0,21 0,37 0,80 0,42 0,18 0,55 0,34 15,96
24,14 65,43 0,00 0,00 23,95 35,38 3,12 86,19 59,40 76,71 46,82 421,13
11,60 0,00 0,00 6,98 16,64 8,54 0,16 20,86 0,29 0,87 4,14 70,07
23,54 0,00 0,01 14,66 35,85 19,78 2,95 18,78 8,73 8,19 6,26 138,74
88,33 128,37 0,20 44,24 110,13 81,95 10,82 148,79 101,45 96,26 62,53 873,07
Chart 6: EI ODA to Albania; sub-sectors
Chart 7: EI ODA to Alb; sub-sector shares
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Table 5: Albania, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Multisector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP* 0,00 0,06 0,00 4,58 0,43 8,92 4,21 0,34 4,88 15,47 11,23 50,12
other 21,72 44,36 51,94 49,27 51,11 39,66 60,68 67,56 17,88 20,38 32,07 456,62
total 21,72 44,42 51,94 53,85 51,53 48,57 64,90 67,90 22,76 35,85 43,30 506,75
Chart 8: Multisector ODA to Albania; sub-sectors
Chart 9: Multisector ODA to Alb; sub-sector shares
*GEP = general environmental protection
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS
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Table 6: All ODA to BIH (selected categories)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
312,46 575,92 895,51 977,55 1475,02 1005,35 784,43 646,65 559,20 631,17 465,83 8329,08
31,52 359,20 350,03 765,28 792,47 500,24 616,79 540,48 403,85 569,04 378,66 5307,56
15,06 151,88 138,23 268,55 261,89 281,00 303,85 255,87 322,91 453,32 298,46 2751,03
0,00 67,78 182,72 356,72 303,84 103,60 147,98 149,16 42,89 91,94 45,81 1492,46
0,00 15,15 28,33 53,09 30,61 17,41 24,41 44,23 27,23 15,44 15,29 271,19
16,46 124,39 0,74 86,92 196,13 98,23 140,55 91,21 10,82 8,33 19,09 792,87
1,12 11,14 15,79 35,62 106,50 17,94 39,29 7,09 46,48 9,08 0,19 290,24
.. 1,85 11,58 30,25 91,73 .. .. .. 39,67 .. 0,19 175,28
273,27 102,78 451,46 138,73 309,54 140,28 113,13 89,64 71,98 41,93 52,31 1785,05
5,16 81,72 37,53 34,15 2,08 0,16 8,78 0,80 10,46 3,17 28,30 212,32
1,39 0,00 .. 0,02 .. 0,05 5,37 5,54 1,61 2,76 1,26 18,01
.. 21,07 11,67 0,87 15,28 1,63 0,14 2,04 2,84 3,18 3,29 62,01
1,51 49,86 19,95 175,56 115,03 144,36 163,61 145,66 209,87 236,50 164,81 1426,73
(of which)
1,46 39,06 8,97 146,68 51,90 85,93 108,90 108,85 158,71 178,83 123,14 1012,42
0,06 10,81 10,98 28,88 63,13 58,42 54,71 36,81 51,16 57,66 41,67 414,31
emerg. ass. and reconstruction
refugees in donor countries
support to NGOs
unspecified/unallocated
govt. and civil society
all assistance
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)
social infr. & services (I)
economic infrastructure (II)
production sectors (III)
multisector (IV)
comm. aid/gen. program ass.
(of which) gen. budget support
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS
govt. and civil society - general
govt. and civil society - cps
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Chart 10: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to BiH
Chart 11: Shares of SAA to BiH
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Table 7: All ODA to BiH, by type of aid
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
2,13 101,23 156,33 125,71 43,91 34,59 72,34 139,44 178,07 143,84 117,07 1114,65
.. .. .. .. .. .. 27,02 59,22 3,01 89,45 8,12 186,82
66,34 111,59 36,86 42,23 301,02 154,83 142,54 118,04 165,73 160,86 131,40 1431,46
.. .. 0,18 6,02 .. .. 0,48 .. .. 24,31 12,62 43,62
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 1,08 1,13
243,98 363,10 702,14 803,59 1130,10 815,93 542,04 329,95 212,39 212,67 195,53 5551,40
312,46 575,92 895,51 977,55 1475,02 1005,35 784,43 646,65 559,20 631,17 465,83 8329,08
Chart 12: All ODA to BiH; shares of types of aid
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total
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Table 8: BiH, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)
1995 1996 197 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 203 2004 2005 total
1,83 55,83 23,31 12,16 21,56 33,68 35,35 38,84 30,15 40,37 33,22 326,27
0,22 7,44 34,04 10,75 36,99 12,70 12,62 9,49 2,11 30,69 28,95 185,98
.. .. .. 0,03 .. 0,91 0,24 1,58 1,35 0,08 1,97 6,15
0,74 3,36 49,47 22,90 14,64 17,78 24,42 36,02 19,60 43,34 18,59 250,87
1,51 49,86 19,95 175,56 115,03 144,36 163,61 145,66 209,87 236,50 164,81 1426,73
10,76 35,39 11,46 47,16 73,67 71,58 67,62 24,28 59,83 102,35 50,92 555,02
15,06 151,88 138,23 268,55 261,89 281,00 303,85 255,87 322,91 453,32 298,46 2751,03
Chart 13: SIS ODA to BiH; sub-sectors
Chart 14: SIS ODA to BiH; sub-sector shares
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Table 9: BiH, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,00 1,78 116,25 37,85 7,64 0,93 22,37 44,47 4,92 51,56 10,17 297,93
0,00 4,97 1,33 15,61 5,93 0,75 0,14 3,66 2,53 0,91 0,04 35,87
0,00 59,67 62,63 122,47 13,16 13,34 50,09 0,54 1,87 6,75 1,13 331,64
0,00 0,31 1,81 150,20 2,46 5,76 44,53 8,64 6,39 5,21 8,38 233,69
0,00 1,06 0,71 30,59 274,64 82,82 30,85 91,86 27,19 27,52 26,08 593,33
.. 67,78 182,72 356,72 303,84 103,60 147,98 149,16 42,89 91,94 45,81 1492,46
Chart 15: EI ODA to BiH; sub-sectors
Chart 16: EI ODA to BiH; sub-sector shares
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Table 10: BiH, Sector Allocable ODA - Multisector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,00 0,39 0,54 1,38 0,46 0,01 1,58 0,59 6,31 3,36 0,37 14,99
16,46 124,00 0,20 85,54 195,66 98,22 138,97 90,62 4,51 4,97 18,72 777,88
16,46 124,39 0,74 86,92 196,13 98,23 140,55 91,21 10,82 8,33 19,09 792,87
Chart 17: Multisector ODA to BiH; sub-sectors
Chart 18: Multisector ODA to BiH; sub-sector shares
total 
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Table 11: All ODA to Croatia (selected categories)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
36,62 110,33 58,82 76,85 61,50 132,39 200,16 311,02 238,63 201,26 209,09 1636,68
19,22 15,31 14,70 43,35 52,03 109,22 169,57 290,36 226,08 172,87 201,61 1314,33
13,43 9,36 13,77 22,10 40,65 58,45 54,35 55,87 169,74 129,41 128,92 696,04
5,07 0,72 0,09 7,48 9,30 28,12 14,06 129,80 34,34 15,14 31,07 275,19
0,04 4,88 0,55 0,98 1,39 1,57 14,76 6,32 5,64 12,81 4,93 53,86
0,68 0,34 0,30 12,80 0,70 21,07 86,40 98,37 16,36 15,51 36,69 289,22
6,46 0,24 0,86 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7,56
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
 
10,41 8,51 42,55 17,53 8,93 19,54 26,82 17,89 9,87 26,94 5,04 194,03
0,50 0,11 0,27 14,08 0,46 0,29 3,38 0,04 0,67 0,20 0,56 20,56
0,00
.. .. .. 1,87 .. .. .. 0,01 0,44 0,43 0,76 3,51
0,03 0,34 0,24 0,02 0,07 0,35 0,38 2,49 1,44 0,20 0,23 5,82
0,00
1,76 0,42 4,42 10,61 16,55 29,22 26,41 28,75 56,27 97,67 93,10 365,18
(of which)
1,76 0,42 1,40 9,97 13,41 22,38 20,75 23,27 49,14 89,13 82,77 314,41
.. .. 3,02 0,64 3,13 6,84 5,66 5,49 7,12 8,54 10,33 50,77
(of which) general budget support
all assistance
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)
social infr. & services (I)
economic infrastructure (II)
emerg. ass. and reconstruction
refugees in donor countries
support to NGOs
unspecified/unallocated
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS
govt. and civil society
govt. and civil society - general
govt. and civil society - cps
production sectors (III)
multisector (IV)
commodity aid/gen.program ass.
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Chart 19: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to Croatia
Chart 20: Shares of SAA to Croatia
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Table 12: All ODA to Croatia, by type of aid
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,02 4,80 0,89 2,26 0,62 8,22 12,16 0,49 88,94 46,21 129,16 293,78
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,20 0,43 9,05 9,68
3,82 8,96 10,41 11,54 44,05 65,72 62,36 83,00 66,34 65,51 52,93 474,66
.. .. 0,01 0,78 .. .. 0,21 .. 1,26 .. 1,01 3,27
32,77 96,58 47,50 62,27 16,82 58,45 125,43 227,53 81,89 89,11 16,94 855,30
36,62 110,33 58,82 76,85 61,50 132,39 200,16 311,02 238,63 201,26 209,09 1636,68
Chart 21: All ODA to Croatia; shares of types of aid
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Table 13: Croatia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,10 7,14 6,59 6,68 19,19 19,22 14,77 15,89 24,56 21,00 13,09 148,24
1,13 0,12 0,08 0,42 0,02 1,02 1,71 0,49 1,11 0,08 1,08 7,27
9,42 .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. 0,16 4,48 0,05 0,05 14,18
.. .. 1,24 0,07 0,09 0,39 1,10 0,10 50,40 .. 16,85 70,26
1,76 0,42 4,42 10,61 16,55 29,22 26,41 28,75 56,27 97,67 93,10 365,18
1,02 1,68 1,43 4,29 4,80 8,59 10,36 10,48 32,92 10,61 4,74 90,92
13,43 9,36 13,77 22,10 40,65 58,45 54,35 55,87 169,74 129,41 128,92 696,04
Chart 22: SIS ODA to Croatia; sub-sectors
Chart 23: SIS ODA to Cro; sub-sector shares
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Table 14: Croatia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,79 0,23 0,00 0,01 0,17 1,83 0,00 108,75 0,00 0,00 16,87 128,64
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,04 0,17 0,69 0,52 0,11 0,11 0,00 1,87
0,00 0,10 0,00 3,76 .. 0,31 2,93 4,05 8,96 1,69 2,45 24,24
4,28 0,39 0,09 1,04 0,02 .. 3,44 0,08 4,27 0,43 0,40 14,44
0,00 0,00 0,00 2,44 9,08 25,81 7,00 16,40 21,00 12,91 11,35 106,00
5,07 0,72 0,09 7,48 9,30 28,12 14,06 129,80 34,34 15,14 31,07 275,19
Chart 24: EI ODA to Croatia; sub-sectors
Chart 25: EI ODA to Croatia; sub-sector shares
business & other services
total 
transport & storage
communications
energy
banking and fin. services
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
transport & storage
communications
energy
banking and fin.
services
business & other
services
1%9%5%
39%
46%
transport & storage
communications
energy
banking and fin.
services
business & other
services
Page 17 of 179
Table 15: Croatia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Multisector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,00 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,26 0,04 6,11 0,43 7,05 6,05 0,46 20,44
0,68 0,34 0,29 12,76 0,44 21,04 80,30 97,94 9,30 9,46 36,23 268,79
0,68 0,34 0,30 12,80 0,70 21,07 86,40 98,37 16,36 15,51 36,69 289,22
Chart 26: Multisector ODA to Croatia; sub-sectors
Chart 27: Multisctor ODA to Cro; sub-sector shares
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Table 16: All ODA to Macedonia (selected categories)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
151,42 57,11 154,82 134,22 443,56 328,75 346,21 359,06 345,68 266,39 182,22 2769,43
139,99 57,05 85,10 121,86 184,23 260,46 235,86 294,97 308,44 234,34 157,88 2080,18
25,89 21,09 29,86 77,07 62,30 98,88 102,65 173,29 228,56 166,03 114,27 1099,90
112,15 1,13 0,44 14,69 63,16 33,56 15,52 31,02 37,77 16,03 20,30 345,77
0,00 18,55 23,42 8,30 11,14 42,64 11,33 19,91 14,53 31,57 5,96 187,34
1,94 16,29 31,38 21,79 47,63 85,38 106,37 70,75 27,58 20,70 17,36 447,16
11,33 .. 44,39 3,87 108,70 50,51 42,83 28,08 22,36 19,98 17,19 349,25
11,33 .. 44,39 3,86 81,74 50,51 42,54 28,08 22,36 19,98 17,19 321,98
0,05 0,04 0,85 1,49 145,98 13,28 64,77 34,11 7,38 2,04 0,06 270,06
0,05 0,02 0,05 0,10 2,01 2,23 1,37 0,55 4,02 1,17 2,75 14,33
.. .. .. 0,91 .. 0,29 .. 0,02 0,48 1,21 1,29 4,21
.. .. 4,14 0,54 0,64 1,26 0,32 0,89 1,93 1,10 2,23 13,05
5,46 0,59 15,87 22,77 26,11 40,45 35,59 121,92 68,45 89,95 67,98 495,14
(of which)
5,46 0,53 14,91 22,77 25,15 36,20 25,54 41,47 58,10 86,63 64,69 381,46
.. 0,06 0,96 .. 0,96 4,24 10,05 80,45 10,35 3,33 3,29 113,69
economic infrastructure (II)
production sectors (III)
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)
social infr. & and services (I)
all assistance
multisector (IV)
comm. aid/gen. program ass.
(of which) gen. budget support
emerg. ass. and reconstruction
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS
govt. and civil society - gen
govt. and civil society - cps
refugees in donor countries
support to NGOs
unspecified/unallocated
govt. and civil society
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Chart 28: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to Macedonia
Chart 29: SAA ODA to Macedonia; sector shares
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Table 17: All ODA to Macedonia, by type of aid
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
108,92 9,40 6,57 10,17 16,47 62,02 34,88 42,67 149,81 67,86 51,64 560,40
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12 12,77 .. 1,15 14,04
8,49 2,34 27,90 21,66 80,90 87,22 83,37 119,38 117,70 85,06 86,68 720,71
0,93 .. .. 0,91 1,62 .. .. 2,39 0,66 18,19 .. 24,70
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
33,09 45,36 120,34 101,48 344,56 179,51 227,96 194,51 64,75 95,28 42,74 1449,59
151,42 57,11 154,82 134,22 443,56 328,75 346,21 359,06 345,68 266,39 182,22 2769,43
Chart 30: All ODA to Macedonia; shares of types of aid
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Table 18: Macedonia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,04 0,43 8,49 7,97 7,74 17,45 24,93 11,72 33,06 17,05 12,31 141,18
4,25 19,50 4,58 6,73 6,24 0,96 8,59 1,80 3,43 5,11 1,46 62,65
.. .. .. .. 0,51 0,06 0,06 1,40 0,45 4,94 1,44 8,86
0,05 .. 0,37 1,49 5,97 36,44 26,12 16,33 95,69 35,66 6,46 224,55
5,46 0,59 15,87 22,77 26,11 40,45 35,59 121,92 68,45 89,95 67,98 495,14
16,10 0,56 0,56 38,12 15,74 3,52 7,36 20,12 27,50 13,32 24,62 167,52
25,89 21,09 29,86 77,07 62,30 98,88 102,65 173,29 228,56 166,03 114,27 1099,90
Chart 31: SAA ODA to Macedonia; sub-sectors
Chart 32: SAA ODA to Mac; sub-sector shares
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Table 19: Macedonia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 16,15 13,47 6,51 0,00 0,00 0,42 3,87 40,44
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,51 0,18 4,11 0,34 0,00 0,11 0,50 1,76 7,51
0,00 0,00 0,08 0,87 0,87 0,33 0,56 4,12 11,47 1,25 0,71 20,26
0,00 0,00 0,36 6,47 0,00 4,51 2,57 9,47 9,70 1,08 0,35 34,51
112,15 1,13 0,00 6,81 45,95 11,15 5,54 17,44 16,49 12,78 13,62 243,04
112,15 1,13 0,44 14,69 63,16 33,56 15,52 31,02 37,77 16,03 20,30 345,77
Chart 33: EI ODA to Macedonia; sub-sectors
Chart 34: EI ODA to Mac; sub-sector shares
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Table 20: Macedonia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Multisector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,00 0,00 0,14 0,81 2,86 15,61 0,95 0,29 1,40 4,76 5,40 32,21
1,94 16,29 31,24 20,98 44,77 69,76 105,42 70,46 26,18 15,95 11,96 414,95
1,94 16,29 31,38 21,79 47,63 85,38 106,37 70,75 27,58 20,70 17,36 447,16
Chart 35: Multisector ODA to Macedonia; sub-sectors
Chart 36: Multisector ODA to Mac; sub-sector shares
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Table 21: All ODA to FRY/Serbia (selected categories)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
29,66 20,21 60,30 149,13 1876,81 2314,87 1432,74 3403,51 1708,77 1284,11 1457,38 13737,49
0,89 3,11 8,85 47,19 479,67 1650,80 1169,05 1018,88 1206,20 1067,72 1005,61 7657,97
0,89 2,67 7,67 41,36 261,08 440,85 632,01 518,66 751,69 660,20 571,38 3888,46
0,00 0,24 0,97 4,68 95,47 386,90 379,85 357,09 326,07 254,61 263,70 2069,58
0,00 0,01 0,21 0,25 13,98 21,39 31,45 29,10 53,67 105,79 100,17 356,04
0,00 0,18 0,00 0,90 109,14 801,66 125,74 114,03 74,77 47,11 70,36 1343,88
0,40 2,77 3,87 3,86 9,92 30,38 65,10 226,65 108,29 124,70 56,45 632,38
.. .. 3,59 2,23 0,32 7,62 35,97 226,65 104,05 124,70 56,24 561,36
13,48 1,70 39,95 73,73 1152,27 563,55 167,07 282,01 74,64 37,92 92,21 2498,53
14,79 12,62 7,49 13,08 232,13 42,31 23,40 10,22 34,76 21,43 63,33 475,58
0,09 .. .. 0,80 0,09 6,06 5,37 2,64 0,96 1,20 1,66 18,88
.. 0,01 0,13 3,16 0,71 12,95 2,57 18,61 5,93 8,18 3,82 56,07
0,29 0,55 0,50 26,91 141,55 272,81 406,18 350,03 506,71 474,88 409,98 2590,39
(of which)
.. 0,55 0,30 26,70 52,11 124,67 315,87 278,62 344,83 409,87 292,02 1845,55
0,29 .. 0,19 0,20 89,45 148,14 90,31 71,41 161,89 65,01 117,96 744,84
govt. and civil society - gen.
govt. and civil society - cps
refugees in donor countries
support to NGOs
unspecified/unallocated
govt. and civil society
multisector (IV)
comm. aid/gen. program ass.
(of which) gen. budget support
emerg. ass. and reconstruction
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)
social infr. & services (I)
economic infrastructure (II)
production sectors (III)
all assistance
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS
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Chart 37: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA)  to FRY/Serbia
Chart 38: All SAA ODA to FRY/Serbia;sector shares
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Table 22: All ODA to FRY/Serbia, by type of aid
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,29 .. 0,02 1,40 14,57 85,05 152,24 95,01 484,14 381,31 439,68 1653,69
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 148,09 97,28 0,42 23,82 269,61
0,60 1,86 8,02 17,18 300,37 477,80 427,41 368,66 391,35 352,72 325,38 2671,35
.. .. 0,00 0,30 .. 2,13 0,34 1,34 1,93 49,87 87,08 142,99
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,63 0,01 0,07 1,70
28,77 18,35 52,26 130,25 1561,87 1749,90 852,75 2790,41 732,44 499,79 581,35 8998,15
29,66 20,21 60,30 149,13 1876,81 2314,87 1432,74 3403,51 1708,77 1284,11 1457,38 13737,49
Chart 39: All ODA to FRY/Serbia; shares of types of aid
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Table 23: FRY/Serbia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,60 0,72 7,02 10,65 31,62 45,73 49,79 79,12 69,31 51,73 44,07 390,38
.. 0,71 .. 1,70 19,89 39,47 17,15 18,63 67,86 44,75 16,37 226,52
.. .. .. .. 0,60 2,46 5,01 5,00 5,42 2,63 2,70 23,81
.. .. 0,02 0,69 13,00 54,78 35,87 26,91 29,28 45,18 42,80 248,53
0,29 0,55 0,50 26,91 141,55 272,81 406,18 350,03 506,71 474,88 409,98 2590,39
0,00 0,70 0,13 1,42 54,42 25,60 118,01 38,98 73,11 41,02 55,46 408,84
0,89 2,67 7,67 41,36 261,08 440,85 632,01 518,66 751,69 660,20 571,38 3888,46
Chart 40: SIS ODA to FRY/Serbia; sub-sectors
Chart 41: SIS ODA to FRY/Ser; sub-sector shares
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Table 24: FRY/Serbia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,37 26,40 12,05 10,66 13,18 91,16 33,44 188,25
0,00 0,00 0,51 0,80 3,90 7,56 1,66 3,06 9,38 0,60 4,38 31,86
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 11,46 63,69 101,33 131,15 134,24 99,15 146,40 688,16
0,00 0,24 0,46 0,24 5,53 4,54 23,00 121,10 112,28 17,18 15,91 300,49
0,00 0,00 0,00 2,89 73,21 284,72 241,82 91,11 56,99 46,51 63,57 860,82
0,00 0,24 0,97 4,68 95,47 386,90 379,85 357,09 326,07 254,61 263,70 2069,58
Chart 42: EI ODA to FRY/Serbia; sub-sectors
Chart 43: EU ODA to FRY/Ser; sub-sector shares
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Table 25: FRY/Serbia, Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Multisector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 2,01 15,00 5,40 10,55 32,81 5,88 17,63 89,30
0,00 0,18 0,00 0,88 107,12 786,67 120,34 103,48 41,95 41,23 52,74 1254,58
0,00 0,18 0,00 0,90 109,14 801,66 125,74 114,03 74,77 47,11 70,36 1343,88
Chart 44: Multisector ODA to FRY/Serbia; sub-sectors
Chart 45: Multisector ODA to FRY/Ser; sub-sector shares
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Table 26: All ODA to ex Yu unspec. (selected categories)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
267,37 497,45 96,53 27,20 385,60 183,06 124,26 356,67 80,51 79,35 27,65 2125,65
19,05 12,74 6,76 9,54 13,78 26,75 29,91 228,70 46,44 68,96 15,88 478,52
8,35 12,14 6,61 9,54 12,43 12,49 14,82 46,57 37,05 49,59 5,99 215,58
7,15 0,57 0,00 0,00 0,00 10,98 7,67 172,67 1,69 0,29 0,13 201,15
2,62 0,04 0,00 0,00 1,27 3,29 5,89 8,32 1,16 4,42 0,11 27,11
0,93 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,08 0,00 1,54 1,13 6,53 14,66 9,66 34,67
0,01 3,69 .. .. 30,52 23,81 14,50 0,63 0,24 .. .. 73,41
0,01 3,69 .. .. .. 15,20 12,08 .. .. .. .. 30,99
245,88 474,46 87,95 6,68 334,36 131,31 78,62 66,62 3,43 7,05 2,52 1438,88
2,25 5,53 1,82 10,98 .. 0,16 0,00 .. 0,15 .. 2,47 23,36
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 0,01 1,71 2,84 4,59
0,18 1,03 .. .. 6,93 1,01 1,09 1,84 30,25 1,42 3,83 47,58
3,00 4,22 5,09 9,41 11,37 6,36 3,96 28,78 22,66 40,95 2,25 138,06
(of which)
2,95 4,16 5,09 9,41 5,23 4,51 3,96 28,38 15,71 40,02 1,30 120,72
0,05 0,07 .. .. 6,14 1,86 .. 0,40 6,95 0,93 0,94 17,34
unspecified/unallocated
govt. and civil society
govt. and civil society - gen
govt. and civil society - cps
(of which) gen. budget support
emerg. ass. and reconstruction
refugees in donor countries
support to NGOs
economic infrastructure (II)
production sectors (III)
multisector (IV)
comm. aid/gen.program ass.
Constant Prices (2006 USD millions), commitments, CRS
all assistance
all sector allocable (I+II+III+IV)
social infr. & services (I)
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Chart 46: All Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) to ex Yu unspec.
Chart 47: All SAA to ex Yu unspec.; sector shares
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Table 27: All ODA to ex Yu unspec. by type of aid
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
10,66 .. .. .. 0,54 15,43 1,92 16,13 .. 19,33 0,70 64,72
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11,78 11,78
1,27 11,25 1,59 .. 0,00 23,73 11,48 5,02 39,36 8,24 8,03 109,97
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0,85 .. .. 4,77 .. 5,62
255,44 486,20 94,94 27,20 385,05 143,90 110,01 335,52 41,15 47,02 7,14 1933,56
267,37 497,45 96,53 27,20 385,60 183,06 124,26 356,67 80,51 79,35 27,65 2125,65
Chart 48: All ODA to ex Yu unspec.; shares of types of aid
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Table 28: ex Yu unspec., Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Social Infrastructure & Services (SIS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,55 7,24 0,52 0,02 0,46 0,13 5,11 2,32 10,78 2,73 0,65 30,52
2,60 0,44 0,16 .. 0,14 0,66 0,17 4,32 0,96 3,67 0,75 13,87
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 .. 0,66 0,25 0,00 0,91
0,27 .. .. .. .. 1,72 2,29 5,14 0,92 0,40 2,23 12,96
3,00 4,22 5,09 9,41 11,37 6,36 3,96 28,78 22,66 40,95 2,25 138,06
1,93 0,24 0,83 0,11 0,46 3,61 3,29 6,01 1,08 1,59 0,12 19,27
8,35 12,14 6,61 9,54 12,43 12,49 14,82 46,57 37,05 49,59 5,99 215,58
Chart 49: SIS ODA to ex Yu unspec.; sub-sectors
Chart 50: SIS ODA to ex Yu; sub-sector shares
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Table 29: ex Yu unspec., Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Economic Infrastructure (EI)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 1,34 134,46 0,47 0,09 0,00 136,87
0,84 0,57 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,46 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,09 0,03 3,01
6,30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,28 8,31 0,80 0,00 0,02 19,71
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,70 2,51 0,43 0,09 0,00 4,73
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 9,02 0,35 27,38 0,00 0,02 0,07 36,84
7,15 0,57 0,00 0,00 0,00 10,98 7,67 172,67 1,69 0,29 0,13 201,15
Chart 51: EI ODA to ex Yu unspec.; sub-sectors
Chart 52: EI ODA to ex Yu; sub-sector shares
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Table 30: ex Yu unspec., Sector Allocable Aid (SAA) - Multisector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,46 0,00 2,00 1,64 0,02 4,12
0,93 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,08 0,00 1,08 1,13 4,53 13,02 9,64 30,55
0,93 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,08 0,00 1,54 1,13 6,53 14,66 9,66 34,67
Chart 53: Multisector ODA to ex Yu unspec.; sub-sectors
Chart 54: Multisector ODA to ex Yu; sub-sector shares
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Table 31: Western  Balkans DISAGGREGATION OF SECTORS BY COUNTRIES
 Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
8,83 2,26 1,80 5,04 12,42 35,14 17,87 17,09 103,10 32,64 22,96 259,17
1,83 55,83 23,31 12,16 21,56 33,68 35,35 38,84 30,15 40,37 33,22 326,27
0,10 7,14 6,59 6,68 19,19 19,22 14,77 15,89 24,56 21,00 13,09 148,24
0,04 0,43 8,49 7,97 7,74 17,45 24,93 11,72 33,06 17,05 12,31 141,18
0,60 0,72 7,02 10,65 31,62 45,73 49,79 79,12 69,31 51,73 44,07 390,38
0,55 7,24 0,52 0,02 0,46 0,13 5,11 2,32 10,78 2,73 0,65 30,52
total 11,95 73,62 47,73 42,52 93,00 151,36 147,81 164,98 270,96 165,53 126,30 1295,76
Chart 55: Education ODA to Western Balkans
Chart 56: Country shares in education ODA
FRY/Ser
ex Yu unspec. unspec.
Alb
BiH
Cro
Mac
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Alb
BiH
Cro
Mac
FRY/Ser
ex Yu unspec.
20%
11%11%
31%
2%
25%
Alb
BiH
Cro
Mac
FRY/Ser
ex Yu
nspec
Page 39 of 179
Table 32: Albania
 Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,57 0,71 1,85 1,45 1,76 1,17 1,35 1,50 1,45 1,48 13,29
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 0,57 .. .. 0,06 .. .. 0,63
Denmark 3,28 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,28
Finland .. 0,01 0,07 .. .. .. 0,41 0,09 0,24 .. .. 0,82
France .. 0,24 0,21 0,56 1,93 2,14 2,32 2,27 2,67 2,76 3,15 18,25
Germany .. .. 0,43 .. 2,74 3,58 3,58 3,99 5,04 5,26 0,89 25,51
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,22 80,95 10,54 10,36 106,09
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy 5,55 1,44 0,15 1,04 2,70 2,24 4,08 1,78 5,78 2,32 2,10 29,18
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,22 0,14 0,12 0,47
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. 0,26 0,28
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 0,72 .. 2,12 0,16 .. .. .. 0,50 3,50
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. 0,39 0,38 1,65 0,83 0,68 1,42 1,02 1,50 7,88
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 0,17 2,69 2,59 .. 1,65 3,18 1,10 11,38
.. .. 0,23 .. .. 0,04 .. .. .. .. .. 0,27
.. .. .. 0,48 3,06 2,52 2,58 .. .. 0,02 .. 8,66
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,59 3,50 5,87 1,28 13,24
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. 15,45 .. .. .. .. .. 15,45
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,39 0,12 0,11 0,08 0,08 0,22 1,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 8,83 2,26 1,80 5,04 12,42 35,14 17,87 17,09 103,10 32,64 22,96 259,17
IDB SF.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
Luxemb.
Netherl.
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Table 33: Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 7,91 8,94 8,54 8,20 6,50 8,26 8,25 10,71 12,02 13,95 93,28
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. 5,02 0,06 0,58 .. 1,08 6,74
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. 0,20 0,01 .. .. .. .. 2,58 2,80 .. .. 5,59
France .. 0,10 0,09 0,27 1,37 1,42 1,41 1,37 1,28 1,35 1,28 9,95
Germany .. .. .. .. 8,57 8,58 8,95 8,65 9,39 10,34 0,40 54,86
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,15 .. 0,18 0,09 0,41
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,33 .. .. .. .. 0,18 0,51
Italy 1,83 46,61 0,13 2,06 0,22 0,07 0,18 1,41 0,37 0,94 0,10 53,92
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. 7,99 8,91 0,11 0,02 0,46 17,49
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. 0,42 0,21 0,57 0,03 0,00 0,02 .. .. 0,03 0,07 1,35
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 0,51 0,87 0,08 0,11 1,00 0,50 0,55 0,15 3,75
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,12 0,16 0,74 0,39 0,46 0,15 0,43 0,88 0,86 4,19
Sweden .. .. 0,16 .. 0,31 .. .. 0,34 0,48 .. 1,24 2,54
.. .. .. .. 1,16 2,53 2,01 2,50 0,10 0,83 0,04 9,17
.. 0,59 .. 0,03 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,62
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0,77 .. .. .. .. 0,77
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,24 3,19 6,00 3,07 15,50
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. 13,64 .. .. 13,65 .. .. .. 7,13 10,23 44,64
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,09 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,14 0,18 0,23 0,22 0,12 0,03 0,92
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 1,83 55,83 23,31 12,16 21,56 33,68 35,35 38,84 30,15 40,37 33,22 326,27
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Page 41 of 179
Table 34: Croatia
 Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 6,55 5,91 6,21 5,90 5,67 5,05 3,87 4,03 3,59 3,96 50,77
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. 0,17 0,15 0,34 0,94 0,90 1,14 1,39 1,39 1,28 0,51 8,21
Germany .. .. .. .. 8,72 6,65 5,84 6,22 6,51 6,40 1,42 41,75
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. 0,03 0,09 0,14
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy 0,10 0,42 0,07 0,11 0,31 0,04 0,05 0,13 0,00 0,01 0,17 1,42
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,14 0,04 0,28 0,46
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,36 .. 0,39
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 0,12 .. 0,01 0,05 0,23
Spain .. .. 0,01 0,02 0,12 0,10 0,10 0,08 0,10 0,08 0,16 0,77
Sweden .. .. 0,45 .. .. .. .. .. 0,48 .. .. 0,93
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,08 0,06 0,21
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 3,19 3,53 2,53 .. .. .. .. 9,26
EC .. .. .. .. .. 2,28 .. 4,06 11,81 9,13 6,40 33,67
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. .. .. .. .. 0,04
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,10 7,14 6,59 6,68 19,19 19,22 14,77 15,89 24,56 21,00 13,09 148,24
UK
US
IDB SF.
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
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Table 35: Macedonia
Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,15 0,24 0,42 0,70 0,59 1,03 1,31 1,80 1,34 1,48 9,06
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,03 0,05
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France 0,02 0,21 0,19 0,23 0,40 0,72 1,05 0,95 0,32 0,79 0,81 5,68
Germany .. .. .. 0,19 2,29 4,28 2,36 2,59 4,15 2,87 0,11 18,86
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,39 0,20 0,67 0,13 1,39
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy 0,02 0,07 0,02 0,01 0,07 0,05 0,36 0,03 0,35 0,03 .. 1,01
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,14 .. 0,08 0,22
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. 0,56 7,02 0,76 5,70 9,20 0,44 14,92 1,49 3,13 43,22
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 0,10 .. 0,00 1,59 0,40 0,06 0,74 0,86 3,75
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,06 0,17
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,58 .. .. 0,18 .. 0,76
.. .. 1,28 .. .. 1,38 1,00 1,40 1,16 1,52 1,45 9,18
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 3,49 4,56 7,33 .. .. .. .. 15,39
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,92 9,71 7,17 3,84 24,63
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. 6,20 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,20
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 0,42 0,25 0,23 0,23 0,32 1,62
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,04 0,43 8,49 7,97 7,74 17,45 24,93 11,72 33,06 17,05 12,31 141,18
US
IDB SF.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
Luxemb.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 36: FYR/Serbia
Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,04 6,98 7,88 8,02 9,47 8,87 9,26 6,63 7,34 8,06 72,54
Belgium 0,01 0,04 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. 0,06
Canada .. .. .. .. 1,06 11,62 0,03 .. 7,22 2,17 .. 22,10
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,57 4,89 .. .. .. 6,46
Finland .. .. .. .. .. 2,38 4,02 4,35 0,13 2,86 0,04 13,78
France .. 0,48 .. 0,75 2,88 3,24 7,34 3,69 3,62 3,71 3,87 29,57
Germany .. .. .. .. 17,86 12,68 17,25 16,10 13,59 16,14 2,84 96,46
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,46 0,44 0,71 0,84 2,45
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,28 0,33 0,94 0,42 0,91 2,87
Italy 0,59 0,17 0,01 0,30 0,04 0,00 0,21 0,36 0,35 .. .. 2,03
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,59 .. 0,24 0,84
.. .. .. .. .. .. 1,25 1,65 0,65 0,45 0,46 4,45
.. .. .. .. .. 0,48 1,68 0,08 .. 0,82 0,00 3,06
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 1,59 0,01 0,71 0,54 .. 2,68 1,19 5,21 11,94
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 0,01 .. 0,01 0,01 0,07
Spain .. .. 0,03 0,13 0,18 0,45 0,22 0,91 0,15 0,17 0,56 2,81
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. 0,53 .. .. 0,44 .. .. 0,98
.. .. .. .. 0,83 1,47 1,44 2,78 1,60 2,94 0,63 11,69
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 0,75 2,69 2,91 0,14 .. 0,04 0,03 6,56
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,12 21,02 24,59 12,39 15,35 75,47
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13,00 5,14 .. 4,86 23,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,10 0,51 0,37 0,17 1,18
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,60 0,72 7,02 10,65 31,62 45,73 49,79 79,12 69,31 51,73 44,07 390,38
IDB SF.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
Luxemb.
Netherl.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 37: Ex Yu Unspecified
Social Infrastructure & Services - EDUCATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 7,02 .. .. .. .. 0,14 .. 0,65 0,05 0,03 7,88
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. 0,44 .. .. .. .. .. 0,52 .. .. 0,96
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9,31 .. .. 9,31
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. 0,01
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. 0,08 .. 0,00 .. 1,45 0,54 0,11 2,39 0,62 5,18
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 .. 0,11
0,55 0,22 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,77
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 0,02 0,46 .. .. 1,06 .. 0,18 .. 1,72
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,01 .. 0,20 .. .. 0,21
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. 0,13 3,52 0,72 .. .. .. 4,37
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,55 7,24 0,52 0,02 0,46 0,13 5,11 2,32 10,78 2,73 0,65 30,52
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 38: Western Balkans
Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,92 1,77 1,30 29,14 15,47 19,93 8,35 9,23 8,13 11,25 24,13 129,61
0,22 7,44 34,04 10,75 36,99 12,70 12,62 9,49 2,11 30,69 28,95 185,98
1,13 0,12 0,08 0,42 0,02 1,02 1,71 0,49 1,11 0,08 1,08 7,27
4,25 19,50 4,58 6,73 6,24 0,96 8,59 1,80 3,43 5,11 1,46 62,65
0,00 0,71 0,00 1,70 19,89 39,47 17,15 18,63 67,86 44,75 16,37 226,52
2,60 0,44 0,16 0,00 0,14 0,66 0,17 4,32 0,96 3,67 0,75 13,87
total 9,12 29,98 40,16 48,73 78,73 74,73 48,58 43,96 83,60 95,55 72,75 625,89
Chart 57: Health ODA to Western Balkans 
Chart 58: Country shares in health ODA
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Table 39: Albania
Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions)  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,86 .. 0,21 0,04 0,31 0,24 0,01 .. 0,21 0,00 1,88
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. 0,00
Canada .. 0,10 .. .. .. 0,19 .. .. .. .. .. 0,29
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,08 .. 6,48 0,03 0,04 0,06 0,02 0,01 6,73
Germany .. .. .. .. 5,53 .. .. 0,20 .. .. 0,22 5,94
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,81 1,43 2,08 7,34 11,66
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,40 0,42 0,82
Italy 0,20 .. 0,73 0,05 8,42 7,80 0,34 0,52 1,62 0,78 7,24 27,71
Japan .. .. .. .. .. 3,12 .. .. 0,05 1,96 .. 5,13
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. 0,81 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,81
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 0,36 0,02 0,04 0,49 1,55 0,01 1,34 0,97 4,77
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,09 0,32 0,02 .. 0,41 0,34 .. .. .. 1,19
Sweden .. .. .. .. 0,55 .. 3,00 0,02 .. 0,95 4,13 8,65
.. .. .. 2,55 .. .. 0,29 1,95 0,51 1,39 1,22 7,92
0,72 .. 0,47 2,69 .. 1,19 0,57 0,26 0,99 .. .. 6,89
.. .. .. 1,46 0,89 0,03 2,87 3,37 3,29 2,00 2,42 16,35
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. 21,41 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21,41
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,77 0,10 0,16 0,17 0,12 0,15 1,46
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,92 1,77 1,30 29,14 15,47 19,93 8,35 9,23 8,13 11,25 24,13 129,61
IDB SF.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
Luxemb.
Netherl.
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Table 40: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,00 .. 1,43 1,51 0,38 0,31 0,23 .. 0,03 .. 3,88
Belgium .. 0,59 0,66 0,45 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,70
Canada .. 2,59 4,64 2,51 1,20 4,62 6,03 1,52 0,20 9,61 0,90 33,82
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,44 0,44 .. .. .. 0,87
France .. .. .. 1,64 0,12 0,12 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,04 2,13
Germany .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,05 0,01 .. .. .. 0,09
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,47 0,05 1,00 0,33 1,85
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,15 .. .. .. 0,02 0,10 0,28
Italy 0,22 .. 0,39 0,53 0,52 0,30 0,20 0,33 0,01 1,63 1,27 5,41
Japan .. .. 24,71 .. 10,49 .. .. 4,85 0,05 12,61 5,34 58,05
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 .. 0,08
.. 1,49 1,42 1,17 1,02 1,13 .. .. .. .. .. 6,22
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. 0,07 1,86 0,22 0,20 0,45 0,14 0,20 0,11 0,28 3,52
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,41 .. 1,39 0,79 0,60 0,30 0,21 0,50 0,78 4,98
Sweden .. .. 1,76 1,12 1,47 1,51 1,16 0,45 .. .. 0,01 7,48
.. .. .. .. 6,19 2,87 3,27 0,64 0,73 4,86 0,13 18,70
.. 2,75 .. 0,04 0,49 0,36 0,02 .. .. .. .. 3,67
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,55 .. .. 0,55
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. 12,37 .. .. .. .. .. 19,43 31,80
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,24 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,18 0,32 0,91
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,22 7,44 34,04 10,75 36,99 12,70 12,62 9,49 2,11 30,69 28,95 185,98
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
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Table 41: Croatia
Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,01
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada 0,97 .. .. 0,03 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. 0,02 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,25
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. 0,02
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy 0,01 .. .. 0,11 .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. 0,13
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
0,16 0,12 .. 0,13 .. .. .. .. 0,63 .. .. 1,04
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 0,08 .. 0,04 0,56 .. 0,38 .. 1,00 2,06
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,08 0,02 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12
Sweden .. .. .. 0,05 .. 0,10 0,79 0,33 .. .. .. 1,27
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. 0,86 .. 0,07 .. .. .. 0,93
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0,34 0,07 .. .. .. 0,41
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. 0,02
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 1,13 0,12 0,08 0,42 0,02 1,02 1,71 0,49 1,11 0,08 1,08 7,27
UK
US
IDB SF. 
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
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Table 42: Macedonia
Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. .. .. .. 0,05
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. 0,40 .. 0,42
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,18 0,63 .. 0,11 0,64 .. .. 1,56
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,16 0,02 0,02 0,05 0,24
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. 0,50 .. 0,19 0,57 0,21 0,18 0,04 0,00 1,68
Japan 4,25 .. 4,58 6,21 6,05 .. 7,27 .. 1,04 3,07 0,18 32,65
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,58 1,07 1,39 1,01 1,10 5,15
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,47 .. 0,47
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,13 0,07 .. .. 0,20
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. 19,50 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19,50
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,14 0,12 0,13 0,10 0,11 0,13 0,73
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 4,25 19,50 4,58 6,73 6,24 0,96 8,59 1,80 3,43 5,11 1,46 62,65
US
IDB SF.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
Luxemb.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 43: FYR/Serbia
Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,02 0,03 0,05 0,05 0,01 0,22
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. 0,01
Canada .. 0,71 .. .. .. 3,18 3,52 .. .. 1,12 .. 8,52
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,83 .. .. .. 0,83
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,15 3,32 .. .. 5,47
France .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,07 1,12 0,05 0,01 0,03 0,05 1,36
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,68 1,20 1,62 1,16 .. 0,57 .. 5,23
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,14 0,21 0,04 0,12 0,52
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,28 0,32 0,61 0,29 0,19 1,69
Italy .. .. .. .. 0,68 0,02 0,19 .. 4,70 .. .. 5,60
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11,58 .. 0,13 11,71
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5,16 0,01 0,96 6,13
.. .. .. 0,24 .. 6,30 0,04 2,75 .. .. .. 9,32
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 1,11 2,82 4,01 3,12 0,21 2,99 0,39 3,04 17,69
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. 0,95 2,64 1,01 1,32 1,65 .. 0,83 8,38
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,50 .. .. .. 0,03 1,53
.. .. .. 0,08 0,02 0,92 1,08 0,40 .. 0,04 0,05 2,59
.. .. .. 0,23 10,91 5,87 0,56 1,48 1,78 1,45 .. 22,27
.. .. .. .. 2,38 0,93 3,08 1,00 .. .. .. 7,40
EC .. .. .. .. 1,45 14,27 .. 6,79 12,63 30,51 10,87 76,51
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22,85 7,34 .. 30,19
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. 0,32 0,38 0,09 0,81
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,55 .. 2,55
total 0,00 0,71 0,00 1,70 19,89 39,47 17,15 18,63 67,86 44,75 16,37 226,52
IDB SF.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
Luxemb.
Netherl.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 44: ex Yu unspecified
Social Infrastructure & Services - HEALTH
1995 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,47 .. 0,47
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. 0,12 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. 0,16 .. 0,03 .. .. .. .. 0,83 0,74 1,76
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,25 .. 0,01 0,27
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,52 .. 0,52
2,60 0,31 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,92
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. 0,10 0,59 .. 4,32 0,71 1,85 .. 7,58
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,17 .. .. .. .. 0,23
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 2,60 0,44 0,16 0,00 0,14 0,66 0,17 4,32 0,96 3,67 0,75 13,87
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 45: Western Balkans
Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION (watsan)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
16,03 19,50 26,53 19,55 1,67 92,11 17,15 25,45 38,96 26,24 51,61 334,80
0,74 3,36 49,47 22,90 14,64 17,78 24,42 36,02 19,60 43,34 18,59 250,87
0,00 0,00 1,24 0,07 0,09 0,39 1,10 0,10 50,40 0,00 16,85 70,26
0,05 0,00 0,37 1,49 5,97 36,44 26,12 16,33 95,69 35,66 6,46 224,55
0,00 0,00 0,02 0,69 13,00 54,78 35,87 26,91 29,28 45,18 42,80 248,53
0,27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,72 2,29 5,14 0,92 0,40 2,23 12,96
total 17,08 22,87 77,64 44,69 35,37 203,23 106,95 109,95 234,85 150,82 138,52 1141,96
Chart 59: Water & Sanitation ODA to Western Balkans
Chart 60: Country shares in watsan ODA
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Table 46: Albania
Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,59 0,63 3,96 1,01 5,25 0,38 0,80 0,73 2,50 2,92 18,76
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 0,71 .. .. .. .. .. 0,71
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,11
France .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany 8,97 .. 25,89 15,57 0,07 32,70 15,85 11,97 20,05 7,04 16,01 154,12
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,51 0,38 0,21 1,10
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. 0,00
Italy 6,97 18,22 .. 0,02 0,35 40,56 0,03 .. 0,43 0,11 7,83 74,52
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 0,17
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,48 .. 0,93 .. 7,41
0,09 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. 0,23 .. 0,03 5,57 0,10 2,31 2,57 10,80
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. 0,70 0,02 .. .. 0,01 0,58 0,07 .. .. 2,19 3,56
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,70 1,70
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0,28 0,56 .. .. .. 0,84
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9,82 .. 9,82
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. 12,88 .. .. 17,14 3,14 17,89 51,05
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 16,03 19,50 26,53 19,55 1,67 92,11 17,15 25,45 38,96 26,24 51,61 334,80
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 47: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 2,72 3,11 3,61 3,79 .. 0,65 0,32 0,58 0,06 0,17 15,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. 7,20 .. 0,92 .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,13
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,99 .. 17,80 0,00 22,79
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. 0,00
Italy 0,74 .. 0,00 .. 0,54 0,03 0,02 0,34 0,26 .. .. 1,94
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 .. 0,05 0,12
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. 0,65 0,07 1,19 .. 0,71 .. .. .. 0,78 .. 3,39
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. 0,60 18,08 2,51 0,20 8,40 4,00 1,86 1,59 1,41 38,66
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,38 0,55 0,15 8,06 0,34 0,48 9,98
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 2,15 1,02 .. 2,82 .. 1,80 8,29 16,08
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 0,39 .. 14,80 .. .. .. .. 15,19
EC .. .. 38,48 .. 4,34 .. .. .. 8,77 .. .. 51,60
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. 15,45 .. 23,40 .. 20,96 8,18 68,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,74 3,36 49,47 22,90 14,64 17,78 24,42 36,02 19,60 43,34 18,59 250,87
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 48: Croatia
Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. 0,66 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,66
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 49,50 .. 1,12 50,62
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. 0,58 0,04 .. .. 0,31 .. .. .. .. 0,93
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. 0,39 .. 0,10 0,90 .. .. 1,40
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. 0,03 0,09 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0,79 .. 0,01 .. .. 0,79
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15,73 15,73
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 1,24 0,07 0,09 0,39 1,10 0,10 50,40 0,00 16,85 70,26
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 49: Macedonia
Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. 0,73 4,72 0,95 1,49 0,39 2,12 2,08 3,61 16,09
Belgium .. .. 0,37 0,74 0,54 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,64
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5,43 .. .. 5,43
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France 0,05 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,38 14,34 6,75 14,84 0,66 11,70 .. 48,67
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,43 0,22 0,08 0,03 0,76
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,01 3,89 5,52 0,28 9,73
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 81,02 6,30 .. 87,33
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,66 1,01 0,63 0,88 3,18
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. 18,88 .. .. .. .. .. 18,88
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9,34 .. 9,34
Sweden .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,38 .. .. .. .. .. 0,40
.. .. .. .. .. 1,42 .. .. .. .. 1,65 3,07
.. .. .. .. 0,33 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,33
.. .. .. .. .. 0,47 0,16 .. .. .. .. 0,63
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,33 .. .. 1,33
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. 17,70 .. .. .. .. 17,70
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,05 0,00 0,37 1,49 5,97 36,44 26,12 16,33 95,69 35,66 6,46 224,55
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 50: FYR/Serbia
Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. 2,37 2,00 1,90 .. 2,17 0,98 9,42
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,22 0,22
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,96 .. .. .. 0,96
Finland .. .. .. .. .. 2,47 .. 0,63 .. .. .. 3,10
France .. .. .. .. 0,39 .. .. 0,71 0,47 .. .. 1,57
Germany .. .. .. .. 6,31 33,76 16,84 11,72 4,56 19,45 13,31 105,94
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,26 .. .. 0,05 0,31
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,42 .. .. 0,02 .. .. 0,44
Italy .. .. .. .. .. 0,18 .. .. 0,35 .. .. 0,52
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,66 6,66
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12 .. 0,09 0,21
.. .. .. 0,21 .. 3,17 4,84 3,08 .. .. .. 11,30
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. 6,14 0,89 1,41 .. 1,38 4,44 3,15 17,40
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. 0,74 0,04 .. 0,17 0,87 4,29 6,11
.. .. .. 0,48 0,17 0,80 0,49 0,87 .. .. 10,21 13,02
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. 10,25 .. .. .. .. 10,25
EC .. .. .. .. .. 9,99 .. 6,79 14,23 18,25 3,84 53,09
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,00 .. .. 8,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,69 13,00 54,78 35,87 26,91 29,28 45,18 42,80 248,53
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 51: ex Yu unspecified
Social Infrastructure & Services - WATER & SANITATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. 0,76 0,85 .. .. .. 0,70 2,31
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,01 0,05
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,51 1,51
0,27 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,32 .. .. 0,58
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 .. 4,42 0,56 0,40 .. 5,49
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. 0,86 1,44 0,72 .. .. .. 3,02
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,27 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,72 2,29 5,14 0,92 0,40 2,23 12,96
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 52: Western Balkans
Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 3,85 3,02 0,00 1,50 1,26 3,61 5,05 0,87 2,59 3,12 0,94 25,82
BiH 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,91 0,24 1,58 1,35 0,08 1,97 6,15
Cro 9,42 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,16 4,48 0,05 0,05 14,18
Mac 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,51 0,06 0,06 1,40 0,45 4,94 1,44 8,86
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,60 2,46 5,01 5,00 5,42 2,63 2,70 23,81
ex Yu 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,66 0,25 0,00 0,91
13,27 3,02 0,00 1,56 2,36 7,04 10,36 9,00 14,95 11,06 7,11 79,73
Chart 61: Population ODA to Western Balkans
Chart 62: Country shares of population ODA
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Table 53: Albania
Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark 0,40 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,40
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany 3,45 2,06 .. .. .. 1,37 .. .. .. .. .. 6,87
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,04 0,05
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. 0,96 .. 0,26 0,36 0,40 0,92 0,29 .. .. .. 3,20
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,59 .. .. .. .. 1,59
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,03
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,84 0,01 0,85
Switzerl. .. .. .. .. .. 1,67 .. .. .. .. .. 1,67
UK .. .. .. 0,04 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04
US .. .. .. 1,21 0,89 0,08 1,82 .. 2,09 2,11 0,58 8,79
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 0,12 0,10 0,10 0,08 0,21 0,70
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,08 0,15
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,61 0,48 0,39 .. .. 1,48
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 3,85 3,02 0,00 1,50 1,26 3,61 5,05 0,87 2,59 3,12 0,94 25,82
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 54: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 .. .. .. .. .. 0,08
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. 0,03 .. 0,76 .. 1,11 0,71 .. .. 2,61
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,27 0,26 .. 0,74 1,26
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,14 1,14
Switzerl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 .. .. .. 0,06
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 0,16 0,01 .. .. 0,01 0,24
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 .. 0,08 0,08 0,22
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,07 0,38 .. .. 0,54
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,00 0,91 0,24 1,58 1,35 0,08 1,97 6,15
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 55: Croatia
Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,63 .. .. 0,74
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switzerland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US 9,42 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. .. .. 9,47
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 0,05 0,10
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,84 .. .. 3,84
total 9,42 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,16 4,48 0,05 0,05 14,18
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 56: Macedonia
Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zea. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,33 0,25 0,32 0,93
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. 0,84 0,84
Switzerl. .. .. .. .. 0,51 .. .. 1,20 .. .. .. 1,71
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,08 0,19
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 0,06 0,10 0,06 0,02 0,12 0,43
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,05 .. 0,08 0,20
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,56 .. 4,56
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,51 0,06 0,06 1,40 0,45 4,94 1,44 8,86
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 57: FRY/Serbia
Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 1,52 2,01 1,31 .. .. .. 4,85
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,21 .. .. .. 0,21
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,10 .. .. .. 0,10
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,65 0,01 .. .. .. 1,66
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,68 .. .. 0,19 0,20 1,06
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,67 1,67
Switzerl. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,21 0,36 0,15 .. .. 0,73
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. 0,60 0,93 0,34 2,52 .. 2,13 0,54 7,05
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,14 0,44 0,32 0,07 0,97
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 .. 0,23 0,29
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12 0,35 1,66 .. .. 2,12
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,11 .. .. 3,11
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,60 2,46 5,01 5,00 5,42 2,63 2,70 23,81
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 58: ex Yu unspecified
Social Infrastructure & Services - POPULATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,59 .. .. 0,59
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,25 .. 0,32
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switzerl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,66 0,25 0,00 0,91
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 59: Western Balkans
Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
20,65 2,98 43,14 48,94 169,03 87,31 63,35 55,99 80,77 83,79 89,12 745,07
1,51 49,86 19,95 175,56 115,03 144,36 163,61 145,66 209,87 236,50 164,81 1426,73
1,76 0,42 4,42 10,61 16,55 29,22 26,41 28,75 56,27 97,67 93,10 365,18
5,46 0,59 15,87 22,77 26,11 40,45 35,59 121,92 68,45 89,95 67,98 495,14
0,29 0,55 0,50 26,91 141,55 272,81 406,18 350,03 506,71 474,88 409,98 2590,39
3,00 4,22 5,09 9,41 11,37 6,36 3,96 28,78 22,66 40,95 2,25 138,06
total 32,67 58,62 88,97 294,21 479,64 580,51 699,11 731,14 944,72 1023,74 827,24 5760,58
Chart 63: Government & Civil Society ODA to Western Balkans
Chart 64: Country shares of GCS ODA
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Table 60: Albania
Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,23 .. .. 0,02 0,13 0,27 .. 0,10 0,08 0,04 0,87
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,25 .. 0,25
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 0,41 0,14 .. 0,00 0,48 .. 1,03
Denmark 2,17 .. .. .. 19,88 .. .. 0,37 .. .. .. 22,41
Finland .. .. 0,16 .. .. 0,31 1,59 0,52 0,41 0,76 0,90 4,65
France .. .. .. 0,04 0,07 0,10 0,13 0,20 0,11 0,14 0,17 0,96
Germany .. .. .. .. 1,97 1,58 1,02 2,00 0,54 1,14 2,08 10,32
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14,50 8,04 3,00 0,56 26,11
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. 0,20 0,34 0,28 0,31 1,14
Italy .. 0,05 12,46 13,32 34,94 2,93 12,89 0,69 0,82 2,13 1,05 81,27
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 0,82 0,02 0,90
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
0,40 2,65 0,14 1,12 .. 11,79 8,58 3,46 0,42 0,86 0,91 30,32
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 2,85 3,34 2,69 1,54 10,72 1,21 2,75 2,39 27,49
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,10 0,51 1,02 0,47 0,37 0,18 0,21 0,29 0,50 3,65
Sweden .. 0,05 0,46 0,39 0,78 0,12 1,60 3,31 1,05 2,07 8,15 17,98
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0,71 0,41 0,39 0,30 0,89 2,69
0,46 .. .. 1,71 0,12 2,36 6,63 0,62 2,79 1,59 3,53 19,82
4,59 .. .. 5,13 27,50 35,42 22,70 17,22 15,52 15,98 17,97 162,03
EC 13,03 .. 29,82 23,88 23,83 6,46 5,07 1,39 48,73 50,84 49,62 252,66
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. 54,45 22,53 .. .. .. .. .. 76,98
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 1,12 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,12
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,20 0,04 0,02 0,04 0,41
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 20,65 2,98 43,14 48,94 169,03 87,31 63,35 55,99 80,77 83,79 89,12 745,07
Luxemb.
Netherl.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
New Zeal.
UK
Switz.
US
IDB SF.
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Table 61: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 1,34 3,75 5,40 18,22 5,56 4,92 1,05 1,42 4,11 7,10 52,88
Belgium .. .. .. .. 2,36 1,27 2,46 1,49 0,74 0,78 0,38 9,47
Canada .. 9,98 1,44 10,48 2,15 6,22 5,89 1,31 0,65 19,15 14,18 71,46
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. 0,08 .. 0,84 1,63 1,54 6,96 1,50 3,97 4,43 2,22 23,16
France .. .. .. 0,14 0,03 0,10 0,16 0,12 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,83
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,06 5,90 2,96 7,03 4,63 5,40 1,95 27,93
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7,76 6,17 6,27 0,13 20,34
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,57 0,79 0,92 1,00 0,56 0,82 4,66
Italy 1,18 1,42 1,74 1,58 0,52 0,22 5,13 0,16 0,66 0,79 0,04 13,45
Japan .. 19,42 .. .. .. 2,96 .. .. 3,31 .. 0,44 26,13
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. 5,69 0,71 7,89 1,85 9,34 6,59 2,58 52,24 4,50 10,20 101,57
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. 0,05 18,35 10,88 10,11 6,46 14,73 10,32 10,87 10,80 92,59
Portugal .. .. .. 1,44 0,84 1,50 1,45 .. 0,12 7,36 0,26 12,97
Spain .. .. 8,04 12,88 25,04 32,39 23,62 21,37 17,97 10,90 2,34 154,55
Sweden 0,33 3,27 3,18 10,11 1,13 3,38 3,76 9,98 3,13 15,35 10,23 63,85
.. .. 0,07 0,34 2,47 .. 0,35 .. 2,43 4,32 5,36 15,34
.. .. 0,97 0,37 4,25 2,65 7,58 3,60 5,65 0,98 3,82 29,87
.. .. .. 17,87 38,55 28,91 64,58 41,44 36,37 30,00 26,25 283,97
EC .. .. .. 8,53 4,02 31,73 19,94 30,45 58,82 81,88 68,09 303,46
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. 8,66 .. 79,33 .. .. .. .. .. 28,51 .. 116,50
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 1,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,02
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 0,18 0,25 0,12 0,73
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 1,51 49,86 19,95 175,56 115,03 144,36 163,61 145,66 209,87 236,50 164,81 1426,73
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 62: Croatia
Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,15 0,15 .. 0,00 0,30
Austria .. .. 2,98 0,61 0,51 0,39 0,25 0,05 0,24 1,18 0,23 6,45
Belgium .. .. 0,15 .. 0,18 .. 0,19 0,77 0,18 0,12 .. 1,60
Canada .. .. .. 0,02 0,65 1,12 0,35 1,72 .. .. .. 3,86
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,28 0,14 0,15 0,08 0,17 0,06 0,96
France .. .. .. 0,01 .. 0,09 0,14 0,25 0,21 0,20 0,22 1,12
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,47 5,49 1,57 1,63 1,85 1,76 1,50 14,27
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,15 0,02 .. 0,17
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. 0,45 0,60 .. 1,06
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,28 .. 0,30
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. 0,53 .. .. 0,36 0,19 0,07 1,42 0,73 0,26 3,56
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 3,15 0,49 3,01 3,00 6,84 7,25 8,82 8,73 41,29
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. 0,26 0,30 0,15 0,57 0,46 .. .. .. 1,75
Sweden 0,04 0,42 0,19 2,67 0,14 0,06 0,04 0,03 0,76 1,63 6,03 12,02
.. .. .. .. 0,51 .. 0,13 .. 0,07 .. 0,01 0,72
.. .. 0,56 0,57 1,21 1,84 1,15 1,13 0,04 0,61 .. 7,11
1,71 .. .. 3,31 10,30 10,77 17,98 15,49 9,07 14,47 14,56 97,67
EC .. .. .. .. 0,30 5,66 0,70 .. 34,33 67,08 61,50 169,57
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 1,39 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,39
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 1,76 0,42 4,42 10,61 16,55 29,22 26,41 28,75 56,27 97,67 93,10 365,18
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 63: Macedonia
Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,11 .. .. .. 0,03 0,03 0,20 .. 0,20 0,14 0,71
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12 .. .. 0,43 0,55
Canada .. .. .. 0,99 .. 0,48 0,08 0,50 0,05 .. .. 2,09
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. 0,25 .. .. .. .. .. 1,95 .. 0,87 0,02 3,10
France .. .. .. 0,07 0,01 0,08 0,20 0,06 0,09 0,11 0,14 0,77
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,69 1,37 1,61 2,61 0,36 0,87 4,26 11,76
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 69,42 0,78 0,16 0,18 70,55
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,04 0,20 0,01 0,32
Italy .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. 2,82 .. 0,02 0,05 .. 2,92
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,15 .. 0,09 0,24
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,26 0,26
0,40 .. .. 0,06 0,82 9,61 1,82 3,69 2,71 0,61 3,69 23,43
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 1,69 1,78 0,93 3,99 4,91 4,74 4,57 5,04 27,66
Portugal .. .. .. .. 0,74 4,24 4,09 0,07 1,44 .. 0,06 10,65
Spain .. .. .. 0,06 .. .. .. .. 1,22 0,01 .. 1,29
Sweden 0,11 0,23 0,08 0,42 0,33 0,67 1,46 3,03 1,12 2,86 9,01 19,33
.. .. 0,96 0,18 4,95 .. 0,51 .. 0,85 0,66 1,46 9,56
.. .. .. 0,12 0,59 0,74 0,91 1,11 5,93 .. .. 9,41
4,95 .. .. 4,57 5,75 15,85 16,06 33,38 26,62 25,15 17,44 149,77
EC .. .. 14,83 14,60 10,27 6,45 1,99 0,69 22,20 53,45 25,58 150,07
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,17 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,17
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12 0,11 0,17 0,16 0,56
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 5,46 0,59 15,87 22,77 26,11 40,45 35,59 121,92 68,45 89,95 67,98 495,14
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 64: FYR/Serbia
Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,16 0,27 0,15 0,60
Austria .. .. .. 0,87 3,29 18,26 16,16 7,95 9,45 12,45 9,88 78,32
Belgium .. .. 0,08 0,01 2,12 6,40 6,99 4,63 3,39 0,30 0,37 24,28
Canada .. 0,00 .. 0,29 5,17 22,55 8,03 2,04 6,60 5,18 0,45 50,32
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,54 0,93 .. .. .. 3,47
Finland .. .. .. .. 1,38 3,79 6,25 9,04 4,82 1,29 0,04 26,62
France .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,10 1,49 0,02 0,06 0,15 0,15 2,00
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,71 6,07 13,95 32,40 33,87 15,47 6,18 108,64
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,15 67,68 0,08 34,65 102,57
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 1,09 0,66 0,38 0,35 0,62 0,57 3,67
Italy 0,29 .. 0,01 0,39 10,88 0,07 2,21 .. 1,23 .. .. 15,08
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,16 0,20
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,21 0,45 0,74
.. .. 0,18 0,91 4,02 22,73 18,44 12,88 10,80 7,33 3,24 80,53
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 16,13 15,93 18,36 16,35 0,73 9,04 10,64 18,47 105,66
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. 0,76 .. .. 1,31 0,22 7,74 10,02
Spain .. .. .. .. 38,16 35,58 28,54 25,50 22,71 9,84 1,34 161,67
Sweden .. 0,55 0,23 1,02 0,92 2,31 6,55 6,54 6,51 8,07 27,23 59,94
.. .. .. .. .. 31,28 14,63 1,54 3,66 30,08 26,90 108,10
.. .. .. 0,00 34,87 31,02 14,79 8,08 17,35 4,60 7,44 118,16
.. .. .. 7,25 5,51 49,69 210,22 141,91 133,09 156,28 83,35 787,30
EC .. .. .. .. 18,60 22,77 38,34 95,22 174,39 211,58 167,85 728,75
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12,78 12,78
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,17 0,17 0,58 1,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,29 0,55 0,50 26,91 141,55 272,81 406,18 350,03 506,71 474,88 409,98 2590,39
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 65: ex Yu unspecified
Social Infrastructure & Services - GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. 0,25 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,26
Austria .. 0,07 .. .. .. .. .. 0,31 .. .. .. 0,38
Belgium 0,45 0,11 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,56
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,10 .. .. .. .. 0,10
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. 0,01 0,12 .. .. 2,70 .. 0,83 0,70 0,89 0,94 6,19
France .. .. 0,22 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,22
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9,65 .. .. 9,65
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. 27,53 .. 27,54
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,86 2,79 0,47 5,12
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 0,15 0,03 0,35
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
0,22 1,57 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. .. 1,84
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway 0,48 0,06 0,08 9,41 10,77 2,36 .. 26,93 10,03 8,79 .. 68,92
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,79 0,80 1,59
Spain .. .. .. .. 0,60 .. .. 0,21 0,20 .. .. 1,02
Sweden 1,85 2,16 4,66 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,67
.. .. .. .. .. 0,16 3,86 0,50 .. .. .. 4,52
.. .. .. .. .. 1,14 .. .. .. .. .. 1,14
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 3,00 4,22 5,09 9,41 11,37 6,36 3,96 28,78 22,66 40,95 2,25 138,06
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 66: Western Balkans
Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 4,52 0,33 31,27 0,57 9,90 10,10 17,86 14,86 10,19 11,45 6,73 117,76
BiH 10,76 35,39 11,46 47,16 73,67 71,58 67,62 24,28 59,83 102,35 50,92 555,02
Cro 1,02 1,68 1,43 4,29 4,80 8,59 10,36 10,48 32,92 10,61 4,74 90,92
Mac 16,10 0,56 0,56 38,12 15,74 3,52 7,36 20,12 27,50 13,32 24,62 167,52
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,70 0,13 1,42 54,42 25,60 118,01 38,98 73,11 41,02 55,46 408,84
ex Yu 1,93 0,24 0,83 0,11 0,46 3,61 3,29 6,01 1,08 1,59 0,12 19,27
total 34,33 38,90 45,68 91,67 158,98 123,00 224,50 114,72 204,62 180,35 142,59 1359,33
Chart 65: Other to Western Balkans
Chart 66: Country shares in other ODA
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Table 67: Albania
Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. .. .. .. 0,03
Austria .. .. .. 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,06 0,34 0,58
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. 0,01 0,02
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark 1,41 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,20 .. 0,06 .. 1,67
Finland .. .. .. 0,02 0,02 0,15 .. .. .. 0,16 0,15 0,50
France 0,19 0,20 0,20 0,17 0,12 0,15 0,18 0,32 0,31 0,21 0,42 2,46
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,28 3,69 0,28 1,63 1,44 2,03 0,47 9,81
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,44 0,67 1,50 1,03 3,65
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,01 .. 0,03
Italy .. .. 0,07 0,19 8,11 2,43 0,15 5,27 2,88 3,64 2,01 24,74
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,09 0,11
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. 0,13 .. .. .. .. 1,78 .. 0,43 .. .. 2,35
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,59 0,44 3,21 1,60 0,13 5,96
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. 0,16 0,17 0,52 0,06 0,70 0,50 0,15 .. 2,26
Sweden 0,03 .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,38 0,05 .. 1,62 .. 2,08
Switzerl. .. .. .. .. .. 1,81 0,12 1,68 .. .. .. 3,61
UK .. .. .. .. .. 1,22 0,42 3,72 .. .. .. 5,36
US 2,90 .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,02 0,28 0,00 0,35 3,58
EC .. .. .. .. 0,87 .. .. .. 0,03 .. 1,28 2,17
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. 31,00 .. .. .. 13,51 .. .. .. .. 44,51
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,29 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,29
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,32 0,36 0,38 0,40 0,46 2,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 4,52 0,33 31,27 0,57 9,90 10,10 17,86 14,86 10,19 11,45 6,73 117,76
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 68: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. 0,02
Austria .. 0,84 0,33 0,26 0,10 0,09 0,03 0,20 0,02 0,27 0,12 2,26
Belgium .. .. 0,39 .. 0,51 .. 0,34 1,23 0,04 0,03 0,04 2,59
Canada 5,51 1,82 1,61 4,62 0,03 .. .. .. .. 9,33 .. 22,93
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,02
Finland .. 0,47 3,71 .. 0,47 1,75 1,52 0,17 0,45 1,51 .. 10,05
France 2,15 0,11 0,11 0,26 0,31 0,44 0,42 0,38 0,33 0,49 0,50 5,51
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,89 0,23 0,01 0,31 1,24 6,43 0,95 10,06
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,03 0,02 .. 0,08
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,82 0,66 .. 0,02 .. .. 1,50
Italy 3,09 0,18 0,29 0,42 2,92 6,94 0,14 0,52 1,78 0,03 0,21 16,52
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,61 0,28 2,13 3,02
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. 0,21 0,65 12,85 0,83 0,46 1,60 1,20 .. 0,01 1,28 19,10
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 13,23 14,64 8,01 0,41 0,25 0,31 0,80 0,75 38,42
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,01 0,03
Spain .. .. 0,29 2,67 0,09 0,53 0,73 1,58 0,89 0,75 1,16 8,68
Sweden .. 2,26 2,73 9,06 7,39 11,14 11,01 16,40 13,28 12,09 42,62 127,99
Switzerl. .. .. 1,36 0,09 1,94 3,07 2,52 1,27 .. .. 0,16 10,41
UK .. 0,65 .. 0,04 9,29 1,14 0,51 0,49 3,27 1,93 0,44 17,75
US .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,03 3,51 2,05 0,08 5,68
EC .. .. .. 3,65 24,86 12,85 .. .. 25,92 .. .. 67,28
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. 28,85 .. .. 4,95 23,89 47,29 .. 8,00 66,03 .. 179,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 4,44 .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,44
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,21 0,40 0,22 0,13 0,27 0,47 1,71
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 10,76 35,39 11,46 47,16 73,67 71,58 67,62 24,28 59,83 102,35 50,92 555,02
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 69: Croatia
Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,02 .. .. 0,06
Austria .. .. .. 0,02 0,05 0,08 0,07 0,12 0,01 0,11 0,02 0,48
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,04
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 0,11 .. 0,16
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France 1,02 0,92 0,90 0,56 0,13 0,61 0,61 0,66 0,20 0,62 0,66 6,90
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,78 0,12 0,00 0,00 1,18 2,24 1,04 5,36
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. 0,76 .. 0,03 .. 0,01 0,07 .. .. .. 0,04 0,92
Japan .. .. .. 0,34 0,38 0,36 0,38 .. 0,29 .. 0,03 1,77
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. 0,56 .. .. .. 0,31 0,75 .. 1,62
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 1,57 0,62 2,07 2,32 1,98 1,75 0,52 0,09 10,93
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,03 .. 0,00 0,00 0,04
Spain .. .. 0,53 1,69 .. 0,22 0,27 0,44 0,31 0,36 0,20 4,01
Sweden .. .. .. .. 0,78 4,42 4,36 3,89 4,27 3,72 2,31 23,77
Switzerl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. .. 0,03
UK .. .. .. 0,08 .. 0,54 1,22 0,69 .. .. 0,04 2,57
US .. .. .. .. 1,50 .. 1,02 2,66 4,27 1,93 0,03 11,42
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20,01 .. .. 20,01
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,14 .. .. 0,21 0,23 0,24 0,83
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 1,02 1,68 1,43 4,29 4,80 8,59 10,36 10,48 32,92 10,61 4,74 90,92
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 70: Macedonia
Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. 0,02 0,02 0,08 0,04 0,02 .. 0,00 0,02 0,21
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,01
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France 0,72 0,56 0,56 0,32 0,13 0,26 0,35 0,40 0,17 0,49 0,34 4,32
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,33 0,92 .. .. 0,19 7,52 0,37 9,34
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,71 0,39 0,22 0,04 1,35
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,43 0,27 .. .. 4,70
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,40 .. 0,00 0,03 2,72 3,15
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,34 0,82 4,65 0,33 0,70 6,85
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,46 0,10 0,52 3,64 2,56 7,28
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. 0,03
Sweden .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. 0,51 0,04 0,19 0,22 0,25 1,26
Switzerl. .. .. .. .. 0,19 1,98 0,85 .. 0,34 0,05 0,01 3,42
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. 2,64 .. 0,64 6,88 8,60 0,59 7,56 26,91
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11,97 .. 9,85 21,81
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA 15,37 .. .. 37,78 12,37 .. 3,38 6,50 .. .. .. 75,41
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,26 0,38 0,21 0,21 0,20 0,20 1,47
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 16,10 0,56 0,56 38,12 15,74 3,52 7,36 20,12 27,50 13,32 24,62 167,52
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 71: FRY/Serbia
Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. .. .. .. 0,03
Austria .. .. .. 0,02 0,08 0,64 3,13 0,38 1,52 0,74 1,64 8,15
Belgium 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,30 .. 0,02 0,33
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,50 0,50 0,58 .. .. 1,58
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,00 2,05 .. .. .. 4,05
Finland .. .. .. .. .. 0,45 0,87 .. 0,27 .. .. 1,59
France .. 0,70 .. 0,59 0,13 0,04 1,64 0,88 0,36 1,29 1,08 6,70
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,76 0,81 4,91 0,00 2,64 4,89 1,27 15,28
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,33 1,82 4,90 1,99 9,04
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,36 0,63 .. 0,14 0,06 0,24 1,43
Italy .. .. 0,00 .. 0,02 0,04 0,62 1,85 6,46 .. .. 9,00
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,40 0,08 0,14 0,12 0,74
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,58 7,96 1,08 0,22 11,84
Netherl. .. .. 0,04 0,19 0,42 0,41 3,23 1,78 0,74 0,54 .. 7,36
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 0,62 2,29 13,55 6,78 0,46 3,99 2,12 3,01 32,82
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. 0,01 0,01
Spain .. .. .. .. .. 0,54 0,79 0,67 0,79 1,20 0,35 4,34
Sweden .. .. .. .. 3,28 8,09 12,66 10,44 3,55 2,99 7,34 48,35
Switzerl. .. .. 0,09 .. .. 0,67 14,95 1,31 0,15 .. 1,53 18,70
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,41 0,29 .. .. 4,74 6,44
US .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,59 14,32 2,63 1,66 3,31 22,51
EC .. .. .. .. 47,44 .. 63,10 .. 29,62 13,04 1,41 154,61
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7,71 5,24 25,56 38,52
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,19 0,72 1,79 1,14 1,61 5,44
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,70 0,13 1,42 54,42 25,60 118,01 38,98 73,11 41,02 55,46 408,84
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 72: ex Yu unspecified
Social Infrastructure & Services - OTHER
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France 1,91 .. 0,67 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,58
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. 0,16 .. .. 0,36 3,29 0,13 0,04 0,18 0,06 4,22
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. 0,06 0,06
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 .. 0,08
Netherl. .. 0,24 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,24
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 0,11 0,46 1,17 .. 4,97 1,03 1,30 .. 9,04
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 .. 0,03 .. 0,12
Sweden 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02
Switzerl. .. .. .. .. .. 0,90 .. 0,07 .. .. .. 0,97
UK .. .. .. .. .. 1,19 .. 0,74 .. .. .. 1,93
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 1,93 0,24 0,83 0,11 0,46 3,61 3,29 6,01 1,08 1,59 0,12 19,27
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 73: Western Balkans
Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 17,49 62,69 0,10 21,42 33,48 17,88 3,80 22,55 32,84 9,95 4,97 227,17
BiH 0,00 1,78 116,25 37,85 7,64 0,93 22,37 44,47 4,92 51,56 10,17 297,93
Cro 0,79 0,23 0,00 0,01 0,17 1,83 0,00 108,75 0,00 0,00 16,87 128,64
Mac 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 16,15 13,47 6,51 0,00 0,00 0,42 3,87 40,44
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,37 26,40 12,05 10,66 13,18 91,16 33,44 188,25
ex Yu unspec. 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 1,34 134,46 0,47 0,09 0,00 136,87
total 18,29 64,70 116,35 59,30 58,81 61,00 46,06 320,88 51,41 153,17 69,32 1019,30
Chart 67: Transport & Storage ODA to Western Balkans
Chart 68: Country shares in T&S ODA
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Table 74: Albania
Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,23 .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,24
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. 0,02 1,99 .. .. .. .. .. 2,01
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. 32,94 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32,94
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,22 0,07 0,17 0,29 0,75
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. 10,10 1,50 3,39 .. 0,21 .. 0,21 15,41
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
1,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,02
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. 0,67 0,10 .. .. 0,80 .. .. .. .. .. 1,57
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 2,13 3,16 0,41 0,22 0,58 .. .. 6,49
EC .. .. .. .. 4,34 .. .. .. .. 9,78 4,48 18,60
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA 16,47 28,85 .. 21,41 16,89 10,43 .. 22,10 31,99 .. .. 148,15
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 17,49 62,69 0,10 21,42 33,48 17,88 3,80 22,55 32,84 9,95 4,97 227,17
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 75: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. 1,68 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,68
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. 1,63 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,63
France .. .. 3,52 .. .. .. 0,55 .. .. .. .. 4,08
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,02
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. 0,35 0,15 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,50
Japan .. .. 10,80 12,37 5,46 .. 6,20 .. 4,92 8,60 0,07 48,42
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. 1,78 0,01 0,37 0,61 0,10 .. .. .. .. 0,38 3,25
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. 1,02 0,49 .. .. .. .. .. 1,52
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5,47 .. 42,47 9,58 57,51
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,13 0,13
Sweden .. .. 0,02 1,24 0,05 0,33 .. .. .. 0,03 .. 1,67
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 0,35 .. 0,76 .. .. 0,46 .. 1,57
EC .. .. 51,85 21,91 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 73,76
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. 48,36 .. .. .. 14,86 39,00 .. .. .. 102,23
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 1,78 116,25 37,85 7,64 0,93 22,37 44,47 4,92 51,56 10,17 297,93
Luxemb.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 76: Croatia
Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. 0,05 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,38 0,43
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France 0,79 0,18 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,97
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. 1,83 .. .. .. .. .. 1,83
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,76 0,76
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 0,17 .. 0,00 0,11 .. .. .. 0,28
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 108,64 .. .. 15,73 124,37
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,79 0,23 0,00 0,01 0,17 1,83 0,00 108,75 0,00 0,00 16,87 128,64
Luxemb.
Netherl.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 77: Macedonia
Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,31 .. 0,31
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,59 2,59
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,50 .. .. .. 0,00 6,50
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. 0,03 0,97 0,75 .. .. .. .. .. 1,75
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. 0,01
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 1,59 0,74 .. .. .. 0,11 0,00 2,44
EC .. .. .. .. 13,59 .. .. .. .. .. 1,28 14,87
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. 11,98 .. .. .. .. .. 11,98
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03 16,15 13,47 6,51 0,00 0,00 0,42 3,87 40,44
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
UK
US
IDB SF.
Switz.
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Table 78: FYR/Serbia
Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,03 0,01 .. 0,07
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,00 0,22 3,78 1,14 .. .. .. .. 5,15
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,71 1,14 7,35 0,65 2,59 .. .. 12,44
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,32 .. 5,38 10,39 16,09
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. 17,80 .. 0,67 .. .. .. 18,47
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. 1,34 0,37 .. 2,76 0,83 .. 5,29
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. 1,36 2,66 0,06 1,12 1,95 0,02 7,17
.. .. .. .. 0,44 0,98 0,52 .. .. .. .. 1,94
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,79 0,70 1,23 .. 2,72
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,15 5,98 24,12 23,02 61,27
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 57,64 .. 57,64
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,37 26,40 12,05 10,66 13,18 91,16 33,44 188,25
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 79: ex Yu unspecified
Economic Infrastructure - TRANSPORT & STORAGE
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. 0,50 .. .. .. .. .. 0,50
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 .. 0,09
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15,14 0,03 .. .. 15,17
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
0,01 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,89 0,43 .. .. 4,33
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. 1,34 .. .. .. .. 1,34
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 115,43 .. .. .. 115,43
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,50 1,34 134,46 0,47 0,09 0,00 136,87
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
UK
US
IDB SF.
Switz.
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Table 80: Western Balkans
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 11,56 0,25 0,09 1,18 0,21 0,37 0,80 0,42 0,18 0,55 0,34 15,96
BiH 0,00 4,97 1,33 15,61 5,93 0,75 0,14 3,66 2,53 0,91 0,04 35,87
Cro 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,04 0,17 0,69 0,52 0,11 0,11 0,00 1,87
Mac 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,51 0,18 4,11 0,34 0,00 0,11 0,50 1,76 7,51
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,51 0,80 3,90 7,56 1,66 3,06 9,38 0,60 4,38 31,86
ex Yu unspec. 0,84 0,57 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,46 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,09 0,03 3,01
total 12,40 5,78 1,94 18,32 10,27 14,42 3,65 7,68 12,29 2,76 6,55 96,07
Chart 69: Communication ODA to Western Balkans
Chart 70: Country shares of communication ODA
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Table 81: Albania
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,05 0,05 0,02 0,11 0,06 0,01 .. .. 0,30
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,08 0,08 0,19
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,32 0,17 0,46 0,27 1,21
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy 11,56 .. .. .. .. .. 0,69 .. .. .. .. 12,25
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. 0,09 0,34 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,43
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. 0,01
.. .. .. 0,78 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,78
.. 0,25 .. .. 0,17 0,04 .. .. .. .. .. 0,46
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. 0,30 .. .. 0,01 .. .. 0,31
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 11,56 0,25 0,09 1,18 0,21 0,37 0,80 0,42 0,18 0,55 0,34 15,96
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 82: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. 0,37 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,37
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. 0,05 0,36 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,41
France .. .. .. 0,08 0,12 0,13 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,04 .. 0,44
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. 0,01
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. 0,03
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 .. .. .. .. 0,11
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,03 0,04
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. 1,33 0,01 0,72 0,32 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. 2,39
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,02 1,18 0,05 .. 1,29
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. 0,69 3,51 0,27 .. 3,60 .. .. .. 8,07
Sweden .. 3,61 0,13 5,45 0,11 .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 9,32
.. .. 0,77 8,30 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9,06
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 1,86 0,00 0,01 0,01 .. 0,79 .. 2,67
EC .. .. .. .. .. 0,30 .. .. 1,33 .. .. 1,63
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 4,97 1,33 15,61 5,93 0,75 0,14 3,66 2,53 0,91 0,04 35,87
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Luxemb.
Netherl.
New Zeal.
Switz.
UK
US
IDB SF.
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Table 83: Croatia
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,04 0,04 0,08 0,08 0,17 0,11 0,11 .. 0,63
Germany .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 .. .. .. .. .. 0,07
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Japan .. .. .. 0,18 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,18
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. 0,02
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. .. .. 0,05
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,59 0,30 .. .. .. 0,92
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,04 0,17 0,69 0,52 0,11 0,11 0,00 1,87
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 84: Macedonia
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,03 0,02 .. 0,07 0,06 .. 0,18
Germany .. .. .. .. .. 1,02 .. .. .. 0,06 0,11 1,20
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,38 0,19 0,57
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. 0,24 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,24
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. 0,25 .. .. 0,33 .. 0,03 .. 0,06 0,67
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,10 0,10
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. 0,02 0,15 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,18
US .. .. .. .. 0,03 2,75 .. .. .. .. .. 2,78
EC .. .. .. .. .. 0,30 .. .. .. .. 1,28 1,58
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,51 0,18 4,11 0,34 0,00 0,11 0,50 1,76 7,51
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 85: FYR/Serbia
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 0,87 .. .. .. .. .. 0,87
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,04 .. .. 0,94 0,11 0,10 0,01 .. 1,20
Germany .. .. .. .. .. 0,26 .. 0,18 .. 0,08 0,09 0,61
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,57 0,57
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,37 .. .. .. 0,37
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,08
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. 0,01
Netherl. .. .. 0,51 0,76 3,90 2,03 .. .. 0,00 0,13 .. 7,33
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. 3,32 0,20 .. .. .. .. 3,52
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. 0,22 .. 1,46 .. 0,01 0,02 1,71
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 .. .. .. 0,42 0,58
UK .. .. .. .. .. 0,68 0,36 0,17 .. .. .. 1,21
US .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 .. 0,77 1,30 0,36 0,01 2,61
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7,98 .. 3,20 11,17
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,51 0,80 3,90 7,56 1,66 3,06 9,38 0,60 4,38 31,86
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
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Table 86: ex Yu unspecified
Economic Infrastructure - COMMUNICATION
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. 0,12 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12
France .. .. .. .. .. 1,46 .. .. .. .. .. 1,46
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 .. 0,09
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,03
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. 0,68 0,45 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,12
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway 0,16 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. 0,18
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,84 0,57 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,46 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,09 0,03 3,01
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
Page 94 of 179
Table 87: Western Balkans
Economic Infrastructure  - ENERGY
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 24,14 65,43 0,00 0,00 23,95 35,38 3,12 86,19 59,40 76,71 46,82 421,13
BiH 0,00 59,67 62,63 122,47 13,16 13,34 50,09 0,54 1,87 6,75 1,13 331,64
Cro 0,00 0,10 0,00 3,76 0,00 0,31 2,93 4,05 8,96 1,69 2,45 24,24
Mac 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,87 0,87 0,33 0,56 4,12 11,47 1,25 0,71 20,26
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 11,46 63,69 101,33 131,15 134,24 99,15 146,40 688,16
ex Yu unspec. 6,30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,28 8,31 0,80 0,00 0,02 19,71
total 30,43 125,20 62,71 127,85 49,44 113,05 162,31 234,36 216,74 185,54 197,53 1505,15
Chart 71: Energy ODA to Western Balkans
Chart 72: Country  shares in energy ODA
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Table 88: Albania
Economic Infrastructure  - ENERGY
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. 0,13 .. .. 0,16 .. 1,45 1,74
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. 23,73 .. .. 3,33 .. 49,05 16,78 92,89
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy 5,66 7,12 .. .. 0,21 20,36 .. 42,49 57,29 0,14 0,09 133,36
Japan 12,98 24,26 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,03 37,27
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. 14,42 .. .. .. .. .. 14,42
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 1,41 .. .. 0,99 .. 2,41
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. 0,47 1,71 1,50 1,95 0,32 0,88 6,82
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA 5,49 34,05 .. .. .. .. .. 38,87 .. 26,20 27,61 132,22
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 24,14 65,43 0,00 0,00 23,95 35,38 3,12 86,19 59,40 76,71 46,82 421,13
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Table 89: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economic Infrastructure  - ENERGY
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 4,36 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,36
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. 3,26 7,51 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10,76
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. 7,62 1,44 2,33 1,27 .. .. .. .. .. .. 12,65
France .. .. .. 2,87 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,87
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,10 .. 2,70 .. .. 6,50 .. 9,30
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04
Japan .. .. 23,90 31,72 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 55,69
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. 3,35 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,35
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. 1,81 20,95 .. 0,05 0,11 .. 1,16 .. 1,01 25,08
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. 31,24 3,78 0,67 .. 0,54 0,46 0,24 .. 36,93
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 .. .. 0,17
Switz. .. .. .. .. 6,51 11,79 .. .. .. .. .. 18,30
UK .. .. .. 1,88 0,17 .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,05
US .. .. .. .. 1,29 0,83 .. .. 0,07 .. 0,05 2,24
EC .. .. 15,57 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15,57
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. 41,09 12,40 31,48 .. .. 47,29 .. .. .. .. 132,25
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 59,67 62,63 122,47 13,16 13,34 50,09 0,54 1,87 6,75 1,13 331,64
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Table 90: Croatia
Economic Infrastructure  - ENERGY
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,01 .. .. .. .. 0,03
Canada .. 0,10 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,10
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,01
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 .. .. 0,07
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 3,65 .. 0,30 2,91 3,79 .. 1,20 1,92 13,78
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. 0,11 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,26 0,88 0,49 0,52 2,14
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,00 .. .. 8,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,10 0,00 3,76 0,00 0,31 2,93 4,05 8,96 1,69 2,45 24,24
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Table 91: Macedonia
Economic Infrastructure  - ENERGY
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. 0,54 0,87 .. .. .. .. .. 0,38 1,80
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. 0,08 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 0,08 0,07 .. .. .. 0,19
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,02
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 3,68 1,58 1,22 .. 6,50
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9,89 .. .. 9,89
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. 0,33 .. 0,29 0,46 0,37 0,00 0,03 0,30 1,78
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,87 0,87 0,33 0,56 4,12 11,47 1,25 0,71 20,26
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Table 92: FYR/Serbia
Economic Infrastructure  - ENERGY
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. 0,02
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 0,08 .. 0,03 10,89 11,04
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,23 12,99 85,67 28,76 .. 5,30 40,46 173,42
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5,71 5,36 .. 0,06 11,14
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. 7,63 .. 6,57 0,35 2,02 2,64 3,66 22,85
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,39 0,85 0,26 0,20 0,16 2,85
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. 6,21 5,38 1,57 11,72 .. 3,87 28,76
Switz. .. .. .. .. 2,88 15,13 2,07 12,63 .. .. .. 32,71
UK .. .. .. 0,75 .. 0,36 0,19 .. .. .. .. 1,29
US .. .. .. .. .. 6,99 .. 0,01 0,17 1,18 1,87 10,23
EC .. .. .. .. 0,72 22,00 .. 74,69 113,00 67,79 61,40 339,61
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,50 1,71 22,01 24,03 54,25
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,75 11,46 63,69 101,33 131,15 134,24 99,15 146,40 688,16
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Table 93: ex Yu unspecified
Economic Infrastructure  - ENERGY
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,28 .. .. .. .. 4,28
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,02 0,06
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. 6,30 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,30
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,31 0,76 .. .. 9,07
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 6,30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,28 8,31 0,80 0,00 0,02 19,71
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Table 94: Western Balkans
Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 11,60 0,00 0,00 6,98 16,64 8,54 0,16 20,86 0,29 0,87 4,14 70,07
BiH 0,00 0,31 1,81 150,20 2,46 5,76 44,53 8,64 6,39 5,21 8,38 233,69
Cro 4,28 0,39 0,09 1,04 0,02 0,00 3,44 0,08 4,27 0,43 0,40 14,44
Mac 0,00 0,00 0,36 6,47 0,00 4,51 2,57 9,47 9,70 1,08 0,35 34,51
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,24 0,46 0,24 5,53 4,54 23,00 121,10 112,28 17,18 15,91 300,49
ex Yu unspec. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,70 2,51 0,43 0,09 0,00 4,73
total 15,88 0,94 2,71 164,94 24,65 23,35 75,39 162,65 133,36 24,86 29,18 657,93
Chart 73: Banking & Financial Services ODA to Western Balkans
Chart 74: Country shares in BFS ODA
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Table 95: Albania
Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,39 0,51 0,90
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany 4,83 .. .. 6,80 .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 3,55 15,27
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,13 .. .. 0,20
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 .. .. 0,08
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. .. 0,03 .. 0,06
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,01 0,05
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. 0,03 .. .. .. 1,29 .. .. 0,07 1,39
Switz. .. .. .. .. 1,79 .. .. .. 0,04 0,36 .. 2,18
UK .. .. .. 0,14 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,14
US 6,77 .. .. .. .. 0,17 0,13 .. 0,00 .. .. 7,08
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. 14,85 8,37 .. 19,50 .. .. .. 42,72
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 11,60 0,00 0,00 6,98 16,64 8,54 0,16 20,86 0,29 0,87 4,14 70,07
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Table 96: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,28 1,29 1,56
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 5,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5,02
Germany .. .. .. .. 1,36 1,88 13,49 7,32 5,10 .. .. 29,15
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,39 0,40 .. .. .. .. 0,79
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,61 0,65 0,01 .. 1,27
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 .. 0,05 0,22
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. 1,21 .. .. 0,85 0,28 .. .. .. .. 2,33
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. 0,60 5,87 0,89 2,18 1,31 0,71 0,33 4,60 7,05 23,54
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. 0,20 1,29 .. .. 0,33 .. 1,81
UK .. 0,31 .. .. 0,22 0,27 0,74 .. .. .. .. 1,53
US .. .. .. 133,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 133,02
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,13 .. .. 0,13
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. 6,30 .. .. 27,02 .. .. .. .. 33,32
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,31 1,81 150,20 2,46 5,76 44,53 8,64 6,39 5,21 8,38 233,69
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Table 97: Croatia
Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France 0,29 0,04 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,33
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,12 0,13 0,26
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,31 .. 0,31
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,01 0,05
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,29 .. .. 3,29
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 0,22 .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. .. 0,27
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,09 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. 0,35 .. 0,82 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,19
US 3,99 .. .. .. .. .. 3,44 0,08 0,84 .. 0,26 8,60
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 .. .. 0,06
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 4,28 0,39 0,09 1,04 0,02 0,00 3,44 0,08 4,27 0,43 0,40 14,44
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Table 98: Macedonia
Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,57 .. 0,57
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,93 0,06 0,02 2,01
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. 0,37 0,37 0,35 0,01 .. .. 1,10
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,01 0,05
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. 6,33 .. 3,64 0,32 7,62 7,23 .. .. 25,14
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. 0,41 0,41 0,69 0,40 0,45 0,25 2,61
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,48 0,80 0,08 .. 0,07 2,43
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. 0,36 0,14 .. 0,09 .. .. .. .. .. 0,59
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,36 6,47 0,00 4,51 2,57 9,47 9,70 1,08 0,35 34,51
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Table 99: FYR/Serbia
Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. 0,47 .. .. .. .. .. 0,47
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,02
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,69 1,20 1,89
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 1,42 .. .. .. .. .. 1,42
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. 1,41 .. .. .. .. .. 1,41
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,68 0,03 14,50 5,88 19,00 1,13 13,50 54,73
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 0,04
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,39 1,07 .. .. .. 2,46
Netherl. .. .. .. .. 4,56 .. 1,40 .. .. .. .. 5,96
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. 0,30 0,88 .. .. 0,00 .. 0,92 2,11
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. 0,30 4,29 1,43 0,03 0,09 0,10 6,23
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,06 6,70 .. 7,77
UK .. 0,24 0,46 0,24 .. 0,02 1,37 1,15 0,79 1,05 0,09 5,41
US .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 1,06 .. .. 0,05 1,17
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7,52 .. 7,52
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 110,51 91,40 .. .. 201,91
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,24 0,46 0,24 5,53 4,54 23,00 121,10 112,28 17,18 15,91 300,49
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Table 100: ex Yu unspecified
Economic Infrastructure - BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES (BFS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,37 .. .. 0,37
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 .. 0,09
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. .. 0,05
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,51 .. .. .. 2,51
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,70 .. .. .. .. 1,70
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,70 2,51 0,43 0,09 0,00 4,73
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Table 101: Western Balkans
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 23,54 0,00 0,01 14,66 35,85 19,78 2,95 18,78 8,73 8,19 6,26 138,74
BiH 0,00 1,06 0,71 30,59 274,64 82,82 30,85 91,86 27,19 27,52 26,08 593,33
Cro 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,44 9,08 25,81 7,00 16,40 21,00 12,91 11,35 106,00
Mac 112,15 1,13 0,00 6,81 45,95 11,15 5,54 17,44 16,49 12,78 13,62 243,04
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,89 73,21 284,72 241,82 91,11 56,99 46,51 63,57 860,82
ex Yu unspec. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 9,02 0,35 27,38 0,00 0,02 0,07 36,84
total 135,69 2,18 0,72 57,40 438,73 433,31 288,50 262,97 130,41 107,94 120,94 1978,78
Chart 75: Business & Other Services ODA
Chart 76: Country shares in BOS ODA
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Table 102: Albania
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,05 .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. 0,05
Germany 3,45 .. .. .. 3,39 .. 1,48 .. .. 0,76 0,11 9,19
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,04 .. 0,05
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,13 0,13
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,02
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. 0,06 .. .. 0,75 .. 0,02 0,04 0,17 1,04
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. .. 0,05
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US 20,09 .. .. 14,56 32,08 19,78 0,71 18,78 8,66 7,35 5,82 127,83
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,38 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,38
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 23,54 0,00 0,01 14,66 35,85 19,78 2,95 18,78 8,73 8,19 6,26 138,74
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Table 103: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. 0,01 0,01
Germany .. .. .. .. 4,75 3,86 0,20 0,65 2,91 0,20 2,22 14,78
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. 0,03
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. 0,02 .. 0,14 .. .. 0,92 0,00 0,00 .. 1,08
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,12 0,14
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. 0,03 0,02 0,01 0,91 .. 0,02 1,23 17,90 20,12
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. 1,10 0,12 0,09 0,19 0,42 1,24 .. 3,15
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. 0,04 .. .. .. .. 0,28 0,27 0,10 0,69
Sweden .. .. 0,69 0,10 .. 0,02 0,20 2,02 0,44 0,01 .. 3,48
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,57 0,04 0,04 .. .. 0,66
UK .. 1,06 .. 0,87 1,16 4,23 1,47 1,55 0,36 0,77 .. 11,47
US .. .. .. 29,55 205,34 74,59 0,65 16,28 22,71 11,38 5,73 366,22
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12,39 .. 12,39
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. 61,87 .. 26,75 70,21 .. .. .. 158,83
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,28 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,28
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 1,06 0,71 30,59 274,64 82,82 30,85 91,86 27,19 27,52 26,08 593,33
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Table 104: Croatia
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,10 2,97 .. 0,64 .. 2,29 0,34 6,34
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. 0,57 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,57
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,16 0,03 0,21
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. 0,30 0,32
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. 1,87 8,97 19,51 6,98 15,76 12,81 10,46 10,68 87,05
EC .. .. .. .. .. 3,34 .. .. 8,18 .. .. 11,52
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,44 9,08 25,81 7,00 16,40 21,00 12,91 11,35 106,00
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Table 105: Macedonia
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 .. 0,17
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,02
Germany 6,90 .. .. .. 0,02 2,67 .. 2,23 2,37 0,11 0,78 15,08
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,10 0,04 0,04 0,19
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,34 .. .. .. 0,34
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12 .. 0,02 0,14
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. 0,75 .. 0,02 0,75 0,18 1,71
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,30 .. .. 0,07 0,41 0,78
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. .. .. .. 0,03
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,18 .. .. 0,18
UK 0,93 1,13 .. 0,11 .. 0,08 .. .. .. .. .. 2,25
US 10,98 .. .. 6,67 45,93 8,40 4,47 14,85 13,70 11,63 12,17 128,80
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA 93,35 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 93,35
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 112,15 1,13 0,00 6,81 45,95 11,15 5,54 17,44 16,49 12,78 13,62 243,04
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Table 106: FYR/Serbia
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,02
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. 1,08 .. .. .. .. .. 1,08
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. 1,71 3,99 6,84 3,35 9,25 3,53 28,67
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 1,20 0,38 .. 1,61
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,16 .. .. 0,16
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,16 0,16
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,28 .. 0,28
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,36 0,22 1,49 2,65 1,46 10,17
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,26 0,44 2,54 3,24
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. 0,02 2,37 2,37 .. 2,02 .. 1,94 8,72
Switz. .. .. .. .. 0,08 .. 0,13 .. 0,01 .. .. 0,22
UK .. .. .. 0,09 0,05 .. 0,29 .. .. .. .. 0,43
US .. .. .. 2,80 73,06 243,90 30,78 56,13 39,20 23,38 36,65 505,90
EC .. .. .. .. .. 35,67 199,90 13,58 9,31 10,13 17,27 285,86
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14,30 .. .. .. 14,30
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,89 73,21 284,72 241,82 91,11 56,99 46,51 63,57 860,82
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Table 107: ex Yu unspecified
Economic Infrastructure - BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES (BOS)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions)  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,04 0,06
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,03
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. 8,81 .. 0,20 .. .. .. 9,01
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. 0,21 0,35 0,02 .. .. .. 0,58
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27,16 .. .. .. 27,16
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 9,02 0,35 27,38 0,00 0,02 0,07 36,84
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Table 108: Western Balkans
Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0,00 0,06 0,00 4,58 0,43 8,92 4,21 0,34 4,88 15,47 11,23 50,12
BiH 0,00 0,39 0,54 1,38 0,46 0,01 1,58 0,59 6,31 3,36 0,37 14,99
Cro 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,26 0,04 6,11 0,43 7,05 6,05 0,46 20,44
Mac 0,00 0,00 0,14 0,81 2,86 15,61 0,95 0,29 1,40 4,76 5,40 32,21
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 2,01 15,00 5,40 10,55 32,81 5,88 17,63 89,30
ex Yu unspec. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,46 0,00 2,00 1,64 0,02 4,12
total 0,00 0,44 0,69 6,83 6,02 39,57 18,72 12,19 54,45 37,17 35,11 211,18
Chart 77: GEP ODA to Western Balkans
Chart 78: Country shares in GEP ODA
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Table 109: Albania
Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,06 0,05 0,03 0,15
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. .. 0,05 .. .. .. 0,10
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,23 0,84 0,17 0,02 1,26
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. 0,01
Italy .. .. .. .. 0,12 0,08 1,49 .. .. .. .. 1,69
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,15 0,18
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. 0,06 .. .. .. .. 0,85 .. 3,34 7,17 0,06 11,48
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,06 0,03 0,03 .. 0,15
Sweden .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. 0,08 0,00 .. 0,10
Switz. .. .. .. 0,85 .. 7,13 1,20 .. .. .. .. 9,18
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,63 .. 0,49 0,32 0,09 1,54
US .. .. .. 3,73 0,24 .. .. .. .. .. 7,04 11,01
EC .. .. .. .. .. 1,71 .. .. .. 4,59 3,84 10,14
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,14 .. 3,14
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
0,00 0,06 0,00 4,58 0,43 8,92 4,21 0,34 4,88 15,47 11,23 50,12
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Table 110: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,20 .. 0,30 .. .. 0,50
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. 0,01
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,16 0,17 .. .. 0,00 0,33
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,29 0,06 0,03 .. 0,39
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. 0,01
Italy .. .. 0,54 .. 0,19 0,01 0,30 .. 1,08 0,54 0,29 2,94
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12 0,01 0,07 0,20
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,87 .. .. .. .. 0,87
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 0,10 0,06 0,06 .. 0,27
Sweden .. 0,39 .. 0,84 0,03 .. .. .. 0,03 0,88 .. 2,17
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,01
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,01 .. 0,02
EC .. .. .. 0,54 0,25 .. .. .. 4,65 1,83 .. 7,26
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,39 0,54 1,38 0,46 0,01 1,58 0,59 6,31 3,36 0,37 14,99
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Table 111: Croatia
Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,20 .. 0,20
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. 0,03 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,07
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,11
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 .. .. 0,09
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,02 1,40 .. 1,53 .. .. 3,01
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,18 .. 0,06 0,24
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,32 .. .. 0,02 .. 2,34
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. 0,23 .. 2,31 .. 0,19 0,43 0,24 3,41
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,03 .. .. .. .. 0,04
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,34 .. 0,26 .. 0,59
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 0,07 5,05 5,14 0,04 10,34
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,26 0,04 6,11 0,43 7,05 6,05 0,46 20,44
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Table 112: Macedonia
Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,92 1,16 .. .. .. 0,03 .. 2,11
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 0,42 0,08 0,19 0,74
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,50 .. .. .. .. .. 0,50
Italy .. .. .. 0,17 .. .. .. .. 0,47 .. .. 0,65
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 .. 0,17 0,23
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. 0,08 0,03 0,45 0,32 0,85 .. 0,11 .. .. 1,84
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,82 .. 0,83
Switz. .. .. 0,06 .. 0,08 13,63 .. 0,23 0,31 1,17 1,12 16,60
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. 0,60 0,96 .. 0,09 .. .. 0,04 .. 1,70
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,63 3,93 6,55
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,45 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,45
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,14 0,81 2,86 15,61 0,95 0,29 1,40 4,76 5,40 32,21
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Table 113: FYR/Serbia
Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
195 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12 0,12
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5,15 .. .. .. 5,15
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,07 .. .. .. .. 2,07
France .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 0,02 .. .. .. 0,08
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,09 0,13
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,61 0,29 0,12 0,15 5,18
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. 0,02
Italy .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,15 0,13 0,69 .. .. 0,99
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,11
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,07 0,70 .. 0,02 0,03 .. 0,83
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,56 .. 4,25 1,51 1,14 7,47
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 0,09 0,06 0,05 .. 0,26
Sweden .. .. .. .. 2,01 3,79 0,82 0,48 2,88 0,85 .. 10,84
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. 11,12 0,88 0,07 .. .. .. 12,07
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. 0,03
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 .. 24,59 3,26 16,01 43,97
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 2,01 15,00 5,40 10,55 32,81 5,88 17,63 89,30
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Table 114: ex Yu unspecified
Multisector - GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (GEP)
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,40 .. .. 1,40
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,46 .. .. .. .. 0,46
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,29 1,64 .. 1,93
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,31 .. 0,02 0,32
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,46 0,00 2,00 1,64 0,02 4,12
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Table 115: Western Balkans
Multisector - OTHER
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 21,72 44,36 51,94 49,27 51,11 39,66 60,68 67,56 17,88 20,38 32,07 456,62
BiH 16,46 124,00 0,20 85,54 195,66 98,22 138,97 90,62 4,51 4,97 18,72 777,88
Cro 0,68 0,34 0,29 12,76 0,44 21,04 80,30 97,94 9,30 9,46 36,23 268,79
Mac 1,94 16,29 31,24 20,98 44,77 69,76 105,42 70,46 26,18 15,95 11,96 414,95
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,18 0,00 0,88 107,12 786,67 120,34 103,48 41,95 41,23 52,74 1254,58
ex Yu unspec. 0,93 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,08 0,00 1,08 1,13 4,53 13,02 9,64 30,55
total 41,73 185,16 83,83 169,43 399,19 1015,35 506,78 431,19 104,36 105,00 161,36 3203,38
Chart 79: Multisector Other ODA to Western Balkans
Chart 80: Country shares in Multisctor other ODA
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Table 116: Albania
Multisector - OTHER
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,95 .. 1,95
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. 0,01
Canada .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. 0,04
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 .. .. .. .. 0,09
Finland .. 0,12 .. .. .. .. 0,54 .. .. .. .. 0,66
France 0,28 0,69 0,60 .. 0,00 .. 0,12 0,04 0,02 0,31 0,06 2,12
Germany 6,90 .. .. .. 4,10 5,14 0,55 4,69 6,39 1,03 11,45 40,25
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,55 1,30 1,07 3,92
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. .. 0,03 .. .. 0,06
Italy .. 0,78 .. .. 1,94 0,40 3,93 0,04 .. 0,00 3,85 10,95
Japan .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,05 0,03 0,05 .. .. .. 0,20
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,79 .. 1,79
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 .. 0,09
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,03 0,05
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 3,12 0,29 0,07 0,04 0,03 3,61
Switz. .. .. .. .. 4,02 .. .. 0,17 .. 0,78 0,06 5,02
UK .. .. .. 0,49 .. .. 6,31 .. .. .. .. 6,81
US 3,56 .. .. 1,05 .. 3,70 .. 2,57 9,18 8,89 7,35 36,30
EC .. 42,77 45,14 35,14 40,96 30,25 45,98 59,72 0,63 4,17 .. 304,76
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA 10,98 .. 6,20 12,59 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 29,77
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,18 8,18
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 21,72 44,36 51,94 49,27 51,11 39,66 60,68 67,56 17,88 20,38 32,07 456,62
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Table 117: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Multisector - OTHER
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,67 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. 0,00 0,70
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. 0,15 .. 0,86 0,13 0,25 0,05 0,02 .. .. .. 1,47
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. 0,21 .. .. 0,21
France 0,06 0,16 0,13 0,02 0,01 .. 0,01 0,01 .. 0,00 .. 0,40
Germany .. .. .. .. 11,97 0,46 1,90 0,65 0,52 1,12 14,15 30,77
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,13 0,17 0,16 0,46
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,98 0,28 .. 0,03 .. .. 1,29
Italy 0,36 18,84 0,07 .. .. 2,82 0,13 1,65 .. 0,79 0,00 24,64
Japan .. .. .. 0,71 0,31 0,62 1,69 0,84 .. .. 0,03 4,21
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. 0,15 .. 6,57 0,47 0,80 0,90 3,22 .. .. .. 12,09
New Zeal. 0,04 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04
Norway .. .. .. 1,86 2,28 .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,14
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. 0,31 .. 0,99 0,83 0,84 0,41 1,06 0,00 4,45
Sweden 0,01 .. .. 0,65 .. .. .. 0,06 .. 0,01 0,47 1,19
Switz. .. .. .. .. 20,78 5,10 4,10 0,17 0,29 0,35 0,90 31,69
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US 16,00 .. .. 74,56 0,03 .. .. 1,91 2,89 1,47 3,01 99,88
EC .. 0,16 .. .. 141,11 86,20 129,08 81,26 .. .. .. 437,82
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. 103,87 .. .. 18,56 .. .. .. .. .. .. 122,43
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 16,46 124,00 0,20 85,54 195,66 98,22 138,97 90,62 4,51 4,97 18,72 777,88
Page 125 of 179
Table 118: Croatia
Multisector - OTHER
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,03 0,02 .. 0,03 .. 0,08
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. 0,01
Canada .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,18 0,05 .. .. .. .. 0,31
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France 0,17 0,33 0,29 0,01 0,04 .. .. 0,01 0,08 0,06 0,04 1,02
Germany .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,02 .. 1,62 2,33 0,85 1,04 5,97
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,11
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. 0,01 .. 0,13 .. 0,04 0,01 .. .. 4,60 .. 4,79
Japan .. .. .. .. 0,06 0,10 0,35 0,41 .. .. .. 0,93
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. 2,44 .. 0,59 .. .. .. 0,25 0,05 3,32
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,18 .. 0,18
Sweden 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,09
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. 1,77 0,83 0,06 .. 0,02 0,02 2,69
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,04
US 0,50 .. .. 10,19 .. .. .. 19,78 3,54 0,79 3,11 37,91
EC .. .. .. .. 0,15 18,32 79,02 76,05 3,32 2,61 31,87 211,34
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,68 0,34 0,29 12,76 0,44 21,04 80,30 97,94 9,30 9,46 36,23 268,79
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Table 119: Macedonia
Multisector - OTHER
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,03 .. .. .. .. .. 0,05
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France .. 0,11 0,10 .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,22
Germany .. .. .. .. 3,56 16,71 0,07 1,79 8,93 0,62 3,43 35,10
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,21 0,20 0,53
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,18 .. .. .. 0,18
Japan .. .. .. 0,32 0,23 0,20 0,61 0,17 .. .. 0,06 1,60
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. 0,07 .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. 0,02 0,09
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 .. .. 0,08
Sweden 0,01 .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. 2,51 0,01 .. 0,03 2,61
Switz. .. .. .. 0,50 .. .. .. 0,17 .. 0,68 0,00 1,35
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US 1,18 .. .. 1,10 0,48 29,68 0,83 18,80 15,45 6,20 4,96 78,67
EC 0,75 16,18 31,14 18,98 40,30 23,12 76,89 46,85 1,60 8,23 3,07 267,10
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. 27,02 .. .. .. .. 27,02
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,16 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,16
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 0,17
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 1,94 16,29 31,24 20,98 44,77 69,76 105,42 70,46 26,18 15,95 11,96 414,95
Page 127 of 179
Table 120: FYR/Serbia
Multisector - OTHER
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. 0,10 .. .. .. .. 2,07 2,17
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 .. .. .. .. .. 0,06
Canada .. .. .. .. 1,19 0,04 12,16 0,32 0,17 .. .. 13,88
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 12,54 .. .. .. .. 12,54
Finland .. .. .. .. .. 2,25 0,34 .. .. .. .. 2,58
France .. 0,18 .. 0,00 0,01 .. 0,01 0,00 0,18 0,24 0,04 0,66
Germany .. .. .. .. 6,09 15,74 2,48 12,63 4,71 10,10 33,70 85,45
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,50 0,63 0,57 1,71
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,40 0,76 .. 0,09 .. .. 1,24
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,03 0,03 .. .. 0,16
Japan .. .. .. .. .. 0,46 .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,46
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,15 0,00 0,00 .. 1,49 1,65
Netherl. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,96 .. 1,96
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. 0,39 0,01 .. .. 0,39 0,07 0,87
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 .. .. .. .. 0,04 0,11
Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 2,39 4,52 0,02 0,28 7,24
Switz. .. .. .. .. 1,81 7,03 0,10 .. 1,32 1,17 0,80 12,23
UK .. .. .. .. .. 0,54 .. .. .. .. .. 0,54
US .. .. .. 0,88 .. 1,17 .. 17,36 27,57 4,33 9,03 60,33
EC .. .. .. .. 98,02 758,42 91,66 70,75 2,86 22,39 4,48 1048,58
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,16 0,16
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,18 0,00 0,88 107,12 786,67 120,34 103,48 41,95 41,23 52,74 1254,58
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Table 121: ex Yu unspecified
Multisector - OTHER
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,19 .. .. 0,01 .. 0,20
Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
France 0,04 .. 0,16 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,20
Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,25 4,77 .. 5,02
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. 4,28 8,23 9,62 22,16
Japan .. .. .. .. 0,08 .. 0,49 0,57 .. .. .. 1,14
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,00
Netherl. 0,84 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,84
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden 0,05 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05
Switz. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,37 0,56 .. 0,00 0,02 0,95
UK .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB SF. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,93 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,08 0,00 1,08 1,13 4,53 13,02 9,64 30,55
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Table 122: Albania
Humanitarian Aid HUMANITARIAN AID
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,01 1,04 0,05 21,01 0,03 0,01 0,23 0,36 0,47 0,39 23,59
Belgium 0,69 .. .. .. 4,11 1,36 .. .. .. .. .. 6,15
Canada .. .. 1,07 0,52 .. 0,65 .. 0,06 .. .. .. 2,30
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. 0,24 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,24
France 0,16 0,12 0,44 .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. .. 5,47 6,24
Germany 0,06 0,17 1,35 4,33 7,01 0,42 .. 0,54 .. 0,38 0,51 14,77
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,36 .. 0,06 .. 0,42
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. 0,01
Italy 1,74 .. 10,54 5,33 111,90 1,71 1,05 0,00 0,00 .. .. 132,28
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,04
Netherl. .. .. 0,36 .. 0,38 0,11 .. .. 0,67 0,46 .. 1,99
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway 1,24 0,83 2,10 .. 3,05 0,20 0,33 0,89 0,10 .. .. 8,73
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,13 0,22 15,47 .. .. .. .. .. 0,19 16,02
Sweden .. .. .. .. 3,69 .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,69
Switzerl. 0,38 0,02 0,35 1,12 22,38 1,55 0,64 0,79 0,04 0,05 0,04 27,37
UK 0,26 0,24 0,66 .. 45,00 9,69 .. .. 0,40 .. 0,06 56,30
US .. .. .. 0,04 .. 7,61 11,03 9,07 .. .. .. 27,75
EC 0,86 3,00 5,55 17,24 42,83 4,78 6,41 3,20 .. 3,26 .. 87,12
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,76 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,76
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 5,39 4,39 23,81 28,84 277,61 28,12 19,48 15,19 1,57 4,72 6,66 415,77
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Table 123: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Humanitarian Aid
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 4,35 1,95 0,07 1,09 2,28 0,52 0,77 .. .. 0,01 11,06
Belgium 0,97 2,38 0,92 0,54 .. 0,70 6,57 .. .. .. .. 12,08
Canada 1,42 0,97 12,12 4,64 0,69 4,73 5,41 0,05 0,73 .. .. 30,77
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. 3,92 0,12 0,94 1,38 1,12 1,63 1,55 .. 0,16 0,41 11,23
France .. 2,17 1,22 .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. 26,25 29,67
Germany 2,48 17,59 19,66 22,33 5,02 13,02 8,93 6,09 3,22 6,54 5,33 110,20
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,59 0,59
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,21 0,01 .. .. 0,21
Italy 18,56 12,76 5,66 3,09 0,27 0,09 0,16 0,43 .. .. .. 41,02
Japan .. 1,51 .. 0,91 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,42
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,43 0,03 .. .. .. 0,46
Netherl. 61,65 16,03 72,19 31,45 104,59 85,96 49,35 39,68 52,07 15,17 12,74 540,89
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. 37,09 0,02 10,79 1,16 3,75 2,25 0,24 0,27 .. 55,56
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,41 0,03 12,00 11,36 9,93 14,42 11,97 6,99 .. 67,11
Sweden 12,94 16,73 14,79 13,26 5,10 9,60 7,98 5,93 0,27 .. 0,69 87,30
Switzerl. 12,76 4,17 2,85 0,92 98,95 1,26 0,31 0,52 3,45 2,93 2,31 130,43
UK .. .. .. 0,23 .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. 0,28
US .. .. 31,76 14,72 29,78 .. 16,93 17,51 .. 0,05 0,02 110,77
EC 162,47 .. 229,63 45,59 39,87 9,00 1,21 0,20 .. 9,78 3,97 501,72
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. 20,20 21,08 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 41,28
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 273,27 102,78 451,46 138,73 309,54 140,28 113,13 89,64 71,98 41,93 52,31 1785,05
Page 131 of 179
Table 124: Croatia
Humanitarian Aid
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,01 .. 0,00 0,00 1,15 .. 0,67 .. .. 0,04 1,87
Belgium 0,29 .. 0,76 1,41 1,08 1,13 1,41 .. .. .. .. 6,06
Canada 0,02 0,11 0,49 0,86 .. .. 2,13 .. .. .. .. 3,60
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. 0,36 0,19 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,55
France .. 0,44 0,25 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,40 1,09
Germany 2,34 0,82 0,58 0,25 0,01 5,27 4,98 2,61 1,16 2,67 1,72 22,42
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy 2,93 1,61 0,89 0,03 0,02 0,01 .. .. 0,03 .. .. 5,51
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. 1,21 0,34 0,30 .. 6,37 0,45 .. .. .. .. 8,67
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. 9,86 .. 4,05 1,47 4,65 4,96 4,94 4,66 2,86 37,44
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden 0,85 1,01 0,60 0,42 0,10 0,17 .. .. .. .. .. 3,15
Switzerl. 3,99 3,02 0,30 0,25 0,02 1,15 2,30 0,83 1,14 0,00 .. 12,99
UK .. .. .. .. .. 2,05 .. 0,14 .. 1,36 .. 3,55
US .. .. 1,22 3,46 .. .. 10,91 8,69 2,59 .. 0,02 26,89
EC .. 0,29 26,91 10,37 3,65 0,77 .. .. .. 18,25 .. 60,24
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 10,41 8,51 42,55 17,53 8,93 19,54 26,82 17,89 9,87 26,94 5,04 194,03
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Table 125: Macedonia
Humanitarian Aid
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. .. .. .. 1,69 .. .. 0,15 .. .. 0,01 1,85
Belgium .. .. .. .. 1,50 0,59 .. .. .. .. .. 2,09
Canada .. .. .. 0,51 .. 0,56 13,04 1,09 .. .. .. 15,20
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. .. .. 0,15 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,15
France .. 0,00 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,26 .. 0,29
Germany 0,05 .. .. .. 7,36 0,24 3,78 6,79 .. 0,27 .. 18,49
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 0,05
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,37 0,42 .. .. .. 0,78
Italy .. .. .. .. 3,97 0,08 2,20 4,11 0,09 0,03 .. 10,49
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. .. .. .. .. 0,41 .. 14,25 9,98 0,10 .. .. 24,75
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. .. .. 2,74 .. 2,09 0,66 0,29 0,09 .. 5,87
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 .. .. 0,09
Spain .. .. .. .. 0,95 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,95
Sweden .. .. .. .. 0,36 .. 1,12 0,82 .. .. .. 2,31
Switzerl. .. 0,04 .. .. 2,23 1,04 0,82 0,78 0,08 .. .. 4,99
UK .. .. .. .. 30,40 4,82 9,78 .. .. 1,39 .. 46,40
US .. .. .. 0,98 .. 3,94 9,60 2,82 0,08 .. .. 17,43
EC .. .. 0,82 .. 31,97 2,01 7,72 6,49 6,65 .. .. 55,67
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. 61,87 .. .. .. .. .. .. 61,87
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 0,37 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,37
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,05 0,04 0,85 1,49 145,98 13,28 64,77 34,11 7,38 2,04 0,06 270,06
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Table 126: FRY/Serbia
Humanitarian Aid
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. 7,04 0,07 .. .. .. .. .. 7,11
Austria .. .. .. 3,65 8,56 8,56 1,38 .. .. 0,01 0,03 22,19
Belgium .. .. .. 0,15 2,34 3,93 0,55 0,69 1,08 .. .. 8,72
Canada 1,65 .. 0,23 2,60 50,05 .. 2,41 .. .. .. .. 56,95
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,13 9,60 .. .. .. 10,73
Finland .. .. 0,72 2,08 7,34 2,16 1,55 4,62 0,37 2,55 1,88 23,26
France .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. 0,19 0,21 0,14 47,68 48,22
Germany 8,93 .. .. 15,71 34,72 33,89 18,57 10,88 5,88 6,15 4,55 139,28
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,48 0,33 0,64 1,50 3,96
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 6,46 .. .. 0,02 .. 0,13 6,60
Italy 0,85 .. .. 3,57 24,66 33,61 0,61 3,24 4,00 .. .. 70,55
Japan .. .. .. .. .. 3,59 .. .. .. .. .. 3,59
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,49 0,20 .. .. .. 3,69
Netherl. .. .. 1,07 6,37 73,46 62,16 14,83 3,96 14,52 6,13 0,68 183,18
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. 8,67 .. 110,83 9,13 5,83 .. 2,29 1,53 5,21 143,48
Portugal .. .. .. .. 0,73 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,73
Spain .. .. .. 0,43 13,14 9,51 5,00 6,25 8,16 2,14 0,69 45,31
Sweden 0,04 0,13 0,72 9,22 26,64 19,08 6,80 0,74 0,97 .. 0,91 65,25
Switzerl. 2,01 1,57 1,70 8,10 74,39 37,28 17,47 7,39 14,69 9,29 0,61 174,49
UK .. .. 0,46 4,50 137,02 77,84 0,69 .. .. 1,28 .. 221,79
US .. .. .. 2,65 581,34 68,75 17,27 11,89 11,94 8,05 3,95 705,84
EC .. .. 26,38 14,72 .. 187,54 69,51 220,87 10,18 .. 24,39 553,59
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 13,48 1,70 39,95 73,73 1152,27 563,55 167,07 282,01 74,64 37,92 92,21 2498,53
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Table 127: ex Yu unspecified
Humanitarian Aid
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. 1,08 .. 0,10 0,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,20
Austria .. 0,08 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,09
Belgium 0,19 2,36 0,49 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,04
Canada 10,31 17,01 .. .. .. 17,54 2,74 0,77 .. .. .. 48,37
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 .. 0,08
Finland 5,35 1,30 0,96 .. 0,46 0,45 1,09 .. .. .. .. 9,61
France .. .. 0,11 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 2,47 2,60
Germany .. .. .. .. .. 20,48 .. .. .. .. .. 20,48
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,63 .. 3,63
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,36 .. .. .. .. 0,36
Italy .. 0,03 1,81 .. 0,52 9,09 2,38 .. .. 1,31 0,03 15,17
Japan .. .. .. 5,68 28,34 0,87 .. .. .. .. .. 34,89
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,25 0,08 .. .. 0,33
Netherl. 45,23 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,24 .. .. 45,48
New Zeal. 0,24 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,24
Norway 106,47 92,73 8,66 .. 8,57 .. .. 4,42 3,11 2,01 .. 225,96
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Sweden 15,37 11,22 5,58 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32,17
Switzerl. 2,50 1,80 0,49 .. 0,52 9,69 0,22 0,78 .. .. 0,00 16,02
UK 60,22 104,82 69,84 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 234,89
US .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
EC .. 242,01 .. 0,90 295,94 73,18 71,83 60,39 .. .. .. 744,25
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 245,88 474,46 87,95 6,68 334,36 131,31 78,62 66,62 3,43 7,05 2,52 1438,88
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Table 128: Albania ALL  ASSISTANCE  
ALL ASSISTANCE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. .. .. .. 0,03
Austria .. 3,23 2,73 6,54 23,66 7,91 2,29 2,52 3,30 6,94 7,31 66,44
Belgium 0,69 0,09 0,22 .. 4,11 1,37 .. .. 0,01 0,64 0,52 7,64
Canada 0,08 0,10 1,07 0,58 4,28 5,05 0,14 0,08 0,06 0,48 .. 11,92
Denmark 7,26 .. .. .. 19,88 .. 0,09 1,02 .. 0,06 .. 28,30
Finland 0,12 0,13 0,48 0,02 0,02 0,46 2,83 0,61 0,70 1,70 1,16 8,24
France 1,30 1,25 1,45 1,03 2,17 8,99 3,16 3,00 3,35 4,27 15,36 45,34
Germany 31,13 37,91 27,77 26,83 56,44 51,71 23,20 30,13 35,82 67,26 52,57 440,79
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22,44 102,20 24,41 25,35 174,39
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,20 0,50 0,68 0,73 2,15
Italy 41,15 28,68 27,27 39,10 182,67 85,66 30,69 62,29 73,69 40,55 26,89 638,65
Japan 12,98 26,59 .. .. 10,24 3,17 6,16 3,32 1,93 4,44 0,93 69,76
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,48 .. 1,03 0,07 7,58
Netherl. 8,58 3,80 8,16 1,65 0,38 14,31 14,68 3,52 6,06 10,39 1,48 73,03
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway 1,27 0,86 2,17 3,99 11,51 19,53 3,46 19,57 7,02 9,84 7,12 86,35
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Spain .. .. 0,33 1,62 17,05 2,65 2,47 2,08 2,23 1,76 2,55 32,75
Sweden 0,03 1,41 0,58 0,42 5,04 1,62 9,13 6,10 1,33 5,54 20,45 51,66
Switzerl. 0,39 0,03 1,01 5,52 32,58 16,81 7,51 5,98 3,68 7,84 8,06 89,40
UK 2,45 0,61 1,37 5,25 45,35 14,55 14,57 4,60 4,67 1,91 3,68 99,01
US 37,92 .. .. 33,90 78,37 78,42 59,75 53,48 48,22 42,30 42,41 474,78
EC 13,89 45,76 81,34 83,68 120,98 47,12 58,10 70,76 63,41 109,19 60,51 754,74
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA 39,54 72,13 37,20 68,31 171,58 69,66 26,89 113,76 69,69 52,40 52,66 773,82
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. 16,91 .. .. .. .. .. 8,18 25,09
UNDP .. .. .. .. 3,19 .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,19
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 1,55 0,77 0,92 1,21 1,15 1,59 7,19
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,08 0,15
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,61 0,48 0,39 .. .. 1,48
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 198,76 222,61 193,16 278,46 806,41 430,57 266,54 413,34 429,49 394,85 339,65 3973,85
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Table 129: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
ALL ASSISTANCE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. 0,02
Austria .. 105,22 54,19 50,78 35,67 184,09 15,10 10,92 13,83 16,91 22,06 508,77
Belgium 0,97 2,97 5,64 5,19 7,78 1,97 9,38 2,73 0,79 1,10 1,70 40,22
Canada 6,94 20,99 27,82 23,16 15,56 15,83 22,39 5,85 2,16 38,21 16,16 195,06
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,02
Finland .. 13,49 12,54 6,09 6,54 4,42 10,75 6,50 7,55 6,15 2,63 76,67
France 2,21 2,69 5,08 10,35 153,31 28,06 2,78 2,17 1,79 3,19 54,86 266,50
Germany 2,76 17,72 19,90 22,58 50,32 141,57 40,14 36,03 28,03 54,52 25,17 438,73
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,72 6,51 7,73 1,32 24,28
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 3,43 2,42 1,13 1,25 0,79 1,51 10,52
Italy 28,13 86,83 9,47 11,34 10,25 54,19 7,75 8,40 7,60 10,56 5,04 239,55
Japan .. 20,92 89,52 49,57 16,26 7,56 15,88 14,61 24,25 22,11 11,55 272,23
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,43 0,03 .. 0,39 .. 0,85
Netherl. 61,65 54,96 104,71 95,53 110,08 98,89 66,92 46,87 125,70 23,01 46,25 834,57
New Zeal. 0,04 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04
Norway 4,89 .. 44,46 84,08 58,21 25,73 22,13 28,25 25,54 18,96 18,06 330,32
Portugal .. .. .. 1,44 0,84 1,50 1,45 5,47 0,12 49,85 9,85 70,52
Spain .. .. 9,35 48,10 47,50 47,97 43,11 46,66 41,60 23,38 6,41 314,09
Sweden 13,28 29,21 25,70 48,24 17,16 31,74 29,63 37,00 22,73 40,31 67,75 362,76
Switzerl. 13,12 4,27 6,00 12,39 146,06 28,85 14,76 11,79 7,83 18,79 21,29 285,15
UK .. 5,36 0,97 3,46 19,60 8,66 10,36 5,64 9,27 3,73 4,26 71,31
US 16,00 .. 31,76 269,74 351,30 122,22 131,02 77,85 80,68 55,58 35,51 1171,65
EC 162,47 0,16 335,53 109,57 220,24 144,47 157,73 156,59 124,29 111,90 75,13 1598,08
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. 202,66 95,48 125,93 201,71 52,99 163,20 132,61 25,99 122,62 37,83 1161,03
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. 8,46 17,36 .. .. .. 16,21 .. .. .. .. 42,03
UNDP .. .. .. .. 6,63 .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,63
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 1,22 0,79 0,70 1,32 1,29 1,39 6,72
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 .. 0,08 0,08 0,22
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,08 0,07 0,38 .. .. 0,54
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 312,46 575,92 895,51 977,55 1475,02 1005,35 784,43 646,65 559,20 631,17 465,83 8329,08
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Table 130: Croatia 
ALL ASSISTANCE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,07 0,17 0,17 0,03 0,00 0,45
Austria .. 6,73 8,89 6,86 6,47 7,33 5,37 4,74 4,32 5,43 6,12 62,24
Belgium 0,29 .. 1,64 1,41 1,25 1,15 1,62 0,78 0,20 0,13 0,02 8,47
Canada 1,02 0,42 0,59 1,11 0,73 1,30 2,53 1,73 0,15 0,25 0,51 10,35
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Finland .. .. 0,36 0,19 0,08 0,53 0,71 0,18 0,08 0,17 0,10 2,40
France 2,27 2,07 2,69 1,01 1,16 1,71 1,99 2,56 2,14 3,01 2,79 23,41
Germany 2,44 86,69 0,60 0,28 10,42 21,43 12,62 12,75 65,00 16,35 9,21 237,79
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,31 0,09 0,28 0,71
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Italy 3,04 7,76 1,75 1,82 0,36 1,95 2,19 1,99 3,94 8,60 0,40 33,80
Japan .. .. .. 0,53 0,44 0,46 0,73 0,41 1,28 0,91 1,18 5,94
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Netherl. 0,19 1,34 1,12 0,43 0,56 7,73 5,54 0,07 6,06 1,83 0,33 25,21
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway 0,40 .. 10,11 25,15 6,84 7,87 20,27 22,58 17,60 18,29 16,84 145,95
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 0,15 .. 0,01 0,05 0,26
Spain .. .. 0,71 2,00 0,45 0,47 0,94 0,97 0,59 0,62 0,36 7,11
Sweden 0,91 1,43 1,24 3,13 1,03 4,79 5,59 4,97 5,60 5,35 9,59 43,62
Switzerl. 4,11 3,26 0,44 0,25 0,73 2,92 3,41 1,25 1,43 0,47 0,11 18,39
UK .. 0,35 0,56 1,63 1,31 5,30 2,37 2,04 0,04 2,01 0,04 15,64
US 21,95 .. 1,22 20,69 24,14 33,84 54,40 64,62 34,78 29,03 29,18 313,86
EC .. 0,29 26,91 10,37 4,11 33,38 79,77 189,03 82,88 108,39 131,66 666,78
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,00 .. .. 8,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. 1,43 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,43
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,23 .. .. 0,21 0,23 0,24 0,92
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 0,05 0,10
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,84 .. .. 3,84
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total 36,62 110,33 58,82 76,85 61,50 132,39 200,16 311,02 238,63 201,26 209,09 1636,68
Table 131: Macedonia
ALL ASSISTANCE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Austria .. 0,27 0,24 1,76 8,06 1,71 3,17 2,59 4,16 4,39 7,03 33,36
Belgium .. .. 0,37 0,74 2,04 0,59 .. 0,12 .. 0,59 0,47 4,91
Canada .. .. 0,08 1,57 0,03 2,42 13,12 1,62 0,14 .. .. 18,98
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. 5,43 .. .. 5,48
Finland .. 0,25 .. .. 0,15 .. .. 1,95 0,04 0,87 0,02 3,28
France 0,79 0,89 0,87 0,64 0,55 1,16 1,75 1,54 0,69 3,55 1,78 14,20
Germany 6,99 0,02 20,32 2,54 17,44 56,50 15,60 32,55 20,81 34,04 9,28 216,10
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 71,21 2,32 1,92 3,85 79,30
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 0,50 0,37 0,48 0,04 0,20 0,01 1,61
Italy 0,02 0,07 0,02 0,94 23,74 1,01 7,48 9,67 5,29 6,61 1,09 55,94
Japan 8,11 .. 8,44 12,71 18,02 0,20 19,37 4,83 83,43 9,99 4,16 169,25
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,26 0,26
Netherl. 7,88 .. 25,33 13,84 17,28 56,80 69,79 23,56 57,93 23,27 25,96 321,64
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway 0,01 .. 0,01 1,86 10,96 1,35 9,80 14,40 15,63 15,54 13,65 83,19
Portugal .. .. .. .. 0,74 23,12 4,10 0,07 1,52 .. 0,06 29,62
Spain .. .. .. 0,07 0,96 0,01 0,04 10,82 1,33 9,87 0,06 23,15
Sweden 0,13 0,26 0,08 0,46 0,99 1,17 7,03 8,47 1,53 16,50 10,24 46,87
Switzerl. .. 0,04 2,30 0,68 9,19 22,89 3,60 4,19 14,26 6,08 8,06 71,28
UK 0,93 1,13 0,36 2,26 33,42 8,75 11,01 7,24 5,93 1,39 .. 72,41
US 17,10 .. .. 19,68 90,45 69,19 44,14 78,49 65,07 44,57 42,53 471,22
EC 0,75 16,18 46,80 36,70 134,10 32,59 86,68 58,39 59,04 81,25 52,07 604,55
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA 108,72 28,62 49,60 37,78 74,25 37,73 48,10 26,00 .. .. .. 410,80
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. 9,40 .. .. .. 10,36 .. .. .. .. .. 19,76
UNDP .. .. .. .. 1,21 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,21
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,68 1,03 0,81 1,03 1,20 1,57 6,32
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 0,05 .. 0,08 0,20
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,56 .. 4,56
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total 151,42 57,11 154,82 134,22 443,56 328,75 346,21 359,06 345,68 266,39 182,22 2769,43
Table 132: FRY/Serbia
ALL ASSISTANCE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. .. .. .. 67,80 9,26 0,73 .. 0,16 0,27 0,15 78,36
Austria .. 0,04 9,16 18,40 55,34 44,82 36,15 122,54 22,11 29,74 35,01 373,30
Belgium 0,10 0,05 0,10 0,16 4,53 10,39 7,54 75,41 4,79 0,99 1,59 105,65
Canada 1,65 0,71 0,41 2,97 57,46 42,40 33,69 4,17 15,05 8,47 0,67 167,66
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 20,97 52,32 .. .. .. 73,29
Finland .. .. 0,72 2,38 8,73 18,30 20,69 22,40 10,96 11,52 1,96 97,65
France .. 1,35 .. 1,50 3,62 10,29 14,82 142,60 240,50 6,85 112,37 533,90
Germany 23,72 12,62 5,32 22,76 145,12 154,78 189,14 729,89 98,93 132,42 123,75 1638,46
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,15 72,57 13,26 51,00 144,99
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. 8,72 2,59 1,06 2,33 1,64 2,44 18,78
Italy 1,73 2,24 0,02 5,92 64,47 34,36 6,40 17,51 25,65 .. 42,84 201,14
Japan .. .. .. .. .. 4,05 .. 6,11 18,61 2,26 120,03 151,07
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,63 5,60 18,07 7,43 6,36 44,09
Netherl. .. .. 5,50 8,71 95,13 124,20 68,30 27,14 37,54 25,79 5,93 398,23
New Zeal. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Norway .. .. 8,67 19,49 184,08 54,84 50,55 1,76 59,45 45,61 54,44 478,88
Portugal .. .. .. .. 0,83 0,76 0,04 0,01 1,31 0,23 7,76 10,93
Spain .. .. 0,09 0,62 58,26 49,40 42,37 38,26 49,97 13,68 4,05 256,72
Sweden 0,04 0,68 0,95 10,23 34,20 48,15 44,97 27,66 39,64 20,70 47,83 275,06
Switzerl. 2,41 2,28 2,07 9,26 81,03 115,00 55,56 28,53 27,63 56,38 45,24 425,38
UK .. 0,24 0,92 17,61 182,85 126,17 19,75 637,50 19,92 8,38 98,77 1112,11
US .. .. .. 14,38 666,22 384,43 346,76 555,24 227,92 202,45 141,62 2539,03
EC .. .. 26,38 14,72 167,13 1074,48 464,74 619,70 473,24 500,86 401,65 3742,91
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 278,56 233,92 189,70 149,03 851,22
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 0,23 1,03 3,66 2,92 2,67 10,61
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 .. 0,23 0,29
UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,12 0,35 1,66 .. .. 2,12
Page 142 of 179
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,11 2,55 .. 5,65
total 29,66 20,21 60,30 149,13 1876,81 2314,87 1432,74 3403,51 1708,77 1284,11 1457,38 13737,49
Table 133: ex Yu unspecified
ALL ASSISTANCE
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Australia .. 1,33 0,00 0,10 0,09 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,52
Austria .. 9,97 .. .. .. .. 0,14 0,31 0,65 0,52 0,04 11,63
Belgium 0,64 2,47 0,49 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,60
Canada 10,32 17,01 .. .. .. 26,15 5,26 0,81 .. .. .. 59,55
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,19 .. .. 0,09 .. 0,28
Finland 5,35 1,56 1,08 .. 0,46 3,30 1,09 0,83 0,70 0,89 1,05 16,31
France 1,95 .. 1,60 .. .. 2,82 5,13 .. 0,52 0,47 5,64 18,14
Germany .. .. .. .. .. 23,49 .. .. 35,96 4,77 .. 64,21
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01 0,00 31,16 .. 31,17
Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,82 .. .. .. .. 0,82
Italy .. 0,77 2,21 .. 0,55 9,45 12,89 1,18 6,69 22,37 17,72 73,84
Japan .. .. .. 5,68 28,42 0,87 12,58 15,71 0,95 0,15 0,24 64,59
Luxemb. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,25 0,31 0,98 1,51 3,05
Netherl. 59,50 6,77 .. .. .. .. .. .. 16,57 .. .. 82,85
New Zeal. 0,24 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,24
Norway 109,36 95,55 10,57 20,52 28,46 13,21 .. 64,48 17,74 17,14 .. 377,02
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,80 0,80 1,59
Spain .. .. .. .. 0,63 0,03 0,01 60,35 0,43 0,03 .. 61,48
Sweden 17,28 13,38 10,24 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 40,90
Switzerl. 2,50 1,80 0,49 .. 0,52 13,02 14,33 8,91 .. 0,00 0,02 41,61
UK 60,22 104,82 69,84 .. .. 17,53 .. 0,74 .. .. .. 253,16
US .. .. .. .. 23,28 .. .. .. .. .. .. 23,28
EC .. 242,01 .. 0,90 303,18 73,18 71,83 203,09 .. .. .. 894,19
IBRD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IDB Sp.F. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
IFAD .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNDP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
UNICEF .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,63 0,63
UNAIDS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
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UNFPA .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
GFATM .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 267,37 497,45 96,53 27,20 385,60 183,06 124,26 356,67 80,51 79,35 27,65 2125,65
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TOP FIVE DONORS TO THE WESTERN BALKANS
Table 134: EC to WESTERN BALKANS
Social Infrastructure & Services EUROPEAN COMMISSION
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 13,03 0,00 29,82 23,88 24,69 6,46 5,07 3,98 52,26 66,53 52,18 277,90
BiH 0,00 0,00 38,48 12,18 33,22 44,58 19,94 33,69 96,71 87,87 71,16 437,84
Cro 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,30 7,95 0,70 4,06 66,14 76,20 83,63 238,99
Mac 0,00 0,00 14,83 14,60 10,27 6,45 1,99 4,61 45,20 60,62 39,27 197,85
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 67,49 47,02 103,57 129,82 255,46 285,76 199,31 1088,43
ex Yu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0
total 13,03 0,00 83,13 50,66 135,99 112,45 131,27 176,16 515,77 576,99 445,55 2241,00
Table 135: EC to ALBANIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,59 3,50 5,87 1,28 13,24
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9,82 .. 9,82
13,03 .. 29,82 23,88 23,83 6,46 5,07 1,39 48,73 50,84 49,62 252,66
other .. .. .. .. 0,87 .. .. .. 0,03 .. 1,28 2,17
total 13,03 0,00 29,82 23,88 24,69 6,46 5,07 3,98 52,26 66,53 52,18 277,90
Table 136: EC to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,24 3,19 6,00 3,07 15,50
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. 38,48 .. 4,34 .. .. .. 8,77 .. .. 51,60
.. .. .. 8,53 4,02 31,73 19,94 30,45 58,82 81,88 68,09 303,46
other .. .. .. 3,65 24,86 12,85 .. .. 25,92 .. .. 67,28
govt. & civ. soc
govt. & civ. soc.
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total 0,00 0,00 38,48 12,18 33,22 44,58 19,94 33,69 96,71 87,87 71,16 437,84
Table 137: EC to CROATIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. 2,28 .. 4,06 11,81 9,13 6,40 33,67
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15,73 15,73
.. .. .. .. 0,30 5,66 0,70 .. 34,33 67,08 61,50 169,57
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 20,01 .. .. 20,01
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,30 7,95 0,70 4,06 66,14 76,20 83,63 238,99
Table 138:EC to MACEDONIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,92 9,71 7,17 3,84 24,63
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,33 .. .. 1,33
.. .. 14,83 14,60 10,27 6,45 1,99 0,69 22,20 53,45 25,58 150,07
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11,97 .. 9,85 21,81
total 0,00 0,00 14,83 14,60 10,27 6,45 1,99 4,61 45,20 60,62 39,27 197,85
Table 139: EC to FRY/Serbia
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,12 21,02 24,59 12,39 15,35 75,47
health .. .. .. .. 1,45 14,27 .. 6,79 12,63 30,51 10,87 76,51
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. 9,99 .. 6,79 14,23 18,25 3,84 53,09
.. .. .. .. 18,60 22,77 38,34 95,22 174,39 211,58 167,85 728,75
other .. .. .. .. 47,44 .. 63,10 .. 29,62 13,04 1,41 154,61
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc
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total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 67,49 47,02 103,57 129,82 255,46 285,76 199,31 1088,43
Table 140: EC to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00
Table 141: EC to WESTERN BALKANS
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb .. .. .. 0,00 4,34 0,30 0,00 0,00 0,01 9,78 4,48 18,90
BiH .. .. 67,43 21,91 0,00 0,30 0,00 0,00 1,46 12,39 0,00 103,48
Cro .. .. .. .. 0,00 3,34 0,00 108,64 8,23 0,00 15,73 135,94
Mac .. .. .. .. 13,59 0,30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,56 16,45
FRY/Ser .. .. .. .. 0,72 57,68 199,90 96,42 136,27 109,57 104,88 705,43
ex Yu .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,00 0,00 142,59 0,00 0,00 0,00 142,59
total 0,00 0,00 67,43 21,91 18,65 61,92 199,90 347,64 145,97 131,73 127,65 1122,79
Table 142: EC to ALBANIA
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. 4,34 .. .. .. .. 9,78 4,48 18,60
comm. .. .. .. .. .. 0,30 .. .. 0,01 .. .. 0,31
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
govt. & civ. soc.
banking & fin. services
business & other services
transport & storage
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total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,34 0,30 0,00 0,00 0,01 9,78 4,48 18,90
Table 143: EC to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. 51,85 21,91 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 73,76
comm. .. .. .. .. .. 0,30 .. .. 1,33 .. .. 1,63
energy .. .. 15,57 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15,57
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,13 .. .. 0,13
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12,39 .. 12,39
total 0,00 0,00 67,43 21,91 0,00 0,30 0,00 0,00 1,46 12,39 0,00 103,48
Table 144: EC to CROATIA
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 108,64 .. .. 15,73 124,37
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,06 .. .. 0,06
.. .. .. .. .. 3,34 .. .. 8,18 .. .. 11,52
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,34 0,00 108,64 8,23 0,00 15,73 135,94
Table 145: EC to MACEDONIA
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. 13,59 .. .. .. .. .. 1,28 14,87
comm. .. .. .. .. .. 0,30 .. .. .. .. 1,28 1,58
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
transport & storage
transport & storage
transport & storage
banking & fin. services
business & other services
banking & fin. services
business & other services
banking & fin. services
business & other services
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total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 13,59 0,30 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,56 16,45
Table 146: EC to FRY/Serbia
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,15 5,98 24,12 23,02 61,27
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7,98 .. 3,20 11,17
energy .. .. .. .. 0,72 22,00 .. 74,69 113,00 67,79 61,40 339,61
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7,52 .. 7,52
.. .. .. .. .. 35,67 199,90 13,58 9,31 10,13 17,27 285,86
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,72 57,68 199,90 96,42 136,27 109,57 104,88 705,43
Table 147: EC to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 115,43 .. .. .. 115,43
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27,16 .. .. .. 27,16
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 142,59 0,00 0,00 0,00 142,59
Table 148: EC to WESTERN BALKANS
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0,00 42,77 45,14 35,14 40,96 31,96 45,98 59,72 0,63 8,76 3,84 314,89
BiH 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,54 141,36 86,20 129,08 81,26 4,65 1,83 0,00 445,08
Cro 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,15 18,32 79,07 76,11 8,38 7,74 31,91 221,68
Mac 0,75 16,18 31,14 18,98 40,30 23,12 76,89 46,85 1,60 10,86 7,00 273,66
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 98,02 758,42 91,77 70,75 27,46 25,65 20,49 1092,55
business & other ser.
banking and fin. services
business & other services
transport & storage
banking and fin. ser.
transport & storage
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ex Yu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,75 59,10 76,28 54,66 320,79 918,02 422,80 334,70 42,72 54,83 63,23 2347,87
Table 149: EC to ALBANIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. 1,71 .. .. .. 4,59 3,84 10,14
other .. 42,77 45,14 35,14 40,96 30,25 45,98 59,72 0,63 4,17 .. 304,76
total 0,00 42,77 45,14 35,14 40,96 31,96 45,98 59,72 0,63 8,76 3,84 314,89
Table 150: EC to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. 0,54 0,25 .. .. .. 4,65 1,83 .. 7,26
other .. 0,16 .. .. 141,11 86,20 129,08 81,26 .. .. .. 437,82
total 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,54 141,36 86,20 129,08 81,26 4,65 1,83 0,00 445,08
Table 151: EC to CROATIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 0,07 5,05 5,14 0,04 10,34
other .. .. .. .. 0,15 18,32 79,02 76,05 3,32 2,61 31,87 211,34
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,15 18,32 79,07 76,11 8,38 7,74 31,91 221,68
Table 152: EC to MACEDONIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
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GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,63 3,93 6,55
other 0,75 16,18 31,14 18,98 40,30 23,12 76,89 46,85 1,60 8,23 3,07 267,10
total 0,75 16,18 31,14 18,98 40,30 23,12 76,89 46,85 1,60 10,86 7,00 273,66
Table 153: EC to FRY/Serbia
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 .. 24,59 3,26 16,01 43,97
other .. .. .. .. 98,02 758,42 91,66 70,75 2,86 22,39 4,48 1048,58
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 98,02 758,42 91,77 70,75 27,46 25,65 20,49 1092,55
Table 154: EC to EX YU INSPECIFIED
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00
Table 155: GERMANY to WESTERN BALKANS
Social Infrastructure & Services GERMANY
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 12,41 2,06 26,33 15,57 10,58 42,92 20,73 19,79 27,06 15,47 19,67 212,59
BiH 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 9,51 14,74 11,97 20,99 15,25 39,97 3,30 115,72
Cro 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 9,97 12,27 7,43 7,85 59,03 10,39 5,08 112,02
Mac 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,19 3,88 21,54 10,71 20,15 6,00 22,97 4,74 90,18
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 26,31 54,51 54,57 61,38 54,66 56,53 23,60 331,55
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ex Yu 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 18,95 0,00 0,00 18,95
total 12,41 2,06 26,33 15,76 60,25 145,97 105,41 130,16 180,95 145,32 56,38 881,00
Table 156: GERMANY to ALBANIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. 0,43 .. 2,74 3,58 3,58 3,99 5,04 5,26 0,89 25,51
health .. .. .. .. 5,53 .. .. 0,20 .. .. 0,22 5,94
population 3,45 2,06 .. .. .. 1,37 .. .. .. .. .. 6,87
watsan 8,97 .. 25,89 15,57 0,07 32,70 15,85 11,97 20,05 7,04 16,01 154,12
.. .. .. .. 1,97 1,58 1,02 2,00 0,54 1,14 2,08 10,32
other .. .. .. .. 0,28 3,69 0,28 1,63 1,44 2,03 0,47 9,81
total 12,41 2,06 26,33 15,57 10,58 42,92 20,73 19,79 27,06 15,47 19,67 212,59
Table 157: GERMANY to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. 8,57 8,58 8,95 8,65 9,39 10,34 0,40 54,86
health .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,05 0,01 .. .. .. 0,09
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,99 .. 17,80 0,00 22,79
.. .. .. .. 0,06 5,90 2,96 7,03 4,63 5,40 1,95 27,93
other .. .. .. .. 0,89 0,23 0,01 0,31 1,24 6,43 0,95 10,06
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 9,51 14,74 11,97 20,99 15,25 39,97 3,30 115,72
Table 158: GERMANY to CROATIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
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education .. .. .. .. 8,72 6,65 5,84 6,22 6,51 6,40 1,42 41,75
health .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. 0,02
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 49,50 .. 1,12 50,62
.. .. .. .. 0,47 5,49 1,57 1,63 1,85 1,76 1,50 14,27
other .. .. .. .. 0,78 0,12 0,00 0,00 1,18 2,24 1,04 5,36
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 9,97 12,27 7,43 7,85 59,03 10,39 5,08 112,02
Table 159: GERMANY to MACEDONIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. 0,19 2,29 4,28 2,36 2,59 4,15 2,87 0,11 18,86
health .. .. .. .. 0,18 0,63 .. 0,11 0,64 .. .. 1,56
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. 0,38 14,34 6,75 14,84 0,66 11,70 .. 48,67
.. .. .. .. 0,69 1,37 1,61 2,61 0,36 0,87 4,26 11,76
other .. .. .. .. 0,33 0,92 .. .. 0,19 7,52 0,37 9,34
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,19 3,88 21,54 10,71 20,15 6,00 22,97 4,74 90,18
Table 160: GERMANY to FRY/SERBIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. 17,86 12,68 17,25 16,10 13,59 16,14 2,84 96,46
health .. .. .. .. 0,68 1,20 1,62 1,16 .. 0,57 .. 5,23
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. 6,31 33,76 16,84 11,72 4,56 19,45 13,31 105,94
.. .. .. .. 0,71 6,07 13,95 32,40 33,87 15,47 6,18 108,64
other .. .. .. .. 0,76 0,81 4,91 0,00 2,64 4,89 1,27 15,28
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 26,31 54,51 54,57 61,38 54,66 56,53 23,60 331,55
Table 161: GERMANY to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
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education .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9,31 .. .. 9,31
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9,65 .. .. 9,65
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 18,95 0,00 0,00 18,95
Table 162: GERMANY to WESTERN BALKANS
Ecoomic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 8,28 32,94 .. 6,80 27,13 0,00 1,48 3,36 0,00 49,98 20,51 150,49
BiH 0,00 0,00 .. .. 6,21 5,73 16,39 7,98 8,01 6,70 2,22 53,25
Cro 0,00 .. .. .. 0,10 3,04 0,00 0,64 0,00 2,41 0,47 6,66
Mac 6,90 .. .. .. 0,02 3,73 0,08 2,30 4,30 0,54 0,92 18,79
FRY/Ser .. .. .. .. 1,62 16,12 111,52 42,31 24,94 15,76 57,58 269,86
ex Yu .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 0,37
total 15,17 32,94 0,00 6,80 35,08 28,62 129,48 56,60 37,63 75,40 81,70 499,42
Table 163: GERMANY to ALBANIA
Ecoomic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. 32,94 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32,94
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. 0,08 0,08 0,19
energy .. .. .. .. 23,73 .. .. 3,33 .. 49,05 16,78 92,89
4,83 .. .. 6,80 .. .. .. .. .. 0,09 3,55 15,27
3,45 .. .. .. 3,39 .. 1,48 .. .. 0,76 0,11 9,19
total 8,28 32,94 0,00 6,80 27,13 0,00 1,48 3,36 0,00 49,98 20,51 150,49
Table 164: GERMANY to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Ecoomic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
banking & fin. services
business & other services
govt. & civ. soc.
transport & storage
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.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
comm. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. 0,01 .. .. .. 0,01
energy .. .. .. .. 0,10 .. 2,70 .. .. 6,50 .. 9,30
.. .. .. .. 1,36 1,88 13,49 7,32 5,10 .. .. 29,15
.. .. .. .. 4,75 3,86 0,20 0,65 2,91 0,20 2,22 14,78
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 6,21 5,73 16,39 7,98 8,01 6,70 2,22 53,25
Table 165: GERMANY to CROATIA
Ecoomic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
comm. .. .. .. .. .. 0,07 .. .. .. .. .. 0,07
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,12 0,13 0,26
.. .. .. .. 0,10 2,97 .. 0,64 .. 2,29 0,34 6,34
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10 3,04 0,00 0,64 0,00 2,41 0,47 6,66
Table 166: GERMANY to MACEDONIA
Ecoomic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,31 .. 0,31
comm. .. .. .. .. .. 1,02 .. .. .. 0,06 0,11 1,20
energy .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 0,08 0,07 .. .. .. 0,19
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,93 0,06 0,02 2,01
6,90 .. .. .. 0,02 2,67 .. 2,23 2,37 0,11 0,78 15,08
total 6,90 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 3,73 0,08 2,30 4,30 0,54 0,92 18,79
Table 167: GERMANY to FRY/SERBIA
Ecoomic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
transport & storage
banking & fin. services
business & other services
business & other services
transport & storage
banking & fin. service
business & other services
transport & storage
banking & fin. services
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. 0,71 1,14 7,35 0,65 2,59 .. .. 12,44
comm. .. .. .. .. .. 0,26 .. 0,18 .. 0,08 0,09 0,61
energy .. .. .. .. 0,23 12,99 85,67 28,76 .. 5,30 40,46 173,42
.. .. .. .. 0,68 0,03 14,50 5,88 19,00 1,13 13,50 54,73
.. .. .. .. .. 1,71 3,99 6,84 3,35 9,25 3,53 28,67
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,62 16,12 111,52 42,31 24,94 15,76 57,58 269,86
Table 168: GERMANY to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Ecoomic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,37 .. .. 0,37
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,00 0,37
Table 169: GERMANY to WESTERN BALKANS
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 6,90 .. .. .. 4,16 5,14 0,55 4,74 6,39 1,03 11,45 40,35
BiH .. .. .. .. 11,97 0,46 1,90 0,65 0,52 1,12 14,15 30,77
Cro .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,02 0,00 1,62 2,33 0,85 1,15 6,08
Mac .. .. .. .. 4,48 17,87 0,07 1,79 8,93 0,65 3,43 37,21
FRY/Ser .. .. .. .. 6,09 15,74 2,48 12,63 4,71 10,13 33,80 85,58
ex Yu .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,65 4,77 0,00 6,42
business & other ser.
banking & fin. services
business & other services
transport & storage
banking and fin. ser.
transport & storage
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total 6,90 0,00 0,00 0,00 26,81 39,24 5,00 21,42 24,53 18,54 63,98 206,41
Table 170: GERMANY to ALBANIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. .. 0,05 .. .. .. 0,10
other 6,90 .. .. .. 4,10 5,14 0,55 4,69 6,39 1,03 11,45 40,25
total 6,90 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,16 5,14 0,55 4,74 6,39 1,03 11,45 40,35
Table 171: GERMANY to BOSNIA AND HEREGOVINA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. 11,97 0,46 1,90 0,65 0,52 1,12 14,15 30,77
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 11,97 0,46 1,90 0,65 0,52 1,12 14,15 30,77
Table 172: GERMANY to CROATIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,11
other .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,02 .. 1,62 2,33 0,85 1,04 5,97
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,11 0,02 0,00 1,62 2,33 0,85 1,15 6,08
Table 173: GERMANY to MACEDONIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. 0,92 1,16 .. .. .. 0,03 .. 2,11
other .. .. .. .. 3,56 16,71 0,07 1,79 8,93 0,62 3,43 35,10
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total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,48 17,87 0,07 1,79 8,93 0,65 3,43 37,21
Table 174: GERMANY to FRY/SERBIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,09 0,13
other .. .. .. .. 6,09 15,74 2,48 12,63 4,71 10,10 33,70 85,45
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 6,09 15,74 2,48 12,63 4,71 10,13 33,80 85,58
Table 175: GERMANY to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,40 .. .. 1,40
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,25 4,77 .. 5,02
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,65 4,77 0,00 6,42
Table 176: UNITED STATES to WESTERN BALKANS
Social Infrastructure & Services UNITED STATES
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 7,49 .. .. 8,28 32,34 38,06 30,28 21,17 21,18 20,12 21,32 200,25
BiH 0,00 .. .. 17,87 38,94 28,91 80,17 41,47 40,42 32,05 26,33 306,15
Cro 9,42 .. .. 0,00 5,00 9,19 5,38 2,78 38,60 69,01 61,53 200,91
Mac 4,95 .. .. 4,57 11,88 20,88 24,20 40,39 35,28 25,85 25,08 193,08
FRY/Ser .. ... .. 7,25 9,24 54,24 227,39 159,88 135,73 160,10 87,23 841,06
ex Yu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 21,86 0,00 0,00 37,97 97,40 151,29 367,42 265,68 271,22 307,13 221,49 1741,46
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Table 177: UNITED STATES to ALBANIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. 0,48 3,06 2,52 2,58 .. .. 0,02 .. 8,66
health .. .. .. 1,46 0,89 0,03 2,87 3,37 3,29 2,00 2,42 16,35
population .. .. .. 1,21 0,89 0,08 1,82 .. 2,09 2,11 0,58 8,79
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,28 0,56 .. .. .. 0,84
4,59 .. .. 5,13 27,50 35,42 22,70 17,22 15,52 15,98 17,97 162,03
other 2,90 .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,02 0,28 0,00 0,35 3,58
total 7,49 0,00 0,00 8,28 32,34 38,06 30,28 21,17 21,18 20,12 21,32 200,25
Table 178: UNITED STATES to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,77 .. .. .. .. 0,77
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,55 .. .. 0,55
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. 0,39 .. 14,80 .. .. .. .. 15,19
.. .. .. 17,87 38,55 28,91 64,58 41,44 36,37 30,00 26,25 283,97
other .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,03 3,51 2,05 0,08 5,68
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 17,87 38,94 28,91 80,17 41,47 40,42 32,05 26,33 306,15
Table 179: UNITED STATES to CROATIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. 3,19 3,53 2,53 .. .. .. .. 9,26
health .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,34 0,07 .. .. .. 0,41
population 9,42 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,04 .. .. .. 9,47
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,79 .. 0,01 .. .. 0,79
.. .. .. .. 0,30 5,66 0,70 .. 34,33 67,08 61,50 169,57
other .. .. .. .. 1,50 .. 1,02 2,66 4,27 1,93 0,03 11,42
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
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total 9,42 0,00 0,00 0,00 5,00 9,19 5,38 2,78 38,60 69,01 61,53 200,91
Table 180: UNITED STATES to MACEDONIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. 3,49 4,56 7,33 .. .. .. .. 15,39
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,13 0,07 .. .. 0,20
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,11 0,08 0,19
watsan .. .. .. .. .. 0,47 0,16 .. .. .. .. 0,63
4,95 .. .. 4,57 5,75 15,85 16,06 33,38 26,62 25,15 17,44 149,77
other .. .. .. .. 2,64 .. 0,64 6,88 8,60 0,59 7,56 26,91
total 4,95 0,00 0,00 4,57 11,88 20,88 24,20 40,39 35,28 25,85 25,08 193,08
Table 181: UNITED STATES to FRY/SERBIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. 0,75 2,69 2,91 0,14 .. 0,04 0,03 6,56
health .. .. .. .. 2,38 0,93 3,08 1,00 .. .. .. 7,40
population .. .. .. .. 0,60 0,93 0,34 2,52 .. 2,13 0,54 7,05
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. 10,25 .. .. .. .. 10,25
.. .. .. 7,25 5,51 49,69 210,22 141,91 133,09 156,28 83,35 787,30
other .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,59 14,32 2,63 1,66 3,31 22,51
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,25 9,24 54,24 227,39 159,88 135,73 160,10 87,23 841,06
Table 182: UNITED STATES to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
education
health
watsan
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total 0,00
Table 183: UNITED STATES to WESTERN BALKANS
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 26,87 .. .. 14,56 34,21 23,57 2,96 20,50 11,19 7,67 6,70 148,22
BiH 0,00 .. .. 162,57 208,83 75,42 1,42 16,28 22,78 12,64 5,78 505,71
Cro 3,99 .. .. 1,87 9,14 19,53 11,01 16,51 14,53 10,95 11,46 98,99
Mac 10,98 .. .. 7,00 47,55 12,18 4,92 15,22 13,70 11,77 12,47 135,79
FRY/Ser 0,00 .. .. 2,80 73,06 251,07 30,83 58,77 41,37 26,15 38,58 522,62
ex Yu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 41,83 0,00 0,00 188,79 372,79 381,76 51,14 127,28 103,57 69,17 74,99 1411,32
Table 184: UNITED STATES to ALBANIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. 2,13 3,16 0,41 0,22 0,58 .. .. 6,49
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy .. .. .. .. .. 0,47 1,71 1,50 1,95 0,32 0,88 6,82
6,77 .. .. .. .. 0,17 0,13 .. 0,00 .. .. 7,08
20,09 .. .. 14,56 32,08 19,78 0,71 18,78 8,66 7,35 5,82 127,83
total 26,87 0,00 0,00 14,56 34,21 23,57 2,96 20,50 11,19 7,67 6,70 148,22
Table 185: UNITED STATES to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. 0,35 .. 0,76 .. .. 0,46 .. 1,57
.. .. .. .. 1,86 0,00 0,01 0,01 .. 0,79 .. 2,67
energy .. .. .. .. 1,29 0,83 .. .. 0,07 .. 0,05 2,24
.. .. .. 133,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 133,02
.. .. .. 29,55 205,34 74,59 0,65 16,28 22,71 11,38 5,73 366,22
banking and fin. services
business & other services
banking and fin. service
business & other services
transport & storage
comm.
transport & storage
comm.
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total 0,00 0,00 0,00 162,57 208,83 75,42 1,42 16,28 22,78 12,64 5,78 505,71
Table 186: UNITED STATES to CROATIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. 0,17 .. 0,00 0,11 .. .. .. 0,28
comm. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 0,59 0,30 .. .. .. 0,92
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,26 0,88 0,49 0,52 2,14
3,99 .. .. .. .. .. 3,44 0,08 0,84 .. 0,26 8,60
.. .. .. 1,87 8,97 19,51 6,98 15,76 12,81 10,46 10,68 87,05
total 3,99 0,00 0,00 1,87 9,14 19,53 11,01 16,51 14,53 10,95 11,46 98,99
Table 187: UNITED STATES to MACEDONIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. 1,59 0,74 .. .. .. 0,11 0,00 2,44
comm. .. .. .. .. 0,03 2,75 .. .. .. .. .. 2,78
energy .. .. .. 0,33 .. 0,29 0,46 0,37 0,00 0,03 0,30 1,78
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
10,98 .. .. 6,67 45,93 8,40 4,47 14,85 13,70 11,63 12,17 128,80
total 10,98 0,00 0,00 7,00 47,55 12,18 4,92 15,22 13,70 11,77 12,47 135,79
Table 188: UNITED STATES to FRY/SERBIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,79 0,70 1,23 .. 2,72
comm. .. .. .. .. .. 0,17 .. 0,77 1,30 0,36 0,01 2,61
energy .. .. .. .. .. 6,99 .. 0,01 0,17 1,18 1,87 10,23
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 1,06 .. .. 0,05 1,17banking & fin. services
transport & storage
banking & fin. service
business & other services
banking & fin. service
business & other services
transport & storage
transport & storage
Page 162 of 179
.. .. .. 2,80 73,06 243,90 30,78 56,13 39,20 23,38 36,65 505,90
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,80 73,06 251,07 30,83 58,77 41,37 26,15 38,58 522,62
Table 189: UNITED STATES to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00
Table 190: UNITED STATES to WESTERN BALKANS
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 3,56 0,00 0,00 4,77 0,24 3,70 0,00 2,57 9,18 8,89 14,39 47,30
BiH 16,00 0,00 0,00 74,56 0,03 0,00 0,00 1,91 2,89 1,49 3,01 99,89
Cro 0,50 0,00 0,00 10,19 0,00 0,00 0,00 20,12 3,54 1,04 3,11 38,50
Mac 1,18 0,00 0,00 1,70 1,44 29,68 0,92 18,80 15,45 6,24 4,96 80,38
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,88 0,00 1,17 0,00 17,36 27,57 4,35 9,03 60,36
ex Yu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 21,24 0,00 0,00 92,11 1,71 34,54 0,92 60,76 58,63 22,01 34,50 326,43
Table 191: UNITED STATES to ALBANIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. 3,73 0,24 .. .. .. .. .. 7,04 11,01
other 3,56 .. .. 1,05 .. 3,70 .. 2,57 9,18 8,89 7,35 36,30
total 3,56 0,00 0,00 4,77 0,24 3,70 0,00 2,57 9,18 8,89 14,39 47,30
business & other services
banking & fin. services
business & other services
transport & storage
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Table 192: UNITED STATES to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 .. 0,01 .. 0,02
other 16,00 .. .. 74,56 0,03 .. .. 1,91 2,89 1,47 3,01 99,88
total 16,00 0,00 0,00 74,56 0,03 0,00 0,00 1,91 2,89 1,49 3,01 99,89
Table 193: UNITED STATES to CROATIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,34 .. 0,26 .. 0,59
other 0,50 .. .. 10,19 .. .. .. 19,78 3,54 0,79 3,11 37,91
total 0,50 0,00 0,00 10,19 0,00 0,00 0,00 20,12 3,54 1,04 3,11 38,50
Table 194: UNITED STATES to MACEDONIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. 0,60 0,96 .. 0,09 .. .. 0,04 .. 1,70
other 1,18 .. .. 1,10 0,48 29,68 0,83 18,80 15,45 6,20 4,96 78,67
total 1,18 0,00 0,00 1,70 1,44 29,68 0,92 18,80 15,45 6,24 4,96 80,38
Table 195: UNITED STATES to FRY/SRBIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,03 .. 0,03
other .. .. .. 0,88 .. 1,17 .. 17,36 27,57 4,33 9,03 60,33
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,88 0,00 1,17 0,00 17,36 27,57 4,35 9,03 60,36
Table 196: UNITED STATES to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Multisector
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commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00
Table 197: IDA to WESTERN BALKANS
Social Infrastructure & Services IDA
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0,00 0,00 31,00 21,41 54,45 50,86 13,51 0,00 17,14 3,14 17,89 209,41
BiH 0,00 37,51 13,64 79,33 17,32 52,99 47,29 23,40 8,00 122,62 37,83 439,94
Cro .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Mac 15,37 19,50 6,20 37,78 12,37 0,00 21,08 6,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 118,81
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 13,00 43,70 12,58 43,20 112,48
ex Yu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 15,37 57,01 50,84 138,52 84,15 103,85 81,87 42,90 68,83 138,35 98,93 880,63
Table 198: IDA to ALBANIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. 15,45 .. .. .. .. .. 15,45
health .. .. .. 21,41 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21,41
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population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. 12,88 .. .. 17,14 3,14 17,89 51,05
.. .. .. .. 54,45 22,53 .. .. .. .. .. 76,98
other .. .. 31,00 .. .. .. 13,51 .. .. .. .. 44,51
total 0,00 0,00 31,00 21,41 54,45 50,86 13,51 0,00 17,14 3,14 17,89 209,41
Table 199: IDA to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. 13,64 .. .. 13,65 .. .. .. 7,13 10,23 44,64
health .. .. .. .. 12,37 .. .. .. .. .. 19,43 31,80
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. 15,45 .. 23,40 .. 20,96 8,18 68,00
.. 8,66 .. 79,33 .. .. .. .. .. 28,51 .. 116,50
other .. 28,85 .. .. 4,95 23,89 47,29 .. 8,00 66,03 .. 179,00
total 0,00 37,51 13,64 79,33 17,32 52,99 47,29 23,40 8,00 122,62 37,83 439,94
Table 200: IDA to CROATIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00
Table 201: IDA to MACEDONIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
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education .. .. 6,20 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,20
health .. 19,50 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19,50
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. 17,70 .. .. .. .. 17,70
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other 15,37 .. .. 37,78 12,37 .. 3,38 6,50 .. .. .. 75,41
total 15,37 19,50 6,20 37,78 12,37 0,00 21,08 6,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 118,81
Table 202: IDA to FRY/SERBIA
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13,00 5,14 .. 4,86 23,00
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22,85 7,34 .. 30,19
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,00 .. .. 8,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12,78 12,78
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7,71 5,24 25,56 38,52
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 13,00 43,70 12,58 43,20 112,48
Table 203: IDA to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Social Infrastructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00
Table 204: IDA to WESTERN BALKANS
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
Page 167 of 179
Alb 21,96 62,90 0,00 21,41 31,74 18,80 0,00 80,48 31,99 26,20 27,61 323,09
BiH 0,00 41,09 60,76 37,78 61,87 0,00 115,92 109,21 0,00 0,00 0,00 426,63
Cro 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 8,00 0,00 0,00 8,00
Mac 93,35 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 11,98 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 105,32
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 131,31 93,11 79,65 24,03 328,11
ex Yu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 115,31 103,98 60,76 59,18 93,62 30,77 115,92 321,00 133,10 105,86 51,64 1191,14
Table 205: IDA to ALBANIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
16,47 28,85 .. 21,41 16,89 10,43 .. 22,10 31,99 .. .. 148,15
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy 5,49 34,05 .. .. .. .. .. 38,87 .. 26,20 27,61 132,22
.. .. .. .. 14,85 8,37 .. 19,50 .. .. .. 42,72
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 21,96 62,90 0,00 21,41 31,74 18,80 0,00 80,48 31,99 26,20 27,61 323,09
Table 206: IDA to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. 48,36 .. .. .. 14,86 39,00 .. .. .. 102,23
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy .. 41,09 12,40 31,48 .. .. 47,29 .. .. .. .. 132,25
.. .. .. 6,30 .. .. 27,02 .. .. .. .. 33,32
.. .. .. .. 61,87 .. 26,75 70,21 .. .. .. 158,83
total 0,00 41,09 60,76 37,78 61,87 0,00 115,92 109,21 0,00 0,00 0,00 426,63
Table 207: IDA to CROATIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
business & other services
transport & storage
banking & fin. services
business & other services
transport & storage
banking & fin. services
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.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8,00 .. .. 8,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 8,00 0,00 0,00 8,00
Table 208: IDA to MACEDONIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. 11,98 .. .. .. .. .. 11,98
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
93,35 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 93,35
total 93,35 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 11,98 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 105,32
Table 209: IDA to FRY/SERBIA
Economic Infrastructure
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 57,64 .. 57,64
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,50 1,71 22,01 24,03 54,25
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 110,51 91,40 .. .. 201,91
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14,30 .. .. .. 14,30
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 131,31 93,11 79,65 24,03 328,11
Table 210: IDA to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Economic Infrastructure
business & other services
banking & fin. services
business & other services
transport & storage
banking & fin. services
transport & storage
banking & fin. services
business & other services
transport & storage
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commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00
Table 211: IDA to WESTERN BALKANS
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 10,98 0,00 6,20 12,59 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,14 0,00 32,92
BiH 0,00 103,87 0,00 0,00 18,56 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 122,43
Cro .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
Mac 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 27,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 27,02
FRY/Ser .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
ex Yu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 10,98 103,87 6,20 12,59 18,56 0,00 27,02 0,00 0,00 3,14 0,00 182,37
Table 212: IDA to ALBANIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,14 .. 3,14
other 10,98 .. 6,20 12,59 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 29,77
total 10,98 0,00 6,20 12,59 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,14 0,00 32,92
Table 213: IDA to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
transport & storage
banking & fin. service
business & other service
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GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. 103,87 .. .. 18,56 .. .. .. .. .. .. 122,43
total 0,00 103,87 0,00 0,00 18,56 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 122,43
Table 214: IDA to CROATIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00
Table 215: IDA to MACEDONIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. .. .. 27,02 .. .. .. .. 27,02
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 27,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 27,02
Table 216: IDA to FRY/SERBIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00
Table 217: IDA to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
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GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00
Table 218: NETHERLANDS to WESTERN BALKANS
Social Infrasructure & Services THE NETHERLANDS
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 0,49 3,59 0,14 1,12 0,00 11,79 11,98 3,46 0,86 0,86 1,16 35,44
BiH 0,00 8,45 3,05 23,66 3,73 11,65 8,20 3,78 52,24 5,33 11,54 131,63
Cro 0,16 0,12 0,53 0,13 0,56 0,36 0,19 0,07 2,36 1,49 0,26 6,23
Mac 0,40 0,00 0,56 7,08 1,58 15,33 11,36 4,96 22,28 2,43 7,52 73,50
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,22 1,55 4,44 33,10 29,87 20,58 11,54 8,69 3,24 113,23
ex YU 3,65 2,35 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,96 0,00 0,00 6,95
total 4,70 14,51 4,49 33,54 10,32 72,22 61,60 32,85 90,22 18,79 23,72 366,98
Table 219: NETHERLANDS to ALBANIA
Social Infrasructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. 0,26 0,28
health .. 0,81 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,81
population .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,59 .. .. .. .. 1,59
watsan 0,09 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,09
0,40 2,65 0,14 1,12 .. 11,79 8,58 3,46 0,42 0,86 0,91 30,32
other .. 0,13 .. .. .. .. 1,78 .. 0,43 .. .. 2,35
total 0,49 3,59 0,14 1,12 0,00 11,79 11,98 3,46 0,86 0,86 1,16 35,44
govt. & civ. soc.
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Table 220: NETHERLANDS to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Social Infrasructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. 0,42 0,21 0,57 0,03 0,00 0,02 .. .. 0,03 0,07 1,35
health .. 1,49 1,42 1,17 1,02 1,13 .. .. .. .. .. 6,22
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. 0,65 0,07 1,19 .. 0,71 .. .. .. 0,78 .. 3,39
.. 5,69 0,71 7,89 1,85 9,34 6,59 2,58 52,24 4,50 10,20 101,57
other .. 0,21 0,65 12,85 0,83 0,46 1,60 1,20 .. 0,01 1,28 19,10
total 0,00 8,45 3,05 23,66 3,73 11,65 8,20 3,78 52,24 5,33 11,54 131,63
Table 221: NETHERLANDS to CROATIA
Social Infrasructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
0,16 0,12 .. 0,13 .. .. .. .. 0,63 .. .. 1,04
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. 0,53 .. .. 0,36 0,19 0,07 1,42 0,73 0,26 3,56
other .. .. .. .. 0,56 .. .. .. 0,31 0,75 .. 1,62
total 0,16 0,12 0,53 0,13 0,56 0,36 0,19 0,07 2,36 1,49 0,26 6,23
Table 222: NETHERLANDS to MACEDONIA
Social Infrasructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. 0,56 7,02 0,76 5,70 9,20 0,44 14,92 1,49 3,13 43,22
health .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
watsan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
0,40 .. .. 0,06 0,82 9,61 1,82 3,69 2,71 0,61 3,69 23,43
other .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 0,34 0,82 4,65 0,33 0,70 6,85
total 0,40 0,00 0,56 7,08 1,58 15,33 11,36 4,96 22,28 2,43 7,52 73,50
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
education
health
watsan
govt. & civ. soc.
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Table 223: NETHERLANDS to FRY/SERBIA
Social Infrasructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education .. .. .. .. .. 0,48 1,68 0,08 .. 0,82 0,00 3,06
health .. .. .. 0,24 .. 6,30 0,04 2,75 .. .. .. 9,32
population .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,65 0,01 .. .. .. 1,66
watsan .. .. .. 0,21 .. 3,17 4,84 3,08 .. .. .. 11,30
.. .. 0,18 0,91 4,02 22,73 18,44 12,88 10,80 7,33 3,24 80,53
other .. .. 0,04 0,19 0,42 0,41 3,23 1,78 0,74 0,54 .. 7,36
total 0,00 0,00 0,22 1,55 4,44 33,10 29,87 20,58 11,54 8,69 3,24 113,23
Table 224: NETHERLANDS to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Social Infrasructure & Services
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
education 0,55 0,22 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,77
health 2,60 0,31 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,92
population .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,59 .. .. 0,59
watsan 0,27 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,32 .. .. 0,58
0,22 1,57 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,05 .. .. 1,84
other .. 0,24 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,24
total 3,65 2,35 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,96 0,00 0,00 6,95
Table 225: NETHERLANDS to WESTERN BALKANS
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb 1,02 0,00 0,09 0,40 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,17 2,49
BiH 0,00 6,47 0,01 1,12 0,95 0,12 0,91 0,00 0,02 1,23 18,28 29,12
Cro 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 3,29 0,00 0,00 3,31
Mac 0,00 0,00 0,00 6,63 0,97 4,39 1,39 7,62 7,28 0,75 0,24 29,28
FRY/Ser 0,00 0,00 0,51 0,76 8,46 19,83 5,75 0,89 1,49 2,78 1,46 41,93
ex Yu 6,99 0,45 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,43
govt. & civ. soc.
govt. & civ. soc.
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total 8,00 6,91 0,62 8,92 10,38 24,34 8,82 8,51 12,10 4,80 20,15 113,56
Table 226: NETHERLANDS to ALBANIA
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
1,02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,02
.. .. 0,09 0,34 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,43
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. 0,06 .. .. 0,75 .. 0,02 0,04 0,17 1,04
total 1,02 0,00 0,09 0,40 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,17 2,49
Table 227: NETHERLANDS to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. 1,78 0,01 0,37 0,61 0,10 .. .. .. .. 0,38 3,25
.. 1,33 0,01 0,72 0,32 0,01 .. .. .. .. .. 2,39
energy .. 3,35 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,35
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. 0,03 0,02 0,01 0,91 .. 0,02 1,23 17,90 20,12
total 0,00 6,47 0,01 1,12 0,95 0,12 0,91 0,00 0,02 1,23 18,28 29,12
Table 228: NETHERLANDS to CROATIA
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
comm. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,02 .. .. .. .. 0,02
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3,29 .. .. 3,29
.. .. .. 0,00 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
comm.
transport & storage
banking & fin. services
business & other services
banking & fin. ser.
business & other ser.
transport & storage
comm.
transport & storage
banking & fin. services
business & other services
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total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 3,29 0,00 0,00 3,31
Table 229: NETHERLANDS to MACEDONIA
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. 0,03 0,97 0,75 .. .. .. .. .. 1,75
comm. .. .. .. 0,25 .. .. 0,33 .. 0,03 .. 0,06 0,67
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. 6,33 .. 3,64 0,32 7,62 7,23 .. .. 25,14
.. .. .. 0,02 .. .. 0,75 .. 0,02 0,75 0,18 1,71
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 6,63 0,97 4,39 1,39 7,62 7,28 0,75 0,24 29,28
Table 230: NETHERLANDS to FRY/SERBIA
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
.. .. .. .. .. 17,80 .. 0,67 .. .. .. 18,47
comm. .. .. 0,51 0,76 3,90 2,03 .. .. 0,00 0,13 .. 7,33
energy .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. 4,56 .. 1,40 .. .. .. .. 5,96
.. .. .. .. .. .. 4,36 0,22 1,49 2,65 1,46 10,17
total 0,00 0,00 0,51 0,76 8,46 19,83 5,75 0,89 1,49 2,78 1,46 41,93
Table 231: NETHERLANDS to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Economic Infrastructure 
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
0,01 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,01
comm. 0,68 0,45 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,12
energy 6,30 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6,30
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
banking & fin. services
business & other services
banking & fin. services
business & other services
transport & storage
transport & storage
transport & storage
banking & fin. service
business & other services
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total 6,99 0,45 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,43
Table 232: NETHERLANDS to WESTERN BALKANS
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
Alb .. 0,06 .. .. .. 0,00 0,85 0,00 3,34 8,97 0,06 13,27
BiH .. 0,15 .. 6,57 0,47 0,80 1,77 3,22 0,00 0,00 0,00 12,96
Cro .. .. .. .. .. 0,00 2,32 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 2,34
Mac .. .. 0,08 0,10 0,45 0,32 0,85 0,00 0,11 0,00 0,02 1,93
FRY/Ser .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,07 0,70 0,00 0,02 1,99 0,00 2,79
ex Yu 0,84 .. .. .. .. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,84
total 0,84 0,20 0,08 6,69 0,92 1,18 6,49 3,22 3,46 10,97 0,08 34,14
Table 233: NETHERLANDS to ALBANIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. 0,06 .. .. .. .. 0,85 .. 3,34 7,17 0,06 11,48
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,79 .. 1,79
total 0,00 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,85 0,00 3,34 8,97 0,06 13,27
Table 234: NETHERLANDS to BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
gep .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,87 .. .. .. .. 0,87
other .. 0,15 .. 6,57 0,47 0,80 0,90 3,22 .. .. .. 12,09
total 0,00 0,15 0,00 6,57 0,47 0,80 1,77 3,22 0,00 0,00 0,00 12,96
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Table 235: NETHERLANDS to CROATIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,32 .. .. 0,02 .. 2,34
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,32 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 2,34
Table 236: NETHERLANDS to MACEDONIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. 0,08 0,03 0,45 0,32 0,85 .. 0,11 .. .. 1,84
other .. .. .. 0,07 .. .. .. 0,00 .. .. 0,02 0,09
total 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,10 0,45 0,32 0,85 0,00 0,11 0,00 0,02 1,93
Table 237: NETHERLANDS to FRY/SERBIA
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. 0,02 .. 0,07 0,70 .. 0,02 0,03 .. 0,83
other .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,96 .. 1,96
total 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,07 0,70 0,00 0,02 1,99 0,00 2,79
Table 238: NETHERLANDS to EX YU UNSPECIFIED
Multisector
commitments (constant 2006 USD millions); CRS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 total
GEP .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,00
other 0,84 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0,84
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total 0,84 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,84
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CHAPTER 7 – ANNEX 
 
CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM (CRS) MICRO DATA 
OF MAJOR YEARS AND ALLOCATIONS 
 
 
 
 
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES (SIS) 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Table 1: Germany to Albania 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
(3.6)  (2.5) (3.60)  (2.4) (4.0)  (2.9) (5.0)  (4.4) (5.3)  (5.1) 
 
VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING - 0.2356 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 
2.0699 
GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS 
VIA NGO - 0.2450 
GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO 
- 0.4067 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN 
EUROPE - 0.3118 
IMPUTED STUDENT 
COSTS- 1.9491  
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 
2.2028 
GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO 
- 0.6044 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 0.4970 
  
 
 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 2.8627 IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 3.5102 
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Table 2: Italy to Albania 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 2001 2003 
 
(5.6)  (3.9) (4.1)  (2.6) (5.8)   (4.9) 
 
SOCIAL ACTIVITIES&PROFESS.TRAINING - 0.2983 
COMMUNITY WORKS - 1.8501 
PROMOTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEMALE MICRO 
ENTERPRISE - 0.2353 
EXPERTS/SCHOLARSHIPS - 3.5366 
 
UNIVERSITY & POST-UNIV. SCHOLARSHIPS - 0.1302 
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION TO TRUST FUND ETF - 0.5648 
 
  VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION TO TRUST FUND ETF - 0.5648 
 
 
 REMODELING OF EDUCATION FACILITIES LOCAL FUND - 2.6416 
  
DVPT OF THE ITALIAN LANGUAGE DEPARTMENT OF SCUTARI 
UNIVERSITY - 0.2545 
 
 
Table 3: US to Albania 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(3.1)  (2.6) 
ACCELERATED DVPT & GROWTH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES: HIGHER EDUCATION - 1.4023 
 
CROSS-CUTTING: HIGHER EDUCATION - 1.1628 
 
 
 
Table 4: EC to Albania 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(3.5)  (3.0) 
 
(5.9)  (5.6) 
EDUCATION - 1.6945 SUPPORT TO VET AND LIFELONG LEARNING - 3.7272 
 
TEMPUS CARDS - 1.1297  TEMPUS CARDS - ALBANIE 2004 - 1.8636  
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Table 5: IDA to Albania 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(15.5)  (12.0) 
EDUCATION REFORM [LOAN] – 12.0000 
 
 
 
Table 6: Austria to BiH  
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(7.9)  (7.2) 
 
(8.9)  (7.1) 
 
(8.5)  (6.7) 
 
(8.2)  (6.2) 
 
(6.5)  (4.3) 
 
(8.3)  (5.4) 
 
(8.3)  (5.8) 
 
(10.7)  (9.1) 
 
(12.0)  (11.5) 
 
(13.9)  (13.6) 
 
NATIONAL 
LIBRARY 
SARAJEVO - 
0.6445 
EQUIPMENT 
FOR SCHOOL - 
0.3072 
REHABILITATION 
SARAJEVO 
UNISVERSITY - 
0.4040 
REHABILITATION 
UNIVERSITY 
SARAJEVO - 0.6124 
SUPPORT FOR 
UNIVERSITIES - 
0.4025 IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 
4.8656 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 5.1409 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 
8.7292 
SUPPORT OF 
UNIVERSITIES IN 
BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA 
04/05 - 0.5673 
SUPPORT TO THE 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN 
BOSNIEN UND 
HERZEGOVINA 
2005-2007 - 
0.9477 
SUPPORT 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION - 
0.6617 
RENOVATION 
UNIVERSITY 
SARAJEWO - 
0.4057 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS - 
4.0827 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS - 
1.7588 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 3.4472  
SUPPORT OF 
UNIVERSITIES IN 
BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA - 
0.3817 
 INFORMATION & 
CONTACT POINT 
F. BOSN. 
UNIVERSITIES F. 
EC RESEARCH 
PROGR. - 0.4730 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 12.2766 
 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 
4.1489 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 3.8315 
SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME FOR 
UNIVERSITIES - 
.3951 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS - 
1.9793 
 
 
  IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 9.8461  
 
ASSISTANCE 
UNIVERSITY 
SARAJEWO - 
0.5535 
SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME F. 
SARAJEVO UNIV - 
0.5472 
UNIVERSITY 
PARTNERSHIP - 
0.0839 
 
 
   
 
 
ASSISTANCE 
FOR 
UNIVERSITY 
SARAJEWO. - 
0.3468 
SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME FOR 
UNIVERSITIES - 
0.5429 
SUPPORT FOR 
UNIVERSITY 
SARAJEVO - 0.5231 
 
 
   
 
   
SUPPORT BOSNIAN 
UNIVERSITIES 
99/2000 - 0.5211 
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Table 7: Germany to BiH  
 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(8.6)   (6.9) 
 
(8.6)  (5.9) 
 
(8.9)  (6.1) 
 
(8.7)  (6.3) 
 
(9.4)  (8.2) 
 
(10.3)  (10.1) 
 
IMPUTED STUDENT 
COSTS - 6.7653 
IMPUTED STUDENT 
COSTS - 5.7752 
IMPUTED STUDENT 
COSTS - 5.7752 
BASIC LIFE SKILLS FOR 
YOUTH & ADULTS - 0.4712 
GOVERNMENT 
CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 
0.4406 
REFORM OF THE VOCATIONAL 
EDUCATION TRAINING SYSTEM IN 
BiH- 1.2424 
   
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 
5.4558 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 
0.5648 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 0.5814 
   
 IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 
6.8880 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 
7.7956 
 
 
Table 8: Italy to BiH 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
(46.6)  (36.5) 
 
EXPERTS AND SCHOLARSHIPS - 33.5062 
 
SCHOLARSHIPS - 0.3240 
 
SCHOLARSHIPS - 0.6157  
 
 
Table 9: Japan to BiH  
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
1998 
 
 
1999 
 
(8.0)  (8.2) 
(8.9)  (8.7) 
 
PROJECT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF BASIC SCHOOLS - 8.1646 
CONSTRUCTION OF BASIC SCHOOLS - 8.6911 
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Table 10: EC to BiH  
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(3.2)  (2.2) 
(3.2) (2.7) 
(6.0)  (5.7) 
 
TEMPUS III - CARDS 2002 – BIH - 
2.2472 
ENGAGEMENT GLOBAL TEMPUS CARDS - 2.7113 
SOCIAL COHESION AND DEVELOPMENT - 2.7333 
 
 
 
TEMPUS CARDS - BOSNIE HERZEGOVINE 2004 - 2.9817 
 
 
 
Table 11: IDA to BiH  
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
2000 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(13.6)  (11.0) 
(13.6)  (10.6) (7.1)  (6.8) 
(10.2)  (10.0) 
 
EDUCATION RECONSTRUCTION - 
11.0000 
EDUCATION - 10.6000 ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT/INSTITUTION 
BUILDING - 6.8000 
EDUCATION RESTRUCTURING PROJECT - 
10.0000 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Austria to Croatia 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 1997 1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(6.6)  (6.0) 
 
(5.9)  (4.7) 
 
(6.2)  (4.9) 
 
(5.9)   (4.4) 
 
(5.7)  (3.8) 
 
(5.1)  (3.3) 
 
(3.9)  (2.7) 
 
(4.0)  (3.4) 
 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 
5.7689 
MINISTRY OF 
SCIENCE 
SCHOLARSHIPS - 
0.1044 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 4.6194 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS - 
1.9041 
IMPUTED STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 3.4790 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS - 
3.1405 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS - 
2.4693 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS - 
3.2377 
 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS - 
4.5729 
 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS- 
2.3050 
  MINISTRY OF 
EDUCATION 
SCHOLARSHIPS - 
0.1425 
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Table 13: Germany to Croatia 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(8.7)  (7.0) 
 
(6.7)  (4.6) 
 
(5.8)  (4.0) 
 
(6.2)  (4.5) 
 
(6.5)  (5.7) 
 
(6.4)  (6.2) 
IMPUTED STUDENT 
COSTS - 6.9679 
IMPUTED STUDENT 
COSTS - 4.4347 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS 
- 3.8668 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 
4.1615 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 
5.4602 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 
6.0212 
   
ADVANCED TECH. & MANAGERIAL 
TRAINING - 0.1885 
  
 
 
 
Table 14: US to Croatia  
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
1999 2000 
 
2001 
 
(3.2)  (2.7) 
 
(3.5)  (3.0) 
 
(2.5)  (2.2) 
 
HUMAN SUFFERING AND NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRISES: HIGHER EDUCATION 
- 1.2676 
HIGHER EDUC.: CROSS-CUTTING - 3.0290 
BASIC LIFE SKILLS: ACCEL. RETURN/SUST. REINTEGR. OF WAR-
AFFECTED POP. - 0.5000 
CROSS-CUTTING: HIGHER EDUCATION - 1.4123  
BASIC LIFE SKILLS FOR YOUTH & ADULTS: CROSS-CUTTING 
PROGRAMS -  0.3000 
  
GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 
0.7500 
  
BASIC LIFE SKILLS: MITIGATION OF ADVERSE SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
AND TRENDS - 0.2500 
  
HIGHER EDUC.: MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION & 
IMPROVED GOV. - 0.4250 
 
 
 
Table 15: EC to Croatia 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(4.1)  (2.8) 
 
(11.8)  (10.0) 
 
(9.1)  (8.7) 
 
(6.4)  (6.2) 
 
TEMPUS III - CARDS 2002 – CROATIE 
- 2.8168 
SOCIAL COHESION PROJECTS. EDUCATION - 6.6087 
SOCIAL COHESION - 3.7272 
HIGHER EDUCATION - 6.2143 
 ENGAGEMENT GLOBAL TEMPUS CARDS - 3.3891 
TEMPUS CARDS - CROATIE 2004 - 
4.9696 
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Table 16: Germany to Macedonia    
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(2.3)  (1.8) 
 
(4.3)  (3.0) 
 
(4.2)  (3.6) 
 
(2.9)  (2.8) 
 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 0.9821 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 1.1304 IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 2.0967 IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 2.5324 
ADVANCED TECH. & MANAGERIAL 
TRAINING - 0.8171 
HIGHER EDUCATION - 0.4578 FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE 
SCOPE OF THE STABILITY PACT - 0.3502 
 
 
 
 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 1.7905 
  
 
 
Table 17: Netherlands to Macedonia  
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(8.3)  (5.3) 
 
SOUTH EAST EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY - 5.067 
 
 
Table 18: US to Macedonia  
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
(3.5)  (2.9) 
 
(5.0) (4.4) 
 
CROSS-CUTTING: HIGHER EDUCATION - 2.934 
HIGHER EDUC.: SPECIAL INITIATIVES – 3.0 
 
 
CONTRIBUTION OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUC TO SUST. DVT INCREASED- 1.36 
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Table 19: Austria to FRY/Serbia 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
2005 
 
(7.0)  (5.5)  (7.9)  (6.2) (8.0)  (6.0) (9.5)  (6.3) (8.9)  (5.8) (9.3)  (6.5) (6.6)  (5.6) (7.3)  (7.0) (8.1)  (7.8) 
 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 
5.5261 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 5.6385 
SCHOOL 
REHABILITATION – 
KOSOVO - 0.3871 
SUPPORT 
UNIVERSITY 
PRISTINA - 
0.2007 
CONSTRUCTION 
OF SCHOOL - 
0.2733 
SUPPORT FOR 
EDUCATION 
INITIATIVES 
FOR 
MARGINALISED 
CHILDREN - 
0.4509 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 5.1191 
EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING FOR 
YOUNG ASKHALI 
IN THE KOSOVO - 
0.2361 
REFORM OF 
UNIVERSITIES IN 
SERBIA AND 
MONTENEGRO 2005-
2007 - 1.5735 
 
SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION - 
0.2406 
UNICEF 
CONTRIBUTION 
FOR SCHOOL 
BOOKS - 0.2710 
SUPPORT 
UNIVERSITY 
MONTENEGRO - 
0.2171 
SUPPORT 
UNIVERSITIES 
IN SERBIA - 
0.5212 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 4.0750 
REORGANISATION 
UNIVERSITY 
KOSOVSKA 
MITROVICA - 
0.1154 
SUPPORT FOR 
UNIVERSITY 
PRISTINA - 
0.3138 
SUPPORT OF 
UNIVERSITY PRISTINA 
2005-2007 - 0.5581 
 
SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION - 
0.1998 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS 
- 2.1396 
SUPPORT 
UNIVERSITY 
MONTENEGRO - 
0.2014 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 4.2147 
SUPPORT OF 
HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN 
SERBIA AND 
MONTENEGRO - 
0.8898 
 SUPPORT OF 
HIGHER 
EDUCTION 
SERBIA AND 
MONTENEGRO - 
1.4120 
IMPUTED STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 5.1113 
  
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' COSTS 
- 2.7710 
SUPPORT 
UNIVERSITY 
PRISTINA - 
0.2123 
 
SUPPORT FOR 
UNIVERSITY 
PRISTINA - 
0.2822 
 ORGANISATIONAL 
RESTRUCTURING 
OF UNIVERSITIES 
IN KOSOVO - 
0.2112 
MANAGEMENT 
TRAINING - 0.1859 
  
  MINISTRY OF 
SCIENCE – 
SCHOLARSHIP - 
0.3460 
MINISTRY OF 
EDUCATION 
SCHOLARSHIPS 
- 0.5536 
 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 4.3997 
 
  
   
 
IMPUTED 
STUDENTS' 
COSTS - 4.3130 
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Table 20: France to FRY/Serbia 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 2001 2002 2005 
 
(3.2)   (2.1) 
 
(7.3)  (4.7) 
 
(3.7)  (2.6) 
 
(3.9)  (3.7) 
 
EDUCATION: TECHNICAL CO-
OPERATION - 1.7891 
EDUCATION: TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION - 1.8084 
COOPERATION TECHNIQUE : 
EDUCATION POST SECONDAIRE - 
2.0757 
COOPÉRATION TECHNIQUE : EDUCATION POST 
SECONDAIRE - 2.8775 
HIGHER EDUCATION - 0.2223 
APPUI À LA RÉFORME DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT 
SUPÉRIEUR - 1.9121 
 
SERBIE-BOURSES - 0.1066 
 
 
 
Table 21: Germany to FRY/Serbia  
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(17.9)  (14.3) 
 
(12.7)  (8.7) 
 
(17.3)  (11.7) 
 
(16.1)  (11.9) 
 
(13.6)  (11.7) 
 
(16.1) (15.8) 
 
FED. STATES 
CONTRIBUTIONS: 
EDUCATION - 0.2996 
STABILITY PACT IN SE 
EUROPE: EDUCATION - 
0.3019 
EDUCATION POLICY & 
ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 
0.7049 
TRAINING MEASURES 
IN CRISIS REGIONS 
AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
RECONSTRUCTION - 
0.6408 
REHABILITATION AND 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
AND UPGRADING IN 
KOSOVO - 1.3556 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN 
EUROPE - 0.4137 
IMPUTED STUDENT 
COSTS - 14.0186 
IMPUTED STUDENT 
COSTS - 8.2886 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 
1.5111 
PROMOTING YOUNG 
PEOPLE TO PREVENT 
CONFLICT AND 
VIOLENCE - 0.3298 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 
10.1744 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN 
EUROPE - 0.2572 
  
VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 
0.3647 
REHABILITATION AND 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
AND UPGRADING IN 
KOSOVO - 0.9424 
 
REFORM OF THE VOCATIONAL/ 
EDUCATIONAL TRAINING (KOSOVO) - 
1.8636 
  
VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 
1.0074 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
- 0.9424 
 
REFORM OF THE VOCATIONAL 
EDUCATION SYSTEM IN SERBIA - 
1.6151 
  IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS 
- 7.4739 
 
IMPUTED STUDENT 
COSTS - 8.0833 
 
IMPUTED STUDENT COSTS - 10.7670 
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Table 22: Norway to FRY /Serbia 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(5.2)  (4.8) 
MIER ZAJECAR SCHOOLS - 1.6655 
 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING. STUDENT ENT. - 0.3093 
 
TEXTBOOKS FOR VOCATIONAL EDUC. - 0.3824 
 
BACHELOR IN NURSING - 0.2880 
 
KOSOVO INST. OF JOURNALISM AND COMM. - 1.5092  
 
 
 
  
 
Table 23: EC to FRY/Serbia 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(21.0)  (14.6) 
 
(24.6)  (20.9) 
 
(12.4)  (11.8) 
 
(15.3)  (14.9) 
 
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR 
SERBIA - SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY - 5.1833 
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING - 
14.6859 
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING - 
2.4848 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 2.4857 
SUPPORT TO VOCATIONAL 
EDUCATION AND UNIVERSITY 
EDUCATION - 4.2409 
ENGAGEMENT GLOBAL TEMPUS CARDS - 
4.5188 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND HR DEV. - 2.4848 VOCATIONAL TRAINING - 4.3500 
TEMPUS III- CARDS 2002-FRY 
SERBIA - 3.7543 
ENGAGEMENT GLOBAL TEMPUS CARDS - 
0.5648 
TEMPUS CARDS - KOSOVO 2004 - 1.2424 HIGHER EDUCATION - 0.6214 
TEMPUS III- CARDS 2002 - FRY 
KOSOVO - 0.9407 
ENGAGEMENT GLOBAL TEMPUS CARDS - 
1.1297 
TEMPUS CARDS - MONTENEGRO 2004 - 0.6212 HIGHER EDUCATION - 6.2143 
TEMPUS III - CARDS 2002 - FRY 
MONTENEGO - 0.4683 
 TEMPUS CARDS - SERBIE 2004 - 4.9696 HIGHER EDUCATION - 1.2429 
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Table 24: IDA to FRY/Serbia 
 
Education; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
(13.0)   (10.0) 
 
(5.1)  (4.5) 
 
(4.9)   (4.8) 
 
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT 
PROJECT - 10.0000 
EDUCATION PARTICIPATION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT 
[grant] - 4.5000 
EDUCATION REFORM PROJECT - 0.7500 
 
 
 EDUCATION REFORM PROJECT - 2.7500 
 
 
 EDUCATION REFORM PROJECT - 1.2500 
 
 
 
 
HEALTH 
 
Table 25: France to Albania 
 
Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(6.5)  (4.2) 
REALISATION CLINIQUE - 4.2116 
 
 
 
 
Table 26: Germany to Albania 
 
Health;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(5.5)  (4.4) 
EMERGENCY PROG. HEALTH SECTOR - 4.3580 
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Table 27: Italy to Albania 
 
Health;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
2000 2005 
 
(8.4)   (6.0) 
 
(7.8)  (4.9) 
 
(7.2)    (7.0) 
 
TRAINING OF HEALTH PERSONNEL - 0.3755 
HEALTH: HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE - 0.4474 PROGRAMME FOR FIVE POLICLINICS [loan] - 6.3137 
BASIC HEALTH: PROVISION OF HEALTH 
EQUIPMENT - 3.8519 
EVALUATION OF DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTS - 0.3808  
BASIC HEALTH: PROVISION OF AMBULANCES - 
1.3757 
INFORMATIZATION PROGRAM - 0.4760  
 
 
REHAB. OF HEALTH SYSTEM - 1.4519  
 
 
BASIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURES - 0.8805 
 
 
 HEALTH PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT - 0.4760  
 
 
 
Table 28: Sweden to Albania  
 
Health;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
2005 
 
(3.0)  (2.0) 
(4.1)  (4.0) 
 
HEALTH POLICY & ADM MGMT: STRENGHTEN THE MGMT AND MAINTENANCE 
SYSTEM - 0.7932 
BASIC HEALTH: MAINTENANCE HOSPITALS EQUIPMENTS - 4.0148 
 
MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS - 1.2091 
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Table 29: US to Albania 
 
Health;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(2.9)  (2.5) 
 
(3.4)  (3.0) 
 
(3.3)  (3.0) 
IMPROVE SELECTED PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES AT TARGETED SITES - 2.5250 
HEALTH-  0.1150 ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 
1.8150 
 
HEALTH - 1.9150 ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES: 
PROJECT ASSISTANCE - 0.7000 
 
 
HEALTH - 0.9850 ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES - 
0.2500 
 
 
 
Table 30: IDA to Albania 
 
Health;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
(21.4)  (17.0) 
 
HEALTH RECOVERY - 17.0000  
 
 
 
 
Table 31: Japan to BIH  
 
Health;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1999 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(24.7)  (26.4) (10.5)  (11.8) (4.9)  (4.7) (6.2)  (6.8) (5.3)   (5.7) 
 
IMPROVE HOSPITAL MED 
EQMT - 14.8017 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
INSTITUTION EQPT - 
11.7735 
IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNITY 
BASED REHABILITATION 
CENTERS- 4.7326 
HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 0.6532 
IMPROVEMENT OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT 
IN PRIMARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 
- 5.5223 
MED EQMT FOR PRIMARY 
HEALTH CARE - 11.6446 
  
IMPROVE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT IN 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 
- 6.1887 
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Table 32: Switzerland to BiH  
 
Health;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
(6.2)  (4.9) 
 
(3.3)  (2.3) 
 
(4.9)  (4.8) 
 
HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.3966 
HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.1334 FAMILY MEDICINE - 2.7601 
 
HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.2928 
BASIC HEALTH CARE - 0.1186 SOUTIEN AUX ONG - 1.4485 
 
HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.9183 
BASIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE - 1.7784  
SECTEUR BUDGÉTAIRE: SOINS ET SERVICES DE 
SANTÉ DE BASE - 1.3309   
FAMILY MEDICINE PROGRAMME: BASIC HEALTH 
CARE - 0.3334   
FAMILY MEDICINE PROGRAMME: BASIC HEALTH 
INFRASTRUCTURE - 0.5317 
  
 
 
 
Table 33: IDA to BiH  
 
Health;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
1999 
2005 
 
 
(12.4)  (10.0) 
(19.4)   (19.0) 
 
BASIC HEALTH - 10.0000 
HEALTH SECTOR ENHANCEMENT PROJECT - 17.0000 
 
 
HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT -2.0000 
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Table 34: Japan to Macedonia  
  
Health;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
(4.2)  (5.8) 
(4.6)  (4.9) (6.2)  (6.1) (6.1)  (6.8) (7.3)  (7.4) 
UPGRADING MEDICAL 
EQUIPMENT - 5.8448 
EQUIPMENT SUPPLY FOR SKOPJE 
SURGICAL - 4.900 
GENERAL HOSPITAL EQUIPMENT 
SUPPLY - 6.1497 
BASIC HEALTH: HOSPITAL EQPT - 
6.7954 
PROJECT FOR IMPROVMT OF 
MEDICAL EQUIPMT FOR PRIMARY 
HEALTH CARE SERVICES - 7.4238 
 
 
 
Table 35: Italy to FRY/Serbia 
 
Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(4.7)  (4.0) 
REINFORCEMENT OF DIALYSIS CENTER - 3.9539  
 
 
 
 
Table 36: Japan to FRY/Serbia 
 
Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(11.6)  (12.0) 
IMPROVEMENT OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT - 12.0104 
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Table 37: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia 
 
Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(6.3)  (4.0) 
 
KOSOVO: UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL - 1.4930 
 
KOSOVO: EMERGENCY LABORATORY R. - 1.0974 
 
BASIC HEALTH: UN CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY - 0.5437 
 
KOSOVO: DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATION - 0.6306 
 
 
 
 
Table 38: Norway to FRY/Serbia 
 
Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(4.0)  (2.3) 
 
HEALTH: IFRC'S APPEALS 2000 - 0.2361 
MENTAL HOSPITAL KOSOVO - 0.2842 
 
BASIC HEALTH: ICRCS APPEALS 2000 REHABILITATION - 0.3126 
 
NUTRITION: ICRC APP 2000 FOOD SANITARY EQUIPMENT - 0.8512  
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Table 39: UK to FRY/Serbia 
 
Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
(10.9)  (8.1) 
 
(5.9)  (4.1) 
 
REHABILITATION OF PRIMARY HEALTH CARE - 4.0447 
STRENGTHENING & RATIONALISATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE - 1.5138 
REHABILITATION OF PRIMARY HEALTH CARE - 4.0447 
 HEALTH SCOPING MISSION & RECRUITMENT/MANAGEMENT - 0.7509 
 
 MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH-UNIVERSITY CLINICAL CENTRE: BASIC HEALTH CARE - 1.8489 
 
 
 
Table 40: EC to FRY/Serbia  
 
Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(14.3)  (9.2) 
(6.8)  (4.7) (12.6)  (10.7) (30.5)  (29.1) (10.9)  (10.6) 
 
SYSTEME DE SANTE AU 
KOSOVO - 9.2157 
CONSOLIDATING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF 
KOSOVO'S HEALTH 
SYSTEMS - 4.7121 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
CAPACITY BUILDING MEASURES 
- 10.7320 
PUBLIC ADMIN. REFORM - 
EFECTIVENESS OF THE TERTIARY 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM - 9.6906 
HEALTH POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT 
- 10.5643 
   
PUBLIC ADMIN. REFORM - DEV. OF 
HELATH INFO SYSTEM FOR BASIC 
HEALTH - 9.6906 
 
   
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM - 
IMPROVING PREVENTIVE HEALTH CARE 
- 9.6906 
 
 
 
 
Table 41: IDA to FRY/Serbia 
 
Health; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
2004 
 
(22.8)  (20.0) 
 
(7.3)   (7.0) 
 
SERBIA HEALTH PROJECT - 20.0000 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (MONTENEGRO) - 7.0000 
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WATER AND SANITATION  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 42: Austria to Albania  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(4.0)  (3.1) 
 
(5.2)   (3.5) 
 
(2.5)  (2.4) 
 
(2.9)   (2.8) 
 
WATER SUPPLY SHKODRA II - 3.0942 
REHABILITATION WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM 
SHKODRA - 2.6115 
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM SHKODRA - 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.4637 
WATER SUPPLY & SEWAGE WATER 
DISPOSAL KOPLIK - 1.7276 
 WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM FOR 4 VILLAGES - 
0.8707 
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM SHKODRA - 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT - 1.5105 
WB PROGRAM: INTERCOASTAL ZONE 
MANAGEMENT AND CLEAN-UP (WASTE 
MANAGEMENT) - 0.9943 
   
WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION FOR 4 
VILLAGES SOUTH OF SHKODRA - 0.3727 
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Table 43: Germany to Albania  
 
Water & Sanitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(9.0)  (9.1) 
 
(25.9)  (21.8) 
 
(15.6)  (13.0) 
 
(32.7)  (22.6) 
 
(15.9)  (10.8) 
 
(12.0)  (8.7) 
 
(20.1)  (17.6) 
 
(7.0)  (6.9) 
 
(2.9)  (15.8) 
 
WATER 
SUPPLY 
SYSTEMS 
REHAB. - 
9.0668 
WATER SUPPLY/ 
SEWERAGE REHAB. 
KORCA - 10.0917 
WATER/SANITATION 
SYSTEMS REHABILIT. 
- 5.9679 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION LAKE 
OHRID – 
SEWERAGE - 
6.0548 
PROMOTION OF 
ECONOMIC DVPT 
THROUGH INVEST 
IN INFRA WATER 
SUPPLY. SEWAGE 
[loan] - 10.7606 
WATER 
TREATMENT OF 
PLANTS - 2.4088 
LAKE OHRID-
SEWAGE 
/ACCOMP.MEAS - 
0.8665 
SEWERAGE 
KAVAJA - 
6.8331 
WATER 
SUPPLY & 
SANIT. - 
LARGE SYST. 
- 6.2143 
 
 
BMZ TC:WATER 
SUPPLY/SANIT.-SMALL 
SYS - 7.9811 
RURAL WATER 
SUPPLY. KAVAJA - 
5.6838 
WATER SUPPLY 
AND SEWERAGE 
KORÇA - 5.4186 
 WATER SUPPLY 
AND SEWERAGE 
KORCA [loan] - 
6.2643 
RURAL WATER 
SUPPLY KAVAJA - 
1.7329 
 ENVIRONM.PR
OTECTION 
LAKE 
OHRID/PROGR
ADEC - 
3.1071 
 KORCA WATER 
SUPPLY/SEWERAGE 
[loan]- 3.7483 
WATER 
SUPPLY/SEWERAGE 
REHAB..KRUJA 
[loan]- 1.1936 
WATER SUPPLY & 
SANITATION: 
SEWERAGE KAVAJA 
- 6.5966 
  WATER SUPPLY 
CENTRAL 
ALBANIA [loan] - 
12.7067 
 SEVERAGE 
POGRADEC - 
ACCOMP. 
MEASURES - 
0.3729 
      
ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION LAKE 
OHRID – 
SEWERAGE [loan] - 
4.4998 
RURAL WATER 
SUPPLY KAVAJA - 
2.3102 
 WATER 
SUPPLY & 
SANIT. - 
LARGE SYST - 
6.0687 
 
 
Table 44: Italy to Albania  
 
Water & Sanitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
(7.0)  (4.9) 
 
(18.2)  (14.3) 
 
(40.6)  (25.4) 
 
(7.8)  (7.6) 
 
WATER SUPPLY NETWORK EXT.. TIRANA 
[loan] - 4.9110 
TIRANA DRINKING WATER SUPPLY [loan]- 
14.2579 
WATER PLANT IN TIRANA [loan] - 25.3213 PROGRAMME FOR SOLIDE WASTE 
MANAGEMENT OF TIRANA [loan] - 7.4571 
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Table 45: Norway to Albania  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2005 
 
(5.6)  (3.5) 
 
(2.6)  (2.4) 
REHABILITATION AND UPGRADING OF EXISTING WATER AND WASTEWATER SYSTEMS - 
3.5063 
BURREL WSS REHABILITATION PROJECT - 2.2979 
 
 
Table 46: EC to Albania  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(9.8)  (9.4) 
 
TACIS / WORK PROGRAMME - 1.2833 
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM -  4.3484 
 
 
VLORE - WASTE TREATMENT STABILISATIONS PONDS - 3.7272 
 
 
Table 47: IDA to Albania  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(12.9)  (10.0) 
 
(17.1)  (15.0) 
 
(3.1)  (3.0) 
 
(17.9)  (17.5) 
 
WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION - 10.0000 
MUNICIPAL WATER AND WASTEWATER 
PROJECT - 15.0000 
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
PROJECT - 3.0000 
INTEGRATED COASTAL ZONE 
MANAGEMENT & CLEAN-UP PROJECT -  
17.5000 
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Table 48: Austria to BiH  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
(2.7)  (2.5) 
 
(3.1)  (2.5) 
 
(3.6)  (2.8) 
 
(3.8)  (2.9) 
 
WATER SUPPLY[TRAVNIK]  - 0.6610 
REHAB. OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM [JAJCE 
II]- 0.4067 
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM KONJIC - 1.2928 SEWAGE WATER TREATMENT PLANT - 
0.4628 
WATER SUPPLY REHABILITATION [JAJCE] - 
0.6612 
REHAB. OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM [ 
BUSOVACA] - 0.4562 
IMPROVING WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION 
- 1.3413 
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM IN SRBAC - 
1.3733 
WATER SUPPLY REHABILITATION [TESANJ] 
- 0.6613 
REHAB. OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM  
[KAKANJ]- 0.4895 
 WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM IN LAKTASI - 
0.7464 
WATER SUPPLY REHABILITATION [ZEPCE] 
- 0.4708 
REHAB. OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM 
[MRKONJIC GRAD] - 0.5355 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 49: Germany to BiH  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
(5.0)  (3.6) 
 
(17.8)  (17.4) 
 
REHABILITATION OF WATER SUPPLY FOR CITY OF KAKANJ - 3.6142 
REHAB.OF URBAN WATER SUPPLY - 11.1815 
 
 
REHAB.OF URBAN WATER SUPPLY [loan]- 6.2120 
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Table 50: Norway to BiH  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(18.1)  (9.8) 
 
(2.5)  (1.4) 
 
(8.4)  (4.8) 
 
(4.0)  (2.5) 
 
MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: WATER 
- 0.7255 
WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - SMALL SYST. - 
1.4108 
WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - SMALL SYST. - 
1.2232 
WATER: DELIVERIES - 1.0018 
WATER & SANITATION REHABILITATION - 
4.1400 
 WATER AND SANITATION 
REHABILITATION - 0.4737 
WATER: DELIVERIES - 0.9392 
WATER & SANITATION REHABILITATION - 
4.0605 
 WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - SMALL SYST. - 
0.8340 
WATER CONSULTING SERVICES - 0.3131 
WATER & SANITATION REHABILITATION - 
0.9096 
 KRESOVO WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM - 
1.1120 
WATER CONSULTING SERVICES - 0.2505 
  ODZAK POTABLE WATER TREATMENT 
PLANT-  1.1120 
 
 
 
Table 51: Switzerland to BiH  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2005 
 
(2.8)  (2.2) 
 
(8.3)  (8.2) 
 
WATER PROGRAMME - 2.1840 
WATER PROJECT [PRIJEDOR] - 8.0115 
 
 
Table 52: US to BiH  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(14.8)  (13.0) 
WATER: REDUCE HUMAN SUFFERING & CRISES IMPACT - DEMOCRATIC REFORM - 6.5000 
 
WASTE MGT: REDUCE HUMAN SUFFERING & CRISES IMPACT - DEMOCRATIC REFORM - 6.5000 
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Table 53: EC to BiH  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1999 
 
2003 
 
(38.5)  (29.4) 
 
(4.3)  (3.2) 
 
(8.8)  (7.5) 
 
WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER BIH - 25.9635 
PROGRAMME FOR UNA-SANA CANTON - 3.1966 DEVELOPMENT OF WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT ON THE 
RIVER BASIN LEVEL - 4.5188 
WATER AND SOLID WASTE BH - 3.4444  
 
 WASTE RECYCLING PILOT PROJECT - 2.9372 
 
 
Table 54: IDA to BiH  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(15.5)  (12.0) 
 
(23.4)  (18.0) 
 
(21.0)  (20.0) 
 
(8.2)  (8.0) 
 
WATER SUPPLY & SANITATION - 12.0000 
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PROJECT - 
18.0000 
URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICE 
DELIVERY PROJECT - 20.0000 
SOLID WASTE MGMT SUPPLMT - 8.0000 
 
 
 
Table 55: EC to Croatia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(15.7)  (15.3) 
KARLOVAC WATER AND WASTEWATER PROGRAMME - 15.2871 
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Table 56: Austria to Macedonia  
  
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2005 
 
(4.7)  (3.6) 
 
(3.6)  (3.5) 
 
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM KRIVOGASTANI - 0.8238 
SEWAGE WATER DISPOSAL CUCER-SANDEVO - 2.0507 
 
WASTE WATER TREATM. MAKEDONSKI BROD - 1.5331 
WATER SUPPLY VRAPCISHTE - CONSTITUTION & SUPPORT OF MUNICIPAL SUPPLY - 
1.0564 
 
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM SENOKOS - 0.7033 
 
 
 
Table 57: Germany to Macedonia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
2001 2002 2004 
 
(14.3)  (9.9) 
 
(6.7)  (4.6) 
 
(14.8)  (10.8) 
 
(11.7)  (11.4) 
LAKE OHRID ENVIRONM.PROTECTION - 
9.894 
MUNICIPAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION 
PROGRAMME - 4.578 
IRRIGATION SOUTHERN VARDAR VALLEY - 
1.4456 
ENVIRONMENT SAFEGUARD PROGRAMME 
IN RADIKA RIVER AREA - 5.0490 
  REHABILITATION WASTE WATER 
TREATMENT PLANT AND NETWORK - 
2.3126 
 
  GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 
0.4472 
 
  IRRIGATION SOUTHERN VARDAR VALLEY  
[loan] - 6.264 
 
 
 
Table 58: Japan to Macedonia 
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(81.0)  (84.1) 
 
(6.3)  (6.9) 
WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - LARGE SYST. - 0.3998 
 
THE PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY IN SKOPJE OUTSKIRTS - 0.4902 
ZLETOVICA BASIN WATER UTILIZATION IMPROVEMENT PROJECT [loan] - 83.5979 
 
THE PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY IN SKOPJE OUTSKIRTS - 6.4477 
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Table 59: Germany to FRY/Serbia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(6.3)   (5.1) 
 
(33.8)  (23.3) 
 
6.8)  (11.4) 
 
(11.7)  (8.5) 
 
(4.6)  (4.0) 
 
(19.5)  (19.0) 
 
(13.3)  (13.1) 
 
URBAN WATER 
SUPPIES 
REHABILITATION - 
5.0662 
WATER RESOURCES - 1.6492 REHABILITATION OF 
URBAN WATER 
SUPPLY AND 
SANITARIAN [NOVI 
SAD. NIS AND 
BELGRADE] - 9.1579 
REHABILITATION OF 
WATER SUPPLY IN 
BELGRADE - 4.8186 
INFRASTRUCTURE: 
SOLID WASTE SECTOR 
(KOSOVO) - 1.4686 
WATER SUPPLY & 
SANIT. - LARGE 
SYST. - 0.9939 
REGIONALE WV UND 
AE VI (KOSOVO) - 
8.4514 
 WATER RESOURCES 
POLICY/ADMIN. MGMT 
[Kosovo] - 0.5112 
WATER 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROGRAM  [Kosovo]- 
1.2798 
REHABILITATION 
IMPROVEMENT OF 
URBAN WATER SUPPLY 
- 2.4088 
EXPERT SERVICE FOR 
ESTABL. WATER 
UTILITY - 1.1297 
REHAB.URBAN 
WATER SUPPLIES 
- 4.9696 
REGIONALE WV UND 
AE VI (KOSOVO) - 
2.7343 
 REHABILITATION. UPGRADING 
AND EXTENSION OF WATER 
AND SEWERAGE SECTOR 
[Cetinje. Montenegro]- 0.9424 
WATER SUPPLY & 
SANIT. - SMALL SYST. 
- 0.6271 
INFRASTRUCTURE: 
SOLID WASTE SECTOR 
(KOSOVO) - 0.4712 
INFRASTRUCTURE: 
SOLID WASTE SECTOR 
(KOSOVO) - 0.7908 
REHAB.URBAN 
WATER SUPPLIES 
- 0.6212 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROGRAMME WATER 
SUPPLIES/ 
SANITATION - 1.1807 
 REHABILITATION OF URBAN 
WATER SUPPLY - 5.1831 
WASTE 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROGRAM - 0.3663 
INFRASTRUCTURE: 
SOLID WASTE SECTOR 
(KOSOVO) - 0.4712 
 REHAB.OF 
URB.WATER 
SUPPLY & 
SEW.SYST. - 
2.4848 
DEVELOPMENT OF 
SUSTAINABLE WATER 
TECHNOLOGIES - 
0.7265 
 REHABILITATION OF URBAN 
WATER SUPPLIES - 7.5390 
   REHAB.OF URBAN 
WAT.SUPPL. & 
SEW.SYST. - 
9.9391 
 
 STABILITY PACT IN SE 
EUROPE: WATER - 0.4996 
     
 WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - 
LARGE SYST. - 1.4607 
     
 WASTE 
MANAGEMENT/DISPOSAL  - 
0.6125 
     
 REHABILITATION. UPGRADING 
AND EXTENSION OF WATER 
AND SEWERAGE SECTOR 
[loan] - 4.7119 
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Table 60: Japan to FRY/Serbia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(6.7)  (7.1) 
IMPROVEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM IN BELGRADE CITY - 6.8483 
 
WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - LARGE SYST - 0.2110 
 
 
 
 
Table 61: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(3.2)  (2.0) 
 
(4.8)  (3.1) 
 
(3.1)  (2.2) 
WASTE MGMT: UN CONSOLIDATED INTER [Kosovo] . - 
1.9906 
WATER SUPPLY & SANIT. - SMALL SYST. - 1.0693 KOSOVO: ENVIRONMENT - 2.1506 
 
 
KOSOVO: WASTE MANAGEMENT - 2.0276  
 
 
Table 62: Norway to FRY/Serbia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(6.1)  (3.4) 
 
(4.4)  (3.6) 
 
(3.1)  (2.9) 
CLEAN UP ACTIONS OF THE DANUBE RIVER-  0.2437 
 
SIRIGOJNO - WATER SUPPLY- 1.4462 MIER REG SEWER COLLECTOR VRBAS KULA - 1.5525 
WATER RESOURCES POLICY/ADMIN. MGMT - 0.4489 
 
SOUTH-SERBIA - INFRASTR./MUNICIPL - 0.5935 LIFELONG LEARNING – LLL - 1.0926 
PRISTINA WATER SUPPLY- 2.5138 
 
 
MIER SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN GORNJ - 1.3491  
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Table 63: Sweden to FRY/Serbia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(4.3)  (4.2) 
DANUBE RIVER - 4.1700 
 
 
 
Table 64: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(10.2)  (10.1) 
WATER RESOURCES [Kosovo] - 9.3014 
 
RURAL WATER SANITATION AND SUPPLY - 0.6105 
 
 
 
Table 65: US to FRY/Serbia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(10.2)  (9.0) 
HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY SERVICES AND FACILITIES - 1.8300 
 
WATER: MORE EFFECTIVE. RESPONSIBLE & ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOV. - 0.5710 
 
WATER: RESTORED NORMALCY IN LIVING STANDARDS & OPPORTUNITIES - 2.1000 
 
HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY SERVICES AND FACILITIES - 1.8300 
 
WASTE MGT/DISPOSAL: MORE EFFECTIVE. RESPONSIBLE & ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOV. - 0.5710 
 
WASTE MGT: RESTORED NORMALCY IN LIVING STANDARDS & OPPORTUNITIES - 2.1000 
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Table 66: EC to FRY/Serbia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(10.)  (6.5) 
 
(6.8)  (4.7) 
 
(14.2)  (12.1) 
 
(18.3)  (17.4) 
 
(3.8)  (3.7) 
YS0004DEBLAIEMENT CHENAL 
DU DANUBE - 6.4510 
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR 
KOSOVO- SUPPLY OF CLEAN 
WATER - 4.7121 
FUTHER DEVELOPMENT OF 
KOSOVO'S IRRIGATION SYSTEM - 
2.4853 
ENVIRONMENT - 17.3935 WATER RESOURCES 
POLICY/ADMIN. MGMT [Kosovo] - 
3.7286 
    ENHANCED SEWERAGE AND 
WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT 
[Montenegro] - 1.4686 
 
 
 
 PANCEVO CANAL 
REHABILITATION - 5.0836 
  
 
 
 
 
 ENHANCED SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT [Montenegro] - 
3.0502 
  
 
 
Table 67: IDA to FRY/Serbia  
 
Water & Sanitation; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(8.0)  (7.0) 
MONTENEGRO ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE TOURIST AREAS: SALID WASTE MGMT - 7.0000 
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GOVERNMENT & CIVIL SOCIETY (GCS) 
 
 Table 68:  Italy to Albania  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
     
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
     
(12.5)  (9.1) (13.2)  (9.7) (34.9)  (24.7) (2.9)  (1.8) (12.4)  (7.8) 
PARTICIP. IN INTERNAT. 
INITIATIVES - 8.4850 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO 
NATIONAL ADM - 1.5835 
STRENGTHENING ALBANESE 
PENITENTIARY SYSTEM - 
TRAINING ACTIVITIES - 0.2751 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION - 
0.4286 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF 
PENITENTIARY SYSTEM - 7.7747 
TRAINING FOR MAGISTRATES 
AND PENITENTIARY PERSONNEL - 
0.5502 
RE-EMPLOYMENT OF PUBLIC 
CIVIL SERVANTS - 0.94954 
 
  LABORATORY FOR CUSTOM 
SERVICES - 0.6052 
IMPROVING LIFE CONDITIONS 
FOR MARGINAL POPULATION IN 
KORCIA PROVINCE - 0.42845 
 
   CONSTRUCTION OF PRISON - 
7.4286 
 
    AUTOMATION OF MINISTRIES - 
1.1830 
    RE-ORGANISATION OF CUSTOMS 
- 2.7513 
 
 
Table 69: Netherlands to Albania  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
(2.6)  (2.1) 
 
(11.8)  (7.4) 
 
(7.0)  (4.5) 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION- 2.1143 
 
PROJECT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.4612 YOUTH AND THE LAW - 1.0728 
 
 
STRENGTHENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT - 0.4085 PARLIAMENTARY CAPACITY - 0.7048 
 
 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 2.0905 GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 1.2341 
 CIVIL SOCIETY: PROGRESS THROUGH 
PARTNERSHIP - 1.7246 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 0.62869 
 
 
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATISATION - 0.95935  
 
 
STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 0.4081  
 
 
ELECTION: UNDP ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE - 0.4905  
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Table 70: Norway to Albania  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
(2.8)  (1.5) 
 
(10.7)  (6.8) 
 
(2.7)  (2.2) 
HUMAN RIGHTS:MISC DEMO. & HR SUPPORT - 1.2028 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROJECT - 0.8678 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM - 0.37095 
 UNICEF/COMING OF AGE: INVESTMENT IN YOUNG 
PEOPLES'S PARTICIPATION/DEVPT - 1.3121 
FIGHTING CHILD TRAFFICKING PROJECT - 0.5605 
 
 
CHILDRENS RIGHTS IN ALBANIA - 3.7567 INVESTMENT IN YOUNG PEOPLE´S PART. A - 0.45835 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 71:Sweden to Albania  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2005 
 
(3.3)  (2.4) 
 
(7.8)  (7.6) 
DECENTRALISATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ALLEVIATE POVERTY - 1.3253 
 
JUVENILE JUSTICE - 1.6059 
CLEAN AND GREEN PROJECT: DECENTRALISATION, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL DVPT - 
1.0232 
REGIONAL PROG. STATISTICS - 0.50192 
 
 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 1.6059 
 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.0036 
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Table 72: US to Albania 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(27.5)  (23.1) 
 
(35.4)  (30.4) 
 
(22.7)  (19.9) 
 
(17.2)  (15.4) 
 
(15.5)  (14.2) 
 
(16.0)  (15.0) 
 
(18.0)  (17.4) 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES: 
GOV. 
ADMINISTRATION – 
USD 12M 
 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 
2.8000 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
GROWTH IN NUMBER OF 
SELF-SUSTAINING PRIV. 
ENTERPRISES - 6.2970 
 
ANTI-CRIME 
TRAINING & 
TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE - 
5.2000 
 
 
LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIVITIES - 
4.6100 
LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
ASSISTANCE - 
5.0650 
 LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ASSISTANCE. ALL INL 
PROGRAMS - 5.1100 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES: 
CIVIL SOCIETY-
GENERAL – USD 7.1M  
 
EFFECTIVE 
RESPONSIBLE 
ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL 
GOVT PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION - 
2.3470 
RULE OF LAW & 
RESPECT FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF WOMEN/MEN 
STRENGTHENED - 
3.4500 
 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION - 
4.9470 
 
INVOLVEMENT OF 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL 
DECISION MAKING 
- 4.9040 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 
THAT BETTER 
SUPPORT 
DEMOCRATIC 
PROCESSES & 
MARKET REFORMS 
- 2.7490 
 INCREASED INVOLVEMENT 
OF CIV SOC IN ECONOMIC & 
POLITICAL DECISION 
MAKING - 4.6950 
 ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
GROWTH OF PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 1.8530 
INCREASE 
INVOLVEMENT - CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
ECONOMIC/POLITICAL 
DECISION MAKING - 
1.7500 
 
RULE OF LAW - 
1.2790  
 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 
THAT BETTER 
SUPPORT 
DEMOCRATIC 
PROCESSES & 
MARKET REFORMS 
- 2.9010 
INCREASED 
INVOLVEMENT OF 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
ECO/POLITICAL 
DECISION MAKING 
- 4.4470 
 
DESTRUCTION/CONVERSION: 
MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION: 
EUR. ALBANIA - 2.8000 
 OTHER GOVERNANCE - 
12.0000 
INCREASE 
INVOLVEMENT - CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
ECONOMIC/POLITICAL 
DECISION MAKING - 
1.3500 
 
   INTERNATIONAL TRUST 
FUND FOR DEMINING AND 
MINE VICTIMS ASSISTANCE 
(ITF) - 1.0000 
 CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & 
ECONOMIC DECISION 
MAKING - 2.0510 
A MORE COMPETITIVE & 
MARKET RESPONSIVE 
PRIVATE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR - 1.2610 
 
   LEGAL SYSTEMS THAT 
BETTER SUPPORT 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES & 
MARKET REFORMS - 2.1000 
  
SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 
6.9100 
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Table 73: EC to Albania 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(13.0)  (11.1) 
 
(29.8)  (22.8) 
 
(23.9)  (18.3) 
 
(23.8)  (17.5) 
 
(48.7)  (41.4) 
 
(50.8)  (48.5) 
 
(49.6)  (48.2) 
  
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 
11.1049 
CBC ALBANIA/ITALY 
1997 - 11.4549 
ALBANIA COP 98 CUSTOMS 
- 4.9211 
ALBANIA / CUSTOMS - 
2.5040 
ANNUAL ACTION 
PROGRAMME- 
TAXATION - 3.3891 
DEVELOPMENT OF 
EXTERNAL 
AUDITING SYSTEMS 
- 1.2424 
 
 
 
CBC ALBANIA/GREECE 
1997 - 11.3327 
CROSS BORDER 
COOPERATION 
ALBANIA/ITALY 1998 - 
6.6547 
CROSS BORDER 
COOPERATION 
ALBAINA - ITALY 
AL9913 - 7.4054 
PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
REFORM - 1.1297 
UPGRADING OF 
MINISTRY OF 
FINANCE DISTRICT 
OFFICES - 1.2424 
 
 
 
 CROSS BORDER 
COOPERATION 
ALBANIA/GREECE 1998 - 
6.7107 
CROSS BORDER 
COOPERATION 
ALBAINA - GREECE 
AL9914 - 7.4587 
JUDICIAL REFORM - 
5.6484 
INTERAGENCY CO-
OPERATION IN 
FIGHT AGAINST 
MONEY 
LAUNDERING - 
2.4848 
 
 
 
  MICRO DDH ALBANIA - 
0.1758 
INTEGRATED 
BORDER 
MANAGEMENT - 
5.6484 
UPDGRADE OF 
MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE-
DEPENDENT 
INSTITUTIONS - 
6.0877 
 
 
 
   ANNUAL ACTION 
PROGRAMME – 
CUSTOMS - 3.8837 
STRENTHENING 
CAPACITIES FOR 
INVESTIGATION OF 
ORGANISED CRIME 
- 1.8636 
 
    ASYLUM & 
MIGRATION - 2.2594 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
IN JUVENILE AND 
COMMERCIAL 
MATTERS - 3.1060 
 
    POLICE - 9.0375 GENERAL 
LOGISTICAL 
SUPPORT OT 
ALBANIAN STATE 
POLICE - 7.4543 
 
    LOCAL COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT - 
8.4727 
POLICE 
ASSISTANCE 
MISION - 4.7211 
 
    DEMOCRATIC 
STABILISATION - 
1.1297 
LOCAL COMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME - 
.3179 
 
      
SUPPORT TO 
ALBANIAN PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION - 
2.4848 
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SUPPORT BORDER 
POLICE AND 
CUSTOMS 
AUTHORITIES - 
4.9696 
 
 
 
     READMISSION
AGREEMENT AND 
NATIONAL 
MIGRATION 
STRATEGY - 2.4848 
 
 
   
 
Table 74: Austria to BIH 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(5.4)  (4.2) 
 
(18.2)  (13.7) 
 
(4.1)  (3.9) 
 
(7.1)  (6.9) 
 
UN PEACE MISSION UNMIBH - 2.2289 
PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY/HUMAN 
RIGHTS - 0.2323 
DONATION TO THE BOSNIAN COURT FOR 
WAR-CRIMES - 0.2485 
SUPPORT FOR WORLD BANK COUNTRY 
PROGRAMME BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA 
- 0.8079 
 
POLICE TRAINING - 1.3092 
SFOR: UN PEACE KEEPING MISSION - 
10.0039 
SUPPORT OF THE CREATION OF A 
MODERN CADASTRAL REGISTER 
ADMINISTRATION - 0.9790 
PEACE-BUILDING/POLICE TRAINERS - 
0.3871 
SUPPORT OF DEMINING ACTIVITIES - 
0.2217 
UN PEACE KEEPING MISSION UNMIBH - 
1.4047 
UN PEACE-BUILDING IN BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA - AUSLOG/SFOR - 1.5115 
UN PEACE-BUILDING: BILATERAL 
PARTICIPATION EUFOR - 4.4733 
 
ICG DISPLACED PERSONS PROJECT - 
0.2009 
UN PEACE-BUILDING. POLICE TRAINING - 
1.3419 
PARTICIPATION IN UN-ENDORSED EU-
PEACE MISSION - EUFOR/ALTHEA - 0.4983 
SUPPORT TO INTEGRATED COMMUNITY 
MINE ACTION PLANS - 0.6214 
  
MINE CLEARANCE PROGRAM - 0.4060 
SUPPORT OF ITF MINE ACTION 
PROGRAMME IN BOSNIA - 0.3469 
 
 
 
 
Table 75: Italy to BiH 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(5.1)  (3.2) 
 
OBSERVERS UN MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - 2.8453 
 
LAND MINE CLEARANCE - SUPPORT TO NGO - 0.2196 
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Table 76: Japan to BiH 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
(19.4)  (23.0) 
 
PROMOTION OF THE ECONOMY - 22.9779 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 77: Netherlands to BiH 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
(5.7)  (4.6) 
 
(7.9)  (5.6) 
 
(9.3)  (5.9) 
 
(6.6)  (4.2) 
 
(52.2)  (44.9) 
 
(10.2)  (9.9) 
 
PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION - 
3.0342 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES - 1.4245 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 
4.3827 
GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES - 1.0245 
ECONOMIC & DVPT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 
22.5963 (THROUGH 
WB)  
SOCIO ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF 
SREBRENICA - 4.8163 
 
 
PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION - 
0.8967 
ELECTIONS - 1.3646  
FREE FLOW OF 
INFORMATION - 0.6681 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT - 
21.4665 
CLARIFYING THE FATE OF MISSING 
PERSONS THROUGH DNA IDENTIFICATION. 
- 2.4857 
 
 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 1.0214 
 
LAND MINE CLEARANCE 
- 1.0281 
ICMP ACTIVITIES IN 
2003/II - 0.5649 
DEMINING STAB FUND BOSNIE 
HERCEGOVINA - 0.6210 
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Table 78: Norway to BiH  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
1998 1999 2000 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
(18.4)  (10.0) 
 
(10.9)  (6.1) 
 
(10.1)  (5.8) 
 
(14.7)  (9.3) 
 
(10.3)  (7.6) 
 
(10.9)  (8.8) 
 
(10.8)  (10.0) 
MISC DEMOC./HR 
SUPPORT:CIVIL 
SOCIETY - 4.6606 
ECONOMIC & DVPT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 
0.7695 
UN INTERIM POLICE TASK 
FORCE - 1.4821 
AID CO-ORDINATION - 
0.6136 
UNIPTF/EUPM 
SECONDMENT POLICE 
OFFICERS - 1.1692 
INT. COMMMIS. ON 
MISSING PERSONS - 
0.3605 
INT. COMMIS. ON 
MISSING PEOPLE - 
0.3105 
MISC DEMOC./HR 
SUPPORT:CIVIL 
SOCIETY - 1.5126 
ECONOMIC & DVPT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 
0.5130 
MINE VICTIMS ASSIST - 
2.0576 
POLICE SECONDMENT 
- 1.4184 
GENDER-BASED 
VIOLENCE - 0.4239 
ICTY WAR CRIMES 
CHAMBER WITHIN 
THE C - 0.3694 
RESTORATION BIH-
PARLIMENT - 0.5454 
HUMAN RIGHTS:MISC 
DEMO. & HR SUPPORT - 
1.2935 
 MINE CLEARING - 
0.6156 MINE ACTION - 0.9094 
SECONDMENTS 12 
POLICE OFFICERS - 
1.1445 
MINE ACTION - 
2.5229 
HIGH JUDICICAL 
AND PROSECUT. 
COUNCIL - 0.4926 
RECONSTR. OF 
PARLAM. BIH - AD. 
GRANT - 0.6640 
 
LANDMINE CLEARANCE: 
SLOVENIA TRUST FUND 
- 2.6393 
 
PREVENTING 
TRAFFICKING. GENDER 
BASED VIOLENCE & 
HIV/AIDS - 0.6574 
 
EUPM/POLICE 
SECONDMENT - 
1.3015 
GENDER BASED 
VIOLENCE - 1.0945 
 
 
  
MINE ACTION PROGME 
IN BIH - 1.8972  
RESTORATION BIH-
PARLIMENT - 0.5207 
EUPM 
SECONDMENTS - 
1.3274 
     
AID MINE ACTION 
PROGRAMME BIH - 
2.4726 
MINE ACTION 
PROGR. - 2.5558 
 
 
 
 
Table 79: Portugal to BiH  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(7.4)  (6.9) 
 
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - 6.8533 
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Table 80: Spain to BiH  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(12.9)  (8.4) 
 
(25.0)  (16.1) 
 
(32.4)  (18.6) 
 
(23.6) 
 
(21.4)  (13.7) 
 
(18.0)  (14.3) 
 
(10.9)  (10.0) 
 
PROCESSUS DE PAIX 
POST-CONFLIT - 2.5070 
PEACE BUILDING: 
HEADQUARTERS SFOR - 
1.1346 
OBSERVATEURS EN 
BOSNIE - 1.4538 
RETOUR ET 
STABILISATION 
POPULATION DANS 
LES BALKANS - 0.8668 
MATERIAL 
AMORTIZATION IN 
BOSNIA AND 
KOSOVO - 1.1080 
PROGRAMME. 
ACCESS TO 
JUDICIAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
SYSTEM - 1.0509 
LEGAL AN JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 
1.2448 
PROCESSUS DE PAIX 
POST-CONFLIT - 5.3800 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
BRIGADE ESPAGNOLE 
"SPABRI" - 2.1893 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 0.8267 
GROUPEMENT 
ESPAGNOL EN BOSNIE 
OTAN - 1.4253 
POST-CONFLICT 
PEACE-BUILDING 
(UN) - 0.6058 
DMNSE MILITARY 
MISSION - 0.6280 
POST-CONFLICT 
PEACE BUILDING 
(UN) - 5.0780 
 
 
PEACE BUILDING: 
INTERNATIONAL POLICE 
TASK FORCE (IPTF) - 
3.1017 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 1.4667 
OBSERVATEURS ONU 
EN BOSNIE - 1.4128 
HQSFOR IN BOSNIA - 
0.8445 
OPERATIONS OF 
PEACE 
MAINTAINANCE. 
EUPM MISSION IN 
BOSNIA - 0.7330 
POST-CONFLICT 
PEACE BUILDING 
(UN) - 0.6892 
 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
CONSULTATION ET 
COORD. AVEC 
AUTORITES CIVILES - 
1.6201 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 2.9300 
AMORTISSEMENT DE 
MATERIEL EN BOSNIE 
ET AU KOSOVO - 
4.2118 
SPAGT BOSNIA - 
1.1243 
KFOR MILITAR 
MISSION - 1.0651 
POST-CONFLICT 
PEACE BUILDING 
(UN) - 0.7186 
 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
SECURITE ET 
PROTECTION EN 
BOSNIE - 5.4622 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
SECURITE ET PROTECTION 
EN BOSNIE - 4.6415 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX 
: SECURITE ET 
PROTECTION EN 
BOSNIE - 3.4825 
ADVISING AND 
COORDINATION 
WITH THE CIVILIAN 
AUTHORITIES IN 
BOSNIA - 1.9314 
TRANSPORT IN 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA - 
0.7635 
POST-CONFLICT 
PEACE BUILDING 
(UN) - 1.1285 
  
 
AMORTISSEMENT DU 
MATÉRIEL - 3.6334 
 
SECURITY 
PROTECTION IN 
BOSNIA - 6.5057 
ADVICE AND 
COORDINATION 
WITH POLICE 
AUTHORITIES IN 
BIH - 2.0148 
 
  
 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
CONSULTATION ET 
COORD. AVEC AUTORITES 
CIVILES - 1.3792 
  
SECURITY AND 
PROTECTION IN 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA - 
6.7866 
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Table 81: Sweden to BiH  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
 
1998 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(10.1)  (8.4) 
 
(10.0)  (7.2) 
 
(15.3)  (15.0) 
 
(10.2)  (9.9) 
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT - 0.5793 
 
LEGAL REFORM -  1.2447 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAND REGISTRY 
LAW IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA -  2.3820 
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY/PLANNING -  2.2876 
 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT : 
RUNNING COSTS - 0.3964 
GOVERNMENT AUDIT-INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT -  3.7289 
GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY -  10.2087 
LEGAL AN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT -  
0.6691 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT : 
POLICE ASSISTANCE - 0.4882 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION -  0.7718 
THE INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY WITHIN THE 
MINE CLEARANCE STRUCTURES -  2.0417 
REGIONAL PROG. STATISTICS-  0.5019 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES: 
STATISTICS COOP. PROJ. - 1.1998 
CIVIL SOCIETY: CARITAS YOUTH CENTRES 
AND SCHOOLS -  0.6172 
 GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION -  0.4529 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION : 
PERSONAL TO OHR - 1.5163 
   THE DAYTON PROJECT -  0.4015 
ELECTIONS - 0.6163   
STRENGH. CIVIL SOCIETY: FRAMEWORK 
AGREEMENT OPIC -  0.5009 
HUMAN RIGHTS -  1.4181   
STRENGH. CIVIL SOCIETY: OPC FRAME -  
0.6043 
   
 
CIVILIAN PEACE-BUILDING. CONFLICT 
PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION -  0.7842 
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Table 82: US to BiH  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(17.9)  (14.8) 
 
(38.6)  (32.4) 
 
(28.9)  (24.8) 
 
(64.6)  (56.7) 
 
(41.4)  (37.0) 
 
(36.4)  (33.2) 
 
(30.0)  (28.2) 
 
(26.3)  (25.4) 
 
ECO RESTRUCT.: 
PARTICIPANT 
TRAINING - 3.4250 
 
HUMAN SUFFERING & 
NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRISES: GOV. ADM. 
- 2.8958 
HUMAN SUFFERING 
AND NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRISIS ARE REDUCED 
- 2.0800 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 10.6670 
TREASURY 
ADVISORS - 
2.6800 
LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIVITIES - 
2.5000 
LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
ASSISTANCE - 
6.5700 
LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
ASSISTANCE. ALL 
INL PROGRAMS - 
1.4280 
DEMO TRANSITION: 
POL./SOCIAL 
PROCESS - 4.3350 
HUMAN SUFFERING 
AND NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRISES: CIVIL 
SOCIETY - 10.0968 
HUMAN SUFFERING 
AND NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRISIS ARE REDUCED 
- 19.2190 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
HUMAN SUFFERING 
& CRISES IMPACT - 
DEMOCRATIC 
REFORM - 9.7580 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION: 
HUMANITARIAN - 
11.3500 
POLICE TRAINING 
- 1.0000 
A MORE 
PARTICIPATORY. 
INCLUSIVE 
DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY - 
15.8570 
A MORE 
PARTICIPATORY. 
INCLUSIVE 
DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY - 
10.0220 
INDEPENDENT 
MEDIA - 6.1420 
STATE - ANTI-CRIME 
PROGRAM - BOSNIA 
POLICE: CIVIL 
SOCIETY - 5.0000 
OFFICE OF 
TRANSITION 
INITATIVES - 1.0590 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
CRITICAL PRIVATE 
MARKETS 
EXPANDED & 
STRENGTHENED - 
3.2000 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION - 
17.0400 
CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
- 3.0000 
SUSTAINABLE 
MINORITY 
RETURNS - 
4.3030 
A MORE 
PARTICIPATORY. 
INCLUSIVE 
DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY - 3.3560 
 
 
HUMAN SUFFERING 
AND NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRISES: ELECTION - 
5.8941 
DEMINING - 1.5570 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
CRITICAL PRIVATE 
MARKETS 
EXPANDED & 
STRENGTHENED - 
1.9590 
STRENGTHENING 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 
3.7600 
REDUCED HUMAN 
SUFFERING AND 
CRISES IMPACT -- 
DEMOCRATIC 
REFORM - 9.5220 
 
INTERNAT'L. 
COMM. MISSING 
PERSONS (ICMP) 
- 1.0000 
 
DEMINING - 5.4340 
 
 
GVT ADMIN.: 
REDUCE HUMAN 
SUFFERING & 
CRISES IMPACT - 
DEMOCRATIC 
REFORM - 9.7510 
 
DEMOCRACY 
PROGRAMS - 
1.2500 
 SUSTAINABLE 
MINORITY 
RETURNS- 
CREATION OF A 
MULTI-ETHNIC 
SOCIETY - 0.8510 
 DEMINING- 2.3050  
MORE 
TRANSPARENT & 
ACCOUNTABLE 
GOVERNMENT 
INSTITUTIONS 
ENCOURAGED - 
9.6100 
 
A MORE 
PARTICIPATORY. 
INCLUSIVE 
DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY - 
12.3940 
 
INTERNATIONAL 
TRUST FUND FOR 
DEMINING AND 
MINE VICTIMS 
ASSISTANCE 
(ITF) 3.3730 
   
A MORE 
PARTICIPATORY. 
INCLUSIVE 
DEMOCRATIC SOC. - 
6.3290 
 
A MORE 
PARTICIPATORY. 
INCLUSIVE 
DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY - 1.5380 
 
 
   
 
DEMINING - 5.1610  
PUBLIC 
DIPLOMACY - 
0.7680 
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Table 83: EC to BiH 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(31.7)  (20.5) 
 
(19.9)  (12.8) 
 
(30.5)  (21.1) 
 
(58.8)  (50.0) 
 
(81.9)  (78.0) 
 
(68.1)  (66.2) 
PUBLIC BUILDING 
REHABILITATION IN BIH   
- 2.6726 
SUPPORT FOR THE OHR 
- 12.0992 
SUPPORT TO THE BUDGET 
OF THE OFFICE OF THE 
HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN 
BOSNIA - 12.5410 
REFORM OF PUBLIC 
ADMISTRATION - 1.7221 
DEVELOPMENT OF STATE 
INSTITUTIONS - 11.8027 
ECONOMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 14.9142 
INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
STRENGTHENING IN BIH 
- 9.5844 
MICROPROJETS 
2001/4000 DELEGATION 
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA 
- 0.4478 
ANNUAL ACTION 
PROGRAMME 2002 - 
TAXATION AND CUSTOM - 
5.6920 
SUPPORT JUDICIARY - 
3.5895 
SAP AWARENESS 
PROGRAMME - 2.4848 
LEGAL AN JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 17.4000 
CUSTOMS PROGRAMME 
2000 - 2.5007 
 
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS MICROPROJECTS 
2002 BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA - 0.4712 
SUPPORT TO THE CENTRES 
FOR JUDICIAL AND 
PROSECUTORIAL TRAINING - 
0.9293 
ANNUAL ACTION 
PROGRAMME 2004 FOR 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
– CUS - 9.3179 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 3.7286 
SUPPORT FOR 
INDEPENDENT MEDIA IN 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA - 
2.7952 
 HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.5655 
ANNUAL ACTION 
PROGRAMME - 11.2969 
CUSTOMS AND TAXES - 
5.5908 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 17.8971 
LAND MINE CLEARANCE - 
0.8939  
LAND MINE CLEARANCE - 
0.7539 
SUPPORT TO BIH POLICE 
FORCE 
(MANAGEMENT.ORGANISATI
ON. PREMISES) - 3.9192 
ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE - 12.4239 HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.0626 
   
 
INTEGRATED BORDER 
MANAGEMENT:BORDER 
CROSSING - 6.7781 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 1.8636 
CIVILIAN PEACE-BUILDING. 
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND 
RESOLUTION (SUPPORT TO 
OHR) - 10.5382 
   
 
ASYLUM AND MIGRATION - 
1.6945 
INTEGRATED BORDER 
MANAGEMENT - 17.3935  
   
SUPPORT TO MIGRATION 
MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES - 
1.7292 
SUPPORT TO THE RUNNING 
COSTS OF THE OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE 
- 16.6023 
 
     
SUPPORT TO ASYLUM 
MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES - 
1.1297 
     
TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION: SUPPORT 
TO BLOOD COLLECTION 
TEAMS - 1.0167 
 
 
  HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.9415   
     
SUPPORT TO THE BUDGET OF 
THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
REPRESENTATIVE - 13.8216 
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Table 84: Germany to Croatia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(5.5)  (3.8) 
 
ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 0.7068 
 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.8246 
 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - 0.4712 
 
STATISTICAL SYSTEMS MODERNISATION - 1.4136 
 
 
 
Table 85: Norway to Croatia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(6.8)  (4.3) 
 
(7.2)  (5.3) 
 
(8.8)  (7.2) 
 
(8.7)  (8.1) 
 
LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME - 
0.3131 
FRESH WATER PROJECT - 0.9043 THE JUDGE´S WEB -  0.9303 MODERNISATION OF SYSTEMS HHI - 
0.5123 
 
EMBASSY FUND - 0.3130 
PROJECT FUND 2003 – CROATIA - 0.2119 EU HANDBOOK AND EU SUPPORT FOR 
CROAT - 0.4052 
CAP BUILDING & PROPERTY 
REGISTRATION - 0.7134 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.2062 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.4861 PROJECTFUND 2004 – CROATIA - 0.1993 ANTI TRAFFIICKING PROJECT - 0.1934 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.2505 
IOM - REINTEGRATION OF DEFENCE 
PERSONNEL - 1.4129 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT (CRP) - 0.3919 REININTEGRATION ASSISTANCE TO 
SEPARED DEFERNCE - 2.1734 
 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.4759 
MINE ACTION - 1.9295 AID MINE ACTION PROGRAMME CROATIA - 
1.8732 
SCAN CENTRE EXTENSION - 1.8288 
MINE ACTION PROG. IN CROATIA - 1.8972  
 
CONV. OF ARCHIVE OF CROMAC - 1.3687 MINE ACTION PROGRAMME - 2.0619 
   
REINTEGR. ASSIST. SEPARATED DEFENCE 
- 0.9625 
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Table 86: US to Croatia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(10.3)  (8.7) 
 
(10.8)  (9.2) 
 
(18.0)  (15.8) 
 
(15.5)  (13.8) 
 
(9.1)  (8.3) 
 
(14.5)  (13.6) 
 
(14.6)  (14.1) 
 
DECENTRALIZATION: 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POL. & ECO. 
DECISION MAKING - 
2.7805 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & 
ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 
2.6640 
RULE OF LAW & 
RESPECT FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN/MEN 
STRENGTHENED - 
0.7500 
TREASURY 
ADVISORS - 0.8700 
MORE EFFECTIVE 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION AND 
IMPROVED 
GOVERNANCE - 
6.8810 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ASSISTANCE - 2.0070 
EUR DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS 
(INCL. DEMOCRACY 
COMMISSION)- 0.4600 
 
BETTER-INFORMED 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POL. & ECO. 
DECISION MAKING - 
2.1626 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & 
ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 
0.4850 
LEGAL & JUDIC. DVT: 
MORE EFFECTIVE 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION & 
IMPROVED GOV. - 
2.1290 
 GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES - 0.5300 
NONPROLIFERATION 
PROGRAMS - 0.7500 
MORE EFFECTIVE 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
AND IMPROVED 
GOVERNANCE - 8.4020 
MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION AND 
IMPROVED GOVERNANCE - 
2.4670 
 
BETTER-INFORMED 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POL. & ECO. 
DECISION MAKING - 
0.6179 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & 
ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 
1.6950 
GVT ADMIN.: MORE 
EFFECTIVE CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION & 
IMPROVED GOV. - 
1.9090 
ANTI-CRIME 
TRAINING & 
TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE - 
1.5200 
 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
- 0.4000 
MORE EFFECTIVE CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION AND 
IMPROVED GOVERNANCE - 
6.1790 
 
CITIZENS 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POL. & ECO. 
DECISION MAKING: 
ELECTION - 0.6179 
OFFICE OF 
TRANSITION 
INITATIVES - 1.6560 
GVT ADMIN.: MORE 
EFFECTIVE CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION & 
IMPROVED GOV. - 
1.2500 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION - 
0.6600 
 
NONPROLIFERATION 
PROGRAMS - 0.8500 
INTERNAT'L. COMM. MISSING 
PERSONS (ICMP) - 0.5000 
 
DEMINING - 1.7260 
DEMINING - 2.4260 
MORE EFFECTIVE 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION & 
IMPROVED 
GOVERNANCE - 
4.8370 
HUMANITARIAN - 
0.5000 
 
INTERNATIONAL 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
PROGRAMS - 1.3250 
EXPORT CONTROL AND 
RELATED BORDER SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE - 0.5690 
 
DEMINING - 0.6000 
 
DVT OF POLITICALLY 
ACTIVE CIVIL 
SOCIETY PROMOTED 
- 1.4700 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION - 
9.1890 
 
 INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND 
FOR DEMINING AND MINE 
VICTIMS ASSISTANCE (ITF) - 
2.3000 
  DEMINING - 2.6580 
STRENGTHENING 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 
0.5200 
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Table 87: EC to Croatia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(5.7)  (3.7) 
 
(34.3)  (29.2) 
 
(67.1)  (63.9) 
 
(61.5)  (59.8) 
 
 
RENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS CROATIE 
- 2.7647 
SUPPORT TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
PLANNING - 3.3891 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM - 11.3058 
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 12.5938 
 
MICRO-PROJECT DELEGATION CROATIE 
REGIE D'AVANCE - 0.8928 
PUBLIC FINANCE - 3.1631 
NATIONAL REGIONAL AND LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 3.7272 
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 6.2143 
 
 
MODERNISATION OF JUSTICE - 4.5188 
PUBLIC FINANCE - 3.7272 LEGAL AN JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 2.8735 
 
INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGMENT - 
5.6484 
MODERNIZATION OF JUSTICE - 5.5908 GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 3.7286 
 
POLICING AND ORGANISED CRIME - 
3.3891 
POLICING AND ORGANISED CRIME - 4.2241 GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 3.7286 
 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM - 
6.7781 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE - 7.4543 GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 6.4193 
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 2.2594 INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGMENT - 23.5433 GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 16.3746 
  
 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 4.3484 GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 6.2143 
 
   HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.6157 
 
 
Table 88 : Germany to Macedonia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2005 
 
(2.6)  (1.9) 
 
(4.3)  (4.2) 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 0.471 
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTS - 1.8642 
GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.7162 
 
INTRODUCTION OF EU-DIREKTIVES INTO MACEDONIAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY - 0.9321 
 
 
IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF COMMUNAL SERVICES - 0.6214 
 
 
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION - 0.4877 
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Table 89: Netherlands to Macedonia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CR 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2005 
 
(9.6)  (6.0) 
 
(3.7)  (2.6) 
 
(3.7)  (3.6) 
 
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 4.0833 
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 0.3204 TWINNING CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION - 0.5194 
STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY - 0.4274 
 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 0.711 TWINNING COURT OF AUDITORS - 1.1581 
HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.501 
 
 TWINNING AND SUPPORT TO ZELS - 1.78574 
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION - 0.555 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 90: Norway to Macedonia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(4.0)  (2.3) 
 
(4.9)  (3.1) 
 
(4.7)  (3.5) 
 
(4.6)  (3.7) 
 
(5.0)  (4.7) 
CENTRAL SECURITIES 
DEPOSITORY - 1.223 
STRENGTHEN LOCAL SELF 
GOVERNMENT REFORM - 0.3067 
MUNICIPALITIES, LOCAL 
ENTREPR. & BUS - 1.4126 
EUPOL PROXIMA - 0.681 BILAT EUR INTEGRATION - 
0.7657 
STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY 
- 0.25079 
SECONDMENTS 6 POLICE 
OFFICERS - 0.5996 
OSSE SECONDMENT 4 POLICE 
OFFICERS - 0.6580 
OSSE - POLICE SECONDMENT - 
0.3624 
BILAT STRENGTHENING SEA - 
0.45704 
 UNHCR - 0.3756  LOCAL GOV. TRAINING - 0.5764 MAK - POLICE SECONDM., 
PROXIMA - 0.8229 
   BILAT - POLICE STATION TEARCE 
- 0.464 
LOCALIZING SUST. 
DEVELOPMENT - 0.3104 
    MULTI-FUNCTIONAL LIBRARIES - 
0.3104 
    BILAT MEDIA DEVELOPMENT - 
0.7682 
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Table 91: Sweden to Macedonia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(3.0)  (2.2) 
 
(2.9)  (2.8) 
 
(9.0)  (8.8) 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS- 1.8543 TO BUILD CAPACITY OF COMMUNITIES AND STRENGTHEN 
DECENTRALISATION PROCESS - 1.7131 
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING - 
0.8101 
 FOR NETWORK OF MULTI ETHNIC ORGANISATIONS AND 
INCREASING INST. CAPACITY- 0.4696 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 0.5353  
 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.4301 REGIONAL PROG. STATISTICS - 0.5019 
 
 
 GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION - 0.7701 
 
 
 CADASTRE SUPPORT - 3.6132 
 
 
 OPEN FUN FOOTBALL SCHOOLS - 0.3679 
 
 
 HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.4376 
 
 
 HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.590 
 
 
 
 
Table 92: Switzerland to Macedonia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(5.0)  (3.9) 
PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION - 1.2357 
 
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 1.330 
 
PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - 1.330 
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Table 93: UK to Macedonia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(5.9)  (4.9) 
PUBLIC ADMIN REFORM - 4.8987 
 
 
 
Table 94: US to Macedonia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(5.7)  (4.8) 
 
(15.8)  (13.6) 
 
(16.1)  (14.1) 
 
(33.4)  (29.8) 
 
(26.6)  (24.3) 
 
(25.2)  (23.6) 
 
(17.4)  (16.9) 
DECENTRALIZATION: 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POL. & ECO. DECISION 
MAKING - 0.6404 
EFFECTIVE 
RESPONSIBLE 
ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL 
GOVT PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION - 
2.3 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
CRITICAL PRIVATE 
MARKETS EXPANDED & 
STRENGTHENED - 
1.325 
ANTI-CRIME TRAINING 
& TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE - 1.97 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIVITIES - 1.83 
MITIGATE ADVERSE 
SOCIAL IMPACTS OF 
THE TRANSITION TO 
MARKET-BASED DEMO 
- 7.8 
MORE LEGITIMATE 
DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS - 
13.242 
MORE EFFECTIVE, 
RESPONSIBLE & 
ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL 
GVT & PUBLIC ADM - 
1.19 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 
7.005 
GVT ADMIN.: MORE 
EFFECTIVE, 
RESPONSIBLE & 
ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL 
GOV. - 1.4 
DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION - 10.994 
DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION - MORE 
LEGITIMATE 
DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS - 
14.971 
MORE LEGITIMATE 
DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS - 
10.533 
 
BETTER-INFORMED 
CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POL. & ECO. DECISION 
MAKING - 0.966622 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & 
ECONOMIC DECISION 
MAKING - 2.013 
BETTER-INFORMED 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION - 
POLITICAL/ECO. 
DECISION-MAKING - 
1.759 
CROSS-CUTTING 
PROGRAMS - 2.1 
TRANSITION 
INITIATIVES:PEACE & 
DEMOCRACY IN KEY 
CONFLICT-PRONE 
COUNTRIES -5.92 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ASSISTANCE - 2.425 
 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES: 
CIVIL SOCIETY-
GENERAL - 1.2438 
    CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION - 
1.924 
 
     PEACE & DEMOCRACY 
ADVANCED IN KEY 
CONFLICT-PRONE 
COUNTRIES - 9.952 
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Table 95: EC to Macedonia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CR 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(14.8)  (11.3) 
 
(14.6)  (11.2) 
 
(10.3)  (7.6) 
 
(6.4)  (4.2) 
 
(22.2)  (18.9) 
 
(53.5)  (50.9) 
 
(25.6)  (24.9) 
CBC FYROM/GREECE - 
11.3327 
CBC FYROM/GREECE - 
11.18443 
CROSS BORDER 
COOPERATION 
FYROM/GREECE 
MA9901 - 7.4587 
BLACE BORDER 
CROSSING - 3.6862 
CREATION OF A 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
OFFICE - 1.694 
PRIVATE AND 
FINANCIAL SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENT - 6.833 
ECONOMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 
1.491 
    REFORM OF THE 
JUDICIARY - 2.8245 
REFORM OF THE 
JUDICIARY - 1.8635 
ECONOMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 
1.242 
    FIGHT AGAINST CRIME 
- 3.38944 
DEVELOPMENT OF 
LOCAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE - 
10.560 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT - 1.61 
    BORDER CONTROL 
POINTS - 1.3557 
FIGHT AGAINST CRIME 
- 9.9391 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT - 2.4857 
    ANNUAL ACTION 
PROGRAMME - 2.2596 
INTEGRATED BORDER 
MANAGMENT - 
16.1510 
LEGAL AN JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 1.864 
    STRENGTHENING 
CONTROL OF THE 
GREEN BORDER - 
3.163 
INTER ETHNIC 
RELATIONS AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY - 3.7271 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 
3.728 
    IMMIGRATION AND 
ASYLUM - 1.1298 
 GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 
2.4857 
    CIVIL SOCIETY 
DEVELOPMENT - 
1.3557 
 GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 
7.4571 
      EUROPEAN INITIATIVE 
FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
(EIDHR) 
MICROPROJECTS - 
0.5649 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46
 
 
Table 96: Austria to FRY/ Serbia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(18.3)  (12.1) 
 
(16.2)  (10.6) 
 
(8.0)  (5.6) 
 
(9.4)  (8.0) 
 
(12.4)  (11.9) 
 
(9.9)  (9.6) 
 
UN PEACE MISSION: 
INTERIM 
ADMINISTRATION 
MISSION IN KOSOVO - 
4.2443 
PEACE-BUILDING (UN) 
KOSOVO - 2.2176 
PEACE BUILDING IN THE 
KOSOVO - AUCON/KFOR 
- 2.8216 
UN PEACE MISSION UNMIK - 
2.3610 
PEACE BUILDING IN THE 
KOSOVO - AUCON/KFOR - 
9.8847 
UN PEACE-BUILDING: 
BILATERAL PARTICIPATION 
KFOR - 7.5466 
UN-PEACE-BUILDING 
KOSOVO - 5.1257 
UN PEACE MISSION 
UNMIK - 5.6163 
PARTICIPATION IN 
"CIVIL MILITARY 
COOPERATION" 
PROJECTS IN KOSOVO - 
0.3608 
PEACE BUILDING IN THE 
KOSOVO - AUCON/KFOR - 
3.0769 
UN PEACE-B./POLICE TRAINERS 
- 1.2390 
CIMIC: SUPPORT 
(PERSONNEL & 
LOGISTICS) FOR NGO 
PROJECTS - 0.3357 
UN PEACE-
BUILDING/POLICE 
TRAINERS - 2.1529 
UN PEACE-BUILDING 
AND POLICE TRAINERS - 
2.2245 
UN PEACE 
MISSION/POLICE 
TRAINERS - 1.3166 
UN PEACE MISSION/POLICE 
TRAINERS - 1.5912 
UN-MISSION IN THE KOSOVO - 
UNMIK: ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE –EXPERTS- 0.3727 
UN PEACE-B./POLICE 
TRAINERS - 1.1339 
     
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION 
OF ANTIPERSONNEL 
MINES - 0.3107 
 
 
 
Table 97: Germany to FRY/ Serbia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(14.0)  (9.5) 
 
(32.4)  (23.5) 
 
(33.9)  (29.8) 
 
(15.5)  (15.1) 
 
SETTING UP A COURT OF 
AUDITORS - 1.1905 
LEGAL REFORM (SERBIA) - 1.4136 LEGAL REFORM (SERBIA) - 1.1297 REFORM OF FISCAL ADMINISTRATION - 0.6212 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 1.7400 
FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE 
OF THE STABILITY PACT - 0.9047 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - 1.1297 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE 
- 0.6684 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 1.2821 
FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE 
OF THE STABILITY PACT - 18.2509 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - 1.2427 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE 
- 11.7729 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES - 2.7359 
PROMOTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE (KOSOVO) - 
0.4712 
FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE OF THE 
STABILITY PACT - 0.6457 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE 
- 0.7529 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 0.5748  
FURTHER SKILLS MEASURES IN THE SCOPE OF THE 
STABILITY PACT - 23.6082  
MINE CLEARANCE - 0.5972 
  GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.6748  
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Table 98: Italy to FRY/Serbia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(10.9) (7.7) 
 
PROVISIONAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FOR KOSOSVO RECONSTRUCTION - 2.2011 
 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT - 5.4933 
 
 
 
 
Table 99: Netherlands to FRY/ Serbia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(22.7)  (14.3) 
 
(18.4)  (11.8) 
 
(12.9)  (9.0) 
 
(10.8)  (9.3) 
 
(7.3)  (7.0) 
 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 
- 3.3109 [CONTR. TO MISSION 
IN KOSOVO] 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT 
- 0.8875 
KOSOVO - 1.4551 
KOSOVO:GOV - GOVERNANCE 
AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 
PROGRAMME - 2.8240 
BEL HELP PROJECT 
[REINTEGRATION OF REFUGEES 
AND IDPS] - 0.4340 
KOSOVO: ADVANCING RULE OF 
LAW - 0.8912 
KOSOVO: CAPACITY BUILDING - 
2.6303 
KOSOVO: ASSEMBLEE - 0.4429 
 SUPPORT TO SERBIAN MOFE - 
1.1920 
BEL WAR CRIMES TRIALS - 0.3625 
STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY 
- 1.6117 [KOSOVO] 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION: 
CAPACITY BUILDING FUND - 1.3299 
CAPACITY BUILDING FUND - 
0.6352 
ONAFH.TV STATIONS - 0.4240 
SPM IN SERB.DEP.PREMIER OFF. - 
1.2065 
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION 
[MONTENEGRO] - 1.8836 
MONTENEGRO: PROMOTING 
LEGISLATION - 0.4836 
KOSOVO MISSION - 2.4569 
RADIO TELEVISION KOSOVO - 
2.1542 
BEL UMIER SMN - 0.4848 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 1.3617 
RADIO B92 - 0.3090 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 0.7539 
KOSOVO POLICE SERVICE: 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
BUILDING (KPSICB) - 1.2180 
BEL-LFP BTD 2004 - 0.6212 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 1.1944 
RADIO TELEVISION KOSOVO - 
0.2293 
KOSOVO: POLICE SERVICE 
ASSISTANCE - 0.7539  
DZO FOCUS VOJVODINA 2003-II - 
0.8259 
DEMOBILISATION: UN 
CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY 
- 1.9906 
CONTRIBUTE OVSE MISSION IN 
KOSOVO - 3.6486    UNDP/MOLESP - 0.4431 
 
 
LAND MINE CLEARANCE - 0.3779 
  
DVB SF KOSOVO IOM-PROJ - 
0.4970 
    
DVB SF SENM PRISMA TRAINING - 
0.8697 
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Table 100: Norway to FRY/Serbia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 
 
(16.1)  (8.8) 
 
(15.9)  (8.9) 
 
(18.4)  (10.6) 
 
(16.4)  (9.4) 
 
(9.0)  (6.7) 
 
(10.6)  (8.7) 
 
(18.5)  (17.1) 
MISC DEMOC./HR 
SUPPORT:CIVIL SOCIETY 
- 2.2227 
 
ECONOMIC & DVPT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 
1.4429 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 
0.4576 
QUICK BUILD PRISON 
[Kosovo] - 0.5560 
COVIC-PLAN 
SOUTHERN SERBIA - 
0.9349 
MANAGEMENT 
INFORMATION 
IMPROVEMENT  - 
2.0427 
A MODEL FOR LEGAL 
REFORM IN SERBIA - 
0.6929 
MISC DEMOC./HR 
SUPPORT:CIVIL SOCIETY 
- 0.8971 
GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES 
[Montenegro] - 
3.8477 
ELECTIONS: 
SCHOLARSHIP 
PROGRAMME FOR 
STUDENTS - 0.4757 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT - 0.6894 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT - 0.7065 
OSSE/POLICE 
SECONDMENT - 
0.5037 
FORENCIC 
TECHNICAL CENTRE 
NIS - 0.4363 
HUMAN RIGHTS:MISC 
DEMO. & HR SUPPORT - 
2.3266 
KOSOVO POLICE 
ACADEMY - 0.6413 
HUMAN RIGHTS: OSCE 
MISSION KOSOVO - 
0.4597 
STRENGTHENING 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 
0.4170 
OSSE POLICE 
SECONDMENT 2003 - 
0.3783 
PROJECTS IN SERBIA 
- 0.4048 
OSCE SERBIA AND 
MONTENEGRO - 
0.6385 
HUMAN RIGHTS:MISC 
DEMO. & HR SUPPORT - 
0.9940 
HUMAN RIGHTS - 
0.5036 
DEMOBILISATION: 
KOSOVO OSCE POLICE 
ACADEMY - 0.6869 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT - 0.4448 
POLICE 
COOPERATION 2003 - 
0.8478 
FORENCIC 
TECHNICAL CENTRE 
NIS-  0.3652 
UNMIK KOSOVO - 
3.1487   
HUMAN RIGHTS:MISC 
DEMO. & HR SUPPORT - 
2.0060 
MINE CLEANING - 
0.6413 
DEMOBILISATION: UN 
INTERIM ADMISTRATION 
KOSOVO (UNMIK) POLICE 
- 2.0658 
TRANSPORT OF 
REFUGEES TO 
KOSOVO - 0.7790 
MEDIA - 0.5652 SUPPORTING REAL 
ESTATE 
REGISTRATION - 
1.1128 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROGRAMME - 0.3056 
  INTERNATIONAL TRUST 
FUND MINE VICTIMS - 
2.2736 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS: 
RETURN OF 
REFUGEES - 0.4832 
 CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT - 0.6061 FORENSIC LAB. 
PODGORICA - 0.4037 
  MINE DESTRUCTION 
PROGRAMME IN KOSOVO - 
1.3073 
 
ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS - CHILD 
SUPPORT - 1.4018 
 LOCAL MEDIA 
SUPPORT IN SERBIA - 
0.5935 
SECONDM. LAWYERS 
HPD/UNMIK - 0.5476 
  
  
 
INDEPENDENT LOCAL 
MEDIA SUPPORT - 
0.5560 
SOUTH SERBIA 
COMMUNITY POLICY 
PROJECT - 0.9404 
  
  
 
MINE CLEARANCE 
PROGRAM - 1.5321 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
MUNICIPAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 
0.5841 
    
  CAPACITY BUILDING 
FACILITY PROJECT - 
0.4657 
    
  JUNO III – 
VOJVODINA - 0.5554 
    
  ALTERNATIVE 
LIVELIHOODS 
PROGRAMME - 0.7762 
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Table 101: Spain to FRY/Serbia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(38.2)  (24.5) 
 
(35.6)  (20.5) 
 
(28.5)  (16.6) 
 
(25.5)  (16.3) 
 
(22.7)  (18.1) 
 
(9.8)  (9.0) 
 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
OBSERVATEURS 
POLITIQUES AU KOSOVO 
(UNMIK) - 0.4142 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 0.6453 
RETOUR ET 
STABILISATION 
POPULATION DANS LES 
BALKANS - 0.6476 
UNMIK SPU - 4.1288 
OPERATIONS OF PEACE 
MAINTAINANCE. UNMIK 
MISSION. KOSOVO COMPANY 
- 2.7023 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE 
BUILDING (UN) - 0.4014 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
OPERATION "JOINT 
GUARDIAN" AU KOSOVO - 
0.4470 
FORCES SPÉCIALES DE 
POLICE AU KOSOVO - 
0.4037 
FORCES DE L'OTAN AU 
KOSOVO KFOR - 0.6271 
MATERIAL AMORTIZATION 
IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO - 
1.1080 
TRANSPORT IN KOSOVO - 
1.5999 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE 
BUILDING (UN) - 6.6105 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
CONSULTATION ET 
COORD. AVEC AUTORITÉS 
CIVILES - 2.8816 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 0.5911 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
UNMIK - 3.9236 KFOR EN BOSNIA - 0.6590 
ADVICE AND COORDINATION 
WITH POLICE AUTHORITIES 
IN KOSOVO - 4.2220 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE 
BUILDING (UN) - 0.8684 
 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX: 
TRANSPORT DE MATÉRIEL 
- 1.1398 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 1.3293 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 0.5745 
UN OBSERVERS IN 
KOSOVO (UNMIK) - 0.6697 
SECURITY AND PROTECTION 
IN KOSOVO - 8.5329 
 
 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
SÉCURITÉ ET 
PROTECTION AU KOSOVO 
- 6.0706 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
CONSULTATION ET 
COORD. AVEC 
AUTORITÉS CIVILES - 
3.5116 
AMORTISSEMENT DE 
MATÉRIEL EN BOSNIE ET 
AU KOSOVO - 4.2118 
ADVISING AND 
COORDINATION WITH THE 
CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES IN 
KOSOVO - 2.6372 
  
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
AMORTISSEMENT DE 
MATÉRIEL - 7.7803 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
SÉCURITÉ ET 
PROTECTION AU 
KOSOVO - 7.0952 
CONSULTATION ET 
COORDINATION AVEC LES 
AUTORITÉS CIVILES AU 
KOSOVO - 1.9216 
MATERIAL TRANSPORT TO 
KOSOVO - 0.9993 
  
 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX: 
TRANSPORT DE MATÉRIEL 
POUR DES ONG - 5.7632 
AMORTISSEMENT DU 
MATÉRIEL - 3.6334 
MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX : 
SÉCURITÉ ET PROTECTION 
AU KOSOVO - 3.8862 
PROTECTION AND 
SECURITY IN KOSOVO - 
5.3298 
  
 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 2.9300 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) - 0.7266 
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Table 102: Sweden to FRY/Serbia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(6.6)  (4.4) 
 
(6.5)  (4.7) 
 
(6.5)  (5.8) 
 
(8.1)  (7.9) 
 
(27.2)  (26.5) 
JUDICIAL TRAINING CENTER - 
0.8705 
 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
REFORM- HUMAN RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT - 3.4976 
JUVENILE JUSTICE - 2.3520 
CRIME PREVENTION IN SERBIA - 
1.6918 
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 1.6680 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION: 
INFOSYSTEM - 0.5273 
MINORITY AND YOUTH 
PROGRAMMING - 0.3086 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 0.3590 
TO REFORM THE SYSTEM IN SERBIA 
TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE AND 
IMPARTIALITY - 1.0889 
DEMOCRATIC POLICING - 
4.0148 
HUMAN RIGHTS [micro credit 
in Montenegro] - 0.7738  
CONSOLIDATE PEACE. SERBIA - 
0.7427 STATISTICS IN SAM - 3.3904 
CRIME INTELLIGENCE - 3.2118 
HUMAN RIGHTS: SOUTH 
SERBIA - 0.4836 
 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS - 
0.3892 
STRENGTHENING OF MINISTRIES FOR 
COLLECTING AND ANALYSING DATA - 
0.4352 
STATISTICS KOSOVO - 1.9936 
  
SUPPORT TO THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN 
SERBIA - 0.7427 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 
[Cadastre Serbia] - 0.5445 
REGIONAL PROGRAM 
STATISTICS - 1.5023 
 
 
 
REPORTER MAGAZINE - 0.3063  
CADASTRE - 3.5825 
    
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT OPIC 
- 1.3709 
    
STRENGH. CIVIL SOCIETY: 
OPEN FUN FOOTBALL SCHOOLS 
- 0.4619 
    
BALKAN TRUST FOR 
DEMOCRACY - 0.3747 
    
FREE FLOW OF INFO.: 
FRAMEWORK - 1.5076 
 
 
 
  
HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.7986 
 
 
 
  
ROMA EXPERTS + NGO - 0.4791 
    
HUMAN RIGHTS [Ombudsman 
Kosovo] - 0.6531 
    
IOM REGIONAL ANTI-TRAFFIC - 
0.4376 
    
FREE FLOW OF INFO.: SUPPORT 
TO UNIFEM. KOSOVO - 0.7093 
 
 
 
  
HUMAN RIGHTS - 0.4015 
    
CIVILIAN PEACE-BUILDING. 
CONFLICT PREVENTION AND 
RESOLUTION - 1.3715 
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Table 103: Switzerland to  FRY/Serbia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(31.3)  (22.2) 
 
(14.6)  (10.5) 
 
(30.1)  (29.8) 
 
(26.9)  (26.6) 
 
ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING 
[EBRD]- 16.3487 
ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 1.6527 PENITENTIARY SYSTEM - 0.6196 SOUTIEN À LA KFOR - 24.4079 
 
ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 
2.4291 
ECONOMIC & DVPT POLICY/PLANNING - 5.9280 
MSP MUNICIPAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME 
- 1.2070 
UN: GESTION CIVILE DES CONFLITS 
(POLICE CIVILE) - 0.7491 
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT 
[Kosovo] - 0.5628 
FRY-HARMONISATION OF FRY LAW WITH EU - 
0.5750 
SWISSCOY [KFOR] - 25.9845  
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 
[Cadastre Kosovo] -1.6393 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES [UN Radio 
Kosovo] - 0.7114 
PROJET DANS DOMAINE DE LA GEST. 
CIVILE DES CONFLITS 
(DÉMOCRATISATION) [UN] - 0.9326 
 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 
[Kosovo] - 1.1849 
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Table 104: UK to FRY/Serbia  
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
    
1999 2000 2001 2003 
    
(34.9)  (25.9) (31.0)  (21.8) (14.8)  (10.1) (17.4)  (14.3) 
KOSOVO DEMINING PROGRAMME - 
21.3420 
SHORT TERM CONSULTANCY INPUT TO 
THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS - 
0.4304 
AID COORDINATION SERBIA - 0.6054 
 
SERBIA: STRENGTHENING 
MACROECONOMIC FISCAL ANALYSIS 
CAPACITY - 1.2705 
 
KOSOVO DEMINING DECANE - 4.3456 
SUPPORT FOR DVPT OF AN INTEGRATED 
PERSONNEL & PAYROLL SYSTEM: ECO & DVPT-  
1.0279 
DEV. OF PERSONNEL POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES IN THE UN MISSION IN 
KOSOVO - 3.5964 
SERBIA: CHANGE MANAGEMENT - 0.6557 
 
GOM'S PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME IN 
MONTENEGRO- 0.9471 
 
SOCIAL POLICY REFORM: STATE-CIVIL 
SOCIETY RELATIONSHIPS IN SERBIA - 
4.6090 
SSAJ JUSTICE SECTOR - 0.8497 
 
 
DEV. OF PERSONNEL POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES IN THE UN MISSION IN KOSOVO- 
0.4541 
 PUBLIC SERVICE LAW - 4.5902 
 
 
SUPPORT TO UN MINE ACTION AND COORD. 
CENTER MINE ACTION PROG. IN KOSOVO - 
4.4656 
 
SSAJ PROGRAMME COMMUNITY BASED 
POLICING AND SAFETY - 1.2391 
 
 
KOSOVO DEMINING PROGRAMME - 6.2001  JUSTICE IN SERBIA - 1.8651 
 
KOSOVO HALO TRUST UNEXPLODED ORDONANCE 
CLEARANCE - 2.7914 
 
COMMUNITY BASED POLICING AND 
SAFETY SERBIA - 2.0248 
 
DEFENCE SYSTEMS MINE CLEARANCE 
CAPABILITY - 3.6073  
COMMUNITY BASED POLICING AND 
SAFETY - 1.1915 
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Table 105: US to FRY/Serbia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(49.7)  (42.6) 
 
(210.2)  (184.7) 
 
(141.9)  (126.8) 
 
(133.1)  (121.5) 
 
(156.3)  (146.8) 
 
(83.4)  (80.8) 
 
HUMAN SUFFERING AND 
NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRISIS ARE REDUCED - 
0.5000 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
ACCELERATED DVT & 
GROWTH OF PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE - 26.7850 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 
7.1790 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIVITIES - 1.1300 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ASSISTANCE - 63.5000 
EUR DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS 
(INCL. DEMOCRACY 
COMMISSION) - 1.8830  
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 
1.5630 
 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
CROSS-CUTTING 
PROGRAM - 1.8000 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 
29.9000 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIVITIES - 35.9390 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ASSISTANCE- 3.6110 
DEV & GROWTH OF PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE / FISCAL & ADMIN 
DECENTRALIZATION - - 0.9720 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 
1.7230 
 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
CROSS-CUTTING 
PROGRAMS - 1.0000 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 
50.4320 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
PROGRAMS - 3.0150 
MORE EFFECTIVE. 
RESPONSIVE. AND 
ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS - 12.1050 
MORE OPEN AND RESPONSIVE 
GOVERNMENT ACTING 
ACCORDING TO THE RULE OF 
LAW - 6.1850 
 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 
0.5670 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND 
INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK - 24.7000 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 
25.0550 
POLICE TRAINING - 5.0000 
MORE EFFECTIVE. 
RESPONSIVE AND 
ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS - 5.3370 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ASSISTANCE. ALL INL 
PROGRAMS - 6.4480 
 
HUMAN SUFFERING AND 
NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRISIS ARE REDUCED - 
1.0000 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
RESTORED NORMALCY 
IN LIVING STANDARDS 
& OPPORTUNITIES - 
4.6170 
STRENGTHENING CIVIL 
SOCIETY - 2.5900 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM - 1.5000 
INCREASED INVOLVEMENT 
OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
ECO/POLITICAL DECISION 
MAKING - 48.0600 
MORE EFFECTIVE. RESPONSIVE. 
AND ACCOUNTABLE 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS - 
1.5980 
 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 
4.3980 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 
8.2910 
PEACE & DEMOCRACY 
ADVANCED IN KEY 
CONFLICT-PRONE 
COUNTRIES - 7.0720 
INCREASED. BETTER 
INFORMED CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION - 14.9810 
INCREASED INVOLVEMENT 
OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
ECO/POLITICAL DECISION 
MAKING - 12.3460 
MORE EFFECTIVE. RESPONSIVE. 
AND ACCOUNTABLE 
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS - 
7.4900 
 
CROSS-CUTTING - 1.7340 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 
11.1920 
 
INCREASED. BETTER 
INFORMED CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION - 51.7490 
 CIV SOC & GOVMT ARE MORE 
EFFECTIVE PARTNERS IN 
ACHIEVING GOOD 
GOVERNANCE - 1.3000 
 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 
11.7740 
ECO. & DVT POLICY: 
CRITICAL PRIVATE 
MARKETS EXPANDED & 
STRENGTHENED - 
2.2200 
 
INCREASED. BETTER 
INFORMED CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION - 1.5000 
 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
EXCHANGES - 1.8800 
HUMAN RIGHTS - 1.6000 ECO. & DVT POLICY:    CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN 
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CRITICAL PRIVATE 
MARKETS EXPANDED & 
STRENGTHENED - 
2.9600 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 31.8500 
OFFICE OF TRANSITION 
INITATIVES - 4.4050 
RULE OF LAW & 
RESPECT FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN/MEN 
STRENGTHENED - 
4.5000 
  
 CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 5.6980 
OFFICE OF TRANSITION 
INITATIVES - 7.7890 
GVT ADMIN.: 
ACCOUNTABLE & 
TRANSPARENT GOV. - 
1.0000 
  
 CIV SOC & GOVMT ARE MORE 
EFFECTIVE PARTNERS IN 
ACHIEVING GOOD 
GOVERNANCE - 7.8770 
DEMINING - 5.2740 
 
 
BETTER-INFORMED 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION - 
POLITICAL/ECO. 
DECISION-MAKING - 
7.0000 
  
 CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN 
POLITICAL & ECONOMIC 
DECISION MAKING - 3.3300 
 
GVT ADMIN.: MORE 
EFFECTIVE. 
RESPONSIBLE & 
ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL 
GOV. - 6.8580 
  
 INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND 
FOR DEMINING AND MINE 
VICTIMS ASSISTANCE (ITF) - 
1.0000 
 
STRENGTH. CIVIL 
SOCIETY: CROSS-
CUTTING PROGRAMS - 
1.0000 
  
  
 
 
BETTER-INFORMED 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION - 
POLITICAL/ECO. 
DECISION-MAKING - 
32.1350 
  
  
 
BETTER-INFORMED 
CITIZENS' 
PARTICIPATION - 
POLITICAL/ECO. 
DECISION-MAKING - 
5.0000 
  
  
 
STRENGT. CIVIL 
SOCIETY: RESTORED 
NORMALCY IN LIVING 
STDS & OPPORTUNITIES 
- 6.1990 
  
  
 
DVT OF POLITICALLY 
ACTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY 
PROMOTED - 1.8050 
  
  
 
DVT OF POLITICALLY 
ACTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY 
PROMOTED - 3.3250 
  
  
 
ELECTIONS: CREDIBLE 
& COMPETITIVE 
POLITICAL PROCESSES 
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ENCOURAGED - 1.1000 
 
RULE OF LAW & 
RESPECT FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF 
WOMEN/MEN 
STRENGTHENED - 
4.0000 
  
  
 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) : 
PROMOTE LOCAL 
DEMOCRATIC 
LEADERSHIP - 6.5740 
  
  
 
POST-CONFLICT PEACE-
BUILDING (UN) : 
SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC 
ELMTS IN SOCIETY-
10.1460 
  
  
 
 
DEMINING - 1.9450   
  
 
 
 
Table 106: EC to FRY/Serbia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(18.6)  (13.7) 
 
(22.8)  (14.7) 
 
(38.3)  (24.7) 
 
(95.2)  (66.1) 
 
(174.4)  (148.2) 
 
(211.6)  (201.6) 
 
(167.8)  (163.1) 
 
SUPPORT FOR 
TRANSPORT AND LOCAL 
ADMINISTRATION IN 
KOSOVO - 6.3932 
KOSOVO - UNMIK 
(SOUTIEN AUX 
COUTS DE 
FONCTIONNEMENT) - 
5.5294 
SUPPORT FOR THE 
OPERATING COST FOR 
UNMIK - 9.8513 
SUPPORT FOR THE 
OPERATING COSTS 
OF THE EU PILLAR OF 
UNMIK 2002 - 
18.5656 
GENERAL TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE 
FACILITY - 5.6484 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT - 
FORMULATION OF 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY - 7.1704 
ECONOMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 
19.5128 
AGENCE POUR LA 
RECONSTRUCTION DU 
KOSOVO - 5.3277 
 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 
4.5157 
PROVISION OF TECH. 
ASSIT. IN THE FIELDS OF 
CUSTOM&TAXATION - 
0.8825 
ANNUAL 
PROGRAMMES 2002 - 
GOOD GOVERNANCE 
AND INSTITUTION 
BUILDING - 18.8484 
GENERAL TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE 
FACILITY AND 
PROGAMME RESERVE 
- 2.2594 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT - 
SUPPORT TO KOSOVO 
TRUST AGENCY - 
7.1704 
ECONOMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 
1.8643 
PROCEDURE ECRITE - 
1.5794 
 
MICRO-PROJECT 
DELEGATION 
YOUGOSLAVIE REGIE 
D'AVANCE - 1.0598 
TEMPUS III - CARDS 2001 
- FRY SERBIA - 3.3412 
ANNUAL 
PROGRAMMES 2002 
FOR KOSOVO - 
6.5969 
SUPPORT PUBLIC 
FINANCE REFORM - 
22.5938 
PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
REFORM - 8.6967 
ECONOMIC AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY/PLANNING - 
2.4857 
 
 
FREE FLOW OF 
INFORMATION - 
3.0449 
PROVISION OF TECH. 
ASSIT. IN THE FIELDS OF 
CUSTOMS&TAXATION - 
3.4212 
ANNUAL 
PROGRAMMES 2002 
FOR SERBIA - 
NATIONAL 
PROGRAMME - TAX & 
CUSTOM - 4.6233 
CUSTOMS & 
TAXATION - 5.6484 
PUBLIC ADMIN. 
REFORM - OVERALL 
ADM. & FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT 
REFROMS - 9.6906 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT - 
1.2429 
  
PROVISION OF THECH. 
ASSIT.IN THE FIELDS OF 
CUSTOMS&TAXATION - 
2.7581 
 
ANNUAL 
PROGRAMMES 2002 
FOR KOSOVO-PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
REFORM - 9.1415 
SUPPORT TO JUSTICE 
SYSTEM - 14.6859 
CAPCITY BUILDING 
MINISTRIES. 
FINANCIAL SECTOR. 
AGENCIES.LOC.AUTH
ORITIES - 63.9831 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT - 
3.1071 
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  91 PROJETS DROITS DE 
L'HOMME ET DEMOCRATIE 
- 0.6493 
 
ANNUAL 
PROGRAMMES 2002 
FOR KOSOVO - 
CUSTOMS & 
TAXATION - 2.3560 
SUPPORT TO 
JUDICIAL REFORM - 
1.1297 
2004 ACTION 
PROGRAMME FOR 
KOSOVO - CUSTOMS 
& TAXES - 1.8636 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT - 
1.8643 
  
91 PROJETS DROITS DE 
L'HOMME ET DEMOCRATIE 
- 0.5969 
ANNUAL ACTION 
PROGRAMME 2002 
FOR MONTENEGRO - 
TAX & CUSTOM - 
0.7181 
SUPPORT TO POLICE 
- 5.6484 
2004 ACTION 
PROGRAMME FOR 
MONTENEGRO - 
CUSTOMS & TAXES - 
1.2424 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT - 
4.9714 
  
91 PROJETS DROITS DE 
L'HOMME ET DEMOCRATIE 
- 0.7351 
ANNUAL 
PROGRAMMES 2002 
FOR KOSOVO-
SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
SOCIETY - 2.6388 
EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION - 
10.1672 
2004 ACTION 
PROGRAMME FOR 
SERBIA - CUSTOMS & 
TAXES - 7.4543 
LEGAL AN JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 
3.7286 
  
91 PROJETS DROITS DE 
L'HOMME ET DEMOCRATIE 
- 0.5136 
7 PROJETS RELATIFS 
AU RENFORCEMENT 
DE LA 
DÉMOCRATISATION - 
0.7068 
SUPPORT TO 
MUNICIPALITIES AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECENTRALISATION - 
39.5391 
JUSTICE & HOME 
AFFAIRS - 8.0755 
LEGAL AN JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 
6.9600 
   
ANNUAL 
PROGRAMMES 2002 
AS A VIABLE AND 
INDEPENDENT 
PUBLIC SERVICE-
1.4136 
BORDER POLICE 
REFORM - 2.2594 
JUSTICE & HOME 
AFFAIRS - SUPPORT 
TO JUSTICE 
MINISTRY - 21.1206 
LEGAL AN JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT - 
17.1514 
    
SUPPORT FOR 
DESCENTRALISATION 
TO THE MUNICIPAL 
LEVEL - 1.1297 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT - 
FOOD SAFETY 
CONTROL SYSTEM 
FOR KOSOVO - 
7.1704 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 
4.3500 
    
 
MINISTRY OF STATE 
ADMINISTRATION- 
TRAINING OF MIDDLE 
MANAGEMENT - 
2.2594 
PUBLIC 
ADMIN.REFORM - TO 
STATE UNION 
INSTITUTIONS & 
EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION - 
9.6906 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 
3.7286 
    
SUPPORT TO THE 
ASSEMBLY - 2.2594 
PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
REFORM - 6.2120 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 
1.8643 
    
PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
REFORM SUPPORT AT 
THE CENTRAL LEVEL - 
2.2594 
INTEGRATED BORDER 
MANAGEMENT - 
4.9696 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION 
[Kosovo] - 18.6428 
    
CUSTOMS & 
TAXATION - 2.2594 
BORDER CROSSINGS 
COMMITTE & 
REHABILITATION OF 
BORDER CROSSINGS 
- 2.4848 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 
24.4842 
    
 
CIVIL 
SOCIETY/INCLUSION 
IN POVERTY 
REDUCTION 
STRATEGY PROCESS - 
SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 
8.6967 
GOVERNMENT 
ADMINISTRATION - 
6.2143 
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1.1297 
    
CIVIL SOCIETY - 
1.1297 
STRENGTHENING 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 
1.2424 
STRENGTHENING 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 
2.4857 
    
INSITITUTIONAL 
SUPPORT TO CIVIL 
SOCIETY 
ORGANISATIONS- 
1.1297 
SUPPORT FOR THE 
OPERATING COSTS 
OF THE EU PILLAR OF 
UNMIK 20 - 24.1396 
STRENGTHENING 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 
1.2429 
    
 
PROMOTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
EDUCATION ANT 
INTER-ETHNIC 
DIALOGUE - 1.3876 
 STRENGTHENING 
CIVIL SOCIETY - 
2.4857 
    
SUPPORT FOR THE 
OPERATING COSTS 
OF THE EU PILLAR - 
22.3284 
 POST-CONFLICT 
PEACE BUILDING 
(UN) [EU Pillar of 
UNMIK] - 31.2988 
 
 
 
 
Table 107: IDA to FRY/Serbia 
 
GCS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(12.8)  (12.5) 
 
ECONOMIC POLICY & PUBLIC EXP. MGMT TECHNICAL ASS. PROJECT [grant] - 5.5000 
 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT TA PROJECT [grant]  - 7.0000 
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OTHER  
 
 
 
Table 108: Italy to Albania 
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(8.1)    (5.7) 
 
(5.3) (3.6) 
 
(2.9) (2.4) 
 
(3.6) (3.5) 
BSS SOCIO-CULTURAL COOP. 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALBANIA & 
CAMPANIA REGION - 1.6508 
 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT [BUILDING OF A 
PRISON] 2.8840  
PLANNING OF FIER-VLORE ROAD - 0.5242 
ESSENTIALS SOCIAL SERVICES IN 
TIRANA - LOCAL FUNDS - 3.0034 
REORGANISATION OF MINISTRY OF 
CULTURE - 1.1005  
UNESCO TRUST FUND: ACTION PLAN IN SOUTH 
EAST-EUROPE REGION - 1.4121  
 
CENSUS OF CULTURAL GOODS - 1.3757    
 
 
 
Table 109: IDA to Albania 
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
2001 
 
(31.0)  (25.0) 
(13.5)  (10.0) 
 
HOUSING: REHABILITATION - 25.0000 
SOCIAL SERVICES DEVELOPMENT - 10.0000 
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Table 110: Germany to BiH 
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(6.4)  (6.3) 
 
PROMOTION OF STRZUCTURES IN THE YOUTH SECTOR - 1.2424 
 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.2174 
 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN - 0.2510 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.6200 
 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.4671 
 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN - 0.2609 
 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.6411 
 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.4497 
 
 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.4460 
 
FOREIGN CULTURAL RELATIONS - 0.6591 
 
 
 
Table 111: Italy to BiH  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(6.9)  (4.3) 
 
BSS: VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION TO WB RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME - 4.2837 
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Table 112: Netherlands to BiH  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
(12.9)  (9.8) 
 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 4.2706 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.9942 
 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.4837 
 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.5049 
 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.5543 
 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.4550 
 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 1.0819 
 
 
 
 
Table 113: Norway to BIH  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
(13.2)  (7.2) 
 
(14.6) (8.2) 
 
(8.0)  (4.6) 
MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: SOCIAL - 3.4658 CENTER FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN - 0.5130 
 
EMPLOYMENT: STABILITY PACT SOUTH EAST 
EUROPE [through World Bank] - 1.8530 
MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: SOCIAL - 0.6666 
SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 1.1800 
 
BUILDING PROGRAMME - 0.6792 
 
MISC DEMOCRACY & HR SUPPORT: HOUSING - 3.0698 
SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 0.5900 
HOUSING: REHABILITATING REPATRIATING - 
0.6254 
 SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 0.6413 
LOW-COST HOUSING: RETURN AND 
REHABILITATION - 1.0231 
 
 
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN PROGRAMME - 0.5130 
 
 
 
WAR VICTIMS & EMPLOYMENT - 1.5391  
 
 
EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT. - 0.7054  
 
 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.5900  
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Table 114: Sweden to BIH  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(9.1) (7.5) 
 
(7.4) (6.0) 
 
(11.1) (8.2) 
 
(11.0) (7.3) 
 
(16.4) (11.8) 
 
(13.3) (11.7) 
 
(12.1) (11.8) 
 
(42.6) (41.4) 
 
EMPLOYMENT 
POLICY AND 
ADMIN. MGMT. - 
0.5033 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
0.9002 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
2.3970 
CARITAS 
RECONSTRUCTION 
- 0.9507 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
3.0253 
CARITAS - 3.5484 RECONSTRUCTION 
OF 320 HOUSES IN 
FIVE 
COMMUNITIES IN 
NORTH EAST BIH - 
4.6610 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
2.5828 
EMPLOYMENT 
POLICY AND 
ADMIN. MGMT. - 
0.5033 
HOUSING: 
RECONSTRUCTION - 
2.6627 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
MGMT. :CARITAS 
RECONSTRUCTION - 
2.0051 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
2.6067 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
2.2463 
RECONSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM - 2.8855 
SANSKI BRIDGE - 
RECONSTRUCTION 
OF 350 HOUSES 
FOR RETURNEES - 
5.5971 
TUZLA 
RECONSTRUCTION 
- 3.5196 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
1.3376 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT-  
2.2414 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
3.1656 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
0.4836 
HOUSES 
RECONSTRUCTION 
- 3.0856 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
4.7216 
RECONSTRUCTION 
OF 120 HOUSES IN 
FOUR 
MUNICIPALITIES IN 
EASTERN BIH - 
1.5245 
CARITAS 
RECONSTRUCTION 
- 3.7605 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
3.5233 
 
CULTURE WITHOUT 
BORDERS - 0.4367 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
2.7811 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
3.2931 
HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
0.4246 
 HOUSING POLICY 
AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 
5.0988 
CULTURAL 
HERITAGE - 
0.5813 
 
   
   LOW-COST 
HOUSING - 5.7937 
    
   LOW-COST 
HOUSING - 6.6283 
    
   CARITAS HOUSING 
- 6.3948 
    
   CULTURE AND 
RECREATION - 
0.7628 
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Table115: UK to BiH  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(9.3)  (6.9) 
 
SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 1.2284 
SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 0.3964 
 
SOCIAL SERVICES: OXFAM LOTOS - 0.3574 
 
STRENGTHENING SOCIAL WELFARE - 4.8536 
 
 
 
 
Table 116: EC to BiH  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2003 
 
(24.9)    (18.3) 
 
(12.8) (8.3) 
 
(25.9) (22.0) 
 
ECONOMIC REGENERATION + SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN BIH - 18.3059 
EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT. - 8.2981 HOUSING REPAIR&RELATED ACTIVITIES - 22.0289 
 
 
 
Table 117: IDA to BiH  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(28.9)   (25.0) 
 
(23.9)  (18.6) 
 
(47.3) (35.0) 
 
(8.0) (7.0) 
 
(66.0)  (63.0) 
WAR VICTIMS 
REHABILITATION - 5.0000 
SOCIAL PROTECTION - 
3.5500 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT - 
15.0000 
SOCIAL INSURANCE TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT - 7.0000 
 
SOCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT - 
51.0000 
 
EMERGENCY HOUSING 
REPAIR - 15.0000 
SOCIAL PROTECTION : 
LABOR REDEPLOYMENT 
PILOT - 15.0000 
SOCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT 
CREDIT - 20.0000 
 
EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT - 12.0000 
EMERGENCY HOUSING 
REPAIR - 5.0000 
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Table 118: Sweden to Croatia 
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(4.4)  (3.3) 
 
(4.4) (2.9) 
 
(3.9)  (2.8) 
 
(4.3)  (3.8) 
 
(3.7)  (3.6) 
 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 3.2640 
RECONSTRUCTION - 2.8921 HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 2.4430 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 3.7746 
RECONSTRUCTION OF 
APPROXIMATELY 500 HOUSES FOR 
MINORITY RETURNEES - 3.6384 
   DEVELOPMENT METADATABASE 
REPOSITORY/ PUB 
MACRODATABASE CBS. - 0.3513 
 
 
 
Table 119: EC to Croatia 
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(20.0)  (17.0) 
 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND REVITALISATION - 16.9453 
 
 
 
Table 120: Germany to Macedonia  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(7.5)  (7.3) 
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 6.336 
 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 0.2646 
 
FOREIGN CULTURAL RELATIONS - 0.2255 
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Table 121: Italy to Macedonia  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(4.4)  (3.0) 
SOCIAL/WELFARE SERVICES - 2.827 
 
 
 
 
Table 122: Netherlands to Macedonia  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(4.6)  (4.0) 
WORLD BLOAN FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT - 3.9487 
 
 
 
 
Table 123: Norway to Macedonia  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(3.6)  (3.0) 
EUR. INTEGRATION AND PUBLIC DEVELOP. - 0.55643 
 
MUNICIPAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME- 1.235 
 
BILAT - SAFETY & HEALT STAND. GARMEN - 0.6779 
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Table 124: US to Macedonia  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
(6.9)   (6.1) 
 
(8.6)  (7.8) 
 
(7.6)  (7.3) 
SOCIAL TRANSITION - 4.233 TRANSITION TO MARKET-BASED DEMOCRACY:MITIGATE 
ADVERSE SOCIAL IMPACTS - 6.744 
MITIGATION OF ADVERSE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF 
TRANSITION TO MARKET-BASED DEMOC - 5.45 
SOCIAL TRANSITION - 1.413 
 
 LABOR - 0.375 
 
 
 
Table 125: EC to Macedonia  
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
(12.0)  (10.2) 
 
(9.8)  (9.6) 
IMPLEMENTATION OF LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 10.1683 
 
MULTISECTOR AID FOR BASIC SOC. SERV. - 8.3271 
 
 
STATISTICAL CAPACITY BUILDING - 1.2428 
 
 
 
Table 126: Norway to FRY/Serbia 
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(13.5)  (7.8) 
CHILD ALLOWANCES PROJECT - 6.2873 
 
EMPLOYMENT: PROPERTY REGISTRY IN KOSOVO - 0.4547 
 
REHABILITATION OF HOUSES IN KOSOVO - 0.5116 
 
 
SHELTER PROGRAM IN KOSOVO - 0.2046 
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Table 127: Sweden to FRY/Serbia 
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2005 
 
(8.1) (6.0) 
 
(12.7) (8.4) 
 
(10.4) (7.5) 
 
(7.3) (7.1) 
 
EMPLOY. POLICY AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT : 
CARITAS KOSOVO 2000 - 1.3223 
EMPLOYMENT POLICY & ADM MANAGEMENT: 
SOCIAL PROTECTION FUND [WB and IMF] - 
1.5815 
CAPACITY BUILDING OF MINISTRY OF 
LABOUR COVERING INSTITUTIONAL - 
0.5144 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT 
[Kosovo] - 1.3294 
HOUSING : KOSOVO - 2.5741 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 0.9992 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 1.3130 
LOW-COST HOUSING [Kosovo] - 0.9753 
HOUSING : KOSOVO - 1.7811 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 2.5533 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 2.9660 
LOW-COST HOUSING [Kosovo] - 1.3361 
 
 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 2.0607 
HOUSING POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT [Kosovo] - 2.2147 
CULTURE AND RECREATION - 3.2520 
 
ECONOMIC STATISTICS AN IT [Kosovo] - 
0.8472 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 128: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia 
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(14.9)  (10.7) 
MULTISECTOR AID FOR BASIC SOC. SERV. - 1.7428 
 
MULTISECTOR AID FOR BASIC SOC. SERV. - 5.0092 
 
REFINANCING FUND FOR MONTENEGRO - 1.3931 
 
REFINANCING FUND FOR SERBIAN - 2.0748  
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Table 129: US to FRY/Serbia 
 
 Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(14.3)  (12.8) 
HUMANITARIAN: SOCIAL SERVCIES in Kosovo - 12.2770; 
 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION - 0.5190 
 
 
 
 
Table 130: EC to FRY/Serbia 
 
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(47.4)  (34.9) 
 
(63.1)  (40.6) 
 
(29.6)  (25.2) 
 
(13.0)  (12.4) 
 
INTEGRATED REHABILITATION 
PROGRAMME FOR KOSOVO - 
34.9335 
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR 
SERBIA IN 2001 - 40.5696 
DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE - 12.7429 
SOCIAL DEV. & CIVIL SOCIETY - SUPPORT 
MINISTRY OF LABOUR & EMPL. - 12.4239 
 
 
 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - 4.5188  
  
ECONOMIC INITIATIVES FOR MINORITY 
COMMUNITIES [Kosovo] - 4.5188 
 
  
 
EMPLOYMENT REGENERATION [Kosovo] - 3.3891 
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Table 131: Italy to ex Yu 
 
 Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(3.3)  (2.1) 
INCOME GENETARING ACTIVITIES IN FAVOUR OF SERBIAN REFUGEES- 0.2097 
 
CONTRIBUTION TO ILO PROGRAMME - 1.8500 
 
 
 
 
Table 132: Norway to ex Yu 
  
Other; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(5.0)  (3.1) 
EMPOWE THE POOR AND VULNERABLE - 1.3714 
 
SAVE THE CHILDREN PROGRAMME - 0.3271 
 
NORWEGIAN KFOR - 0.2504 
 
CADASTRE SUPPORT PROGME - 0.6762 
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ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE (EI)1
 
 
 
Transport & Storage 
 
Table 133: Germany to Albania  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
(32.9)  (31.9) 
 
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT/ RINAS [loan] - 31.9000 
 
 
Table 134: Italy to Albania  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
(10.1)  (7.2) 
 
(3.4)  (2.1) 
 
SUPPLY OF RAIL TRUCKS. TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS - 1.3481  
WATER TRANSPORT: SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT - 0.2775  
 
 PROVISION OF BUSES AND RAIL MATERIAL - 2.4762  
TRANSFERT DE 2 HÉLICOPTÈRES - 1.5262  
 
REHABILITATION OF RAILWAY - 3.3016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 135: US to Albania  
                                                 
1 In the EI sector the allocations reported by some donors were expressed with figures with up to 15 decimal numbers. In such cases the number of 
decimals was reduced to up to four for reasons of simplicity and readability.  
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Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
(2.1)  (1.8) 
 
(3.2)   (2.7) 
RAIL TRANSPORT - 1.6 
 
PRODUCTION/SWITCH TAMPER - 0.897 
 
 
PORT-RELATED EQUIPMENT - 1.4 
 
 
PORT OF DURRES INTERMODAL CONTAINER FACILITY - 0.318 
 
  
Table 136: EC to Albania  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(4.3)  (3.2) 
 
(9.8)  (9.3) 
 
(4.5)   (4.3) 
 
ALBANIA 1999 COMPLEMENT TRANSPORT - 3.19659  
ASSISTANCE TO MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS - 6.9573  
ROAD TRANSPORT - 4.3499  
  
ASSISTANCE TO PORT OF DURRES AUTHORITY - 2.3605  
 
 
Table 137: IDA to Albania  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(16.5)  (15.0) 
 
(28.9)  (25.0) 
 
(28.4)  (17.0) 
 
(16.9)  (13.7) 
 
(10.4)  (8.1) 
 
(22.1)  (17.0) 
 
(32.0)  (28.0) 
 
RURAL ROADS – 15.0 
NATIONAL ROADS – 
25.0 
WATER TRANSPORT: 
DURRES PORT – 17.0 
EMG ROAD REPAIR - 
13.65 
TRANSPORTATION : 
TRADE & 
TRANSPORTATION 
FACILITY IN SERVICES 
EUROPE - 8.1 
ROAD MAINTENANCE 
PROJECT – 17.0 
ROAD MAINTENANCE 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
CREDIT – 13.0 
      SECOND COMMUNITY 
WORKS PROJECT – 
15.0 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 138: France to BiH  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
(3.5)  (2.7) 
 
REHABILITATION VOIE FERREE SARAJEVO - 2.7409  
 
 
 
Table 139: Japan to BiH  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(10.8)  (11.6) 
 
(12.4)  (12.2) 
 
(5.5)  (6.1) 
 
(6.2)  (6.3) 
 
(4.9)  (5.1) 
 
(8.7)  (9.6) 
 
REHAB. PUBLIC 
TRANSPORT SARAJEVO - 
7.7190 
 ROAD CONSTRUCTION 
EQUIPMENT - 12.2383  
PUBLIC ROAD TRANSP.. 
LOCAL CITIES - 6.1281  
PROJECT FOR 
REHABILITATION OF 
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 
SYSTEM IN MOSTAR - 
6.3292  
TRANSPORT POLICY & 
ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 
0.0318  
THE PROJECT FOR 
CONSTRUCTION OF DOBOJ 
BRIDGE AND MODRICA 
BRIDGE - 9.4634  
REHABILITATION OF 
PUBLIC TRANSPORT - 
3.8429  
   THE PROJECT FOR 
CONSTRUCTION OF DOBOJ 
BRIDGE AND MODRICA 
BRIDGE - 0.3278  
 
    CONSTRUCTION OF 
OSANICA BRIDGE AND 
BOGATICI BRIDGE - 4.2364  
 
    
 
ROAD TRANSPORT - 0.5105   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 72
 
 
Table 140: Portugal to BiH  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(5.5)  (3.7) 
 
(42.5)  (39.8) 
 
(9.6)  (9.2) 
 
SUPPLY OF FREIGHT WAGONS [loan] - 3.6754  
DELIVERY OF FREIGHT WAGONS TO FEDERATION 
RAILWAYS [loan] - 39.7564  
SUPPORT TO IMPORTS FROM PORTUGAL [loan] - 9.2180  
 
 
 
Table 141: EC to BiH  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
(51.9)  (39.6) 
 
(21.9)  (16.8) 
RECONSTRUCTION TRANSPORT 97 PART 1 - 28.7851  
 
1998 TRANSPORT PROGRAMME FOR B-H - 16.7766  
RECONSTRUCTION TRANSPORT 97 PART2 - 10.8422  
 
 
 
 
Table 142: IDA to BiH  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(48.4)  (39.0) 
 
(14.9)  (11.0) 
 
(39.0)  (30.0) 
TRANSPORT RECONSTRUCTION – 39.0 
 
TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES – 11.0 ROAD MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY PROJECT – 30.0 
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Table 143: EC to Croatia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2005 
 
(108.6)  (75.4) 
 
(15.7)  (15.3) 
RIJEKA-ZAGREB MOTORWAY [loan] - 56.5450   
VINKOVCI TO TOVARNIK TO STATE BORDER RAILWAY REHABILITATION - 15.2870  
ZAGREB-AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL [loan] - 18.8483  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 144: Japan to Macedonia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(6.5)  (6.6) 
PROJECT FOR IMPROVEMENT OF ROAD MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT - 6.6419 
 
 
 
 
Table 145: EC to Macedonia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(13.6)  (10.0) 
BINIFICATION INTERÊTS PRET BEI FYROM - 10.0067  
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Table 146: IDA to Macedonia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(12.0)  (9.3) 
TRANSPORTATION : TRADE & TRANSPORTATION FACILITY IN SERVICES EUROPE - 9.3 
 
 
 
Table 147: France to Serbia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(3.8)  (2.5) 
FINANCEMENT PONT DE MITROVICA - 1.3823   
 
TRANSPORT ROUTIER - 0.3225  
 
FINANCEMENT AEROPORT DE PRISTINA - 0.6266  
 
 
 
 
Table 148: Germany to FRY/Serbia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
(7.4)  (5.0) 
 
(2.6)  (2.3) 
REHABILITATION OF THE ROAD PODGORICA-KULA - 4.5789  
 
REHAB. ROAD PODGORICA-KULA - 2.2596  
ROAD AND INFRASTRUCTURES REORGANISATION - 0.4121  
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Table 149: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(17.8)  (11.2) 
KOSOVO: TROJAN ROADS - 1.7313  
 
ROAD TRANSPORT: STABPACT MONTENEGRO - 1.8430  
 
URGENT ROAD - 7.6112 
 
 
 
 
Table 150: Norway to FRY/Serbia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(2.8)  (2.0) 
RECONSTRUCTION NIS AIRPORT - 1.6951  
 
 
 
Table 151: Sweden to FRY/Serbia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
(2.7)  (1.8) 
 
(2.0) (1.9) 
REVIEW RAILWAY - 0.2418 
 
TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN ORDER TO ENHANCE ROAD SAFETY - 1.9057  
RAILWAY WORKSHOPS - 1.4638   
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Table 152: EC to FRY/Serbia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(8.1)  (5.7) 
 
(6.0)  (5.1) 
 
(24.1)  (23.0) 
 
(23.0)  (22.4) 
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES - REHABILITATION 
OF TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 
(ROADS) - 5.6545 
FEASIBLITY STUDIES FOR BELGRADE 
CITYPASS. BELGRADE TO MONTENGRO 
ROAD - 5.0841  
TRANSPORT - 3.1059  TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 4.9714  
  TRANSPORT - 19.8782  TRANSPORT POLICY & ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 17.3999  
 
 
 
Table 153: IDA to FRY/Serbia  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(57.6)  (55.0) 
TRANSPORT REHABILITATION PROJECT – 55.0 
 
 
 
Table 154: Japan to ex Yu 
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(15.1)  (14.8) 
REHABILITATION OF THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY IN BELGRADE CITY - 14.7763  
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Table 155: Norway to ex Yu 
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(3.9)  (2.5) 
CONSULT ASSISTANCE NIS AIRPORT- 0.1878 
 
RECONTRUCTION OF NIS AIRPORT - 2.2540  
 
 
 
 
Table 156: EC to ex YU  
 
Transport & Storage; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(115.4)  (80.1) 
RAILWAYS REHABILITATION [loan] - 80.1055  
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMUNICATIONS 
 
Table 157: Italy to Albania  
 
Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
(11.6)  (8.1) 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS [loan] - 8.1473  
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Table 158: Spain to BiH  
 
Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2002 
 
(3.5)  (2.3) 
 
(3.6)  (2.3) 
PUBLIC TELEPHONE INSTALLAT./MATERIAL [loan] - 1.13 SYSTEMS BY CABLE DESTINED TO RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TELEPHONIC NETWORK 
[loan] - 1.15 
TELEPHONES REMOTE CONTROL SYSTEM / MAINTENANCE [loan] - 1.13 CELLULAR SYSTEMS DESTINED TO RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TELEPHONIC NETWORK 
[loan] - 1.15 
 
 
 
Table 159: Sweden to BiH  
 
Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
1998 
 
(3.6)  (3.5) 
 
(5.5)  (4.5) 
TELESWITCH. SARAJEVO. AF - 3.4441  
 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS [loan] - 2.1706  
 
 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS : CONCESSIONAL LOAN TELECOM [loan]- 2.1706  
 
 
Table 160: Switzerland to BiH  
 
Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
(8.3)  (6.7) 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS - 6.7269  
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Table 161: US to Macedonia  
 
Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(2.7)  (2.4) 
RAIL FIBER OPTIC CABLING - 2.178 
 
 
 
 
Table 162: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia  
 
Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(3.9)  (2.7) 
 
RADIO/TELEVISION/PRINT MEDIA - 2.7196  
 
 
 
Table 163: Norway to FRY/Serbia  
 
Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(3.3)  (1.9) 
COMMUNICATION: LOCAL MEDIA SUPPORT PROGRAMME 2000 - 0.7957  
 
MEDIA DEPARTMENT - 0.9321  
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Table 164: EC to FRY/Serbia  
 
Communications; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
(8.0)  (6.8) 
 
(3.2)  (3.1) 
SUPPORT TO THE MEDIA SECTOR - 6.7788  
 
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY & ADMIN. MGMT - 3.1071  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENERGY 
 
Table 165: Germany to Albania  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(23.7)  (19.1) 
 
(3.3)  (2.4) 
 
(49.1)  (47.9) 
 
(16.8)  (16.5) 
HYDRO ELEC. SUPPLY FINANCE: SOUTH 
[loan]- 19.0662 
POWER SUPPLY SOUTHERN ALBANIA 
[loan] - 2.4088  
TRANSMISS. LINE TIRANA-PODGORICA 
[loan] - 47.9301  
HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS [loan] - 
12.4285  
   HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS [loan] - 
4.0883  
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Table 166: Italy to Albania  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(5.7)  (4.0) 
 
(7.1)  (5.6) 
 
(20.4)  (12.7) 
 
(42.5)  (28.9) 
 
(57.3)  (48.2) 
EMERGENCY INTERV.-
ELEC.NETWOR - 3.9901  
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION 
REHAB. [loan] - 5.5735 
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM REHABILITATION - 
2.2526 
ELECTRICAL 
TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 
0.5729  
ASSISTANCE TO TOP 
MANAGEMENT OF KESH - 
1.10474 
  ELECTRICITY SECTOR [loan] - 
10.4712  
IMPORT OF ELECTRIC POWER 
FROM ITALY TO KESH (ALBANIAN 
ELECTRIC COMPANY) [loan] - 
28.2725  
TECHNICAL&MANAGERIAL 
RESTRUCTURE&STRENGHTENING 
OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
[loan]- 46.9190  
 
 
Table 167: Japan to Albania  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
(13.0)  (17.9) 
 
(24.3)  (28.7) 
HYDRO POWER PLANTS DEV. [loan] - 17.8639 
 
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION [loan] - 28.7132 
 
 
Table 168: Norway to Albania  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(14.4)  (8.3) 
ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 8.3002  
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Table 169: US to Albania  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
(1.7)  (1.5) 
 
(2.0)  (1.8) 
ENERGY: SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 1.5 
 
ENERGY RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION INCL. REGULATORY REFORM - 1.78 
 
 
 
Table 170: IDA to Albania  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(5.5)  (5.0) 
 
(34.0)  (29.5) 
 
(38.9)  (29.9) 
 
(26.2)  (25.0) 
 
(27.6)  (27.0) 
POWER LOSS REDUCTION – 5.0 POWER TRANSMISSION & 
DISTRIBUT. - 29.5 
POWER SECTOR REHABILITATION 
AND RESTRUCTURING PROJECT - 
29.9 
POWER SECTOR GENERATION & 
RESTRUCTURING PROJECT – 25.0 
ENERGY COMMUNITY OF SOUTH 
EAST EUROPE – 27.0 
 
 
Table 171: Austria to BiH 
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
(4.4)  (4.0) 
POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK REHAB. - 3.5731  
 
STUDY ON THERMAL POWER PLANT REHAB. - 0.4026 
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Table 172: France to BiH 
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
(2.9)  (2.2) 
EQUIPEMENT / REHAB. LIGNES ELECTR. - 2.21563  
 
 
 
Table 173: Germany to BiH  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
(2.7)  (1.8) 
 
(6.5)  (6.4) 
REHABILITATION OF THE HYDRO POWER PLANT IN TREBINJE - 1.8315 
 
REHABILITATION HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER PLANT TREBINJE - 6.3523  
 
 
 
Table 174: Japan to BiH  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
(23.9)  (25.6) 
 
(31.7)  (31.4) 
REHAB. MAIN TRANSMISSION LINES - 25.5785 
 
REHABILITATE POWER PLANT AND MINE [loan] - 31.3980  
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Table 175: Netherlands to BiH  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
(3.4)  (2.7) 
ENERGY - 0.21113  
 
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION - 1.1612 
 
GAS DISTRIBUTION - 0.8540  
 
 
 
 
Table 176: Norway to BiH  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
(1.8)  (1.1) 
 
(20.9)  (11.4) 
POWER DISTRIB/TRANSMISSION - 0.7069  
 
MISC. DEMO. & HR SUPPORT: ENERGY - 1.9880  
POWER DISTRIB/TRANSMISSION - 0.3534  
 
POWER DISTRIBUTION & TRANSMISS REHAB - 4.3089  
 
 
POWER DISTRIBUTION & TRANSMISS REHAB - 5.1041  
 
 
Table 177: Spain to BiH  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
(31.2)  (20.5) 
 
(3.8)  (2.4) 
HYDRO-ELEC. POWER PLANT RECONSTRUCTION. AF [loan] - 20.4615 
 
RÉHABILITATION DU RÉSEAU ELECTRIQUE EN BOSNIE CENTRALE - 2.4307  
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Table 178 : Switzerland to BiH  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
(6.5)  (5.1) 
 
(11.8)  (8.4) 
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 5.1241 
 
HYDROPOWER PLANT REHABILITION - 8.3535 
 
 
 
Table 179: EC to BiH  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
(15.6)  (11.9) 
1997 ENERGY PROGRAMME PART 1 - 11.8997  
 
 
 
 
Table 180: IDA to BiH  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
(41.1)  (35.6) 
 
(12.4)  (10.0) 
 
(31.5)  (25.0) 
 
(47.3)  (35.0) 
EMER. ELECTRIC POWER RECONSTR.- 35.6 
 
EMERGENCY GAS REHAB. – 10.0 ELECTR. POWER – 25.0 
 
ELECTRIC POWER – 35.0 
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Table 181: Norway to Croatia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2005 
 
(3.7)  (2.0) 
 
(2.9)  (1.7) 
 
(3.8)  (2.4) 
 
(1.9)  (1.8) 
MISC. DEMO. & HR SUPPORT: ENERGY- 
1.9880  
REHAB. DISTRIBUTION NETWORK - 1.6679  45 DISTRIBUTION NETWORK REHAB.- 
2.4043  
FINANCIAL ENG. FOR CLEANER 
PRODUCTION AND ENERGY- 0.2199 
   DISTR NETWORK REH IN WAR AFFECTED 
AREAS - 1.5446  
 
 
Table 182: IDA to Croatia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(8.0)  (7.0) 
CROATIA - ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT [grant] – 7.0 
 
 
 
 
Table 183: Norway to Macedonia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(3.7)  (2.3) 
 
(1.6)  (1.2) 
HEATING OIL DELIVERY TO FYROM - 1.2522 
 
REPLACEMENT OF DAMAGED CONDENSER BATTERY - 0.5542 
RECONSTRUC ELECTRICITY SUPP. NETWORK - 1.0179 
 
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION - 0.5646  
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Table 184: Switzerland to Macedonia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(9.9)  (9.0) 
EFFICIENT ENERGY DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMME - 8.9962  
 
 
 
Table 185: France to FRY/Serbia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(10.9)  (10.5) 
EXTENSION RESEAU DISTRIBUTION ELECTRIQUE [loan] - 10.5381 
 
 
 
Table 186 : Germany to FRY/Serbia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(13.0)  (9.0) 
 
(85.7)  (58.2) 
 
(28.8)  (20.8) 
 
(5.3) (5.2) 
 
(40.5)  (39.8) 
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 0.4806  
REHABILITATION OF THE 
DISTRICT HEATING SYSTEMS - 
6.8684  
REHABILITATION DISTRICT 
HEATING SYSTEM - 9.1791 
REHABILITATION HYDRO-
ELECTRIC POWER PLANT 
PERUCICA - 0.6708 
REHAB. DISTRICT HEATING 
SYSTEMS PH. III - 2.4857  
COAL-FIRED POWER PLANT: 
EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME 
ENERGY - 8.4813  
EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME 
ENERGY PHASE II - 1.19053  
REHABILITATION DISTRICT 
HEATING SYSTEM - 0.2450  
REHABILITATION HYDRO-
ELECTRIC POWER PLANT 
PERUCICA [loan] - 4.4477  
REHA. OF BAJINA BASTA HYDRO 
POWER PLANT [loan]- 37.2856 
 EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME 
ENERGY PHASE II - 4.3042 
EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMME 
ENERGY - 4.8157 
  
 UNTIED FINANCIAL CREDIT FOR 
THE ENERGY SECTOR [loan] - 
45.7896  
URGENT MEASURES ENERGY- 
4.7120 
  
  EMERGENCY AID ENERGY - 
1.8848 
  
 
 
 
Table 187: Japan to FRY/Serbia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(5.7)  (5.6) 
 
(5.4)  (5.6) 
REHABILITATION OF STORAGE HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANT - 5.5750  REHAB OF THE BAJNA BASTA PUMPED STORAGE HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANT - 
5.5651 
 
 
Table 188: Norway to FRY/Serbia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(7.6)  (4.3) 
 
(6.6)  (3.8) 
 
(2.0)   (1.5) 
 
(2.6)  (2.1) 
 
(3.7)  (3.4) 
REHABILITATION AV 
ELECTRICITY KOSOVO - 
0.8135284  
EXTENSION TRANSFORMER 
STATION - 0.2792 
ENERGY EFFIENCY CAPACITY 
BUILDING - 0.3531 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY - 0.3705 MIER´ ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
ASSISTANCE - 0.4450 
REPAIR OR 420 KV LINES 
KOSOVO- 1.14571  
PROCUREMENT HEATING OIL - 
1.0003 
METERING SYSTEM FOR 
ELECTRIC POWER - 0.3428 
WATTOUR METER TEST 
EQUIPMENT GOR EPC - 0.3242 
MIER DEREGULATION 
ELECTRICITY MARKET - 0.2702 
ELECTRICAL 
TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 
1.3466 
REPAIR ELECTRIC LINES IN 
KOSOVO BORDER - 0.2779 
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS IN 
PODGORICA - 0.3792 
ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION 
SANDZAK. - 0.4088 
MIER´ SANDZAK ELECTRICITY 
DISTRIBUTION - 1.1177 
ELECTRICAL 
TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 
0.9766 
CETINJE DISTRIBUTION - 0.3571 ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION 
- 0.4079 
ELECTRIC POWER 
DISTRIBUTION. - 0.5089 
BILATERAL PROGRAM 
ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION - 
0.4509 
 TRANSFORMER- 1.7987  NATIONAL DISPATCHING 
CENTER. EPCG - 0.3397 
BILATERAL PROGRAM 
ELECTRICITY DISTRIB - 0.4462 
    HYDROLOGY RESEARCH 
BILATERAL PROJECT - 0.2608 
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Table 189: Sweden to FRY/Serbia 
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
(6.2)  (4.6) 
 
(5.4)  (3.6) 
 
(11.7)  (10.3) 
 
(3.9)  (3.8) 
DISTRICT HEATING - 4.5848 ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 1.5476 
POWER GENERAT./NON-RENEWABLE 
SOURCES - 3.9613 
ELECTRICAL 
TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 3.7658 
 STUDY DISTRICT HEATING - 0.3965 POWER GENERAT./NON-RENEWABLE 
SOURCES - 0.3713 
 
 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION - 1.5959 ELECTRICAL 
TRANSMISSION/DISTRIBUTION - 5.8181 
 
 
 
Table 190: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(2.9)  (2.3) 
 
(15.1)  (10.7) 
 
(2.1)  (1.5) 
 
(12.6)  (9.8) 
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 2.2625 
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 7.5833 
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 1.4820 
NATIONAL CONTROL CENTER 
REHABILITATION - 9.8278 
 ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT- 3.1399 
  
 
 
Table 191: US to FRY/Serbia 
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(7.0)  (6.0) 
 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY  -6.0 
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Table 192: EC to FRY/Serbia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(22.0)  (14.2) 
 
(74.7)  (51.8) 
 
(113.0)  (96.0) 
 
(67.8)  (64.6) 
 
(61.4)  (59.7) 
OBNOVA - ENERGY FOR 
DEMOCRACY - 3.6129 
KOSOVO-ASSISTANCE TO 
ENERGY PRODUCTION. 
TRANSMISSION AND 
DISTRIBUTION - 51.8330 
EPS CAPACITY BUILDING 
MEASURES - 6.1010 
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 49.6956 
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 1.8642 
ENERGY IMPORT 2000 - SUPPORT 
FOR DISTRICT HEATING 
PROGRAM - 10.5981 
 REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING 
OF THE ENERGY SECTOR - 
2.2596 
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 14.9086 
ENERGY POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 26.0999 
  COMPUTERISED OPERATIONS 
AND MAINTENANCE 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN KEK - 
2.8245 
 POWER GENERAT./NON-
RENEWABLE SOURCES - 31.6927 
  DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES 
ELECTRIC BODY KEK.KOSOVO 
ELECTRICITY CORPORATION - 
2.8245 
  
  REHABILITATION THERMAL 
POWER PLANTS - 71.8562 
  
  SUPPORT FOR COAL 
PRODUCTION AND POWER 
GENERATION - 10.16834 
  
 
 
Table 193: IDA to FRY/Serbia  
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(6.5)  (5.0) 
 
(22.0)  (21.0) 
 
(24.0)  (23.5) 
EMERGENCY STABILIZATION OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY. 
REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO – 5.0 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT – 21.0 ENERGY SECTOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 3 PROJECT 
[grant] - 2.5 
  ENERGY COMMUNITY OF SOUTH EAST EUROPE (APL) 
PROGRAM  - 21.0 
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Table 194: France to ex Yu 
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(4.3)  (2.8) 
 
RESEAU REGIONAL ELECTRICITE - 1.2063 
 
REHAB. DE 30 SOUS-STATIONS ELECTRIQUES - 0.6958 
STATIONS ELECTRIQUES - 0.2283 
 
FASEP 433-REHABILITATION RESEAU ELECTRIQUE HTE TE. - 0.6412 
 
 
 
Table 195 : Netherlands to ex Yu 
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
(6.3)  (5.2) 
SETTING OF OIL PIPELINES - 0.7008 
 
ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION - 4.1861 
 
GAS DISTRIBUTION - 0.3451 
 
 
Table 196 : Norway to ex Yu 
 
Energy; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(8.3)  (5.3) 
EXTENSION TRANSF. STATION CETINJE - 1.2522 
 
MIER – TRANSFORMATOR- 3.1761 
 
TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR EMPLOYEES - 0.3255 
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BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
 
Table 197 : Germany to Albania  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1998 
 
2005 
 
(4.8)  (4.9) 
 
(6.8)  (5.7) 
 
(3.5)  (3.5) 
FOUNDATION BANK I (SMI [loan] - 4.8848 FOUNDATION BANK [loan] - 5.6837  
CREDIT FOR NGO'S RURAL A. URB. REGIONS - 0.2609 
  CREDIT FOR NOO'S I RURAL A.URBAN REGIONS [loan] - 
3.2314 
 
 
Table 198: US to Albania  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
(6.8)  (5.4) 
COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL SECTOR - 3.439 
 
COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL SECTOR - 1.913 
 
 
 
Table 199: IDA to Albania  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
(14.8) (12.0) 
 
(8.4)  (6.5) 
 
(19.5)  (15.0) 
MICROCREDIT – 12.0 FINANCE – 6.5 
 
FINANCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT PROJECT – 15.0 
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Table 200: France to BiH  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
(5.0)  (3.9) 
IMPRESSION ET TRANSPORT DE BILLETS - 3.89870 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 201 : Germany to BiH  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(13.5)  (9.2) 
 
(7.3)  (5.3) 
 
(5.1)  (4.5) 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE FUND - 4.5789 ADVISORY SERVICES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
DEPOSIT GUARANTEE FUND - 0.4712 
FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT - 0.4676 
CREDIT GUARANTEE FUND (CGF) - 4.5789 
 
REFORM OF TAX LEGISLATION - 0.4712 DEPOSIT INSURANCE AGENCY - 2.8878 
 CREDIT PROGRAMME IN CRISIS AFFECTED REGIONS - 
4.2408 
MICRO CREDIT FOR SMES - 1.1298 
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Table 202: Sweden to BiH  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(5.9)  (4.9) 
 
(2.2)  (1.6) 
 
(4.6)  (4.5) 
 
(7.0)  (6.9) 
FINANCIAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT : PILOT CREDIT PROJECT - 
0.7424 
PRIVATISATION FEDBH BANKS - 0.6273 SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NEW 
LOAN PRODUCTS THROUGH MICRO 
FINANCE - 2.5864 
FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 0.4252 
FINANCIAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT : LOCAL COSTS - 0.2437 
MICROFINANCE GEN. - 0.9824 FOR THE FINANCIAL MARKET IN BOSNIA 
BY INCREASING LENDING POSSIBILITIES - 
1.8785 
CAPITAL FOR LENDING - 6.4236 
FORMAL SECTOR FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIARIES : PRIVATISATION BANKS 
- 1.3026 
   
INFORMAL / SEMI-FORMAL FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIARIES : AGRICULTURAL 
CREDITS - 0.9185 
   
MICROCREDITS - 0.5914  
 
 
 
 
FORMAL SECTOR FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIARIES [loan] -0.5033 
   
FORMAL SECTOR FINANC. 
INTERMEDIARIES [loan] - 0.5033 
   
 
 
 
Table 203: US to BiH  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
(133.0)   (110.1) 
BOSNIA RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE - 110.086 
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Table 204: IDA to BiH  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
(6.3)  (5.0) 
 
(27.0)  (20.) 
FINANCE:PILOT CREDIT – 5.0 
 
FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. MANAGEMENT – 20.0 
 
 
 
Table 205: Netherlands to Croatia  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(3.3)  (2.8) 
HR/EBRD FINANCIAL FACILITIES SMM - 2.8245  
 
 
 
 
Table 206: US to Croatia  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
2001 
 
(4.0)  (3.2) 
 
(3.4)  (3.0) 
COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL SECTOR – 3.15 BANKING & FIN. SERV.: GROWTH OF A DYNAMIC AND COMPETITIVE PRIVATE SECTOR - 
3.02 
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Table 207: Netherlands to Macedonia  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(6.3)  (4.5) 
 
(3.6)  (2.3) 
 
(7.6)  (5.3) 
 
(7.2)  (6.2) 
INFORMAL/SEMI-FORMAL FIN. INSTITUT. - 
4.4998 
FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT- 0.2091 
FORMAL SECTOR FINANC. 
INTERMEDIARIES - 5.3435 
PRO CREDIT BANK - 6.2139 
 FORMAL SECTOR FINANC. 
INTERMEDIARIES - 2.0617 
  
 
 
 
Table 208: Germany to FRY/Serbia  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
(14.5)  (9.8) 
 
(5.9)  (4.3) 
 
(19.0)  (16.7) 
 
(13.5)  (13.3) 
CONSULTING SERVICES FOR PARTNER 
BANKS FOR LOCAL SME - 0.7784 
FINANCIAL POLICY & ADMIN. 
MANAGEMENT - 1.4136 
PROMOTION OF SME AND HOUSING - 
2.8245 
HOUSING MODERNIZATION LOAN 
PROGRAMME - 11.1856 
REFINANCING OF SUB-LOANS TO LOCAL 
SME - 1.9689 
CONSULTING SERVICES FOR PARTNER 
BANKS - 0.7228 
CREDIT INFRASTRUCTURE / PROMOTION 
OF SME - 4.0673 
HOUSING MODERNIZATION LOAN 
PROGRAMME - 1.2428 
CONSULTING SERVICES FOR THE 
PARTNER BANKS: IMPLEMENT THE LOAN 
PROGRAMME - 0.6868 
CREDIT GUARANTEE FUND FOR SME - 
2.1204 
CREDIT GUARANTEE FUND - 2.0788 FORMAL SECTOR FINANC. 
INTERMEDIARIES - 0.5884 
REFINANCING OF SUB-LOANS TO LOCAL 
SME-6.4105 
 CREDIT GUARANTEE FUND - 2.0788  
  CREDIT INFRASTRUCTURE / PROMOTION 
OF SME - 0.5649 
 
  CREDIT INFRASTRUCTURE / PROMOTION 
OF SME IN SERBIA - 5.0841 
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Table 209: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(4.6)  (3.2) 
MICRO ENTERPRISE BANK OF KOSOVO - 3.1813 
 
 
 
 
Table 210: Sweden to FRY/Serbia 
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(4.3)  (2.9) 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS KOSOVO - 2.0167 
 
MICROFINS MICRO CREDITS - 0.8411 
 
 
 
 
Table 211: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia 
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(6.7)  (6.6) 
SEAF SOUTH BALKAN FUND [equity investment] - 4.8346 
 
REFINANCING FUND FOR SERBIAN - 1.8025 
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Table 212: EC to FRY/Serbia  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(7.5)  (7.2) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING OF COMMERCIAL BANKING - 7.1703 
 
 
 
Table 213: IDA to FRY/Serbia  
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(110.5)  (85.0) 
 
(91.4)  (80.0) 
PRIVATE AND FINANCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT PROJECT – 85.0 
 
PRIVATE AND FINANCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTMENT CREDIT PROJECT – 80.0 
 
 
Table 214: Norway to ex Yu 
 
BFS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(2.5)  (1.6) 
DEBT FORGIVENESS - 1.4744 
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BUSINESS & OTHER SERVICES 
 
 
Table 215: Germany to Albania  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1999 
 
(3.4)  (3.5) 
 
(3.4)   (2.7) 
BUSINESS START-UP PROGRAM [loan] - 3.4891 
 
BUSINESS START-UP PROGRAM [loan] - 2.7237 
 
 
Table 216: US to Albania 
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(20.1)  (15.9) 
 
(14.6)  (12.0) 
 
(32.1)  (26.9) 
 
(19.8)  (17.0) 
 
(18.8)  (16.8) 
 
(8.7)  (7.9) 
 
(7.3)  (6.9) 
 
(5.8)  (5.6) 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES 
DEVELOPMENT- 
1.868 
ECO 
RESTRUCTURING : 
ENTERPRISE FUNDS 
- 6.4 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT & 
GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 
10.2812 
PRIVATE MARKETS 
- 0.233 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 16.184 
GROWTH IN 
NUMBER OF SELF-
SUSTAINING 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 
7.907 
GROWTH IN 
NUMBER OF SELF-
SUSTAINING 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 
0.339 
GROWTH OF SELF-
SUSTAINING 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES IN 
TARGET SECTORS - 
0.714 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES 
DEVELOPMENT - 
4.669 
BUSINESS 
SERVICES - 0.202 
COMPETITIVE & 
MARKET-
RESPONSIVE 
PRIVATE FIN. 
SECTOR - 1.4 
PRIVATE MARKETS 
- 13.513 
BUSINESS 
SUPPORT SERVICES 
& INSTITUTIONS - 
0.6 
 GROWTH IN 
NUMBER OF SELF-
SUSTAINING 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 
6.56 
GROWTH OF SELF-
SUSTAINING 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES IN 
TARGET SECTORS - 
4.931 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES 
DEVELOPMENT - 
0.934 
TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE TO 
ENTERPRISES - 2.2 
SPECIAL 
INITIATIVES: 
BUSINESS 
SERVICES - 
14.4787 
A MORE 
COMPETITIVE & 
MARKET-
RESPONSIVE 
PRIVATE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR - 1.2 
    
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES 
DEVELOPMENT - 
0.934 
PRIVATIZATION & 
ENTERPRISE 
RESTRUCT. - 0.3 
CROSS-CUTTING: 
BUSINESS 
SERVICES - 0.7752 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 
    
 100
2.019 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES 
DEVELOPMENT - 
1.868 
PRIVATIZATION & 
ENTERPRISE 
RESTRUCT. - 2.944 
      
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES 
DEVELOPMENT - 
3.735 
       
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES 
DEVELOPMENT - 
1.868 
       
 
 
Tale 217: Germany to BiH  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
(4.7)  (3.8) 
 
(3.9)  (2.7) 
 
(2.9)  (2.6) 
 
(2.2)  (2.2) 
BUSINESS SERVICES - 0.2723 PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS - 0.5654 
BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & 
INSTITUTIONS - 2.2596 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION - 1.8642 
PRIVATE SECTOR STRUCTURES 
DEVELOPMENT. TUZLA - 0.8171 
BUSINESS SERVICES - 1.2952 PARTNERSHIPS - 0.1609  
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT - 1.9066 SUPPORT FOR PRIVATISATION 
PROCESSES - 0.8010 
  
SUPPORT FOR PRIVATISATION 
PROCESSES - 0.8171 
   
 
 
Table 218: Netherlands to BiH 
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(17.9)  (17.4) 
ECONOMIC SUPPORT - 0.8035 
 
SUPPORT TO SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - 2.4370 
 
SAR SREBRENICA REVITALIZATION - 1.2398 
 
HARMONISED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ENTERPRISE SECTOR RECOVERY - 6.2142 
 
SOCIO ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF SREBRENICA - 6.5309 
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Table 219: Sweden to BiH 
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(2.0)  (1.5) 
TRUST FUND-BANK REFORM AND PRIVATISATION - 1.2344 
 
 
 
 
Table 220: UK to BiH  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(4.2)  (3.0) 
PRIVATISATION. ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING LABOUR & SOCIAL POLICY - 2.6945 
 
 
 
Table 221: US to BiH  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(29.6)  (24.5) 
 
(205.3)  (172.4) 
 
(74.6)  (64.0) 
 
(16.3)  (14.5) 
 
(22.7)  (20.7) 
 
(11.4)  (10.7) 
 
(5.7)  (5.6) 
PRIVATIZATION & 
ENTERPRISE 
RESTRUCT. - 24.457 
CROSS-CUTTING: 
BUSINESS SERVICES – 
12.0 
PRIVATE MARKETS – 
12.0 
ACCESS TO ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
THE POOR EXPANDED 
- 0.7 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR - 
19.65 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR - 
10.686 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR - 
4.97 
 HUMAN SUFFERING 
AND NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRISES: BUSINESS 
SERVICES - 160.3958 
PRIVATE MARKETS - 
51.986 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 13.845 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR - 
1.08 
 ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR - 
0.422 
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Table 222: EC to BiH  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(12.4)  (11.8) 
ECONOMIC REFORM: CORPORATE GOV.. REGIONAL FUND. TRADE & INSURANCE SECTOR - 11.8027 
 
 
 
 
Table 223: IDA to BiH  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(61.9)  (50.0) 
 
(26.7)  (19.8) 
 
(70.2)  (54.0) 
ENTER & BANKING PRIV. – 50.0 
 
PRIVATISATION – 19.8 PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT PROJECT – 10.0 
  BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT ADJUSTMENT CREDIT PROJECT 
– 44.0 
 
 
 
Table 224: Germany to Croatia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(2.3)  (2.2) 
SUPPORT OF ECONOMY AND EMPLOYMENT - 2.2363 
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Table 225: US to Croatia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(9.0)  (7.5) 
 
(19.5)  (16.7) 
 
(7.0)  (6.1) 
 
(15.8)  (14.1) 
 
(12.8)  (11.7) 
 
(10.5)  (9.8) 
 
(10.7)  (10.4) 
COMPETITIVE & 
MARKET-RESPONSIVE 
PRIVATE FIN. SECTOR 
- 0.25 
PRIVATE MARKETS - 
5.8 
BUSINESS: GROWTH 
OF A DYNAMIC AND 
COMPETITIVE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 4.581 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 14.088 
GROWTH OF A 
DYNAMIC AND 
COMPETITIVE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 11.292 
GROWTH OF A 
DYNAMIC AND 
COMPETITIVE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 0.342 
GROWTH OF A 
DYNAMIC AND 
COMPETITIVE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 10.149 
HUMAN SUFFERING 
AND NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRISES: BUSINESS 
SERVICES - 6.635051 
PRIVATE MARKETS - 
7.833 
BUSINESS: CRITICAL 
PRIVATE MARKETS 
EXPANDED & 
STRENGTHENED - 1.55 
 ASSISTANCE FOR 
EASTERN EUROPE AND 
THE BALTIC STATES - 
0.4 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 0.5 
 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES: 
BUSINESS SERVICES - 
0.65 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
DEVPT - 0.31 
   PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 0.67 
 
 PRIVATE MARKETS: 
FISCAL POLICIES - 
2.79 
   GROWTH OF A 
DYNAMIC AND 
COMPETITIVE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 8.245 
 
 
 
 
Table 226: EC to Croatia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2003 
 
(3.3)  (2.2) 
 
(8.2)  (6.9) 
CR0007 SME SUPPORT CROATIA - 2.1564 INVESMENT CLIMATE. REGISTRATION MARITIME DOMAIN. FREE ZONES - 6.9483 
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Table 227: Germany to Macedonia 
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(6.9)  (7.0) 
 
(2.7)  (1.8) 
 
(2.2)  (1.6) 
 
(2.4)  (2.10 
BUSINESS START-UP PROGRAM [loan] - 
6.9783 
BUSINESS SERVICES - 1.1308 PROMOTION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN 
MACEDONIA - 0.9424 
BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & 
INSTITUTIONS - 1.97717 
 PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS - 0.7067 
SUPPORT TO MACEDONIAN CONSUMER 
PROTECTION SERVICES (OPM) - 0.6745 
 
 
 
 
Table 228: US to Macedonia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(11.0)  (8.7) 
 
(6.7)  (5.5) 
 
(45.9) (38.6) 
 
(8.4)  (7.2) 
 
(4.5)  (3.9) 
 
(14.9) (13.3) 
 
(13.7) (12.5) 
 
(11.6) (10.9) 
 
(12.2) (11.8) 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES 
DEVELOPMENT - 
1.301 
TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE TO 
ENTERPRISES - 
1.5 
CROSS-
CUTTING: 
BUSINESS 
SERVICES – 22.0 
PRIVATE 
MARKETS - 0.413 
BUSINESS: 
ACCELERATED 
DVT & GROWTH 
OF THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 2.954 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 
13.273 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT 
AND GROWTH OF 
THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 12.505 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 0.4 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT 
AND GROWTH OF 
THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 11.8 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES 
DEVELOPMENT - 
1.301 
PRIVATIZATION & 
ENTERPRISE 
RESTRUCT. - 
3.821 
ACCELERATED 
DVPT & GROWTH 
OF PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 
9.513611 
PRIVATE 
MARKETS - 1.27 
BUSINESS: 
ACCELERATED 
DVT & GROWTH 
OF THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 0.971 
  ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT 
AND GROWTH OF 
THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR - 10.429 
 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES 
DEVELOPMENT - 
6.07 
 SPECIAL 
INITIATIVES: 
BUSINESS 
SERVICES - 
7.048231 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT 
AND GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 
5.524 
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Table 229: IDA to Macedonia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
(93.3)  (85.0) 
ENTERPRISE SECTOR – 85.0 
 
 
 
 
Table 230: Germany to FRY/Serbia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(4.0)  (2.7) 
 
(6.8)  (5.0) 
 
(3.3)  (2.9) 
 
(9.3)  (9.0) 
 
(3.5)  (3.5) 
PARTNERSHIPS - 0.4720 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION - 
0.9424 
PROMOTION OF THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR AND EMPLOYMENT (PSP) 
IN SERBIA - 1.0168 
PROMOTION OF TRADE AND 
INDUSTRY AND EMPLOYMENT IN 
MONTENEGRO - 3.1059 
DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION 
OF TOURISM IN INTERIOR 
REGIONS OF MONTENEGRO - 
1.2428 
TOURISM SECTOR - 0.6868 PROMOTION OF PRIVATE SECTOR 
DEVELOPMENT. FOCUS ON SME - 
1.4136 
BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & 
INSTITUTIONS - 0.2847 
BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & 
INSTITUTIONS - 0.5917 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION - 
1.6157 
BUSINESS SUPPORT SERVICES & 
INSTITUTIONS - 1.5110 
STRENGTHENING THE TOURISM 
SME SECTOR IN MONTENEGRO - 
0.4712 
ASSISTANCE TO THE SERBIAN 
PRIVATIZATION AGENCY (SPA) - 
1.4687 
PROMOTION OF THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR AND EMPLOYMENT (PSP) 
IN SERBIA - 4.9695 
 
 ASSISTANCE TO THE SERBIAN 
PRIVATIZATION AGENCY (SPA) - 
1.4136 
   
 ASSISTANCE TO THE SERBIAN 
PRIVATIZATION AGENCY (SPA) - 
0.3769 
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Table 231: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2004 
 
(4.4)  (2.8) 
 
(2.7)   (2.5) 
FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME FOR ENVIRONMENT - 0.26867 
 
SUBS 2004 TO CBI - 2.5031 
BUSINESS SERVICES - 0.4800 
 
 
FINANCING OF SALES AGENTS - 2.0481 
 
 
 
 
Table 232: Norway to FRY/Serbia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(2.5)  (2.3) 
MIER BUSINESS INCUBATOR TRAINING - 1.7499 
 
MIER RESTRUCTURING OF JAT AIRWAYS - 0.5812 
 
 
 
Table 233: Sweden to FRY/Serbia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
(2.4)  (1.7) 
 
(2.4)  (1.6) 
 
(2.0)  (1.8) 
BUSINESS SERVICES : PRIVATE SECTOR - 1.7466 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT - 1.5814 BUSINESS REGISTRY - 1.6092 
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Table 234: US to FRY/Serbia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(2.8)  (2.3) 
 
(73.1)  (61.3) 
 
(243.9) (209.2) 
 
(30.8)  (27.0) 
 
(56.1)  (50.2) 
 
(39.2)  (35.8) 
 
(23.4)  (22.0) 
 
(36.6)  (35.5) 
TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE TO 
ENTERPRISES - 
0.589 
CROSS-CUTTING: 
BUSINESS 
SERVICES - 2.9 
PRIVATE MARKETS 
– 15.0 
BUSINESS: 
ACCELERATED DVT 
& GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE - 6.75 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 23.203 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE - 25.5 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE - 
9.854 
ACCELERATED 
DEVT. AND 
GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE - 
2.103 
PRIVATIZATION & 
ENTERPRISE 
RESTRUCT. - 1.726 
CROSS-CUTTING: 
BUSINESS 
SERVICES – 15.0 
PRIVATE MARKETS 
– 11.0 
BUSINESS: 
SPECIAL 
INITIATIVES - 
18.599 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 14.209 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE - 
9.084 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE - 12.1 
ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE - 
12.997 
 CROSS-CUTTING: 
BUSINESS 
SERVICES - 11.698 
PRIVATE MARKETS 
- 16.508 
BUSINESS: 
CRITICAL PRIVATE 
MARKETS 
EXPANDED & 
STRENGTHENED - 
1.415 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 12.259 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE 
GROWTH - 1.2 
 ACCELERATED 
DEVELOPMENT AND 
GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE - 
5.875 
 SPECIAL 
INITIATIVES: 
BUSINESS 
SERVICES - 25.097 
PRIVATE MARKETS 
- 17.901 
    ACCELERATED 
GROWTH OF THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR - 
5.242 
 HUMAN SUFFERING 
& NEGATIVE CONS. 
OF CRISES: 
BUSINESS 
SERVICES - 4.5 
PRIVATE MARKETS 
- 5.699 
    IMPROVED POLICY 
AND 
INSTI.CLIMATE FOR 
PRODUCTIVE 
INVESTMENT - 
9.217 
 CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION IN 
POL. & ECO. 
DECISION MAKING 
- 2.14608 
PRIVATE MARKETS 
- 1.87 
     
 
 
 
 PRIVATE MARKETS 
- 102.428 
     
  PRIVATE MARKETS 
- 9.34 
     
  ACCELERATED 
DEVT. AND 
GROWTH OF 
PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 
22.1 
     
  PRIVATE MARKETS 
- 7.05 
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Table 235: EC to FRY/Serbia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(35.7)  (23.0) 
 
(199.9)  (128.5) 
 
(13.6)  (9.4) 
 
(9.3)  (7.9) 
 
(10.1)  (9.7) 
 
(17.3)  (16.8) 
PROMOTION 
DEVELOPPEMENT 
ECONOMIQUE DU KOSOVO 
- 23.0393 
 
SUPPORT FOR SERBIA 
2001 - 128.5151 
 
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 
2002 FOR KOSOVO-
SUPPORT TO ENTERPRISE 
DEVELOPMENT - 9.4241 
PRE AND POST-
PRIVATISATION 
RESTRUCTURING - 2.2596 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
- TURN AROUND 
MANAGEMENT AND 
BUSINESS ADVICE - 
7.1703 
PRIVATISATION - 2.4857 
   FUTHER SUPPORT 
PRIVATISATION AGENCY - 
5.6490 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
- 2.4847 
PRIVATISATION - 14.2928 
 
 
Table 236: IDA to FRY/Serbia  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(14.3)  (11.0) 
PRIVATIZATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF BANKS AND ENTERPRISES – 11.0 
 
 
 
 
Table 237: Norway to ex Yu 
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(8.8)  (5.1) 
BUSINESS SERVICES: TRANS-BALKAN FUND [equity investment] - 5.0731 
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Table 238: EC to ex YU  
 
BOS; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(27.2)  (18.8) 
GLOBAL LOAN [loan] - 18.8483 
 
 
 
 
MULTISECTOR 
 
 
 
Table 239: Germany to Albania 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 1999 2000 2002 2003 2005 
 
(6.9)  (7.0) (4.2)  (3.3) (5.1)  (3.5) (4.7)  (3.4) (6.4)  (5.6) (11.4)   (11.3) 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
COMMUNAL INFRA. - 
6.9745 
URBAN DVPT:SOCIAL 
INVESTMENT FUND - 3.2685 
STUDY & EXPERT FUND - 
0.7068 
STUDY AND EXPERT 
FUND - 0.9424 
STUDY AND EXPERT FUND 
- 1.1557 
EQUITY INVESTMENT - 
9.9080 
  
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
AND MANAGEMENT - 
2.8271 
STUDY AND EXPERT 
FUND - 0.5268 
STUDY AND EXPERT FUND 
- 1.4121 
STUDY AND EXPERT FUND  - 
1.2429 
   
SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
FUND [loan] - 1.9272 
SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
FUND [loan] - 2.5994  
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Table 240: Italy to Albania 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(5.4) (3.4) 
 
RESTORATION OF COUNCIL PALACE AND MINISTRY OF CULTURE - 0.7863 
MULTISECTOR AID - CONTRIBUTION TO IFAD - 1.8501 
 
RURAL DVPT IN BLINISHT. DAIC. BUSHAT AND ZADRIMA REGION - SUPPORT TO NGO - 0.2257 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 241: Netherlands  to Albania 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(9.0)  (8.5) 
TIR PORTO ROMANO [CLEAN UP OF THE PORTO ROMANO HOT SPOT]-  6.0877 
 
TIR MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT - 0.6791 
 
TIR TIRANA URBAN PLAN - 1.6392  
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Table 242: Switzerland to Albania 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
(4.0)  (3.2) 
(7.1)   (5.1) 
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.5306 
 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 5.0524 
RENOVATION D'UN INTERNAT POUR REFUGIES:AIDE 
PLURISECTORIELLE - 0.3727  
RENOVATION ANCIEN BATIMENT POUR REFUGIES: AIDE 
PLURISECTORIELLE - 0.6655  
RENOVATION ECOLE: AIDE PLURISECTORIELLE - 0.3061 
 
 
RENOVATION ECOLE: AIDE PLURISECTORIELLE - 0.1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 243 : UK to Albania 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(6.9)  (4.8) 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AGENCY - 0.4321 
 
RURAL LIVELIHOODS - 4.3209 
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Table 244 : US to Albania 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(4.8) (4.0) 
 
(3.7) (3.2) 
 
(9.2)  (8.4) 
 
(8.9)  (8.3) 
 
(14.4)  (13.9) 
IMPROVED PUBLIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL SVCES - 3.0860 
MULTISECTOR: ACCELERATED 
DEVPT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 3.1700 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 3.3370 CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 
1.0000 
CHEMICAL AGENT ELIMINATION TO 
PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT - 
6.7570 
AUDIT. EVALUATION & PROJECT 
SUPPORT - 0.2650 
 CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 
1.6410 
TARGETED VULNERABLE 
POPULATIONS - 0.3390 
MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES AND BIO-DIVERSITY - 
0.0500 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE - 0.6000 
 CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 
1.2700 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 2.5070 U.S. PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN 
COUNTRY - 1.3120 
  U.S. PEACE CORPS - 1.1480 SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 0.8000 ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE 
AND THE BALTIC STATES - 2.3660 
  ECA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS - 
0.9800 
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 
2.1260 
ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE 
AND THE BALTIC STATES - 0.4000 
   U.S. PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS 
IN COUNTRY - 1.5010 
ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE 
AND THE BALTIC STATES - 1.0000 
    ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE 
AND THE BALTIC STATES - 1.2580 
    ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE 
AND THE BALTIC STATES - 0.3940 
    INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION 
PROGRAMS (IIP) - 0.0500 
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Table 245: EC to Albania 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
(42.8)  (36.1) 
 
(45.1)  (34.5) 
 
(35.1) (26.9) 
 
(41.0)    (30.2) 
 
(32.0)  (20.6) 
 
(46.0) (29.6) 
 
(59.7) (41.4) 
 
(8.8) (8.3) 
 
COP ALBANIE 1996 
- 35.9695 
MULTISECTOR AID 
- 34.4934 
ALBANIA COP 1998 
- 26.9116 
MULTISECTOR AID 
- 30.1580 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RECONSTRUCTION - 
1.1059 
SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME FOR 
ALBANIA IN 2001 – 
CARDS - 29.5618 
ANNUAL 
PROGRAMME 2002 
ALBANIA - 40.4297 
STRENTHENING 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
MONITORING SYSTEM 
- 3.1060 
DELEGATION 
TIRANA - 0.1269 
   MULTISECTOR AID - 
19.5374 
 ICMPD – ALBANIE - 
0.4159 
SUSTAINABLE AND 
INTEGRATED 
DEVELOPMENT OF 
TIRANAN-DURRES - 
1.2424 
      OIM ALBANIE - 
0.5993 
NEIGHBOURHOOD P - 
IT/ALBANIA - 1.2424 
       NEIGHBOURHOOD P - 
GR/ALBANIA - 2.7333 
 
 
 
Table 246: IDA to Albania 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
(11.0)  (10.0) 
 
(6.2)  (5.0) 
 
(12.6)   (10.0) 
URBAN WORKS + MICROENTERPRISE - 4.0000 
 
RECOVERY PROGRAM TECH ASSIST - 5.0000 URBAN DVPT:LAND DEVELOPMENT - 10.0000 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT - 6.0000 
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Table 247: Germany to BiH  
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2005 
 
(12.0)  (9.6) 
 
(14.1)  (13.9) 
MULTISECTOR AID -  0.5829 
 
EQUITY INVESTMENT - 12.4285 
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.2169 
 
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.3050 
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.4238 
 
 
STUDY & EXPERT FUND - 1.3619  
 
 
MULTISECTOR AID - 5.0237 
 
 
FED. STATES CONTRIB.: SETTLEMENT - 0.9490 
 
 
 
 
Table 248: Italy to BiH  
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
(18.8)  (14.7) 
SUPPORT GROUP BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA [through MGI]  - 14.7447  
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Table 249: Switzerland to BiH  
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
(20.8)  (16.4) 
 
(5.1)  (3.6) 
 
(4.1)  (2.9) 
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.7247 
 
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.5688 MULTISECTOR AID [Caritas Prijedor] - 2.3712 
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.6655 
 
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.6754 MULTISECTOR AID [Caritas Prijedor]-  0.5572 
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.3926 
 
MULTISECTOR AID - 2.3698  
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.8447 
 
  
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.5124 
 
  
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.0648 
 
  
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.9157 
 
  
MULTISECTOR AID - 1.0381 
 
  
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.5856 
 
  
QUICK REACTION MECHANISM: MULTISECTOR AID - 
0.3327 
  
REHABILITATION: URBAN DEVELOPMENT - 0.5523 
 
  
 
 
Table 250: US to BiH  
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1998 
 
(16.0)  (12.6) 
 
(74.6)  (61.7) 
MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 3.1600 
 
AUDIT. EVALUATION & PROJECT SUPPORT - 1.1060 
MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 1.2640 
 
BOSNIA MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE / SERVICES - 60.6010 
MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 0.6320 
 
 
MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 1.2640 
 
 
MULTI SECTOR/CROSS-CUTTING - 5.8140 
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Table 251: EC to BiH  
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(141.4)  (104.1) 
 
(86.2)  (55.7) 
 
(129.1)  (83.0) 
 
(81.3)  (56.4) 
 
(4.7)  (4.0) 
HUTOVO BLATO WETLANDS - 
0.1811 
INTEREST RATE SUBSIDY ON EIB 
LOAN TO BIH (RE/BIH/05/00/00) 
- 6.4510 
BIH SUPPORT PROGRAMME 
CARDS - 2.6867 
ANNUAL ACTION PROGRAMME 
2002 FOR BOSNIA & HERZEG. - 
NATIONAL PROGRAMME - 
56.3970 
SUPPORT TO SUSTAINABLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT - 
2.8249 
TECHNICAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE FUND (ATA) : 
RE/BIH/08/00/99 - 6.4280 
2000 INTEGRATED RETURN 
PROGRAMME FOR BIH - 46.4543 
SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA IN 2001 - 
36.6957 
 SUPPORT TO AIR MONITORING - 
1.1290 
PHARE COP 1999 BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA - 23.6548 
OBNOVA 2000 INTEGRATED 
RETURN PROGRAMME - 2.7647 
SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA IN 2001 - 
9.2345 
  
1999 EC REFUGEE PROGRAMME 
FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
- 73.8242 
 CARDS-SUPPORT PROGRAMME 
FOR BOSNIA & HEZEGOVINA-
REFUGEE RETURN PHASE II- 
0.9672 
  
  REFUGEE RETURN AND HOUSING 
SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR BIH - 
33.4050 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 252: IDA to BiH  
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
1999 
 
(103.9)  (90.0) 
 
(18.6)  (15.0) 
MULTISECTOR AID /COMP. NOT AVAILABLE - 90.0000 
 
LOCAL DEVELOPMENT - 15.0000 
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Table 253: Italy to Croatia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(4.6)  (4.4) 
LOCAL SUPPORT: SMES DEVEL.. AGRICULTURE. ENVIRONMENT. SOCIAL PROMOTION - 4.3632 
 
 
 
Table 254: US to Croatia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
2002 
 
(10.2)  (8.4) 
 
(20.1)  (18.0) 
AUDIT. EVALUATION & PROJECT SUPPORT - 0.9360 
 
SETTLEMENT: HUMANITARIAN - 15.8710 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE - 7.5000 
 
HUMANITARIAN - 0.5770 
 
 
MULTISECTOR EDUCATION/TRAINING - 0.9600 
 
 
Table 255: EC to Croatia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(18.3)  (11.8) 
 
(79.1)  (50.8) 
 
(76.1)  (52.8) 
 
(8.4)  (7.1) 
 
(7.7)  (7.4) 
 
(31.9)  (31.0) 
ATA CROATIA - 0.3126 SUPPORT PROGRAMME 
FOR CROATIA IN 2001 – 
CARDS - 30.0274 
ANNUAL PROGRAMME 
2002 FOR CROATIA - 
52.7754 
ENVIRONMENT AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES - 
4.1798 
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES - 4.7211 
MULTISECTOR AID - 
0.6214 
CROATIA SMALL SCALE 
OPERATIONS - 0.3686 
REFUGEE RETURN 
PROGRAMME FOR 
CROATIA IN 2001 - 
20.7774 
 ACCREDITATION 
SYSTEMS; PLANT HEALTH. 
VETERINIARIAN SYSTEM - 
2.8242 
NEIGHBOURHOOD P - 
SLOVENIA/HUNGARY/CROATIA 
- 2.4848 
MULTISECTOR AID - 
30.3443 
RETOUR DES REFUGIES 
CROATIE - 9.2157 
     
RURAL DEVELOPMENT - 
1.8431 
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Table 256: Germany to Macedonia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
(4.5)  (3.6) 
 
(17.9)  (12.3) 
 
(8.9)  (7.8) 
 
(3.4)  (3.4) 
STUDY & EXPERT FUND - 1.6342 
 
STUDIES & EXPERTS FUND - 2.8271 STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 1.4122 STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 2.1749 
STUDY & EXPERT FUND - 0.9805 URBAN DEVPT: SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
- 7.538 
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE - 5.7767 MULTISECTOR AID - 1.0253 
FED. STATES CONTRIB.: MULTISECTOR - 
0.2451 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
- 0.8481 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 257: Sweden to Macedonia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2.5)  (1.8) 
INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT: WATER SUPPLY, SEWAGE AND WASTE - 1.6047 
 
UNIVERSITY COOPERATION - 0.20574 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 258: US to Macedonia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(29.7)  (25.5) 
 
(18.8)  (16.8) 
 
(15.4)  (14.1) 
 
(6.2)  (5.8) 
 
(5.0)  (4.8) 
MULTISECTOR: CROSS-CUTTING 
– 22.0 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES- 12.0 SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 4.6 CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS – 
2.0 
U.S. PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS 
IN COUNTRY - 1.233 
MULTISECTOR: EXPANDED 
ACCESS AND OPPORTUN NON-
MICROENTERPRISE - 1.3 
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 
2.089 
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 
3.21 
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS – 
2.134 
ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN 
EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES 
- 0.303 
MULTISECTOR: ACCELERATED 
DEVPT AND GROWTH OF PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES - 1.35 
PEACE CORPS - MISSION 
EXPENSES - 0.341 
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 
2.146 
U.S. PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS 
IN COUNTRY - 1.542 
ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN 
EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES 
- 2.248 
MULTISECTOR: PEACE CORPS - 
0.81 
MULTISECTOR 
EDUCATION/TRAINING - 2.18 
U.S. PEACE CORPS - 1.393  ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN 
EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES 
- 0.359 
  ECA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS - 
2.15 
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Table 259: EC to Macedonia  
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(16.2)  (13.7) 
 
(31.1)  (23.8) 
( 
19.0)  (14.5) 
 
(40.3)  (29.7) 
 
(23.1)  (14.9) 
 
(76.9)  (49.4) 
 
(46.9)  (32.5) 
 
(10.9)  (10.3) 
 
(7.0)  (6.8) 
COP FYROM 1996 
/MA9602-05 - 
13.653 
COP II 1997 – 
FYROM - 6.7996 
FYROM COP 1998 
- 14.53976 
BONIFICATION 
BEI PROTOCOLE 
FINANCIER 
FYROM - 13.6920 
NATIONAL 
PROGRAMME 
2000 - 14.9294 
SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME FOR 
THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAV 
REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA IN 
2001 - 3.58230 
CARDS 2002 - 
FYROM - 
ANNUAL 
ACTION 
PROGRAMME - 
32.51342 
PROGRAMME 
RESERVE-3.7271 
MULTISECTOR 
AID - 2.4857 
 COP FYROM 1997 
- 16.9990 
 COP FYROM 1999 
- 15.9829 
 SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME 
FYROM 2001 - 
33.5814 
 NEIGHBOURHOOD 
P - BG/FYROM - 
1.2423 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY AND 
ADMIN. MGMT - 
2.4857 
     ADDITIONAL 
PROGRAMME FOR 
THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAV 
REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA - 
10.7469 
 NEIGHBOURHOOD 
P - GR/FYROM - 
2.2363 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY AND 
ADMIN. MGMT - 
1.24285 
     CARDS-SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME FOR 
FYROM IN 2001 - 
1.5224 
   
 
 
 
Table 260: IDA to Macedonia  
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(27.0)  (20.0) 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURE – 5.0 
 
MULTISECTOR AID – 15.0 
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Table 261: Germany to FRY/Serbia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(6.1)  (4.9) 
 
(15.7)  (10.9) 
 
(12.6)  (9.1) 
 
(4.7)  (4.1) 
 
(10.1)  (9.9) 
 
(33.8)  (33.3) 
MULTISECTOR AID - 0.8553 MULTISECTOR AID 
[Kosovo] - 1.4418 
STUDY AND EXPERT FUND 
- 1.4136 
INTEGRATED SPECIALIST - 
0.6186 
MULTISECTOR AID - 
0.7951 
EQUITY INVESTMENT - 
19.2642 
HUMANITARIAN/STRUCTURAL 
MEASURES TO SURVIVE 
OVER WINTER. KOSOVO - 
2.7238 
MULTISECTOR EMERGENCY 
AID TO SERBIA- 4.7119 
STUDY AND EXPERT FUND 
- 1.8848 
MULTISECTOR AID - 
0.3954 
REGIONAL PROJECT EX- 
YUGOSLAVIA - 2.4848 
MULTISECTOR AID - 
2.4857 
STUDY & EXPERT FUND - 
0.8988 
SMALL PROJECTS FUND 
FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF 
SE EUROPE [Kosovo and 
Montenegro] - 2.1203 
GOVERNMENT 
CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO 
- 2.9605 
SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 
0.8234 
STUDY AND EXPERT FUND 
- 2.4848 
SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 
1.6157 
FED. STATES CONTRIB.: 
SETTLEMENT - 0.4176 
REHABILITATION OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE. 
GREJCEVCE REGION - 
2.5915 
SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 
0.5183 
SMALL PROJECT FUND FOR 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
OF YUGOSLAVIA - 1.1297 
STABILITY PACT FOR 
SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 
1.0772 
SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 
0.8700 
  SMALL PROJECT FUND FOR 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
OF YUGOSLAVIA - 0.9424 
STUDY AND EXPERT FUND 
- 1.1297 
STABILITY PACT FOR 
SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE - 
0.5715 
STUDY AND EXPERT FUND 
- 0.6214 
  STUDY AND EXPERT FUND 
ENERGY - 0.4712 
 SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 
0.4061 
SMALL PROJECTS FUND - 
0.4971 
  MODERNIZATION OF 
LOCAL AUTHORITY 
SERVICES - 0.9424 
 SMALL SCALE FONDS - 
0.6212 
REGIONALPROJEKT EX-
JUGOSLAWIEN - 2.4111 
    URBAN DEVELOPMENT 
AND MANAGEMENT - 
1.2424 
MULTISECTOR AID - 
1.8643 
     MODERNIZATION OF 
MUNICIPAL SERVICES - 
1.1186 
     MODERNIZATION OF 
MUNICIPAL SERVICES - 
1.6779 
     RURAL DEVELOPMENT - 
0.6249 
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Table 262: Sweden to FRY/Serbia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(7.4)  (6.5) 
MINISTRY FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT (MPNRE) - 0.8665 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT - 0.8655 
 
SUST. DEVELOPMENT S-M - 0.7675 
 
URBAN PLANNING MONTENEGRO - 0.7502 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF 4 DIFFERENT SECTORS IN TOPOLA. SERBIA - 0.4393 
 
TOPOLA RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (TRDP) - 2.8047 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 263: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(18.1)  (12.9) 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMIN. MGMT [Kosovo] - 7.8796 
 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FUND  [Kosovo]- 0.6458 
 
PROJET EAU [Kosovo] -  2.9504 
 
MULTISECTOR AID [Kosovo] - 0.6932 
 
MULTISECTOR AID [Kosovo. cadastre] - 0.5925 
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Table 264: US to FRY/Serbia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(17.4)  (15.5) 
 
(27.6)  (25.2) 
 
(4.4)  (4.1) 
 
(9.0)  (8.8) 
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.1040 ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND 
THE BALTIC STATES: PROJECT 
ASSISTANCE - 13.0580 
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.8280 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic States - 1.2370 
SPECIAL INITIATIVES - 4.9900 ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND 
THE BALTIC STATES: PROJECT 
ASSISTANCE - 5.5710 
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.8540 Assistance for Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic States - 1.4710 
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.8730 CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.8330 INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION 
PROGRAMS (IIP) - 0.3800 
Assistance for Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic States - 1.5520 
CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.3330 CROSS-CUTTING PROGRAMS - 1.4150  International Information Programs (IIP) - 
0.4100 
MULTISECTOR EDUCATION/TRAINING - 
1.5800 
ECA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS - 1.5800   
MULTISECTOR EDUCATION/TRAINING - 
3.4900 
ECA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS - 0.7600   
MULTISECTOR EDUCATION/TRAINING - 
0.7800 
ECA EXCHANGE PROGRAMS - 0.7500   
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Table 265: EC to FRY/Serbia 
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(98.0)  (72.2) 
 
(758.4)  (489.8) 
 
(91.8)  (59.0) 
 
(70.8)  (49.1) 
 
(27.5)  (23.3) 
 
(25.6)  (24.4) 
 
(20.5)  (19.9) 
 
PROGRAMME ATA FRY 
- COMMISSION 
DECISION 09/07/99 - 
4.5285 
EMERGENCY 
ASSISTANCE PROG. 
SERBIE - 163.1186 
SUPPORT PROGRAMME 
FOR KOSOVO IN 2001 
- 39.8531 
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 
FOR SERBIA - 
TECHINICAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
ASSISTANCE - 2.8273 
ENVIRONMENT - 
5.6484 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MGMT - 3.1060 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MGMT - 3.7286 
 
MULTISECTOR AID - 
0.2894 
COUTS DE 
FONCTIONNEMENT 
A.R. AU KOSOVO - 
3.2255 
SUPPORT PROGRAMME 
FOR MONTENEGRO IN 
2001 - 11.9112 
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 
2002 FOR KOSOVO-
TECNICAL ASISTANCE 
- 1.8848 
ENVIRONMENT: 
CUSTOMS & TAXATION 
- 1.1297 
GTAF ANFD RESERVE - 
1.8636 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY AND ADMIN. 
MGMT - 11.8071 
MULTISECTOR AID - 
0.2324 
RECONSTRUCTION DU 
KOSOVO - 129.020 
CARDS-ADDITIONAL 
SUPPORT PROGRAMME 
FOR MONTENEGRO IN 
2001 - 2.6867 
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 
2002 FOR KOSOVO- 
0.8482 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
CAPACITY BUILDING - 
9.0375 
GTAF AND 
PROGRAMME RESERVE 
- 1.2424 
MULTISECTOR AID - 
0.6214 
RECONSTRUCTION 
ECONOMIQUE AU 
KOSOVO - 66.5956 
PROG A2000 ENERGY 
& LOGEMENTS ET 
ENVIRONNEMENT - 
36.8630 
ADDITIONAL SUPPORT 
PROGRAMME FOR 
SERBIA IN 2001 - 
4.4779 
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 
2002 FOR SERBIA - 
REGIONAL INT. 
BORDER MANAGEMENT 
- 9.1415 
INSTITUTIONAL 
SUPPORT FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT - 
5.0836 
GTAF AND RESERVE - 
6.8331 
MULTISECTOR AID - 
3.7286 
OBNOVA- FINANCING 
AGREEMENT 
MONTENEGRO - 
0.5328 
RECONSTRUCTION 
DES 
INFRASTRUCTURES ET 
DVLT ECONOMIQUE - 
157.5892 
 ANNUAL ACTION 
PROGRAMME 2002 FOR 
MONTENEGRO - 
10.8378 
COMPTABILISATION 
DES INTÉRETS 
BANCAIRES - 2.4335 
NEIGHBOURHOOD P - 
HU/SCG - 1.2424 
 
   ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 
2002 FOR KOSOVO- 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME - 8.4818 
 NEIGHBOURHOOD P - 
BG/SCG - 1.2424 
 
   ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 
2002 FOR KOSOVO-
HOUSING SECTOR IN 
KOSOVO-  15.0787 
 NEIGHBOURHOOD P - 
RO/SCG - 1.7393 
 
     ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT -
SUSTAINABLE RETURN 
OF MINORITY 
COMMUNTIES - 7.1704 
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Table 266: Germany to ex Yu  
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(4.8)  (4.7) 
REGIONAL STUDY AND EXPERT FUND - 3.727 
 
GRANT FACILITY FOR PREPARATORY STUDIES - 0.9317 
 
 
 
Tale 267: Italy to ex Yu  
 
Multisector; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
(4.6)  (3.8) 
 
(9.9)  (9.4) 
 
(9.6)  (9.4) 
EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCES BETWEEN ITALIAN AND 
BALKAN MUNICIPALITIES - 3.5981 
REFUGEES SETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN SERBIA - 
ACTION PLAN - 7.4042 
REFUGEES SETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN SERBIA - 
ACTION PLAN - 9.0741 
 UTL AT THE ITALIAN EMBASSY OF BELGRADE - 
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS - 0.2767 
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HUMANITARIAN AID 
 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE  
 
 
Table 268: Austria to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(21.0)  (15.8) 
ATHUM/ALBA: AID FOR KOSOVO REFUGEES - 14.94397 
 
HUMANITARIAN AID TO KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.371663  
 
 
 
Table 269: France to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(5.5)  (5.3) 
AIDE D'URGENCE - 5.3 
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Table 270: Germany to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
(4.3)  (3.6) 
 
(7.0)  (5.6) 
SHELTERS FOR REFUGEES, KOSOVO - 2.84187 
 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 4.8145  
HUMANITARIAN AID - 0.77526 
 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 0.8171  
 
 
 
Table 271: Italy to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
(10.5)  (7.7) 
 
(4.8)  (3.5) 
 
(86.6)  (61.3) 
EMERGENCY AID TO ORPHANS AND WOMEN - 0.8807 EMERGENCY ROOM SERVICE - 0.6910 AID TO REFUGEES KOSOVO - CONTRIBUTION TO IFAD - 
1.6508 
AGRO-ZOOTECHNIC PGM :EMERGENCY AID - 5.2847 
 
EMERG. REHAB.:BASIC SOC./HEALTH SVCS - 0.5851 AID TO REFUGEES - 1.0437 
EMERGENCY AID - 1.1227 
 
EMERGENCY REHAB. OF BERAT HOSPITAL - 0.8638 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 55.3447 
 
 
EMERGENCY REHAB. OF SOCIAL SERVICES - 0.5759 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.6508 
 
 
Table 272: Italy to Albania   
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation ; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(25.3)  (17.9) 
REHABILITATION OF ROAD AND ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION PLANT - 17.6085 
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Table 273: Norway to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1999 
 
(2.1)  (1.2) 
 
(3.1)  (1.7) 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 1.2284 
 
HUMANITARIAN AID TO REFUGEES - 0.3187 
 
 
EMERGENCY AID TO KOSOVAR REFUGEES - 0.3719 
 
 
EMERGENCY AID KOSOVO: REFUGEES - 0.5386 
 
 
KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.4713 
 
Table 274: Spain to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(15.5)  (9.9) 
AIDE D'URGENCE: COÛTS D'INSTALLATION DE CAMPEMENT - 9.3747 
 
 
 
Table 275 : Sweden to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(3.7)  (3.0) 
EMERGENCY AID: SRSA-UNHCR/ALBANIA - 0.4693 
 
EMERGENCY AID: TRANSPORTS - 0.6609 
 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 1.5128 
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Table 276 : Switzerland to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(22.4)  (17.6) 
SCHOOL RENOVATION: EMERGENCY AID - 0.63552 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 6.6546 
 
KOSOVAR REFUGEES - 1.5418 
 
CRÉDITS PERSONNELS : AIDE D'URGENCE - 1.2943 
 
CASH FOR SHELTER - 2.9234 
 
LOGEMENTS POUR REFUGIES KOSOVARS - 0.9982 
 
BUILDING SCHOOL REHABILITATION: EMERGENCY AID - 0.8551 
 
 
 
Table 277: UK to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
(44.9)  (33.4) 
 
(9.7)  (6.8) 
ISLAMIC RELIEF TENTS: EMERGENCY - 0.6241 
 
AID MANAGEMENT OFFICE: REFUGEES - 3.9358 
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 0.9707 
 
AMMUNITION DETERIORATION AND LOGISTIC DISPOSAL: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 0.6724 
KOSOVO CRISIS AIRCHARTER:REFUGEES - 2.5203 
 
UNDP WEAPONS IN EXCHANGE FOR DVPT PROGRAMME: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 0.9082 
CONTR. NEEDS: AID TO REFUGEES - 2.0223 
 
 
AID MANAGEMENT OFFICE:REFUGEES - 8.0893 
 
 
DIRECT PURCHASE EQUIP.:REFUGEES - 3.2357 
 
 
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 2.0061 
 
 
 KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 4.044 
 
 
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 1.6178 
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Table 278: US to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(7.6)  (6.5) 
 
(10.4)  (9.1) 
 
(9.1)   (8.1) 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID: COMMODITY - 3.329 DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE - COMPLEX EMERGENCY - 
3.701 
FOOD FOR EDUCATION - EMERGENCY FOOD AID – 
COMMODITIES - 1.413 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID: FREIGHT - 2.89 EMERGENCY FOOD AID : AGRICULTURE - GLOBAL FOOD 
FOR EDUCATION - 1.179 
FOOD FOR EDUCATION - EMERGENCY FOOD AID – 
COMMODITIES - 3.594 
 EMERGENCY FOOD AID : AGRICULTURE - GLOBAL FOOD 
FOR EDUCATION - 2.301 
FOOD FOR EDUCATION - EMERGENCY FOOD AID – 
FREIGHT - 1.007 
  FOOD FOR EDUCATION - EMERGENCY FOOD AID – 
FREIGHT - 1.62 
 
 
 
Table 279: EC to Albania  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(3.0)  (2.5) 
 
(5.5)  (4.2) 
 
(17.2)  (13.2) 
 
(42.8)  (31.5) 
 
(4.8)  (3.1) 
 
(6.4)  (4.1) 
 
(3.2) (2.2) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 2.53 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 4.24 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 13.2 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 31.54 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 3.09 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 3.31 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 2.22 
     EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 0.6326 
 
 
 
Table 280: EC to Albania  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(3.3)  (3.1) 
DEMOCRATIC STABILIZATIONS - DEVELOPMENT OF THE TIRANAN-DURRES REGION - 3.10597 
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Table 281: Austria to BiH 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(2.3)  (1.5) 
REFUGEES REPATRIATION PROJECT/HOUSING - 0.2803 
 
REFUGEES RETURN & REINTEGR. PROGRAM - 0.8036 
 
 
 
Table 282: Austria to BiH  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
19962
 
(4.1)  (3.8) 
HOUSING (REHABILITATION) IN SARAJEVO - 0.6579 
 
HOUSING (REHABILITATION) IN TRAVNIK- 0.65224 
 
HOUSING REHABILITATION - 0.6616 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 283: France to BiH  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
2005 
 
(2.2)  (1.9) 
 
(26.2)  (25.4) 
FONDS D'URGENCE HUMANITAIRE - 1.9100 
 
AIDE D'URGENCE - 25.41 
 
                                                 
2 Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
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Table 284: Germany to BiH3
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
(17.6)  (17.0) 
 
(19.7)  (16.6) 
 
(22.3)  (18.7) 
 
(12.6)  (8.7) 
 
(8.3)  (5.6) 
 
(6.1)  (4.4) 
 
(6.5)  (6.4) 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 
17.0332 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 2.0760 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 3.189 
HUMANITARIOAN AID, 
STABILITY PACT - 
1.4074 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.373 
GOVERNMENT 
CONTRIBUTIONS VIA 
NGO - 0.9424 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF STABILITY 
PACT FOR SOUTH 
EASTERN EUROPE - 
5.5935 
 AID TO REFUGEES IN 
RECIP. COUNTRIES - 
4.0245 
AID TO REFUGEES (IN 
RECIP. COUNTR.) - 
6.1441  
AID TO REFUGEES (IN 
RECIP. COUNTRY) - 
1.3193 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF  - 3.6315 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.3704 
 
 HUMANITARIAN AID - 
9.3316 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 
9.18381 
VARIOUS 
HUMANITARIAN AID 
INTERVENTIONS - 
3.5248  
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 2.0742 
 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.1343 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 0.9727 
   
   AID TO REFUGEES (IN 
RECIP. COUNTRY) - 
0.565424303821326 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3  Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
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Table 285: Italy to BiH  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
(18.6)  (13.1) 
 
(11.9)  (9.3) 
 
(5.7)  (4.1) 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 1.1933 
 
LOCAL TECHNICAL UNIT - 0.9662 WOMEN ASSISTANCE:EMERGENCY AID - 0.3085 
EMERGENCY PROJECTS ADVISORS - 1.2093 
 
EMERGENCY PROJECTS ADVISORS - 0.7161 LOCAL TECHNICAL UNIT:EMERGENCY AID - 0.6502 
ELDERLY ASSISTANCE - 1.5346 
 
RELIEF FOOD AID&AID TO REFUGEES- 2.7219 EMERGENCY SUPPORT:LOCAL HEALTH SYST. - 0.7633 
EMERGENCY SANITARY AID - 1.5346 
 
BASIC INFRASTRUCTURES&SOCIAL REHAB. -  2.9812 
 
EMERGENCY REHAB. PGM - 1.2918 
AID TO REFUGEES- 1.2277 
 
LOCAL TECHNICAL UNIT - ITALIAN EMB. - 0.7297  
HUMANITARIAN TRANSPORTS&ELDERLY ASS. - 1.2277 
 
  
FOOD AID EMERGENCY - 1.1049 
 
  
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 1.9398 
 
  
 
 
Table 286: Netherlands to BiH  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2005 
 
(4.9)  (3.5) 
 
(5.1)  (3.5) 
 
(13.1)  (8.4) 
 
(9.5)  (9.2) 
BIJDRAGE ICRC APPEAL 1998 - 1.2597 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.8562 EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE: 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION - 2.0481 
SUPPORT TO RETURN PROCESS AND 
RECONCILIATIOON - 1.16713 
ICRC RENEWED EMERGENCY APPEAL - 
1.2597 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.7131 AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 
4.0963 
SUSTAINABLE RETURN OF 60 FAMILIES TO 
NORTHWEST BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
- 1.03446 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 0.9685 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.2527 AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY - 
2.0481 
FACILITATION OF SUSTAINABLE RETURN 
TO SREBRENICA AREA - 1.2428 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.7252  SUSTAINABLE RETURN OF 87 FAMILIES TO 
SREBRENICA - 1.2428 
   
 
SUSTAINABLE RETURN TO FOCA - 1.23472 
   RETURN & DEVELOPMENT STUDY - 
0.61397 
   SUSTAINABLE TRANSFER TO RETURN 
RELATED AUTHORITIES - 2.61235 
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Table 287: Netherlands to BiH  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
19964
 
19975
 
19986
 
19997
 
20008
 
20019
 
200210
 
200311
 
2004 
 
(61.7)  (51.4) 
 
(15.4)  (12.4) 
 
(72.2)  (51.5) 
 
(26.6)  (19.0) 
 
(99.5)  (69.4) 
 
(82.8)  (52.0) 
 
(36.2)  (23.3) 
 
(39.6)  (27.8) 
 
(50.8)  (43.6) 
 
(12.6)  (11.9) 
RECONSTRUCTI
ON RELIEF - 
51.3922 
RECONSTRUCTI
ON RELIEF - 
0.5930 
RECONSTRUCTI
ON RELIEF - 
14.6086 
RECONSTRUCTI
ON RELIEF - 
9.8261 
RECONSTRUCTI
ON RELIEF - 
14.5046 
RECONSTRUC
TION RELIEF - 
1.6254 
RECONSTRUC
TION RELIEF - 
1.6254 
INTEGRATED 
RETURN 
PROGRAMME - 
1.24776 
SAR RETURN 
TO 
SREBRENICA 
AREA - 
1.24148 
RECONSTRUC
TION AND 
ECONOMIC 
ASSISTANCE - 
1.2400 
 RECONSTRUCTI
ON RELIEF - 
2.1546 
RECONSTRUCTI
ON RELIEF - 
21.0159 
  MINORITY 
RETURN - 
0.6206 
INTEGRATED 
RETURN OF 
MINORITIES - 
1.373 
 SAR 
INTEGRATED 
RETURN 
ASSISTAN - 
1.23631 
 
     CONSOLIDATI
ON OF CROAT 
MINORITY - 
0.4621 
 RETURN OF 
DISPLACED 
ROMA 
FAMILIES - 
0.8973 
   
     EMERGENCY 
REPAIR OF 70 
HOMES - 
0.52480 
    
     INTEGRATED 
RETURN OF 
MINORITIES - 
1.3738 
    
     HOUSING 
SUPPORT FOR 
FAMILIES - 
1.04782 
    
     MINORITY 
RETURN TO 
VELIKA KLAD 
- 0.84542 
    
                                                 
4 Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
5 ibid 
6 ibid 
7 ibid 
8 ibid 
9 ibid 
10 ibid 
11 ibid 
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Table 288: Norway to BiH  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1999 
 
(37.1)  (21.7) 
 
(9.9)  (5.5) 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 21.5480 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.7791 
 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.1896 
 
 
REHABILITATION HOUSES: EMERGENCY AID - 1.1623 
 
 
REHABILITATION HOUSES: EMERGENCY AID - 1.0444 
 
 
REHABILITATION HOUSES: EMERGENCY AID - 1.0108 
 
 
 
 
Table 289: Spain to BiH  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(11.8)  (7.6) 
 
(10.9)  (6.3) 
 
(9.8)  (5.7) 
 
(14.4)  (9.2) 
 
(11.8)  (9.4) 
 
(6.7)  (6.1) 
RECONSTRUCTION, 
BOSNIE - 7.3704 
RECONSTRUCTION, 
BOSNIE - 6.2643 
RECONSTRUCTION EN 
BOSNIE - 4.70432 
BOSNIA RECONSTRUCTION 
- 8.7826 
REORGANIZATION IN 
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA - 9.16291 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF 
- 6.12588 
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Table 290: Sweden to BiH  
  
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(12.9)  (11.6) 
 
(16.7)  (16.1) 
 
(13.3)  (11.0) 
 
(5.1)  (4.1) 
 
(9.6)  (7.1) 
 
(8.0)  (5.3) 
 
(5.9)  (4.3) 
SEEDS, FOODSTUFF 
ETC… - 0.7709 
EMERG.:MOBILE 
MOTHER/CHILD-CLINIC 
- 0.5859 
EMERGENCY / 
DISTRESS RELIEF : 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT - 
1.006 
EMERGENCY AID: ICRC 
APPEAL - 0.8472 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 3.224 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 2.7034 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 2.8793 
EMERGENCY: 
WOODEN HOUSES 
PRODUCTION - 
2.8737 
EMERG PSYCHOSOC 
CENTERS 
TUZLA/ZENICA - 
0.9415 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.4470 
EMERGENCY AID: 
CARITAS -0.9833 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 2.04320 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 2.6151 
FLOODS PROGRAM - 
0.9381 
HOUSING PROJECTS 
BOSNIA -  1.6821 
REPATRIATION 
PROJECT - 0.7068 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 3.2087 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.934 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.6563 
  
REHABILITATION IN 
CENTRAL BOSNIA - 
1.1074 
EMERGENCY: READY 
MADE 
HOUSES,KRIVAJA - 
1.118 
EMERGENCY / 
DISTRESS RELIEF : 
RECONSTRUCTION - 
2.0927 
    
REHABILITATION 
PROJECT BOSNIA - 
0.7709 
EMERG. SOCIAL 
SERVICE PROJECT - 
2.0873 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.107 
    
ICRC TRUCKS FOR 
BIH - 0.6987 
REHABILITATION, 
KUPRES 2 - 1.0973 
     
EMERGENCY:HOUSE 
PROD. AT KRIVAJA 
BIH - 0.8410 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.282 
     
REHABILITATION IN 
BOSNIA - 1.2514 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 3.369 
     
 EMERG. POWER 
SUPPLY IN KUPRES - 
0.7044 
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Table 291: Sweden to BiH  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
(13.2)  (11.4) 
SALVATION ARMY REBUILDG PROJ, SIPOVO - 1.3884 
 
PMU, RECONSTRUCTION IN BOSNIA 1997 - 2.1350 
 
RETURNING AND REBUILDING PROJECT - 1.94836 
 
REBUILDING IN WAR DAMAGE VILLAGES - 2.4755 
 
REBUILDING OF WAR DAMAGE VILLAGES - 1.690 
 
 
 
Table 292: Switzerland to BiH 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
199912
 
2003 
 
(12.8)  (12.6) 
 
(4.2)  (4.0) 
 
(99.0) (77.9) 
 
(3.5)  (3.1) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 12.6452 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.9578 BOARDING SCHOOL: EMERGENCY AID - 
0.5589 
CARITAS - 1.040 
 
 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.3309 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.46096 
 
 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.4839  
 
 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.1978  
 
 
 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 36.73387  
 
 
 HIGH SCHOOL: EMERGENCY AID - 0.7985  
  EMERGENCY PUBLIC WORKS PROJECT - 
1.22180 
 
 
 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 5.9892  
 
 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.1161  
 
                                                 
12 Due to extensiveness of list of allocations, combined with  generic character of descriptions, only a reduced number of allocations is presented. 
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Table 293: US to BiH  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(31.8)  (26.0) 
 
(5.8)  (4.8) 
 
(29.8)  (25.0) 
 
(16.9)  (14.9) 
 
(17.5)  (15.7) 
EMERGENCY AID – 26.0 TRAUMA/SOC. 
WELFARE/HUMANITARIAN AID - 
0.371 
DRAWDOWN - HUMANITARIAN: 
EMERGENCY RELIEF – 25.0 
REDUCE HUMAN SUFFERING & 
CRISES IMPACT - DEMOCRATIC 
REFORM – 10.0EMERGENCY 
FOOD AID : AGRICULTURE - 
GLOBAL FOOD FOR EDUCATION - 
3.136 
BILATERAL EMERGENCY REFUGEE 
ASSISTANCE THROUGH 
NGOS/PVOS - 8.688 
 EMERGENCY AID - 4.47  EMERGENCY FOOD AID : 
AGRICULTURE - GLOBAL FOOD 
FOR EDUCATION - 1.015 
FOOD FOR EDUCATION - 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID – 
COMMODITIES - 4.806 
    FOOD FOR EDUCATION - 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID – 
FREIGHT - 2.158 
 
 
 
Table 294: US to BiH  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
(8.9)  (7.3) 
BOSNIA EMERGENCY REHABILITATION - 7.342 
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Table 295: EC to BiH  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
(162.5)  (138.5) 
 
(229.6)  (175.5) 
 
(45.6)  (34.9) 
 
(39.9)  (29.4) 
 
(9.0)  (5.8) 
 
(4.0)  (3.9) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 138.47 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 5.892 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 34.92 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 29.36 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 5.81 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 3.8528 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 167.43 
    
 EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 
1.6620 
    
 
 
Table 296: EC to BiH 
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(9.8)  (9.3) 
RETURN OF REFUGEES - 9.3179 
 
 
 
 
Table 297: IDA to BiH  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
(8.7)  (7.5) 
EMER. LANDMINES CLEARANCE - 7.5 
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Table 298: IDA to BiH  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CR 
 
1996 
 
(1997) 
 
(11.5)  (10.0) 
 
(21.1)  (17.0) 
EMER. PUBLIC WORKS/ EMPLOYMENT  -10.0 
 
RECONSTR. ASST – 17.0  
 
 
 
Table 299: Germany to Croatia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2004 
 
(2.3)  (2.4) 
 
(5.3)  (3.6) 
 
(4.2)  (2.8) 
 
(2.6)  (1.9) 
 
(2.7)  (2.6) 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 2.3649 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
0.6024 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
2.1977 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
1.645 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF 
STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH 
EASTERN EUROPE - 2.36325 
 VARIOUS HUMANITARIAN AID 
INTERVENTIONS - 2.0942 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
0.64410 
  
 AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. 
COUNTRY) - 0.9423 
   
 
 
Table 300: Italy to Croatia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
(2.9)  (2.1) 
AID TO REFUGEES - 1.08 
 
AID TO REFUGEES - 0.920 
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Table 301: Netherlands to Croatia  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(6.4)  (4.0) 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 1.2876 
 
STABPACT ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION- 1.5318 
 
STABPACT ASSISTANCE TO RETURNED - 0.6013 
 
 
 
 
Table 302: Norway to Croatia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
2005 
 
(9.9)  (5.8) 
 
(2.9)  (2.6) 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 5.7708 
 
RETURN/RECONSTR. PROGR. CROATIA - 1.2419 
 
 
 
SUSTAINABLE RETURNS TO BANOVINA - 0.4967 
 
Table 303: Norway to Croatia  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(3.8)  (2.1) 
 
(4.5)  (2.6) 
 
(5.0)  (3.1) 
 
(4.9)  (3.6) 
 
(4.7)  (3.8) 
REHABILITATION OF HOUSES -  
1.0254 
RECONSTRUCT. 190 HOUSES -  
1.1119 
RECONSTRUCTION MINORITY 
RETURN - 1.2522 
STATE GEODETIC ADM. - 0.97823 HYDROGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
PROJECT CR - 1.48383 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 
0.74156 
RECONTRUCT. MINORITY RETURN 
- 1.111 
HOUSES OF DISABLED REFUGEES 
- 0.5076 
RECONSTRUCTION FOR 
MINORITY RETURN - 1.3882 
RECONSTRUCTION OF HOUSES 
AND INFRAST - 1.11287 
 RESTORATION OF THE LIBRARY 
IN SKRADI - 0.05559 
COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION - 
1.2522 
CROSS BORDER - COMMUNITY 
RECONSTRUCTION - 1.13008 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 304: Switzerland to Croatia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
(4.0)  (3.9) 
 
(3.0)  (2.9) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.9489 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.8649 
 
 
Table 305: US to Croatia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(3.5)  (2.9) 
 
(10.9)  (9.6) 
 
(8.3)  (7.4) 
TRAUMA/SOC. WELFARE/HUMANITARIAN AID - 2.342 ACCELERATED RETURN/SUSTAINABLE REINTEGRATION 
OF WAR-AFFECTED POP. - 8.347 
BILATERAL EMERGENCY REFUGEE ASSISTANCE THROUGH 
NGOS/PVOS - 7.416 
EMERGENCY AID - .52 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF: HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE- 1.0 
 
 
 
Table 306: EC to Croatia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
(26.9)  (20.6) 
 
(10.4)  (7.9) 
 
(3.7)  (2.7) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.4997 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF- 7.94 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.69 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 15.32  
 
 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 0.9870  
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Table 307: EC to Croatia  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2004 
 
(18.3)  (17.4) 
RETURN OF REFUGEES - 17.3934 
 
 
 
 
Table 308: Germany to Macedonia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(7.4)  (5.9) 
 
(3.8)  (2.6) 
 
(5.2)  (3.8) 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 3.9129 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.0340 RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR-DAMAGED HOUSES - 2.3560 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 1.999 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.5340 GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS VIA NGO - 0.9424 
 
 
 
Table 309: Italy to Macedonia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2002 
 
(4.0)  (2.8) 
 
(4.1.)  (2.8) 
AID TO REFUGEES MACEDONIA - 1.6508 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.9424 
AID TO REFUGEES - 1.1588 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 1.3853 
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Table 310: Netherlands to Macedonia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(3.4)  (2.2) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.71646 
 
LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES - 0.4925 
 
REPATRIATION INFORMATION - 0.5328 
 
 
 
Table 311: Netherlands to Macedonia   
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(10.9)  (7.0) 
 
(9.2)  (6.5) 
CONFLICT PREVENTION / RECONSTRUCTION - 6.966 
 
INTERN. MANAGEMENT GROUP BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA - 4.3162 
 
 
UNHCR - 1.8848 
 
 
Table 312: Norway to Macedonia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
(2.7)  (1.5) 
 
(2.1)  (1.2) 
RED CROSS APPEAL: AID TO REFUGEES - 0.34309 
 
EMERGENCY ANIMAL FEED DISTRICT - 0.5559 
AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY - 0.6412 
 
URGENT APPEAL UNHCR - 0.5169 
REFUGEES: EDUCATION CHILDREN FROM KOSOVO - 0.4531 
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Table 313: Switzerland to Macedonia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(2.2)  (1.8) 
KOSOVAR REFUGEES - 0.45251 
 
KOSOVAR REFUGEES - 0.64483 
 
KOSOVAR REFUGEES - 0.65881 
 
 
 
Table 314: UK to Macedonia  
  
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
(30.4)  (22.5) 
 
(4.8)  (3.4) 
 
(9.8)  (6.7) 
COMMUNITY BASED WATER & SANIT. PROG: EMERGENCY 
- 1.1122 
AID MANAGEMENT OFFICE: REFUGEES - 3.0275 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.6007 
KOSOVO CRISIS AIRCHARTER:REFUGEES - 1.6178 
 
 EMERGENCY: ASSESSMENT MISSION - 0.7489 
CONTR. NEEDS: AID REFUGEES - 2.0223 
 
 ICRC APPEAL 2001 FYR MACEDONIA - 1.0802 
AID MANAGEMENT OFFICE:REFUGEES - 8.0893  EMERGENCY: UNICEF - ED. CONFIDENCE BUILDING - 
0.4320 
DIRECT PURCHASE EQUIPMENT: REFUGEES - 3.23572 
 
  
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 0.50477 
 
  
KOSOVO CRISIS: AID TO REFUGEES - 1.6178 
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Table 315: US to Macedonia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
(3.9)  (3.4) 
 
(3.3)  (2.9) 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID: COMMODITY - 1.625 
 
DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE - COMPLEX EMERGENCY - 2.931 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID: FREIGHT - 1.759 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 316: US to Macedonia  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(6.3)  (5.5) 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF: SPECIAL INITIATIVES – 5.0 
 
 
 
 
Table 317: EC to Macedonia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(32.0)  (23.5) 
 
(7.7)  (5.0) 
 
(6.5)  (4.5) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF -  23.54 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 4.5 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.85 
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Table 318: EC to Macedonia 
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2003 
 
(6.6)  (5.6) 
RUNNING COSTS OF THE EUROPEAN AGENCY FOR RECONSTRUCTION - 5.649 
 
 
 
Table 319: IDA to Macedonia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(61.9)  (50.0) 
EMERGENCY RECOVERY – 50.0 
 
 
 
Table 320: Austria to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
(3.1)  (2.4) 
 
(8.6)  (6.4) 
 
(7.0)  (4.7) 
HUMANITARIAN AID FOR KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.48481 
 
HUMANITARIAN AID TO KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.77429 ADMIN. COSTS OF NGOS FOR RELIEF AID - 2.3440 
AID FOR KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.4848 
 
IKRK: HUMANITARIAN AID (REFUGEES) - 1.5485 REPATRIATION OF KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.8050 
HUMANITARIAN AID FOR KOSOVO - 0.5252 
 
UNHCR: HUMANITARIAN AID (REFUGEES) - 1.5485 REPATRIATION PROGRAM KOSOVO REFUGEES - 0.8050 
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Table 321: France to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(47.7)  (46.2) 
AIDE D'URGENCE - 46.16 
 
 
Table 322: Germany to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
200113
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(8.9)  (9.0) 
( 
15.7)  (13.1) 
 
(34.2)  (27.5) 
 
(33.2)  (22.9) 
 
(18.2)  (12.4) 
 
(10.9)  (7.9) 
 
(5.9)  (5.2) 
 
(6.1)  (6.0) 
HUMANITARIA
N AID - 9.0376 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 1.4209 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 4.4359 
EMERGENCY AID: 
IMPROVING 
RETURNEES' 
LIVING 
STANDARDS - 
1.9238 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 1.45840 
EMERGENCY/DI
STRESS RELIEF 
- 2.6328 
FURTHER SKILLS 
MEASURES IN THE 
SCOPE OF THE 
STABILITY PACT - 
3.9848 
STABILITY PACT FOR 
SOUTH EASTERN 
EUROPE - 0.5205 
 AID TO REFUGEES (IN 
RECIP. COUNTR.) - 
1.1651 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 
19.5342 
EMERGENCY AID 
PROGRAMME FOR 
SERBIA - 2.3559 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 2.3650 
EMERGENCY/DI
STRESS RELIEF 
- 2.91301 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRE
SS RELIEF 
STABILITY PACT FOR 
SOUTH EASTERN 
EUROPE - 4.2917 
 HUMANITARIAN AID - 
6.1123 
EMERGENCY FOOD 
AID - 3.540 
VARIOUS 
HUMANITARIAN 
ACTIVITIES - 
8.8027 
EMERGENCY/DISTRES
S RELIEF - 4.699 
FURTHER 
SKILLS 
MEASURES IN 
THE SCOPE OF 
THE STABILITY 
PACT - 1.866 
  
 EMERGENCY FOOD 
AID- 4.4219 
 VARIOUS 
HUMANITARIAN 
AID 
INTERVENTIONS - 
3.9115 
    
   AID TO REFUGEES 
(IN RECIP. 
COUNTRY) - 
2.1754700089525
5 
    
 
                                                 
13 Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
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Table 323: Italy to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(3.6)  (2.6) 
 
(24.6)  (17.4) 
 
(33.6)  (21.0) 
 
(3.2)  (2.2) 
 
(4.0)  (3.4) 
EMERG./DISTRESS RELIEF IN 
KOSOVO- 1.0942 
AID TO REFUGEES IN 
MONTENEGRO - 1.4202 
EMRGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF IN 
KOSOVO - 1.8086 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
1.7035 
VOL. CONTRIBUT.UNMIK - 
REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES IN 
PEC/PEJE MUNICIPALITY - 2.824 
EMERG. PROG MONITORING-
EMBASSY FUNDS - 1.0701 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
12.5724 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
19.03855 
  
 
 
KOSOVO EMERGENCY - 1.10053    
 AID TO REFUGEES – KOSOVO - 
1.1005 
   
 
 
Table 324: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
199814
 
199915
 
2000 
 
200116
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
(6.2)  (4.4) 
 
(31.2)  (21.7) 
 
(7.8)  (4.9) 
 
(9.4)  (6.0) 
 
(3.2)  (2.3) 
 
(6.1)  (5.3) 
 
(5.9)  (5.6) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 0.7558 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.063 
AID TO REFUGEES: UN 
CONSOLIDATED 
INTER-AGENCY - 
1.0873 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 2.8443 
REFUGEE HOUSING 
PROGRAMME - 0.4796 
AID TO REFUGEES (IN 
RECIP. COUNTRY) - 
0.512 
DZO TERUGKEER 
KOSOVO - 1.9606 
AID TO REFUGEES (IN 
RECIP. COUNTRY) - 
0.5039 
AID TO REFUGEES: 
KOSOVO - 2.2371 
EMERGENCY FOOD 
AID: UN 
CONSOLIDATED 
INTER-AGENCY - 
3.1741 
REPATRIATION 
INFORMATION - 
0.5328 
KOSOVO - 0.9942 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.0253 
DZO START II - 2.4248 
 EMERGENCY FOOD AID 
- 2.9913 
  SERBIA ENTERPRISE 
PROGRAMME - 0.4900 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID 
- 1.1298 
DZO SUPPORT TO HPD 
– 2 - 1.2423 
     EMERGENCY FOOD AID 
- 2.2596 
 
 
                                                 
14 Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
15 ibid 
16 ibid 
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Table 325: Netherlands to FRY/Serbia 
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
199917
 
200018
 
2001 
 
2003 
 
(42.3)  (29.5) 
 
(54.3)  (34.1) 
 
(5.5)  (3.5) 
 
(8.4)  (7.2) 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 5.0969 KOSOVO: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT - 
6.1475 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 1.3093 UNICEF KOSOVO 1999 - 1.1279 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 15.7225 
 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 10.8732 KOSOVO REHABILITATION - 1.1929 UNICEF APPEAL'99 KOSOVO - 2.2045 
 KOSOVO: UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL - 
8.4601 
 HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION CAT. IV EN V 
- 1.7687 
 KOSOVO: UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL - 
1.990 
 RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 1.5954 
 
Table 326: Norway to FRY/Serbia  
 
 Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
199919
 
200020
 
200121
 
200522
 
(8.7)  (5.1) 
 
(110.6)   (62.1) 
 
(8.5)  (4.9) 
 
(3.1)  (1.8) 
 
(4.6)  (4.3) 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 5.07218 AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. 
COUNTRY) - 0.639677307647911 
EMERGENCY: HEATING OIL TO 
SERBIA - 2.3594 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
2.8443 
RETURN TO ROMA MAHALA, 
PHASE 2 - 0.9665 
 ICRC APPEAL: AID TO REFUGEES 
- 2.0528 
REFUGEES: HUMANITARIAN 
PROGRAMME - 0.6820 
REPATRIATION INFORMATION - 
0.53286 
IFRC APPEALS 2005 - DISASTER 
PREPAREDNS. - 0.2328 
 KOSOVO REFUGEES- 
2.56512203568085 
EMERGENCY: ASPHALT FOR 
DEMOCRACY - 0.3410 
 REFUGEE SELF HELP SHELTER 
PROJECT - 1.1798 
 EVACUATION REFUGEES KOSOVO 
TO NORWAY - 
1.41081711962447 
  CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT - 0.4657 
 UN APPEAL KOSOVO: AID TO 
REFUGEES - 7.69536 
   
 EMERGENCY FOOD AID: 500 MT 
OF CANNED FISH - 1.7955 
   
 
                                                 
17 Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
18 ibid 
19 ibid 
20 ibid 
21 ibid 
22 ibid 
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Table 327: Spain to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
(5.7)  (3.7) 
KOSOVO - AIDE HUMANITAIRE ENVOI DIRECT EN ESPÈCES, CROIX ROUGE ESPAGNOLE - 1.0373 
 
KOSOVO - CONTRIBUTION AU PROGRAMME VOLONTAIRE DES NU - 0.3360 
 
CONTRIBUTION A L'ACNUR POUR AGIR CONTRE LA CRISE DU KOSOVO - 1.28070736028924 
 
PREPARAT/DISTRIBUT DE REPAS CHAUDS A POPULATION KOSOVAR LA PLUS DEMUNIE - 0.31112 
 
 
 
Table 328: Spain to FRY/Serbia  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(7.4)  (4.8) 
 
(9.3)  (5.3) 
 
(5.0)  (2.9) 
 
(6.3)  (4.0) 
 
(8.2)  (6.5) 
AIDE À LA RECONSTRUCTION DU 
KOSOVO - 4.7770 
AIDE À LA RECONSTRUCTION DU 
KOSOVO - 5.3227 
RECONSTRUCTION AU KOSOVO - 
2.9119 
KOSOVO RECONSTRUCTION - 
3.9973 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 
1.9538 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 329 : Sweden to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
199823
 
199924
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
(9.2)  (7.7) 
 
(26.6)  (21.5) 
 
(19.1)  (14.1) 
 
(6.8)  (4.5) 
EMERGENCY / DISTRESS RELIEF : 
CHILDREN'S PROJECT - 0.4026 
EMERGENCY AID: KOSOVO DISTRICT 
HEAT - 1.2103 
MINECLEARANCE KOSOVO - 0.24561 EMERGENCY: RAILWAY MANAGEMENT 
SUPPORT - 1.4509 
REFUGEES UNHCR - 1.2583 EMERGENCY AID: RECONSTRUCTION 
KOSOVO - 1.4039 
RAILWAY KOSOVO - 0.8733 ENVIRONMENT REMEDIATION PANCEVO - 
0.9672 
 
 
EMERGENCY AID: ICRC APPEAL - 1.8154 DISTRIBUTION FERIZKOSOVO - 2.8382 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.6770 
 EMERGENCY AID: FARM MECHANICS, 
KOSOVO - 1.2103 
EMERGENCY SUPPORT SERBIA - 2.1832 DOW; TB PROGRAM YEAR 3 - 0.2340 
 
 
EMERGENCY AID: BASIC NEEDS - 1.7670 UNICEF - 1.0916  
 
 
 OSCE MISSION IN KOSOVO - 4.4215  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
24 ibid 
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Table 330: Switzerland to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
199825
 
199926
 
200027
 
200128
 
2002 
 
200329
 
200430
 
(8.1)  (6.6) 
 
(74.4)  (58.5) 
 
(37.3)  (26.4) 
 
(17.5)  (12.5) 
 
(7.4)  (5.8) 
 
(14.7)  (13.4) 
 
(9.3)  (9.2) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 0.3793 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 3.3273 
DEPLETED URANIUM 
[UNEP ASSES.] - 
0.5035 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 1.5572 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 0.3128 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 0.35687 
HOUSING OFFICE 
BELGRAD, OVERHEAD 
- 0.7435 
EMERGENCY 
AID:ALBANIA & 
KOSOVO - 0.6897 
KOSOVAR REFUGEES- 
3.3273 
EMERGENCY AID: 
DEMINING - 1.0664 
BRJ:KOSOVO 
HOUSING 
RECONSTRUCTION - 
1.6598 
SHELTER PROGRAMME 
- 0.5100 
WOMEN BUSINESS 
DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT - 0.5204 
KOSOVO, VOCATIONAL 
EDUCATION SUPPORT 
- 0.820 
AID TO REFUGEES (IN 
RECIP. COUNTRY) - 
0.6897 
CASH FOR SHELTER- 
1.919 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF- 1.777 
BRJ:KOSOVO 
RECONSTRUCTION OF 
SCHOOL - 1.4820 
KOSOVO HOUSING 
FOR MINORITIES - 
0.6423 
 SERBIA: PANCEVO, 
SOCIAL HOUSING - 
0.42649 
 SDR-OFFICE PRISTINA, 
KOSOVO - 1.448 
EMERGENCY AID: 
HOUSING SOCIAL 
CASES - 2.843 
BRJ:KOSOVO 
CONSTRUCTION OF 
BRIDGES - 0.592 
MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAMME - 0.5267 
 SERBIA: KRALJEVO, 
SOCIAL HOUSING - 
0.42649 
 KOSOVO SHELTER 
KITS - 4.2590 
EMERGENCY AID: 
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
- 1.7773 
KOSOVO FRY - 
DEMINING MIT 
EMERCOM - 0.8892 
WFP - 0.8350  KOSOVO / CO-OF / 
MENTAL HEALTH HA - 
0.8449 
 REFUGEES RETURN 
KOSOVO - 3.3273 
     
 MILK PRODUCTS: 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID 
- 0.456511612430958 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
26 ibid 
27 ibid 
28 ibid 
29 ibid 
30 ibid 
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Table 331: UK to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1998 
 
199931
 
200032
 
(4.5)  (3.3) 
 
(136.8)  (101.6) 
 
(77.5)  (54.5) 
APPEAL FOR KOSOVO - 3.3134 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.3263 TRUST FUND: EMERGENCY - 3.4362 
 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 33.9750 KOSOVO MGMT OFFICE: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 10.5964 
 
 
UNICEF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE - 3.2357 PRISTINA UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL: EMERGENCY - 3.0154 
 ISLAMIC RELIEF TENTS: REFUGEES- 1.5487 PROTEC. HUMANIT. ASS. TO RETURNEES & INTERN. 
DISPLACED PERSONS – KOSOVO - 4.2385 
 
 
PRISTINA UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL: EMERG. - 12.9170 ICRC APPEAL: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 3.7844 
 KOSOVO MGMT OFFICE: EMERGENCY RELIEF - 17.7964 CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY APPEAL: EMERGENCY 
RELIEF - 3.7844 
 PRISTINA AIRPORT: EMERGENCY/DISTRESS - 4.8535 CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS UNMIK BUDGET: EMERGENCY 
RELIEF - 3.7844 
 KOSOVO HEALTH ASSIST PROG: EMERGENCY - 5.1690 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS APPEAL 
- 3.0275 
 
 
 WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME APPEAL - 2.319 
 
 
 UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND APPEAL-  1.5137 
 
 
 EMERGENCY SUPPLY OF FIREWOOD - 0.7568 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
32 ibid 
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Table 332: US to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
200333
 
200434
 
2005 
 
(581.3)  (488.1) 
 
(68.7)  (59.0) 
 
(12.0)  (10.5) 
 
(11.9)  (10.6) 
 
(11.9)  (10.9) 
 
(8.0)  (7.6) 
 
(4.0)  (3.8) 
STATE - EMERGENCY 
REFUGEE & 
MIGRATION – 165.0 
INTERNATIONAL 
DISASTER 
ASSISTANCE - 22.392 
DISASTER RELIEF 
ASSISTANCE - 
COMPLEX EMERGENCY 
- 3.753 
BILATERAL 
EMERGENCY REFUGEE 
ASSISTANCE 
THROUGH NGOS/PVOS 
- 3.227 
INTERNATIONAL 
CATHOLIC MIGRATION 
COMMISSION - 2.5 
POPULATION 
REFUGEES AND 
MIGRATION PROJECT - 
2.75 
SUSTAINABLE RETURN 
TO NEEDY IDPS - 1.73 
STATE - MIGRATION & 
REFUGEES – ABROAD- 
266.0 
EMERGENCY FOOD 
AID: COMMODITY - 
15.513 
HUMANITARIAN 
COMMUNITY SERVICES 
AND FACILITIES-  6.79 
BILATERAL 
EMERGENCY REFUGEE 
ASSISTANCE 
THROUGH NGOS/PVOS 
- 5.33 
AMERICAN REFUGEE 
COMMITTEE - 1.875 
  
FOOD AID - 
EMERGENCY – 
FREIGHT - 22.8 
EMERGENCY FOOD 
AID: FREIGHT - 21.071 
  UNITED METHODIST 
COMMITTEE ON 
RELIEF- 1.6 
  
FOOD AID - 
EMERGENCY – 
COMMODITY - 34.1 
   MERCY CORPS - 1.299   
 
 
 
Table 333: US to FRY/Serbia  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2001 
 
(5.3)  (4.6) 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF: SPECIAL PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS - 4.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
34ibid 
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Table 334: EC to FRY/Serbia  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2005 
 
(26.4)  (20.2) 
 
(14.7)  (1.3) 
 
(187.5)  (121.1) 
 
(69.5)  (44.7) 
 
(40.9)  (28.4) 
 
(10.2)  (8.7) 
 
(24.4)  (23.7) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 19.71 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 11.27 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 121.12 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 36.29 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 21.942 
ECHO - EMERGENCY 
RELIEF - 5.869 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 6.2142 
   EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 5.989 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID 
- 6.1888 
 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS 
RELIEF - 15.5356 
 
 
 
Table 335: EC to FRY/Serbia   
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
(179.9)  (124.9) 
ANNUAL PROGRAMMES 2002 FOR SERBIA - ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND REFORM - 124.870 
 
 
 
 
Table 336: France to ex Yu  
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2005 
 
(2.5)  (2.4) 
AIDE D'URGENCE - 2.39 
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Table 337: Germany to ex Yu 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
(20.5)  (14.1) 
EMERGENCY COMMODITY AID: ELECTRICITY & SPARE PARTS IMPORTS - 14.1356 
 
 
 
Table 338: Italy to ex Yu 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
(9.1)  (5.7) 
 
(2.4)  (1.5) 
CONTRIBUTION TO UNDP PROGRAMME IN FAVOUR OF SERBIAN WAR VICTIMES - 0.9519 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL RECLAMATION - CONTRIBUTION TO UNDP - 0.3237 
EMERGENCY PROGRAMME - SERBIAN POPULATION - 4.5216 
 
HEALTH ASSISTANCE - CONTRIBUTION TO WHO - 0.3237 
 
 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE- CONTRIBUTION TO UNDP - 0.6937 
 
 
Table 339: Japan to ex Yu 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
199835
 
199936
 
(5.7)  (5.6) 
 
(28.3)  (31.8) 
EMERGENCY DISASTER RELIEF - 2.7043 
 
EMERGENCY DISASTER RELIEF - 3.5820 
 
 
EMERGENCY DISASTER RELIEF - 8.5338 
                                                 
35 Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
36 ibid 
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Table 340: Netherlands to ex Yu 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
(35.9)  (29.9) 
AID TO REFUGEES THROUGH ICRC- 6.229 
 
AID TO REFUGEES THROUGH UNHCR - 4.983 
 
AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 6.229 
 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 8.7460 
 
 
 
 
Table 341: Netherlands to ex Yu  
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
(9.3)  (7.8) 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF - 4.9834 
 
RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF- 1.8688 
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Table 342: Norway to ex Yu 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
199537
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1999 
 
(106.5)  (64.9) 
 
(92.7)  (57.8) 
 
(8.7)  (5.1) 
 
(8.6)  (4.8) 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 4.521 HUMANITARIAN AID - 55.2383 HUMANITARIAN AID - 5.0692 AID TO REFUGEES (IN RECIP. COUNTRY) - 
4.8096 
 
HUMANITARIAN AID - 43.445 
EMERGENCY FOOD AID - 2.5744   
 
 
Table 343: Norway to ex Yu 
 
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation;  Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
(2.5)  (1.6) 
 
(3.0)  (2.2) 
SHELTER ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES - 0.8139 
 
UNMIK/UNDP RAPID RESPONSE FACILITY - 1.6491 
 
Table 344: Sweden to ex Yu 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
(15.4)  (13.8) 
 
(11.2)  (10.8) 
 
(5.6)  (4.8) 
UNHCR: DHA APPEAL MAY 95 - 8.410 UNHCR: DHA APPEAL MARCH 96 - 6.7093 CONTINUED HUMANITARIAN ASSIST TO EX JUGOSLAVIA - 
3.9294 
WHO: DHA APPEAL MAY 95 - 1.331 
 
EMERGENCY:WHO DHA APPEAL MARCH96 - 2.2364 EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.654 
IFRC ADDITIONAL REFUGEE APPEALS - 0.84109 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 0.8945  
UNHCR: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE - 1.822 
 
  
 
                                                 
37Due to the generic character of the description and/or extensive repetition of the same or few descriptions, the selection has included only the 
major and/or most representative ones.  
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Table 345: Switzerland to ex Yu 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
(2.5)  (2.5) 
 
(9.7)  (6.9) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 2.4811 
 
EMERGENCY AID: HOUSING SOCIAL CASES - 2.3698 
 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 3.5547 
 
 
Table 346: UK to ex Yu 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
(60.2)  (39.0) 
 
(104.8)  (69.5) 
 
(69.8)  (50.0) 
OTHER EMERGENCY AND DISTRESS RELIEF - 39.02 
 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 69.48 EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE - 50.01 
 
 
Table 347: EC to ex YU 
 
Emergency Response; Major years and allocations; USD 2006 constant (left) and USD current (right) millions; CRS 
 
1996 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
(242.0)  (204.3) 
 
(295.9)  (217.9) 
 
(73.2)  (47.3) 
 
(71.8)  (46.2) 
 
(60.4)  (41.9) 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
204.27 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
217.91 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
47.26 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
46.18 
EMERGENCY/DISTRESS RELIEF - 
41.91 
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